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Throughout the early years of the Second World War no official better 
expressed the U.S. desire to reconfigure international politics than Sumner 
Welles. He had known Franklin Roosevelt since childhood, and entered the 
diplomatic corps, with Roosevelt's assistance, just prior to American entry into 
World War One. During the early years of Roosevelt's presidency, Welles 
served as ambassador to Cuba and assistant secretary of state for Latin America, 
helping to design the Good Neighbor policy, which he believed essential to his 
aim of politically and economically integrating Latin America under U.S. 
hegemony. As under secretary after 1937 Welles became Roosevelt's closest 
foreign affairs adviser. His 1937 peace program, also known as the Welles plan, 
represented one of America's most significant international endeavors of the 
decade, while his 1940 mission to Europe, where he met with Hitler and 
Mussolini, was Roosevelt's most serious attempt to achieve a negotiated 
solution to the war. In August of 1941, at the peak of his influence, Welles 
helped draft the Atlantic Charter, which he sought to define as a declaration 
extending the Four Freedoms to the entire world.
Welles's most significant contribution to American diplomacy came after 
U.S. entry in the war, when he led the administration's postwar planning 
program. He dominated efforts to design a new world order, evaluating 
America's burgeoning interests around the world. He helped shape relations 
with the exile governments and sought to design detailed plans for the postwar 
reconstruction of Italy, Japan and Germany. He led the effort to create a new 
world organization, which he hoped would feature regional bodies and a 
military component to promote collective security. He sought to provide a 
response to the increasing nationalism in colonial areas, and promoted an 
elaborate system of international trusteeship to aid in the transition toward 
independence. He also shaped U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and sought 
to create an East European federation to protect the nations of the region from 
the future ambitions of U.S.S.R.
Paying particular attention to Welles's leadership of postwar planning, 
this account utilizes the recently opened Sumner Welles papers, along with the 
state department's extensive postwar planning records, to present an analysis of 
Welles's unique contribution to U.S. postwar planning during the Second 
World War.
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INTRODUCTION
In the middle of August 1941, less than four months before 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Sumner Welles stood at the pinnacle 
of a remarkable diplomatic career. He had just helped draft the 
Atlantic Charter, which he hoped would define America's entry 
into the war as a crusade for a new world order replacing the 
militarism, colonialism, spheres of influence and balance of 
power he believed had characterized the past. He had recently 
delivered a stirring address before hundreds of Washington 
dignitaries at the site of the future Norwegian Legation, 
offering a thorough exposition of America's war aims, and 
pledging the United States to restore liberty to those nations 
subjugated in the war. A Time cover story on Welles's address 
called him the "chief administrative officer of U.S. foreign 
policy," hinting that his elevation to secretary of state was a 
mere formality, while a feature profile in the New York Times 
predicted that his views would dominate America's efforts to 
win the peace.i
Welles was a formidable force in wartime Washington, due 
to his intimate ties to President Roosevelt and the First Lady, 
his alliances with some of the most powerful members of 
Congress, his support in the press corps and the public at 
large and his role as the administration's chief public 
spokesman on foreign affairs. In short, he was one of the most 
important officials in Washington, a man whose vision of what 
the U.S. would become after the war made him a key figure in 
America's wartime transformation from a major power to a 
superpower, an architect of the coming "American Century." But, 
as events would reveal, he was also a figure of immense 
contradictions, a deeply troubled man who wore different faces 
for different occasions and different people. His relationships 
with others, as well as his career, would suffer for it.
"Your name will be written large in the record of these 
times when history is able to assess the great constructive 
work you have performed," former U.S. Ambassador to Japan
1 Time. August 8,1941; New York Times Magazine. August 2,1941.
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Joseph Grew predicted in a wartime letter to Welles. Indeed, 
when Welles died in 1961 his eulogists praised his long career, 
but one would hardly have surmised from such accounts that he 
had once influenced his generation like few public officials 
before or since. President Kennedy wrote upon Welles's death 
that "his career will have an enduring place in the history of 
American diplomacy and public life," and an editorial in the 
New York Times added that "few Americans were better known or 
more highly regarded in the chanceries of the world than he. 
There is no fear that he will be forgotten, for he made his 
mark on the history of the twentieth century. "2 But rarely have 
such prophecies been proven so false so soon, as this once 
dynamic public figure faded from memory within only a few 
years.
In the years since his death his role in wartime diplomacy 
had been diminished, in large part due to the lurid nature of 
the real reasons behind his abrupt resignation in August 1943. 
At the time, many assumed that Welles had resigned due to 
longtime differences with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The 
real causes of Welles' s demise were much more complex and 
controversial, however, and involved more than Welles's rivalry 
with Hull, or, as some charged, a conservative conspiracy to 
purge progressives and New Dealers.
During the early years of the war, numerous stories 
circulated about Welles's conduct on a train returning from the 
Alabama funeral of Speaker of the House William Bankhead in 
September 1940. According to most accounts, an intoxicated 
Welles propositioned several black male porters whom he had 
summoned to his private compartment. On a second train trip 
later that month Welles allegedly solicited porters on a train 
bound for Cleveland.3 The secret service warned President 
Roosevelt that the railroad company was considering legal 
action. Homosexuality was still grounds for criminal
2 Joseph C. Grew to Sumner Welles, September 21, 1943, box 94, folder 5, Welles papers, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library [FDRL]; John F. Kennedy to Harriette Welles, September 25,1961, box 22, folder 5, Welles 
papers, FDRL; New York Times. September 25,1961.
3 A detailed account of the scandal can be found in a  recent biography of Sumner Welles by his son. See 
Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist (New York: S t Martin's Press, 1997), 1-3, 342-346. 
Another useful account is Irwin F. Gellman. Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt. Cordell Hull and Sumner Welle s  
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 219-220, 237-238.
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prosecution in the 1940s and many assumed it would make an
official of Welles's standing susceptible to blackmail, 
particularly in wartime. Shortly after the first train 
incident, one porter filed a formal complaint with his
employer, the Southern Railway Company, which had its
headquarters in Philadelphia, home of William C. Bullitt, 
Roosevelt’s ambassador to Moscow and Paris, and a longtime 
rival of Welles for the president's favor. When Bullitt learned 
of the indiscretion he realized at once that he possessed a 
weapon of sufficient strength to destroy Welles.4
President Roosevelt, with the aid of FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover, orchestrated a three-year cover-up to protect Welles. 
But Bullitt and Hull pushed to bring the allegations to the
attention of the press and Congress and, by the summer of 1943,
they succeeded when revelations about Welles's conduct became 
known to the senate foreign relations committee. Welles
abruptly retired, declining Roosevelt's suggestion that he 
become a special envoy to Moscow. Although only fifty years 
old, it was clear to almost everyone that his career was over.
*  * *
Welles was a more interesting figure, even with all his
flaws, than the selfless public servant or hapless victim who
has been portrayed elsewhere in the drama of World War II 
accounts. To many, Welles had been a model statesmans 
intelligent, articulate and knowledgeable about his department 
and the world. Tall, at six feet three inches, erect in 
bearing, and attired in London-made hand-tailored suits which 
he often changed several times a day, with his neatly clipped 
mustache and ivory-handled walking stick, he seemed the epitome 
of the "striped pants" stereotype of the diplomatic corps. 
James Reston, the chief Washington correspondent of the New 
York Times, thought Welles "has enough dignity to be Viceroy of 
India, and, what is more important, enough influence in this
4 Orville H. Bullitt ed .. For the President: Personal and S ecret Correspondence Between Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972) 511-518; Adolf A. Berle Diary, September 1, 
1943. box 215, Adolf A. Berle Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Breckinridge Long Diary, August 29, 
1943, box 5, the Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; Athan Theoharis, *L 
Edgar Hoover. Sex, and Crime: An Historical Antidote (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1995), 32.
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critical era to make his ideas, principles and dreams count." 
But, Res ton added, "No man in public life in this century has 
been judged so often or so inaccurately . . .  by external 
appearances."6
To others, Welles could be aloof, snobbish, uncompromising 
and elitist. Fluent in several languages, the Washington press 
corps joked that he could hold his tongue in Spanish, French, 
German or Italian. "Someone has said he is the nearest thing to 
a ruling-class Englishman the United States produces," a 
British magazine claimed in 1940, "he has more than his share 
of that uncompromising reticence so popular in official circles 
here." Harold Ickes characterized Welles as "a man of almost 
preternatural solemnity and great dignity. If he ever smiles, 
it has not been in my presence. He conducts himself with 
portentous gravity as if he were charged with all the 
responsibilities of Atlas. Just to look at him one can tell 
that the world would dissolve into its component parts if only 
a portion of the weighty state secrets that he carries about 
were divulged." But Welles had more than his share of human 
frailties which, coupled with his certitude, elitism and 
arrogance, contributed to his downfall. Shrouded in a self- 
protective armor of privilege and rigid manners, little of 
Welles's emotion ever escaped. Dean Acheson, who had known 
Welles since their boyhood days at Groton, recalled that
Welles's "manner was formal to the point of stiffness. His
voice, pitched much lower than would seem natural, though it 
had been so since he was a boy, lent a suggestion of
pomposity." He often concealed himself behind an exaggerated 
fastidiousness and propriety. Once, when a remark of Alice 
Acheson made Welles laugh, he abruptly caught himself short: 
"Pardon me," Welles said, embarrassed, "You amused me."
Washington newspapermen never quite knew what to make of Welles 
and thus referred to him as "Mr. Icicle."6
Welles began his diplomatic career during the First World 
War and had been enthused by President Wilson's pronouncements
5 New York Times MagaTine. August 2, 1941.
6 Time. February 19, 1940; Picture Post. March 9, 1940; Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes: The 
Inside Struggle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 351; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years  
in the State Department (New York: W.W.Norton, 1969), 12.
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about reordering world politics. Early in his career Welles 
became a proponent of the view that the United States should 
use its vast power to achieve a sense of order or equilibrium 
on a world scale to pursue outcomes consistent with U.S. 
interests. He had known Franklin Roosevelt since childhood and 
became a friend and adviser to the future president in the 
1920s. During this time Welles came to understand the 
importance of free trade to what had become the world' s most 
powerful economy, foreseeing America's growing influence in 
world affairs. He assumed that the removal of restraints on 
international trade would increase prosperity and make future 
wars unnecessary. Welles faced his earliest foreign relations 
challenges in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine served as his 
secular religion and he became an early proponent of securing 
better relations with the other American republics as a way of 
promoting greater regional economic integration. In the 1920s 
he not only articulated a vision of what he called the 
"American system," which formed the basic outlines of what 
would later become the Good Neighbor Policy, but he also 
concluded that before the United States could become the 
foremost power in the world it would first have to secure its 
leadership of the western hemisphere. He sought to realize 
these vague aims after Roosevelt named him assistant secretary 
for Latin America in 1933. After a few false starts he took the 
lead in promoting economic integration and political unity in 
the hemisphere. His appointment as under secretary in 1937 
placed him in a position to push for U.S. leadership in the 
world beyond the Americas, as he spearheaded the 
administration's efforts to play a more active role in global 
affairs.
More important than his diplomatic efforts prior to U.S. 
entry into the war was his work toward shaping the postwar 
order. Welles feared that the world powers might achieve a 
settlement contrary to U.S. interests. Thus, even before the 
United States entered the war, Welles emerged as the 
administration's strongest voice advocating a U.S.-led 
international order founded on a new world organization. Prior 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor he publicly called for the United
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States to lead the way toward a future where the world1 s 
markets would be free, trade barriers nonexistent and 
colonialism and economic nationalism unnecessary. He played a 
leading role in drafting the Atlantic Charter and sought to 
include passages further reducing global trade barriers, 
expanding the meaning of self-determination to cover the 
colonial empires and pledging U.S. participation in an 
international organization.
Welles wished to bring about a new world order based upon 
free markets and republican institutions, buttressed by 
American power. While heading the state department's postwar 
planning committees entrusted with the task of designing the 
foundations of the new order, Welles would translate these 
vague goals and aims into a plan of action. He envisioned how 
trade and the distribution of aid would be essential to 
American prosperity in the postwar era. He became sharply 
attuned to the needs of a national economy he believed was 
destined to dominate the global marketplace, and he assumed 
that American prosperity in the postwar era would depend upon 
foreign markets and a world reformed along the lines of 
democratic capitalism. He oversaw plans to design the United 
Nations and advocated a "soft peace" toward the defeated Axis 
powers. He desired the withering away of the world's colonial 
empires and wished to put U.S. relations with Moscow on a more 
permanent footing that might endure after the war. He sought to 
avoid simply reviving the old League of Nations by instead 
building the new world organization upon a series of smaller 
regional leagues and by providing it with a strong military 
capability and an extensive system of trusteeship for colonial 
areas.7
Unlike many of the president's other foreign affairs 
advisers, Welles considered himself more than a mere executor 
of Roosevelt's will. An examination of Welles's career 
challenges the long-accepted view that Roosevelt served as his 
own secretary of state. That title, at least unofficially, 
would seem to belong more properly to Welles. Furthermore, a
7 "An Association of Nations," by Sumner Welles, July 22, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles 
papers, FDRL; "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," by Sumner Welles, November 11,1941, speech files, box 195, 
folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL
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closer look at Welles' s world view allows us a better 
understanding of Roosevelt's foreign policy, for it has been 
long acknowledged that Welles understood Roosevelt's true aims 
just about as well as any one could. Of all those whom 
Roosevelt consulted on international matters, only Welles 
consistently sought to provide a broader justification for 
America's war effort. Welles often introduced themes and ideas 
that the president and Hull were not yet prepared publicly to 
advance themselves. He championed the most advanced universal 
and liberal goals of the administration, thus making him a 
favorite of many progressives and intellectuals.
But can we accept Welles's utterances at face value? Or 
did he merely seek to camouflage his real aims behind an 
idealistic smokescreen? While Welles was a self-professed 
internationalist, his vision of a postwar world sought to 
promote largely national definitions of security through 
international means, and his promotion of idealistic principles 
such as liberal democracy and self-determination perhaps owed 
more to calculations of America's national interests than to 
high ideals or selfless altruism. While an idealist in his 
public pronouncements, he sought to promote the more specific 
needs of America's expanding economy and strategic interests.
He had calculated that the war effort would be better 
sustained by moral arguments than by appeals to self-interest. 
While he understood that his envisioned new world order would 
allow American commerce to flourish alongside universal ideals 
and values, he used idealistic rhetoric because he assumed the 
American people would more willingly sacrifice for ideals they 
believed consistent with their deepest moral, religious and 
political convictions.s He thus offered broader ideals than 
free trade or a mere resurrection of the balance of power, and 
foresaw the United States taking the lead in building a new 
order based on universal principles, but at the same time 
compatible with its national interests. The quasi-religious 
overtones of Welles's wartime utterances made many of his 
public addresses sound like sermons, giving an aura of 
spiritual and moral zeal to what otherwise might have sounded
8 Welles to Archibald MacLeish, August 13,1942, box 81, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL
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like nothing more than a call to American nationalism. Such 
pronouncements sought to give America’s interests a larger 
moral justification. Thus to many it seemed that Roosevelt had 
given Welles the task of defining why Americans fought and 
preparing the country for its preeminent role in the peace.9
His world view did not look backward to a time-honored 
neutrality but forward to a world ”reformed” through American 
guidance. He saw the Second World War as a revolutionary event 
that would transform the United States into a superpower, while 
U.S. participation in the war would begin the gradual process 
of remaking the world in America's image. Welles assumed that 
the promotion of American values and free enterprise would best 
advance the national security of the United States and that a 
stable and capitalist world order would ultimately best promote 
American interests abroad. He assumed that a world made safe 
for democracy and free trade would simultaneously advance the 
material interests and security needs of the United States.
Welles lent intellectual firepower to America's war aims, 
but his idealistic rhetoric was often in conflict with his 
passion for order, which also found personal expression in his 
impeccable attire, precise manners and cold demeanor. His stern 
moral standards, rooted in the Victorian values of his youth, 
never wavered in public. But within his cold exterior was a 
deeply troubled man who could drink himself into blackouts; a 
man with a rigid and tightly-controlled personality who 
struggled to contain his sexual feelings toward both men and 
women, often hiding his behavior behind a monumental snobbery.
Welles's world view was as complex as his personality. His 
idealistic pronouncements about freedom, self-determination and 
radical change belied his fear of revolution, upheaval and 
chaos. He distinguished himself during the war by embracing 
such radical concepts as a "people's war," "world revolution," 
"a new world order," while opposing the "status quo" and the 
"old unsteady balance of power." But, in actuality, he abhorred
9 "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, May 30,1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles 
papers, FDRL; Robert Sherwood to Welles, June 25, 1942, box 83, folder 11, Welles papers, FDRL. Not 
everyone was so convinced of Welles's idealism. "Welles is no radical," wrote the esteem ed journalist and 
social critic I.F. Stone, "he is only occasionally liberal. His outlook is about that of a  sensible business man who 
prefers a  shrewd adjustment of realities to butting his head against a  stone wall." See the Nation. September 4, 
1943.
11
revolution and upheaval and much preferred order, structure and 
equilibrium, as demonstrated by his dogged advocacy of large- 
scale global planning, worldwide institutions and permanently 
fixed international laws and standards. He had a fondness and 
enthusiasm for structure and systematic planning, once telling 
an audience that stability, security and peace could be 
guaranteed only if constructed upon the foundations of 
corporatist consensus, detailed study, scientific truth and 
international law. In the midst of wartime chaos, Welles 
believed his ideals would not flourish without first restoring 
order, and while he attacked much of "status quo" during the 
war, he never reconciled himself to the dilemma that rigidly 
maintaining stability would ultimately make it more difficult 
to overthrow the old order.
Narrow self interest, combined with the utopian ideals, 
mixed freely to shape Welles's world view. Often, Welles sought 
to disguise a ruthless pursuit of his own ends under the cloak 
of idealism. Like Wilson, Welles's idealistic rhetoric often 
masked a crusading internationalism that sought to reshape the 
world in America's image. Wilson's self-professed idealism 
often concealed a blunt unilateral pursuit of narrowly defined 
interests. While Welles frequently spoke about self- 
determination, democracy and independence, he placed stability 
and order on a much higher plane. His public pronouncements 
about national self-determination in the colonial world, for 
example, stood in contrast to his desire that a US-designed and 
US-guided system of international trusteeship would carefully 
manage incremental steps toward independence. In some areas, 
Welles conceded, his system of trusteeship might endure for a 
thousand years. Furthermore, despite his oratory about freedom 
and individual rights, he supported and worked closely with 
authoritarian regimes, readily accepting them so long as they 
did not interfere with American interests. Additionally, he 
spoke of reordering the politics of regions such as the Middle 
East and Eastern Europe, but he desired a return to the 
stability and unity of the Ottoman Empire in the former, and 
flirted with notions of bringing back the Habsburgs for the 
latter.
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There were other paradoxes. Welles claimed he opposed 
spheres of influence, but his regional approach to world 
organization seemed to be a tacit acceptance that spheres would 
inevitably develop. In fact, regionalism was essentially a 
spheres of influence scheme under a different name. In 
addition, while he never hesitated to use religious symbolism 
and analogies in his public comments, he seemed to have few 
religious convictions himself and rarely expressed his views on 
his faith and, while he often expressed his abstract belief in 
the progress of mankind, he essentially distrusted most men. 
Furthermore, he claimed a moral abhorrence of colonialism, but 
he sought to create an informal U.S. empire in the Americas, 
and his "enlightened paternalism" toward certain diplomatic 
officials could be patronizingly similar to the demeanor of 
some European imperial officials. He publicly championed a 
universalist vision of equal opportunity but sought to tell the 
whole world how to arrange its affairs and privately admitted 
that he thought "the Negroes are in the lowest rank of human 
beings"io and that "the colored races" were generally "unfit for 
self-government ... "n
An Anglophile by background, style and temperament, Welles 
had a strong sense of personal, cultural and political kinship 
with Great Britain. Yet he distrusted the sincerity of the
Churchill government, frequently became enraged with British 
officials, sought ways to undermine London's political aims and 
deliberately shaped and pursued policies that led to the
diminishment of British power and influence throughout the
world. In addition, Welles had a strong distrust of communism, 
stemming partly from his years working with right-wing Latin 
American regimes and his friendships with wealthy Latin 
Americans, but perhaps also due to his upbringing and class 
outlook. Yet during the war he pragmatically promoted closer
relations with Moscow and helped cement the Grand Alliance,
10 Welles privately shared his generation's condescension toward "lesser races" and was unsure that all 
peoples were fit for self-government. For Welles's comments see  Political Subcommittee minutes 27, October 
3,1942, box 54, Harley Notter files, Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter referred to as "P minutes"). 
[All planning documents and planning minutes are from the Harley Notter files, National Archives, Record Group 
59, unless otherwise noted].
11 See P minutes 34, November 21, 1942, a s  well a s  the minutes of Welles's subcommittee on international 
organization, referred to a s  PIO minutes 10, October 9,1942, box 85, Notter files.
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which he hoped would outlast the war.
Welles's chief interest would always be postwar planning. 
More than anyone else in Washington, Welles seemed to be more 
concerned about long-term U.S. interests than the day-to-day 
realities of the war. Even before the U.S. entry into the war, 
Welles focused not so much on routine events but on the 
opportunities that a postwar peace afforded U.S. interests. He 
foresaw America's huge accumulation of power and anticipated 
that the dislocation and upheaval of the conflict would 
facilitate America's rise to global leadership, where the world 
would consent to a benevolent American hegemony. But he deluded 
himself that American predominance would be different from what 
had come before. Welles assumed that unlike previous attempts 
at world power the American empire would eschew crude military 
intervention and instead rely on economic power such as aid and 
trade, as well as political and moral guidance. His vision of a 
new world order rested upon the belief that the very fact of 
U.S. power would automatically bring about a sort of 
Americanization of the world based on order, international 
cooperation and free trade.
Welles significantly shaped America's postwar course and 
much of his legacy continued to guide American foreign policy 
long after his departure. He saw the war as an opportunity to 
achieve order abroad and embraced the illusion that the world 
at large would enthusiastically embrace American ideals. 
Welles, like Woodrow Wilson before him, never understood that 
American values, ideals and institutions were not necessarily 
exportable and, throughout the war, Welles would repeatedly 
confront the difficult truth that despite America's vast new 
power U.S. officials would be consistently thwarted in seeking 
to create their new world order. Ultimately, Welles would 
discover that Washington could do little to transform the world 
in its own image and would instead suffer great frustration in 
any attempt to do so.
* * *
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Making of a Wilsonian Internationalists 
Early Life and Career, 1892-1937
During Sumner Welles's long diplomatic career, he saw the 
state department grow from a small operation, with its cramped 
offices adjoining the White House, into a large bureaucracy 
with thousands of employees and a spacious headquarters in
Foggy Bottom. The department's growth during his lifetime 
mirrored America's growing power in the world, as U.S. foreign 
policy evolved from the less extensive preoccupations of his 
early career, where the U.S. sought to project its power 
regionally, to visions of an American-guided world order in the 
1940s, where America began to engage the entire world.
Welles saw these changes starkly reflected throughout his 
lifetime. Born in New York City on October 14, 1892 to a
wealthy and well-established family, Benjamin Sumner Welles 
entered an America which was vastly different from the one he
would come to know as an adult. In the year of his birth the
major European countries elevated their legations in Washington 
to the status of embassies, a move confirming America's growing 
status and power in the world, while the most recent census had 
declared the American frontier closed, spurring the quest for 
new overseas markets and even colonies. Furthermore, the United 
States of Welles’s birth was a country on the verge of becoming 
something it had not been before: a great industrialized world 
power. In the wake of massive unemployment, strikes, labor 
violence, rural dislocation and economic uncertainty, many of 
Welles's generation would come of age with a sense that the 
search for order and the absence of upheaval were necessary to 
restore some sense of equilibrium to American life. Welles, 
like Wilson, would go further by extending the search for 
stability to international politics by seeking to achieve order 
on a global scale.i
1 The New York Times. October 14,1892. For an account of America's expanding economic and political power 
during this period see  Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. 1860-1898 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963). For the relationship between the domestic search for order during this 
period and foreign relations see  the chapter 'The Emergence of Foreign Policy" in Robert Wiebe's The Search 
for Order. 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 224-255.
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Sumner Welles could trace his lineage to the founding of 
the American colonies. The Welles family were prominent in New 
York City society and throughout his later career Sumner would 
reap rich rewards from his close relationship with other 
established New York families, such as the Oyster Bay branch of 
the Roosevelts. The Welles association with the Roosevelts went 
back many years. Sumner's mother and Eleanor Roosevelt's mother 
were good friends and Sumner and Eleanor shared a godmother. In 
1905 the twelve-year-old Sumner attended Franklin and Eleanor's 
wedding, where he carried the bride's train as she walked down 
the aisle on the arm of her uncle Theodore. The Roosevelt 
connection was also important symbolically, for Welles's 
contemporaries would be challenged by the example of Theodore 
Roosevelt's commitment to public service. Teddy Roosevelt 
entered politics at a time when many members of the American 
upper classes thought public life beneath them. He sought to 
make public service seem respectable, even noble.2
Welles was a sickly child, dominated by his mother 
throughout his early years. Contemporaries would later joke 
that the fastidious Sumner wore white gloves as a child at 
play. Nonetheless, his upbringing within the cloistered and 
pampered world of the New York wealthy contributed to shaping 
his political outlook and world view, instilling in him an 
almost Messianic belief in America's destiny, but also possibly 
contributing to his feelings of superiority over others and his 
inability to relate well with those from different 
backgrounds.3 Like the Roosevelts, the Welles family made 
regular trips to Europe, where young Sumner formed opinions and 
impressions about many of the countries he would be involved 
with during his diplomatic career. Following in the footsteps 
of Franklin Roosevelt, Welles attended Groton School in 
Massachusetts at a time when the student body included Averell 
Harriman, Dean Acheson and Eleanor Roosevelt's brother, Hall, 
who became Welles's roommate. Groton served the American
2 "Welles Family Genealogy," box 7, folders 6-7, Welles papers, FDRL; "Sumner Welles: Diplomat de luxe," by 
Fred Rodell, American Mercury. November 1945; John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow 
Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1983), 11.
3 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Welles to 
Bailey, March 8,1948, box 129, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise 
Men: Six Friends and 1he World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
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establishment as Eton or Harrow did in England. The school was 
incredibly inbred, as eventually more than half the student 
body would be the sons of alumni, with both Welles and Franklin 
Roosevelt sending their sons there. Like Franklin Roosevelt 
before him, Welles fell under the tutelage of headmaster 
Endicott Peabody, a stern New Englander who was educated in 
England at Cheltenham and Trinity College, Cambridge. Peabody 
modeled Groton after Cheltenham, arranging the students in 
British-style "forms" rather than American "grades" and 
favoring British spellings over American. Student hierarchies 
were enforced by strict hazing rituals and various other 
tortures of which Peabody approved, believing they contributed 
to the development of "manly Christian character." Welles, 
inept at sports and unpopular with his classmates due to his 
sarcasm and cold personality, fell short of Peabody's ideal. 
But Groton nonetheless left a mark. Peabody told successive 
generations of Grotonians that public service was a high and 
noble calling, and many Grotonians would later acknowledge the 
school's profound influence on their careers. Franklin 
Roosevelt called Peabody the "biggest influence on my life," 
and Welles once told Peabody, "If I ever achieve anything in 
this world, even amount to anything, and I mean to, it will be 
due very greatly to you."4
Taking Peabody's advice, Welles went off to Harvard in 
1 9 1 0 , again following the path of Franklin Roosevelt who had 
graduated in 1 9 0 4 . By his own admission, his years at Harvard 
were not happy. He spent much of his time drinking heavily, 
frequenting brothels, and developing a reputation for reckless 
behavior. He was unpopular. No clubs desired his company, he 
played no sports and was rejected by the Harvard Crimson. He 
left little impression, not even bothering to appear for his 
photograph for the Harvard Annual. His classmates remembered 
him, if at all, for his Brooks Brothers suits, stickpin, stiff 
collar and aloof demeanor.s In 1 9 1 3 , contemplating dropping out 
of Harvard, he took a year off from his studies and traveled
4 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist. 11; Frank Ashburn, Peabody of Groton: A 
Portrait. (New York: Coward, 1944), 112-114.
5 Harvard Annual. 1914; Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist 19; American Mercury. 
November 1945.
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the world. He considered studying art in Paris, but instead 
returned to the United States and graduated from Harvard with 
his class in 1914.6
After a year of drifting he sought to join the foreign 
service and in 1915 requested the help of fellow Harvard 
graduate William Phillips, who had married Welles's cousin and 
occupied a senior position in the state department. Welles also 
asked Franklin Roosevelt, now the assistant secretary of the 
navy, to personally recommend him to Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan. "I am delighted to learn that you are going to 
take the diplomatic examinations this Spring," Roosevelt wrote 
to Welles, "and am gladly sending you a line to go with your 
application." To Bryan, Roosevelt wrote: "I have known [Welles] 
since he was a small boy and have seen him go through school 
and college and I should be most glad to see him successful in 
entering the Diplomatic Corps."?
Welles received the highest score on the diplomatic
examinations held that spring, and soon embarked upon his 
foreign service career. The timing of his entry into the 
diplomatic corps was significant, for with the Great War raging 
abroad, and a neutral America edging toward belligerency, a 
diplomatic career seemed to offer the twin rewards of social 
status and adventure. Like many young men of his station and 
generation, Welles came to admire the wartime leadership of
Woodrow Wilson. "We had been thrilled to the depths of our 
emotional and intellectual being," Welles wrote years later, 
"by the vision that Woodrow Wilson had held out to us of a 
world order founded on justice and on democracy. As my
generation looks back to the years between the wars I think our 
one outstanding thought must always be 'it might have been. "'8 
That same year, 1915, Welles married Esther Slater, the 
sister of a Harvard classmate, whose family controlled a
6 Ibid; Harvard Class of 1914 Report. (Harvard: 1920); "Civic and National Personality," by Sumner Welles, 
c.1916, box 205, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist. 11.
7 Welles to Roosevelt, March 1, 1915, FDR Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-21, FDRL; 
Roosevelt to Welles, March 15, 1915, ibid; Roosevelt to William Jennings Bryan, March 15, 1915, ibid; 
American Mercury. November 1945.
8 Lawrence E. Gelfand, "The Mystique of Wilsonian Statecraft." Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no.2, (Spring 1983), 
87-101; Welles to Roosevelt March 15,1915, FDR Papers a s  Assistant Secretary of the Navy, FDRL; Sumner 
Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 3.
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massive textile empire based in Webster, Massachusetts. They 
would have two sons, Benjamin born in 1916, and Arnold, born 
two years later. Welles soon distinguished himself 
professionally during diplomatic postings in Tokyo, where he 
oversaw Japanese treatment of German internees; and in Buenos 
Aires, were he spent much of his time seeking to outmaneuver 
British officials for trade advantages in the Argentine market. 
He rose rapidly through the ranks of the state department 
bureaucracy, returning to Washington in 1920 to become 
assistant chief of the Latin American Affairs Division.9 Within 
a few months he became "Acting Chief" of the division, helping 
to prepare and implement the "Wilson Plan" for the eventual 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Dominican Republic.io
By August 1921, just a few months shy of his twenty-ninth 
birthday, he became head of the Latin American Affairs 
Division, the youngest division chief in the history of the 
department. He sought to promote Washington's interests and a 
new sense of order in the region by improving the image of the 
United States through the reduction of the American military 
presence and by the avoidance of further interventions. He 
believed Latin America and the Caribbean deserved more 
attention from Washington (mostly through more intimate trade 
ties) and he began to develop many of the ideas that would, in 
little more than a decade, evolve into the Good Neighbor 
Policy.ii Welles admired President Harding's secretary of state, 
Charles Evans Hughes, and shared Hughes's support for reducing
9 Boston Morning Journal. April 15,1915; "Overall History of D.O.S." (Sumner Welles) 4E3,6/29/D, Box 1, RG 
59, War History Branch Studies, National Archives; Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist. 
41-62.
10 Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916- 
24 (Austin: University of Texas, 1984), 204-205; Welles to Josephus Daniels, May 7, 1927, box 23, folder 9, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Bainbridge Colby to Welles, May 25,1920, box 23, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles 
to Norman Davis, August 19, 1921, box 63, Davis papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Colby 
frequently praised Welles's work to Wilson, and Welles occasionally met with president to discuss questions 
related to the administration's Latin American policies during these years. That it was the Wilson administration 
that took the first practical steps toward repairing relations with Latin America see  Daniel M. Smith, "Bainbridge 
Colby and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1920-1921," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 50, no. 1 (June 
1963), 56-78.
11 "Is America Imperialistic?" by Sumner Welles, Atlantic Monthly. September 1924. For an excellent 
examination of Welles's views of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean, see  Gail Hanson, "Ordered Liberty: Sumner 
Welles and the Crowder-Welles Connection in the Caribbean," Diplomatic History, vol. 18, no. 3 (1994), 311- 
332. Hanson concludes that Welles's efforts to check disorder and instability in the Caribbean established a 
useful pattern for Washington's post-World War II relations with the Third World.
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armaments and increasing international economic integration. 
Welles considered the urbane and austere New Yorker one of 
America's greatest statesmen and a suitable model for 
emulation. The admiration was mutual and Hughes made Welles his 
personal envoy for Latin America. 12
Despite his feelings for Hughes, Welles subsequently 
resigned due to his marital difficulties. During the years 
since his marriage to Esther Slater, he had been involved with 
several other women (and perhaps, according to the account by 
his son, even a few men) and had surreptitiously used $100,000 
of his wife's fortune to purchase jewelry for a mistress. Under 
the circumstances, Welles felt a desperate need to earn a
larger income to make a complete break with his wife and pay 
for his complicated lifestyle. 13 He left the department in March 
1922 in search of a more lucrative career, only to change his 
mind and accede to Hughes's pleadings that he become U.S. 
commissioner to the Dominican Republic.n While still serving as 
commissioner he accepted a number of other short-term 
diplomatic missions, including a temporary appointment as 
President Coolidge's personal mediator in the Honduran civil 
war. Welles sought to restore order and equilibrium to the 
region, and his efforts in Honduras brought him national 
attention, as the drama of his mediation efforts reached
millions through the U.S. press.15
Soon thereafter, in July 1925, Welles again resigned. He 
may have been discouraged that his meteoric rise meant that,
due to his age and tenure, he could for the moment rise no
12 "In my opinion," Welles, who was not prone to flattery, wrote to Hughes in 1922, "there has never been a 
period in the history of the country when the foreign relations of the United States were so ably directed a s  they 
are by you today." Welles to Charles Evans Hughes, March 15,1922, box 23, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL.
13 In 1942 Esther eventually retained the services of Henry Stimson, Roosevelt's secretary of war, to recoup 
some of the money owed to her by Welles. See Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist. 95, 
389.
14 Bainbridge Colby to Welles, March 20, 1922, box 23, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Charles 
Evans Hughes, March 6,1925, box 23, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
“15 Welles to Norman Davis, April 29, 1926, Davis papers, Library of Congress; "Overall History of D.O.S." 
{Sumner Welles) 4E3, 6/29/D, Box 1, RG 59, War History Branch Studies, National Archives; Nation. August 1, 
1942; Welles to Hughes, October 23, 1922, Foreign Relations of the United Statesfhereafter referred to as 
FRUS], 1924, vol. II, 75-76.
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further.i6 After his second resignation, he maintained an active 
interest in Latin American and Caribbean affairs. He briefly 
considered becoming a banker, but longed for another diplomatic 
posting. In late 1925, the new secretary of state, Frank 
Kellogg, considered appointing Welles assistant secretary for 
Latin American Affairs, or even minister to one of the Central 
American republics, but the idea encountered the opposition of 
President Coolidge who disapproved of Welles's chaotic personal 
life. "So long as I am President, that young man will never 
even be a minister," Coolidge is alleged to have said. 
Washington newsmen later speculated that Coolidge's dislike for 
Welles was a result of Welles' s divorce from Esther and his 
relationship with the heiress Mathilde Townsend Gerry, whose 
husband was Senator Peter Gerry of Rhode Island, a Coolidge 
friend. Welles did not help his cause when he attended the 1924 
Democratic convention, which sought to nominate Coolidge's 
opponent, in the company of Mrs. Gerry.n
In 1925 Welles and Mathilde married in a quiet ceremony in 
upstate New York, but it was announced to the world the 
following day on the front page of the New York Times.is Welles 
moved with Mathilde and a staff of fifteen servants into the 
gigantic Townsend Mansion on Massachusetts Avenue, which had 
been copied from Marie Antoinette's Petit Trianon.19 But for the 
most part Welles resided a few miles outside of Washington at
16 When Joseph Grew replaced William Phillips as under secretary in early 1924, Welles's mistress, the 
heiress Mathilde Townsend Gerry, wrote to Welles in Santo Domingo, "How stupid of old Charles Evans to give 
that drunken Joe Grew Phillips's place and not you." Mathilde Townsend to Welles, March 10, 1924, box 19, 
folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
17 Norman Davis to Welles. September 2, 1925; Welles to Davis, April 23, 1926, Welles to Davis, April 29, 
1926, box 63, Norman Davis papers, Library of Congress; Welles, The Time For Decision. 188; "Welles/Slater 
divorce papers," box 19, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.
18 As the former wife of a  senator, Mathilde was already a formidable Washington presence. Furthermore, her 
grandfather had made his millions developing the Pennsylvania Railroad and her mother was one of the social 
arbiters of Washington society at the turn of the century. Her family had also been close friends of the Oyster 
Bay branch of the Roosevelts, and when Teddy became president he often visited their home in Washington. 
"Mathilde Welles: Autobiography: My Girlhood Days," box 19, folder 8, Welles papers, FDRL; "Mathilde Welles: 
Autobiography: Today," box 20, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL.
19 "Mathilde Welles: Autobiography: 1910-1925," box 19, folder 6, Welles papers, FDRL.
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the massive 49-room Oxon Hill Manor.20 Without an official 
position in the state department, Welles spent the next several 
years working on a book, Naboth1s Vineyard; The Dominican 
Republic. 1844-1924. which was completed in 1928 and brought 
him considerable notice despite selling few copies. The book 
took its name from the Biblical story in which Naboth is 
murdered at the instigation of Jezebel so she can obtain a 
vineyard. In Welles's telling, the vineyard represented the 
Dominican Republic and the United States, Jezebel. It concluded 
with an appeal for stronger trade ties and a more considerate 
and cooperative policy toward Latin America, and can be seen as 
a prelude to the future Good Neighbor Policy. In Welles's view, 
before the United States could begin to play a greater role in 
the world, it had to first establish its hegemony over the 
western hemisphere. To that end, the United States should 
remove many of the grounds for past distrust by pursuing a 
policy of more benign relations. "No nation can live unto 
itself alone," he wrote. "If the United States, therefore, is 
to maintain itself as one of the greatest forces in the world 
of the future . . . the time is at hand when it must reach the 
conviction that in the Western Hemisphere lies its strength and 
its support."2i
With the severing of his official ties to the Republican 
administrations of the 1920s, Welles began working with 
Franklin Roosevelt, exchanging views on foreign affairs and 
drafting Democratic policy papers. Welles drew closer to 
Eleanor Roosevelt as well, corresponding with her frequently 
and visiting her at Hyde Park.22 He also became active in the 
foreign policy establishment of the 1920s, joining the Woodrow
20 "Oxon Hill: Architecture and Survey," box 9. folder 6, Welles papers, FDRL; Interview with Mary White of the 
Oxon Hill Manor Foundation, April 4, 1996, Oxon Hill, Maryland; "Mathilde Welles: Autobiography: Oxon Hill 
Manor," box 19, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL. Welles would make great use of Oxon Hill during his career at 
state, feting foreign dignitaries and diplomats, entertaining the president, and hosting informal meetings of 
senior officials. Roosevelt, too, liked the location, and would steal away to Oxon Hill, only a  twenty minute drive 
from the White House, to imbibe mint juleps with Welles on the veranda overlooking the Potomac.
21 Sumner Welles. Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic. 1844-1924 (New York: Dayson and Clark, 
1928), 936-937.
22 Welles memorandum to Roosevelt, January 20, 1928, FDR Papers: Family, Business and Personal 
Correspondence, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, February 24, 1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to 
Roosevelt, September 27, 1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Eleanor Roosevelt to Welles, September 13, 
1928, Welles to Eleanor Roosevelt, September 27, 1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Eleanor 
Roosevelt, November 9,1928, box 148, folder 8, Welles papers, FDRL.
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Wilson Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations, and he 
began dabbling in party politics, using his friendship with 
Eleanor and Franklin to gain access to senior Democratic 
figures. Welles even toyed with the idea of seeking the 
Maryland Democratic Party’s nomination for U.S. senator. As 
Roosevelt plotted his next political moves Welles sent him 
regular briefings on Latin American affairs and offered his 
assistance to Democratic candidates such as the 1928 
presidential nominee, A1 Smith. Welles made a number of foreign 
policy speeches in support of Smith, testing some of the themes 
he would seek to implement in the 1930s, such as pledging non­
intervention and closer trade ties with Latin America. 23 
Roosevelt, who was chairing Smith's effort, dangled the 
possibility of Welles receiving a senior appointment in a 
future Democratic administration, and the two men worked 
closely together throughout 1928, drafting a foreign policy 
paper under Roosevelt's name which appeared in the prestigious 
journal Foreign Affairs. In the article, Welles had Roosevelt 
suggest that U.S. intervention in the region should take place 
only in a multilateral context. With Welles's assistance, 
Roosevelt now advocated international limitations on naval 
forces and attacked Coolidge's dispatch of Marines to 
Nicaragua, thus unconsciously implying that Roosevelt's 
previous opinions on Central America and the Caribbean were 
somehow misguided. The article also promoted several objectives 
that would later feature prominently in his future presidential 
administration, such as expanded regional economic integration 
and a desire to work in concert within the inter-American 
system to pursue U.S. interests in the region through subtler 
means. 24
After Roosevelt became governor of New York in 1928 Welles 
served as part of a virtual shadow cabinet, responding to 
Republican foreign policy initiatives and briefing Governor
23 "Washington Democratic Meeting Address," 1928, box 194, folder 1, speech files, Welles papers, FDRL; 
"Campaign Speech, 1928," box 194, folder 2, speech files, Welles papers, FDRL.
24 Roosevelt to Welles, March 7,1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Roosevelt telegram to Welles, June 1, 
1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, July 7, 1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; "Our 
Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Foreign Affairs. July 28, 1928, FDR papers: 
Articles by FDR, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, September 8, 1928, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to 
Norman Davis, February 17,1931, box 63, Davis papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
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Roosevelt on world affairs. Similar to the service the Brain 
Trust provided Roosevelt in the realm of domestic economic 
policy, Welles contributed in the area of foreign affairs. He 
made frequent calls at Hyde Park and the governor’s mansion in 
Albany and he prepared attacks on the foreign policy of 
President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson.25 During the 
1932 campaign Welles attended the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago which nominated Roosevelt and helped 
draft the party's platform plank on Latin America, working
closely on the platform with the journalist Drew Pearson, whom 
Welles subsequently introduced to Roosevelt.26 welles advised 
Roosevelt throughout the fall campaign, gave a number of 
speeches on foreign affairs, and strengthened his hand through 
a generous financial contribution to Roosevelt's coffers. 
Welles was elated by Roosevelt's victory.27
The press assumed Welles would receive an important post 
in the new administration. Some even speculated that Welles, 
although only 40, would be named secretary of state.28 Roosevelt 
instead appointed him assistant secretary for Latin America, 
making him part of a small group of senior advisers to the new 
secretary of state, Cordell Hull.29 Roosevelt made many of the
other appointments beneath Hull, and the emerging working
environment at state did not bode well for the future.30 Dean 
Acheson later recalled that the Department was a "house divided 
against itself," with both Hull and Welles surrounding 
themselves with loyalists. "Suspicious by nature," Acheson
recalled of Hull, "he brooded over what he thought were slights 
and grievances, which more forthright handling might have set 
straight. His brooding led, in accordance with Tennessee-
25 Welles to Roosevelt, February 17,1931, box 148, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL
26 Welles draft of Democratic party statement, 1932, box 148, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to 
Marguerite LeHand, October 27,1932, box 148, folder 11, Welles papers, FDRL
27 Welles to Norman Davis, November 19,1932, box 63, Davis papers, Library of Congress.
28 Baltimore Post. September 28,1932.
29 Roosevelt to Welles, March 9, 1932, President's Personal File [PPF] 2961, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, 
December 19, 1932, PPF 2961, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, February 1, 1933, PPF 2961, FDRL; Eleanor 
Roosevelt to Sumner Welles, December 7,1932, box 148, Welles papers, FDRL; Eleanor Roosevelt to Mathilde 
Welles, February 17,1933, box 149, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL.
30 For an account of Hull's inability to control U.S. foreign policy see, for example, Julius Pratt, "The Ordeal of 
Cordell Hull," Review of Politics, vol. 28 (January 1966), 76-98.
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mountain tradition, to feuds. His hatreds were implacable —  
not hot hatreds, but long cold ones. In no hurry to 'get' his 
enemy, ’get’ him he usually did."3* Matters were further 
complicated because during most of Hull's tenure at state he 
suffered from the debilitating effects of tuberculosis and 
diabetes. Hull kept his condition secret, but his frequent 
absences from Washington raised speculation in the capital and 
later forced him to turn the department over to Welles for long 
periods of time. Neither was Hull's cause helped by his 
unfortunate lisp and an almost inaudible public speaking voice 
which limited his public role.32 His usefulness was also 
undermined by his lack of personal compatibility with the 
president. From the early months of the administration it 
became clear that Roosevelt would bypass Hull.33
Roosevelt paid deference to Hull but sometimes the 
secretary's plodding style exasperated him. Roosevelt would 
cheerily open cabinet meetings by turning to Hull and asking, 
"Cordell, what's the news from abroad," to which Hull's 
deflating answer would usually bes "Not very encouraging." John 
Gunther, the peripatetic chronicler of events during the 1930s 
and 1940s, would later recall that if Welles was present in 
place of Hull, "the reply would be swift, precise, and 
comprehensive. FDR must have wished at least ten thousand times 
that Welles, not Hull, was the actual Secretary. But he could 
not possibly get rid of Hull because of his pivotal power in 
the Senate and his prestige in the country at large. "34 This 
fact was not lost on the foreign diplomatic representatives in 
Washington. The British Embassy described Hull as "a man of the 
utmost integrity, dignity and charm. He behaves with great 
courtesy to the heads of missions, and replies at great length 
to any question they may put to him; but when they return to 
their houses they usually have difficulty remembering anything
31 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. 9-11.
32 Irwin F. Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt. Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1995), 161, 25-26.
33 Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads of History: Wilson Through Roosevelt (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 115; 
Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), 16-19; Acheson, Present at the Creation. 8-9.
34 John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in History (New York: Harper, 1950), 131-132.
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he has said that deserves to be repeated."35
Uncertain about his own status, Hull was uncomfortable 
with Welles's presence in the department. Welles maintained his 
own base of power separate from Hull and Welles' s friendship 
with Drew Pearson aroused Hull's suspicions. By the mid-1930s 
Pearson had become the most influential and the highest paid 
newspaperman in the country, his syndicated column, "Washington 
Merry-Go-Round," appearing in more than 600 newspapers.3® Welles 
and Pearson became intimate friends and Welles served as one of 
Pearson's more valued sources. Pearson wrote glowingly of 
Welles's accomplishments, while Welles reciprocated by feeding 
Pearson gossip and insider information.3?
* * *
Prior to the inauguration, Welles prepared a memorandum 
for Roosevelt which served as the genesis of the Good Neighbor 
Policy. "The creation and maintenance of the most cordial and 
intimate friendship between the United States and other 
republics of the American Continent must be regarded as a 
keystone of our foreign policy," Welles wrote to Roosevelt in 
January.38 A few months later, Welles spelled out in greater 
detail the key components of his proposed new approach to Latin 
America. He suggested a policy whose features would include 
non-interference in the affairs of other nations, non­
intervention, increased trade, and low tariffs.39 Welles 
persuaded Roosevelt to use his Pan American Day speech on April 
12 to enunciate these new policies toward Latin America. "The 
Continent," Welles wrote to the president, "is awaiting very
35 FO 371/21541 "Records of Leading Personalities in the U.S.,'' January 12, 1937, British Public Record 
Office [hereafter cited a s  PRO].
36 Time, February 13,1939; Collier's. April 22,1939.
37 Welles to Pearson, June 12, 1933, box 146, folder 8, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Pearson, June 8, 
1933, box 146, folder 8, Welles papers, FDRL; Pearson to Welles, August 11, 1933, box 146, folder 8, Welles 
papers, FDRL; Drew Pearson to Welles, July 23,1937, box 146, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL.
38 Welles to FDR: "A Memorandum on Inter-American Relations," January 10,1933, box 149, folder 1, Welles 
papers, FDRL For a  more detailed examination of this document see  Charles C. Griffin, ed., "Document 
Section: Welles to Roosevelt: A Memorandum on Inter-American Relations, 1933," The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, vol.34, no. 2 (May 1954), 190-192.
39 Welles to Hull, April 4, 1933, with annex: "Memorandum for the President," by Welles, box 149, folder 1, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
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eagerly some official announcement by you of the policy which 
you intend to pursue with regard to inter-American affairs, and 
it seems to me that the opportunity afforded on April 12 would 
be a very suitable occasion upon which you might make such a 
declaration of policy."40 m  a letter to Hull, Welles added, "It 
seems to me essential, if the President is to speak at all upon 
this occasion, that he should seize the opportunity to announce 
a constructive, remedial policy, and not limit himself solely 
to the expressions of friendship and good will which convey 
nothing concrete and which will not satisfy Latin American 
public opinion."41
Welles understood that Great Britain and France, small as 
they were geographically, added considerable weight to their 
status as world powers due to their claims to speak for 
millions around the world in their colonial empires. Perhaps 
the United States, too, needed to speak for millions more 
beyond its own population. Welles claimed that bitter personal 
experience during the 1920s taught him that the United States 
stood to gain far more through a policy of cooperation with 
Latin America than through intervention and intimidation. But 
the Good Neighbor Policy got off to a rocky start. Welles 
served only a few weeks as assistant secretary before accepting 
an ill-fated assignment as the president's personal envoy to 
the strife-torn Cuban republic.« in Cuba, the rhetorical 
idealism of the Good Neighbor Policy came up against the 
pragmatic realities of maintaining U.S. hegemony.«
Roosevelt and Hull may have felt that with Welles's long 
experience mediating disputes in Central America, the new 
assistant secretary might be on familiar ground in Havana. "The
40 Welles to Roosevelt April 6,1933, box 149, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL
41 Welles to Hull, April 7,1933, box 149, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL
42 P ress statement by Welles, April 24, 1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 278; Welles memorandum of conversation 
with Roosevelt and Charles Taussig, April 24,1933, box 149, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.
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Press, 1990), 193-201; E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the New Good Neighbor Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 
1933," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 39 (November 1959), 538-567; Louis A. Perez, Jr. "Army 
Politics, Diplomacy and the Collapse of the Cuban Officer Corps: the 'Sergeant's Revolt1 of 1933," Latin 
American Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 59-76; William S. Stokes, "The Welles Mission to Cuba," Central America and 
Mexico, vol. 1 (December 1953), 3-21; Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba 1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
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situation [in Cuba] frankly is rather more precarious than even 
I had anticipated/' Welles wrote to Drew Pearson. "There is a 
tension in the atmosphere and a bitterness of feeling generally 
which I have not previously experienced except during the brief 
weeks I was in Honduras at the time of the revolution of
1924. "44
After a decade of repressive rule, Cuban strongman Gerardo 
Machado violently confronted an effective political opposition. 
Welles initially assumed he could compel Machado to resign and 
restore stability in Cuba through patient mediation. "Bearing 
in mind the fact that I think at this time we have the best 
opportunity in my lifetime to lay down the foundation for a 
beneficial and sane Latin American policy, both commercial and 
political, I cannot admit the possibility of intervention," he 
wrote after his arrival in Havana. "Intervention would at once 
create suspicion and distrust, notwithstanding our treaty 
rights here, throughout Latin America, with very great 
prejudice, of course to our improving relations in Latin 
America during the next y e a r s . "45 Although Welles initially 
succeeded in forcing the departure of M a c h a d o ,46 he soon became 
deeply immersed in Cuban political intrigues. Welles wanted to 
restore order to Cuba but he also sought to teach the Cubans to 
select "good men." In the wake of Machado's departure Welles 
moved to secure the presidency for his longtime friend, Carlos 
Manuel de Cespedes, who Welles assumed would form a government 
more amenable to U.S. i n t e r e s t s .  47 But the diminutive and 
professorial Cespedes never captured the imagination of the 
Cuban masses and Welles did not help the new president's cause 
when the two men were photographed for the Cuban newspapers 
embraced in a warm abrazo, a careless blunder in a nation 
sensitive to the appearance of U.S. domination. At times during 
Cespedes's tenure Welles virtually ran Cuba himself. "Owing to 
my intimate personal friendship with President Cespedes,"
44 Welles to Pearson, May 17,1933, box 146, Welles papers, FDRL
45 ibid.
46 This feat brought Welles to the attention of the nation, a s  he was profiled in numerous m agazines and 
newspapers. A New York Times headline called him "Our Man of tfie Hour in Cuba." New York Times Magazine. 
August 20,1933.
47 Welles to Hull, August 12,1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 358-359.
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Welles wrote to Hull, "and the very close relationship which I 
have formed during these past months with all the members of 
his Cabinet I am now daily being requested for decisions on all 
matters affecting the Government of Cuba. These decisions range 
from questions of domestic policy and matters affecting the 
discipline of the Army to questions involving appointments in 
all branches of Government. "48
Cespedes's accession, and his intimate relationship with 
the new U.S. ambassador, led to unrest in the streets of 
Havana.49 When a coalition of workers, students, and young 
military officers led by Ramon Grau San Martin ousted Cespedes, 
Welles reacted angrily and recommended a "limited" U.S. 
military intervention to restore "stability." As mobs in Havana 
shouted "Down with Welles" and the Cuban press accused him of 
acting as a "proconsul of Yankee imperialism," Welles pressed 
for the introduction of U.S. troops under the provision of the 
1901 Platt Amendment which provided for Washington's continued 
intervention into Cuban affairs. Roosevelt and Hull flatly 
rejected his request.so
The call for a military solution may seem strange coming 
from an official such as Welles who was, after all, 
instrumental in implementing the Good Neighbor Policy. But 
Welles may have thought it wholly consistent with the Wilsonian 
policy of non-recognition and intervention that the former 
president had employed against successive Mexican regimes, as 
well as against the Bolshevik government in Russia. Wilson, the 
father of the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, 
frequently relied upon military power to gain his idealistic 
ends in world politics, ordering unilateral armed interventions 
in Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and contributing 
troops to the allied attempts to overthrow the Bolsheviks in
48 Welles to Hull, August 19,1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 367-368.
49 According to Louis Perez, "the new regime was overshadowed by the omnipresence of the American 
Minister." "See Perez, "Army Politics, Diplomacy and the Collapse of the Cuban Officer Corps: the Sergeants' 
Revolt of 1933," 60.
50 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Hull and Welles, September 5,1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 
386; "Mathilde Welles Autobiography: Cuba," box 19, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; Americana. October 1933. 
More detailed accounts of these events can be found in Perez, Cuba and the United States. 193-201; and 
Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista. 35-68. That Welles employed the specter of communism in Cuba in an attempt 
to obtain Hull's backing for intervention see  Robert E. Bowers, "Hull, Russian Subversion in Cuba, and 
Recognition of the USSR," Journal of American History, vol. 53, no. 3 (December 1966), 549.
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Russia. Many presidents have used force to achieve their aims, 
but few so frequently as Wilson. Consequently, Welles's demand 
for military intervention in support of his diplomatic aims in 
Cuba in 1933 partially undermined his later efforts to
embroider his reputation as a innovative liberal. Welles later 
explained that he merely sought to restore a sense of order to 
Cuban society. While the United States did not land troops in 
Cuba, U.S. naval forces maintained a threatening offshore 
presence throughout the crisis. The question of intervention 
became moot when a revolt led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista 
overthrew Grau with the seeming approval of Welles. In any
event, Welles, having become so deeply involved in Cuban
politics, had clearly overstayed his usefulness. After being 
burned in effigy by angry crowds in Havana, Welles returned to 
Washington and his old post as assistant secretary. His
controversial seven-month tour in Cuba further strained his 
relations with Hull, temporarily undermined him in the eyes of 
some colleagues and might have ended his career had it not been 
for his personal friendship with the president and first lady. 
Welles spent the next three years trying to live down the 
interventionist reputation he had acquired in Cuba.si
The Cuban imbroglio illustrated larger truths about Welles 
and the Good Neighbor Policy. Welles believed in hemispheric 
comity, but only so long as other nations did not interfere 
with U.S. interests or the drive for greater economic 
integration. The United States might tolerate some degree of 
diversity in the Caribbean, but only so long as it did not 
disturb order and the economic and political equilibrium of the 
region. This was amply demonstrated in Cuba and would be again 
during Welles's years as assistant secretary. While he sought 
to promote a "new era" in U.S. relations with its hemispheric 
neighbors, he continued to work from the assumption of 
Washington's economic and political domination of Latin 
America. He understood that Washington, through its extensive 
economic ties and the implied threat to intervene militarily,
5 1 "Mathilde Welles Autobiography: Cuba," box 19, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, May 
18, 1933, Official File 470, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, June 24, 1933, Official File 470, FDRL; Welles to 
Roosevelt, July 7, 1933, Official File 470, FDRL; memorandum of conversation between Hull and Welles, 
September 5 ,1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 386-87; Phillips to Roosevelt November 23,1933, FRUS. 1933, vol. V, 
525-26; Time. February 19,1940,15; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 315-317.
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exercised ultimate influence in the region and that mere 
disapproval from a state department official could still 
destabilize a r e g i m e .52 Despite numerous pronouncements by U.S. 
officials about a new approach, there was little change in 
Washington's view of Latin A m e r i c a .  53 The only tangible 
difference between Welles's new approach and that of the 
interventionism of the past was one of method. Control of the 
hemisphere would now be pursued by subtler means s friendlier 
diplomatic relations, the strategic use of inter-American 
trade, a stronger cultural policy, increased respect for Latin 
American customs and protocol, the strategically planned 
distribution of economic aid, a greater reluctance on the part 
of Washington to intervene militarily in the political affairs 
of the other American republics and the full support of 
repressive military regimes friendly to U.S. i n t e r e s t s .54 as for 
intervention, the Good Neighbor Policy sought to work hand-in- 
hand with its favored Latin American regimes to head off the 
potential for upheaval, thus making U.S. intervention 
unnecessary. Washington would work with the Latin Americans to 
suppress leanings toward either fascism or communism, make the 
regional investment climate hospitable to U.S. economic 
interests and restrain radical labor organizations. Welles 
further sought to ameliorate tensions by recognizing all 
governments in the region, no matter how repressive, 
demonstrating that he had no difficulty supporting non- 
democratic regimes so long as they remained amenable to 
Washington's strategic and economic interests. Whatever else 
the Good Neighbor Policy was, one thing is for certains it was
52 See, for example, the essay  by Gerald K. Haines, "Has Anything Changed? The United States and Its 
Relations with Latin America," Diplomatic History, vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 1993), 627-631.
52 For example, when the Dominican Republic's strongman Rafael Trujillo subsequently demanded that 
Washington replace its US-appointed collector of customs, Welles suggested that "the Dominican Government 
will have to be told just where it gets off." Welles to Pulliman, August 24,1933, box 147, Welles papers, FDRL.
54 Throughout the era of the Good Neighbor Policy regional leaders became highly skilled at discerning 
Washington's desires. "When Welles and Hull spoke of a  government capable of guaranteeing order," Lester 
Langley writes, "Batista provided one." See, for example, Lester D. Langley, The United States and the 
Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 134.
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never a boon to regional democracy or individual rights.55
There were, however, several areas where Welles made
lasting improvements in the relations between the United States 
and the rest of the hemisphere. Welles sought the genuine
friendship of Latin American diplomats, showing them a warmth 
and affection which surprised his colleagues. Furthermore, 
after returning to Washington at the end of 1933, Welles sought 
to make amends with Cuba and at the same time push the Good 
Neighbor Policy forward by negotiating the repeal of the
despised Platt Amendment.56 He also began negotiations with 
Panama over revisions to the 1903 Canal Treaty which had been 
unpopular throughout Latin America. He sought to modify the 
treaty, allowing for limited Panamanian involvement in the
canal's control. His efforts to end the 1935 Chaco War between 
Paraguay and Bolivia led him to persuade Roosevelt to call an 
inter-American peace conference at Buenos Aires in 1936, where 
Welles played a major role in rallying support for a 
declaration that established the principle of collective 
consultation and nonintervention. Similar success followed 
inter-American conferences at Lima in 1938 and Panama in 1939, 
as well as the administration's tempered response to Mexico's
55 For an account that the Good Neighbor Policy sought to achieve traditional U.S. goals in Latin America 
merely through new rhetorical approaches, see  David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of 
the Mvths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle books, 1971). For a more orthodox 
account, se e  Irwin Gellman, Good Neighbor Policy: United States Policies in Latin America. 1933-1945 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). Still, Gellman explains that the Good Neighbor Policy 
sought to concede only those U.S. advantages which had already become obsolete while retaining those it still 
considered necessary to its national interests. Gerald K. Haines has argued that Roosevelt and Welles 
justified their policy of supporting repressive dictatorships by claiming that they were technically “republics.M 
See Gerald K. Haines, "Under the Eagle's Wing: The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges An American 
Hemisphere," Diolomatic History, no. 1, vol. 4 (Fall 1977), 374. W hereas Paul Varg has explained that the Good 
Neighbor Policy sought merely to maintain the economic dominance of the United States in the region. See Paul 
A. Varg, 'The Economic Side of the Good Neighbor Policy: The Reciprocal Trade Program and South America," 
Pacific Historical Review, vol. 45, no. 1 (February 1976), 70-71.
56 Memoranda of conversations between Welles and Roosevelt regarding Cuba, January 26 and 30,1934, box 
149, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of conversations between Welles and Roosevelt regarding 
Cuba, March 3, 1934, box 149, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of conversation between Welles 
and Roosevelt August 14,1934, box 149, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL.
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nationalization of American commercial property in 1938.57
While the U.S. for the most part remained aloof from 
European political matters during the interwar years, 
Washington's involvement in Latin America was comparatively 
far-reaching. Washington sought to shape the hemisphere's 
economic, diplomatic, political and social policies along lines 
amenable to U.S. interests. Welles's approach to Latin American 
affairs during these years anticipated his unique brand of 
nationalistic internationalism during his later tenure as under 
secretary, seeking to achieve national aims through 
international means. Furthermore, his later enthusiasm for 
collective security and world organization stemmed partially 
from his experiences organizing his "American system” in the 
1930s, where he called for pan-American unity and a permanent 
regional body to resolve disputes.58
As part of Welles's effort to redefine the Monroe Doctrine 
in more regionally multilateral terms, the Good Neighbor Policy 
also had success, at least theoretically, in having the Latin 
American republics adhere to a hodgepodge of quasi-Wilsonian 
aims. At numerous hemispheric conferences between 1936 and 1942 
U.S. delegations met with success in reaffirming principles 
such as the promotion of self-determination, the non­
aggrandizement of territory, no territorial changes without 
self-determination, the restoration of independence and 
sovereignty, equal access to raw materials and support for some 
form of collective security or world organization. Thus, when 
it came time to construct the new world order during the war, 
Welles would argue that this "American system" could be 
exported outside the western hemisphere, providing a model for 
the other Great Powers in their relations with each other, but
57 "On the Margin of War," September 25,1939, by Sumner Welles, Panama, speech files, box 194, folder 13, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy. 1932-45 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 122-24, 175-76. Welles received much of the credit for the Good Neighbor 
Policy at the time. In a  revealing "tell-all" article in the New York Herald Tribune in the autumn of 1936, William 
Castle, former under secretary of state (1931-1933) wrote that it "would probably be fair to say that Mr. Hull 
generally becom es aware of American policy in Latin America only after the fact" and that Welles "is perfectly 
willing to assum e responsibility and to act independently even when such action may possibly be contrary to 
the policy of the Secretary." New York Herald Tribune: This Week. October 18, 1936. Such stories did little to 
improve the Welles-Hull relationship.
58 "On the Margin of War," by Sumner Welles, September 25, 1939, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics, speech files, box 194, folder 13, Welles papers, FDRL.
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also for those nations within their spheres of responsibility.59
* *  *
59 For Welles's belief in the exportability of the "American system" see  his speeches "On the Margin of War," 
September 25,1939, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, speech files, box 194, folder 
13, Welles papers, FDRL; and “The Victory of Peace," by Sumner Welles, February 26,1943, speech files, box 
196, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; a s  well a s  Welles, The Time For Decision. 240-241. For an account of how 
Roosevelt and Welles sought to use the western hemisphere a s  a  model for regionalism during the Second 
World War, see  Warren Kimball's essay  titled "'Baffled Virtue . . .  Injured Innocence': The Western Hemisphere 
a s  Regional Role Model," in Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin D. Roosevelt a s  Wartime Statesman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 107-125.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Under Secretary of State:
The Welles Plan and Reorganizing the Department
1937-1938
Welles's experience implementing the Good Neighbor Policy 
reinforced his commitment to collective action and underscored 
the importance of Washington's leadership in the western 
hemisphere. But his elevation to under secretary in the spring 
of 1937 enabled him to push for American leadership in the 
world at large. Immediately after his appointment Welles would 
move to reorganize the department and would endeavor to have 
Washington play a more active role in the coming world crisis 
through his promotion of the Welles plan.
Roosevelt's first term had coincided with the high tide of 
isolationism in the United States. The president himself had 
dealt a setback to the cause of international cooperation when 
he scuttled the London Economic Conference in the summer of 
1933. The following year, the Nye committee began its 
investigation of the armaments industry and in 1935 the senate 
rejected American participation in the world court, while the 
neutrality acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937 signaled the United
States's continued desire to avoid political and military 
entanglements.
In the summer of 1936, when the position of under 
secretary became vacant upon the retirement of William 
Phillips, three assistant secretaries —  Welles, Walton Moore 
and Wilbur Carr —  vied for the job. The press described the 
behind the scenes infighting for the position as the "battle of 
the century," but Roosevelt hesitated to make a choice and the 
position remained vacant for ten months.i U.S. Ambassador to 
Italy Breckinridge Long, noted in his diary that "It seems to 
be the impression that Cordell wants Judge Moore as Under-
1 "Undersecretary of State Welles," Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, Division of Historical 
Policy Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, Record Group 59, 
National Archives; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 509-510; Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History 
of its Organization. Procedure and P ersonnel (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 328-329.
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Secretary and that the President wanted Sumner Welles. . . . 
the President has probably ceased his advocacy of Welles and 
left it up to Hull, but each of the two seem to have threatened 
to resign in case the other is appointed."2 Carr, a Republican 
in a Democratic administration, was a serious candidate mostly 
in his own mind, while many observers assumed that the seventy- 
six year old Moore had the advantage. A former member of 
Congress from Virginia and a strong isolationist, he was 
considered one of the most loyal "Hull men" in the department. 
William C. Bullitt, the former ambassador to Moscow, now 
serving in Paris, backed Moore, whom he considered a surrogate 
father. Bullitt even made a pilgrimage to Roosevelt's winter 
retreat at Warm Springs, Georgia, to plead Moore's case in 
person.3
Roosevelt settled the matter with one of his 
characteristic compromises, sending two nominations to Capitol 
Hill in May 1937: Welles would become under secretary and Moore 
would revive the defunct position of state department 
counselor. It was publicly announced that both men would occupy 
positions of equal rank and that they would receive equivalent 
salaries of $10,000. In reality, Moore gradually disappeared 
from the centers of power in the department soon after the 
appointments.4 "i congratulate you on your appointment as Under 
Secretary of State," Bullitt wrote to Welles from the Paris 
Embassy. "I had hoped that the post would go to Judge Moore who 
has been as kind to me as a father; but I am sure you know that 
you will have my fullest and heartiest cooperation and that I 
shall do everything I can to assist your work."5
To some, such as former Brain Truster Adolf Berle,
2 Breckinridge Long Diary, February 15, 1937, box 5, Long Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; 
As a backup, Welles considered purchasing a newspaper in Baltimore, and he even contemplated running for 
the U.S. Senate from Maryland. Incumbent Democrat Millard Tydings, who was up for reelection in 1938, had 
earned the wrath of President Roosevelt for not sufficiently supporting the administration's legislative program.
3 Cordell Hull. Memoirs, vol. I, 509-510; New York Times. March 20, 1937. The British foreign office, tracking 
the controversy, noted that Welles "has vanity and ambition and occasionally falls into the errors which these 
qualities may lead to. He has no sentimentality and his manner is stiff and reserved, but once the exterior is 
penetrated he is a  good man to do business with." See FO 371/21541 "Records of Leading Personalities in the 
U.S.," January 12,1937, PRO.
4 Congressional Record - S enate. 1937, vol. 81, May 20,1937: Time. May 31,1937; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. 
I, 510.
5 Bullitt to Welles, May 28,1937, box 39, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL.
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Welles1s ascendancy and Moore's virtual exile to oblivion 
represented a step toward a more effective and activist state 
department. "If Walton Moore is mildly sidetracked as 
counselor," Berle wrote, "we shall have systematic relations 
restored at all events."« Not everyone agreed with Berle's 
optimistic assessment. In a letter to Bullitt, Moore expressed 
his displeasure with the new arrangement and predicted that 
Welles would find a way to expand his power in every area of 
the department and take over as acting secretary in Hull's
absences.7
Moore's concerns were well founded. Welles craved and 
gloried in his new power and he sought to muscle Walton Moore 
out of his way. His promotion gave him new and broad 
responsibilities and he immediately moved to expand his control 
of the department by purging it of his opponents. Much of this 
occurred against the wishes of Hull, who continued to resent 
Welles's relationship with the president and his eagerness to 
bypass the normal chain of command.8 Brain Truster Rex Tugwell 
recalled that "FDR saw more of Sumner Welles than Hull," and 
that the president "confided in the younger man and entrusted 
him with missions and maneuvers he would not allow Hull even to 
know about."9 Hull's various ailments soon forced him to turn 
the department over to Welles for long periods at a time, 
despite Moore's attempts to serve as acting secretary.But, as 
Hull's health continued to decline during the second term, 
Roosevelt increasingly relied on Welles to run the department. 
While convalescing, Hull would receive daily briefings over the 
telephone from Welles. Many outside the administration soon 
took notice of this strange state of affairs. "The State 
Department has two actual bosses," noted a Newsweek story in 
1938. "A strange team, these co-bosses differ in type as much 
as they differ in philosophy: Hull is a tight-lipped politician 
from the Tennessee mountains; Welles is a suave, dapper, career
6 Berle Diary, April 26,1937, box 210, Berle Papers, FDRL.
7 Orville H. Bullitt ed., For the President. Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 214-215.
8 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1972),11 -12.
9 Rexfbrd Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957), 622
10 FO 371/21541 "Records of Leading Personalities in the U.S.," January 12,1937, PRO.
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diplomat who has been in the Department for 23 years. But, from 
the grimy architectural monstrosity that houses their 
activities, the two guide America's ever-fluctuating foreign 
policy without openly clashing. Each pushes evenly on the 
wheels until he has a chance to plug his own theory publicly."11
In his new role as under secretary, Welles established 
daily contact with the president, sending Roosevelt frequent 
memos and speaking with him regularly on matters related to the 
department and the world. 12 with Welles's enhanced 
responsibilities he and Roosevelt began having informal daily 
meetings, either in the president's office or residential 
study, over dinner at the White House or at Welles's home. The 
president encouraged such personal contacts and, as Welles 
continued to operate independently with the president, he 
became a more powerful figure in the administration, exerting 
increasingly greater i n f l u e n c e .  13
Welles’s friendship with the first lady also aided his 
cause. When Eleanor Roosevelt felt that something needed the 
attention of the state department, she communicated directly 
with Welles, bypassing Hull. "It was only with the president's 
promotion of Welles to the under secretaryship," recalled 
Eleanor's friend Joseph Lash, "that Eleanor began to feel a 
genuinely sympathetic presence in the department."14 Welles's 
position also gave him new opportunities to serve as a valued 
source for important members of the Washington press corps such 
as Pearson, Walter Lippmann, Anne O'Hare McCormick and James 
Reston. "Sumner Welles is an extremely satisfactory man to 
interview," noted Henry Luce. "His mind is clear and precise. 
He has not the slightest hesitancy in telling you exactly what 
he thinks - or at any rate, what he says he thinks. He never 
hurries you, but you feel you should not waste a minute of the 
time of a man who wastes so little himself."15
11 Je sse  H. Stiller, George S. Messersmith: Diplomat of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1987), 136; Newsweek. June 6,1938.
12 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 546; "Undersecretary of State Welles," Welles file, Overall History of 
Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 
4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, Record Group 59, National Archives.
12 Kenneth Davis, FDR: Into the Storm. 1937-1940 (New York: Random House, 1993),187.
14 Joseph Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship (New York: Norton, 1971), 571
The Ideas of Henry Luce. John K. Jessup, ed, (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 349.
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After his confirmation by the senate, Welles immediately 
moved to reorganize the state department, employing 
bureaucratic hardball to reward allies and punish potential 
enemies, while putting his personal stamp on the departmental 
bureaucracy. He folded the Latin American and Mexican Divisions 
into one American Republics Division to be headed by his loyal 
assistant, Lawrence Duggan, whose appointment would allow 
Welles to continue by proxy his domination of Latin American 
policy. He next ousted Robert Kelley, who for years had been 
chief of the Eastern European Division and a staunch anti- 
Soviet who had influenced policy toward Russia for nearly two 
decades. Welles combined Kelley's division with the Western
European Division and created a new entity to be headed by his
friend and former Groton schoolmate, J. Pierrepont Moffat. 
Kelley was shipped off to a post in Turkey. Welles also sought 
to protect and promote his favorites in the department and he 
called on the president to immediately find posts for people 
who he thought had exceptional ability. He further cleared his 
own path in the department by orchestrating the removal of many 
other officials, exiling several to postings abroad, and 
demanding that all embassy employees submit their public
utterances to him for prior approval.He also moved to strip 
the commerce department of its Bureau of Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce, which had served as a springboard for Herbert
Hoover's intrusion into foreign affairs in the Harding and 
Coolidge administrations. Welles believed this would increase 
the power and prestige of the state department and give him a 
stronger hand in determining foreign economic policy, i?
He also sought to extend his power in the department by 
bringing in outside allies such as Adolf Berle and Norman 
Davis. The Anglophobic Berle, a precocious former member of the 
Brain Trust who graduated from Harvard with honors at the age 
of seventeen, had a reputation for arrogance, is The short,
16 "Reorganization of the State Department 1937," box 43, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to 
Roosevelt June 18,1937, box 149, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; "Draft Circular Telegram," by Welles, July 7, 
1937, box 149, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL
17 Despite Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper's threat that he would resign, Welles went ahead with his plan 
to remove the bureau from the commerce department.
18 Raymond Moley noted lhat while Berle once may have been considered an infant prodigy, he continued to 
be an infant long after he had ceased to be a  prodigy.
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white-haired Norman Davis was a lifelong diplomat and longtime 
friend of Welles. Their relationship dated back to when Davis 
was under secretary of state during the last years of the 
Wilson administration. Both Berle and Davis would prove to be
valuable allies to Welles in the years ahead.
As the months passed, Welles and Hull executed an informal 
division of departmental responsibilities. Welles would run the 
day-to-day operations of the department, handle most personnel 
matters, oversee inter-American affairs and have a strong 
influence over European matters. Hull attempted to direct 
American policy in East Asia (although Welles intruded even 
there), handled relations with Congress and struggled to keep 
abreast of events in the rest of the world. Welles had thus 
succeeded in achieving the kind of unequal division of the
spoils that Hull, Moore and Bullitt had originally feared. 19
* * *
Welles next began seeking a way for Washington to play a 
more active diplomatic role in averting the coming world 
crisis. He feared that continued threats to the global
equilibrium would be injurious to American interests. This goal 
dovetailed with Roosevelt's halting attempts during the first 
half of 1937 to find a way to loosen the isolationist hold on 
the country. To that end, Welles thought the administration 
should make clear to the world that the United States would not 
merely stand aside, but would instead act affirmatively to 
prevent another w a r . 20 welles proposed ways of restoring a sense 
of international order during a nationally-broadcast speech 
from the University of Virginia at Charlottesville on July 7, 
1937. The very day of Welles's speech, the world crisis had 
escalated when fighting broke out between Japanese and Chinese 
troops ten miles west of P e k i n g .  21 in his speech, Welles 
outlined ways for the United States to contribute to world
19 Graham H. Stuart The Department of State. 328-330; "Summary," Under Secretary Welles file, Overall 
History of Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, War History 
Branch Studies, 4E3,6/29/D, box 1, Record Group 59, National Archives.
20 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 8.
21 "Present Aspects of World Peace," by Sumner Welles, July 7, 1937, speech files, box 194, folder 10, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
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peace without violating the provisions of the neutrality laws. 
He expanded upon the concept of America's vital interests by 
reminding the assemblage, as well as the nationwide listening 
audience, that if war broke out anywhere in the world the 
United States could not long stay clear of its consequences. 
Implying that the inter-American system offered a suitable 
model for emulation, he laid down four points upon which the 
United States might take the lead. These included the 
establishment of a set of vaguely Wilsonian "international 
standards," the reduction of global trade barriers, the 
limitation of armaments and the regular convening of 
international conferences. His address caught the attention of 
officials in London and Paris but met with little enthusiasm in 
his own state department. 22
Throughout 1937 Roosevelt and Welles sought to focus the 
nation's attention on the increasing dangers of the world 
situation. The president told Welles he had been immensely 
pleased by the United States's active role at the December 1936 
Inter-American conference in Buenos Aires, where the delegates 
pledged collective action if the peace of the hemisphere was 
threatened. Roosevelt thoroughly enjoyed what had amounted to 
his debut on the international stage. He and Welles shared the 
desire to pursue a more assertive role in world affairs, and 
during his first summer as under secretary, Welles and the 
president began discussing the possibility of erecting a naval 
barrier, or "quarantine," around Japan if she continued her 
threatening behavior toward China. When Welles departed for his 
annual visit to Europe in the late summer of 1937, Roosevelt 
asked him to broach secretly with various European officials 
their receptivity to a possible U.S. peace initiative. 
Roosevelt was still smarting over the hostile reaction to his 
court-packing fight. He wanted to avoid further controversy in 
the immediate future, but he continued to seek to play a role 
on the international stage.23
22 FO 371/20808, July 9,1937, minute by Eden, British Public Record Office, PRO; FO 371/20666, Lindsay to 
Foreign Office, July 10,1937, PRO.
23 Welles to Sam Rosenman, June 17,1949, box 140, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; Sumner Welles, Seven 
Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 71-72; Washington S ta r. September 13, 1937; 
Baltimore Sun. September 11,1937.
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A presidential address in Chicago in the autumn of 1937 
offered such an opportunity. With Welles still overseas, Norman 
Davis prepared a speech for Roosevelt which hinted at the
possibility of taking a firmer foreign policy than the 
administration had previously taken. On October 5, an estimated
750.000 people lined the streets of Chicago to see Roosevelt 
make his way in the back seat of an open car to the dedication
ceremonies for Chicago's Outer Link Bridge, where another
500.000 waited to hear his remarks.24 Keeping his comments about 
the dedication brief, he then called upon the United States to 
play a leading role in organizing the other nations of the
world to secure peace, making this address, hereafter known as 
the "quarantine speech," one of the most controversial he had 
ever delivered. "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to 
spread," he said, "the community approves and joins in a 
quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of 
the community against the spread of the disease." The president 
warned that because another war would "engulf states and
peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities," 
Washington would become active in the search for peace. These 
seemingly innocuous words had great significance, for only a 
year before during a campaign stop at Chautauqua, New York, 
Roosevelt had virtually endorsed the isolationist cause.25
Welles returned from Europe only a few days before the 
quarantine speech and he shared the sentiment behind it, later 
describing it as "something you could get your teeth into."2^ 
Roosevelt had been somewhat surprised by the degree of
criticism the address provoked and Welles lamented that within
the cabinet only Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau and Henry 
Wallace expressed their support. Welles thought the speech 
offered an opportunity to restore international equilibrium and 
thus sought to keep the momentum going by drafting a more
24 The New York Times. October 6, 1937; Welles to Sam Rosenman, June 17,1949, box 140, folder 7, Welles 
papers, FDRL.
25 "Outerlink Bridge Dedication," October 5, 1937, FDR Speech Files, #1093, FDRL; Chautauqua Address, 
August 14,1936, FDR Speech Files, #889, FDRL; The New York Times. October 6 ,1937.
26 Welles. Seven Decisions. 13.
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specific plan of action.27
The following day, October 6, Welles proposed that the 
president host diplomatic representatives from all nations at 
the White House on Armistice Day 1937 —  only one month away —  
and then urge adherence to "basic standards of international 
law" which would restore "world order." The president would 
then call for sweeping arms reductions, the lowering of 
international trade barriers and the unity of the neutral 
powers in quarantining aggressor nations. Welles's suggestions 
followed the points made in his July 1937 speech from 
Charlottesville. He hoped the proposal would send a message to 
the world that the United States was prepared to play a more 
assertive role in world affairs, even going so far as to seek a 
revision of the Versailles settlement. 28 But his proposal 
provoked opposition from Hull who said he would soon offer his 
own suggestions for pursuing the aims expressed in Roosevelt's 
speech. Hull believed the president should avoid doing anything 
which might alarm the great powers or disturb public opinion at 
home. 29
The president nevertheless encouraged Welles to proceed. 
Welles told Roosevelt that while the plan would "definitely 
strengthen the hands of the powers that are seeking to avert 
world anarchy" its references to "the probable need for 
readjustment of the settlements arrived at after the conclusion 
of the World War would, I think, almost inevitably create a 
favorable reaction on the part of G e r m a n y .  "30 The president
27 Memorandum by Welles, October 6, 1937, President’s  Secretary's Files 76, FDRL; Welles, Seven 
Decisions. 13-18. For an interpretation of the Welles plan which argues that it was an alternative to Roosevelt's 
quarantine speech, see  Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), 412-413. That the president had a specific plan in mind, one consistent with 
Welles's proposal, see  John McVickar Haight, Jr. "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a  Naval Quarantine of Japan," 
Pacific Historical Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (May 1971), 203.
28 Welles later argued that the plan sought to assist the ongoing Brussels conference (see Welles, Time For 
Decision. 65) but a t the time Welles told the president that the plan "should be dealt with independently of any 
other conference, consultation, or exchange of views." See Welles to Roosevelt, October 9, 1937, President's 
Secretary’s  File 76, FDRL. Arnold Offner and Frederick Marks see  the Welles plan as part of a  larger policy of 
American appeasem ent during these years. See Arnold Offner, "Appeasement Revisited: The United States, 
Great Britain, and Germany, 1933-1940." Journal of American History, vol. 64, no. 2 (September 1977), 379, 
and Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany. 1933-1938 (New York: 
Norton, 1969), 191-192; as  well a s  Frederick Marks, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 136-137.
29 ibid; Welles to Roosevelt, October 6, 1937, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, 
October 9,1937, PSF 76, FDRL; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 547-548; Welles, Seven Decisions. 23-27.
30 w elles to Roosevelt, October 26,1937, PSF 76, FDRL.
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endorsed Welles's plan because it appeared to offer a middle 
way to continue the quest for peace without military or 
political commitments that could antagonize congress and the 
isolationist elements of the press and public. "From the 
standpoint of public opinion at home," Welles wrote to 
Roosevelt, "I would think that your making this proposal four 
days before the opening of the Special Session of Congress 
would put a very definite quietus upon those individuals who 
have been deliberately attempting to misinterpret your Chicago 
s p e e c h . "3i Welles drafted an address for the president to 
deliver at the Armistice Day gathering, laying out the plan's 
essential points.32 "If we get out of this business without a 
war," Adolf Berle confided in his diary, "it will be 
principally due to Sumner. He is the only one who apparently 
keeps his head working aside from his emotions."33
Welles understood that the plan still had numerous 
obstacles to overcome, particularly within his own department. 
To bring Hull to his point of view, Welles enlisted the help of 
Norman Davis, who enjoyed Hull's confidence. Welles hoped that 
Davis's support and encouragement might induce Hull to lessen 
his opposition, so Welles arranged to have Davis sit with Hull 
during his presentation to the secretary on the details of the 
plan. 34 Hull expressed no opposition to the plan during 
Welles's briefing but privately he thought the plan "thoroughly 
unrealistic" and "illogical and impossible" and sought to 
obstruct it by demanding that the British be consulted. Hull 
worried that to "spring" the plan on London and Paris without 
warning might seriously jeopardize their efforts to appease 
Hitler and Mussolini. As Hull later remarked, "Welles kept
31 Ibid.
32 In the statement he prepared for the president, Welles wrote, "It Is possible that before the foundations of a  
lasting peace can be secured, international adjustments of various kinds must be found in order to remove 
those inequities which exist by reason of the nature of certain of the settlements reached at the termination of 
the Great War." See Welles to Roosevelt: "Draft Proposal for Concerted International effort to Reach Common 
Agreement on the Principles of International Conduct Necessary to Maintain Peace," October 26,1937, FRUS. 
I, 668-670.
33 Welles's original notes for "Welles plan", October 1937, box 162, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to 
Roosevelt: "Draft Proposal for Concerted International effort to Reach Common Agreement on the Principles of 
International Conduct Necessary to Maintain Peace," October 26, 1937, FRUS. I, 668-670; Berle Diary, 
October 13,1937, box 210, Berle Papers, FDRL.
34 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions. 20-21.
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pushing the President on, while I kept urging him to go 
slow. "3S
Hull's objections succeeded in stalling Welles's plan, 
and several weeks passed before the president could once again 
give it his full consideration.36 After being counseled by 
Norman Davis in January 1938, the president, while keeping 
Hull's misgivings in mind, decided to revive a slightly amended 
version of Welles's Plan. Hull still opposed calling a 
conference of any kind and instead argued for a new trade 
treaty with Britain. Welles objected to Hull's approach, 
arguing that it overlooked the fact that the political 
questions involved were just as important as the economic ones. 
But Hull stuck to his position that, if the economic problems 
were resolved, the political questions would soon follow. To 
Hull's dismay, Roosevelt sided with Welles. "I understand the 
President backs Sumner's plan," Berle wrote. "I agree with 
Sumner in this, though it is not a clear case: there are
dangers either way, but I think less by following Sumner's plan 
than by taking the Secretary's view . . . ."3?
To obstruct the latest version of Welles's proposal, Hull 
repeated his demand that Welles seek the support of London 
before proceeding with any plans for an international 
conference. Welles feared that Prime Minister Chamberlain would 
oppose the plan, but he proceeded to arrange a series of 
meetings with British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay. Welles 
knew it would be difficult to sell the plan to the British. 
Writing to Bullitt in Paris, Welles had already warned that 
"Lindsay told me in a confidential vein, which, as you know, is 
a vein quite rare with him, that he felt his own Foreign Office 
had for some little time been verging upon a state of hysteria, 
and that Chamberlain was more than ever determined to conduct 
foreign policy himself without the intromission of the F.O."33
In an effort to win British support for the his proposal,
35 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 547-548; “Cordell Hull," by Donald Drummond, in Norman Graebner, ed, An 
Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), 
200.
36 Berle Diary, December 2,1937, box 210, Berle Papers, FDRL; Welles memorandum to Roosevelt, January 
10, 1937 [actually 1938], FRUS. 1938, vol. I 115-17.
37 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. 1,546-549; Berle Diary, February 7,1938, box 211, Berle Papers, FDRL.
33 Welles to Bullitt, December 1,1937, box 39, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL.
45
Welles dined with Lindsay on the evening of January 11 and
explained Roosevelt's enthusiasm for the plan. He told Lindsay
of the president's concern over the deteriorating world
situation and his desire to work more closely with London to
align world opinion behind the plan. Welles said Roosevelt
believed that the international situation was now sufficiently
dangerous that it presented the opportunity to move American
public opinion. Lindsay, apparently convinced, told the foreign
office that Welles's plan offered "a genuine effort to relax
the tension of the world, to stop the prevalent deterioration
and to restore the influence of the democracies." Lindsay hoped
his government would get behind the proposal as a way of gently
influencing American public opinion.39 But the plan met with
considerable opposition in London, where British officials were
already somewhat wary of Welles. The foreign office had
recently protested what it interpreted as Welles's public
characterizations of the British and French as being largely
responsible for the current breakdown of international comity,
and Chamberlain harbored concerns that Welles's plan had the
real, if unstated, intention of eliminating the imperial
preference system. Worse still, Germany and Italy might get
wind of Welles's plan and seek to exploit those features that
might be contrary to British interests. Chamberlain's
suspicions may also have been fueled by the circulation of the
foreign office's secret annex of its profile of Welles, which
warned that Welles was "an intriguer and a rather hard-boiled
individual. . . .  He is unlikely to use his influence at the
State Department in furtherance of the ideal of Anglo-American
intimacy."40 on the other hand, British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden supported Welles's plan, fearing that its
rejection would be an injurious setback to the cause of better
Anglo-American relations. Eden feared the consequences if
Chamberlain completely scuttled the plan and he noted in his
diary that one of the prime minister's "chief objections to
Roosevelt's initiative was that with its strong reference to
39 Welles memorandum to Roosevelt, January 10, 1937 [1938], FRUS. vol. I, 115-17; Chamberlain to 
Roosevelt, January 14, 1938, ibid, 120-22; Welles draft of Roosevelt to Chamberlain, January 17, 1938, ibid, 
126-30; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 624.
49 Memorandum by Welles, October 6, 1937, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL; CAB 23/92 (38) 1, 
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International Law it would greatly irritate the dictator 
powers."41 Sir Alexander Cadogan, the deputy under secretary at 
the foreign office, noted that Chamberlain "hates" Roosevelt's 
plan, " . . .  but I tried to point out that we mustn't snub 
him." Writing to the prime minister, Cadogan added: "FDR's
readiness to enter the arena is obviously a fact of the first 
importance, and I should say that we must not discourage him, 
although the prospects of the success of his system are 
problematical and the risks, maybe great."42
In any event, Chamberlain directed Ambassador Lindsay to 
inform Welles that the British wanted a postponement of his 
proposal, to which Welles protested vigorously. The under 
secretary continued to have an ally in Eden.43 The foreign 
secretary went to great lengths to defend Welles's plan, 
explaining its details to the cabinet in late January, and 
fearing the "alienation of popular opinion in the U.S." But 
Chamberlain replied that the American plan offered "nothing 
new" other than merely "old principles" which the prime 
minister feared would "most likely be unpalatable to the 
Dictator States" and would undermine any attempt "to bring 
about world appeasement."44 "What a fool Roosevelt would have 
looked if he had launched his precious proposal," the prime 
minister later wrote. "What would he have thought of us if we 
had encouraged him to publish it, as Anthony was so eager to 
do? And how we, too, would have made ourselves the laughing 
stock of the world."45 Chamberlain's rejection of Welles's plan 
had important consequences in London. Within a few weeks, Eden 
resigned from the cabinet, ostensibly over the prime minister's 
appeasement of Italy, but also, as Eden explained in his 
memoirs, over Chamberlain's refusal to take Welles's plan more
41 Eden, Facing the Dictators. 634-636.
42 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. 1938-1945, David Dilks, ed. (London: Cassell, 1972), 36; FO 
371/21526, Cadogan to Chamberlain, January 12,1938, PRO.
43 Eden said of Welles that he had “known no man in the United States who had a  clearer perception than he of 
the course of international diplomacy in the last years before the second world war." Eden, Facing the 
Dictators, 645.
44 Eden, Facing the Dictators. 624, 635; CAB 23/92 (38) 1, January 24, 1938, PRO; CAB 23/92 (38) 6, 
February 19,1938, PRO.
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seriously.46
The prime minister's response greatly disappointed 
Roosevelt and Welles, both of whom viewed it as a crippling 
setback to their effort to move public opinion and have the 
U.S. play a larger role on the world stage. Welles later called 
Chamberlain's opposition a "douche of cold water," but after 
the war he would place most of the blame on Hull. "The truth 
is," Welles wrote a decade later to Roosevelt's former
speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, "the failure of that first
attempt of President Roosevelt to exert American influence in 
Europe as a means of arresting the rapid disintegration that 
was then going on was due far more to Mr. Hull than to Mr. 
Chamberlain."4? Years later, Welles summarized his differences
with Hull over the plan when he wrote that "the Secretary of 
State was temperamentally disposed to put off dealing with 
controversial issues as long as possible. He preferred not to 
cross the proverbial bridge until he came to it. A remedial
policy was to him preferable to a preventive policy, even 
though, as events so often showed, a preventive policy adopted 
at the psychological moment and carried out with decision and 
dispatch might later save a world of remedy."48
Winston Churchill would later describe the Welles plan as 
the "last frail chance to save the world from tyranny otherwise 
than by war."49 Churchill's comment is exaggerated. Had 
Welles's plan proceeded it most likely would have been 
disregarded by Berlin, just like every other diplomatic 
proposal made during these years. Nevertheless, the plan might 
have had some success shifting U.S. public opinion, and it 
might have allowed the president a greater role in pushing U.S.
46 Winston Churchill, The Second World W ar, vol. 1,199; Anthony Eden. Facing the Dictators. 560; for another 
account asserting that Chamberlain's opposition to Welles's plan led to Eden's resignation, see  also Stephen 
Roskill, Hankev: Man of Secrets, vol. III. 1931-1963. pp. 298-299, 300, 302. Eden's efforts on behalf of 
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Wallace, Henry Morgenthau, Woodrow Wilson's widow, Edith, and William C. Bullitt. Interestingly enough, the 
press in both Britain and the United States often referred to Welles as an “American Anthony Eden."
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48 Welles. Seven Decisions. 134-135.
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participation in efforts to avert the world crisis. Had 
Welles’s plan gone forward and been rejected by Berlin, it 
might have had some success even if it had only increased 
America's psychological commitment to Britain and France.
Welles would later recall the late 1930s —  and the 
administration's inability to act effectively in the 
international arena —  as a "nightmare of impotence and of 
frustration."50 Welles assumed that Hitler's policy was not 
based on long-term planning but on opportunism. He wanted 
Washington to act affirmatively because he thought Hitler would 
continue to read carefully the mood of the other great powers 
before determining how far he could push. Welles held to the 
belief that a demonstration of allied unity might give Hitler 
reason to pause.si
At a number of times during 1938 and 1939, Welles sought 
to revive his proposal for an international peace conference, 
particularly during the Munich crisis in September 1938 and 
again after Germany annexed Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. 
But events in Europe now had their own momentum and for the 
most part officials in Washington merely watched from the 
s i d e l i n e s .  S2 The Welles plan thus represented the most 
concentrated effort by the United States to reduce world 
tensions prior to the outbreak of war.
On the night of September 2, 1939, only a day after
Hitler had launched his invasion of Poland, British Ambassador 
Lord Lothian dined with Welles at Oxon Hill and told the under 
secretary that London would declare war the following day. 
Welles's immediate focus was not on Europe, but on the western 
hemisphere, where he sought to revive the Monroe Doctrine to 
safeguard the hemisphere. He acted at once to organize an 
inter-American conference in Panama, hoping to obtain 
hemispheric approval for policies designed to keep the war as
50 Sumner Welles. Seven Decisions. 1.
51 Welles to Joseph E. Davies, March 21,1938, box 45, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
52 Welles to Steve Early, March 29, 1939, President's Secretary File 76, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, March 
29, 1939, President's Secretary's File 7, FDRL; Welles draft of Roosevelt speech on Czech crisis, March 29, 
1939, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL. For accounts arguing that Roosevelt's policies had almost no 
effect on German foreign policy during these years, see  Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's 
Germany: Starting the Second World War. 1937-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and E.M. 
Robertson, "Hitler's Planning for War and the Response of the Great Powers," in Aspects of the Third Reich. 
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far as possible from the Americas. Welles had received alarming 
intelligence reports of German work on a bomber capable of 
attacking the Americas from the Azores. In strategic terms, 
Welles believed the security of the United States was 
intimately linked to the safety of the western hemisphere and 
its adjacent waters.53
Borrowing a concept from Wilson's World War I diplomacy, 
the state department created a hemispheric security zone to 
keep open the shipping lanes and lines of communication, and 
the president called for an extension of the three-mile limit 
to one thousand miles. "It really does change the status of the 
New World," Berle wrote, "a kind of pax Americana."54 Welles 
then attended the Panama Conference and he saw its proceedings 
and the accompanying declaration which confirmed the United 
States's views on hemispheric security as the capstone of the 
Good Neighbor Policy. Welles thought the new world could teach 
the old world a few lessons about reordering world politics. In 
his speech before the delegates he called on the neutral 
American republics, led by the United States, to show the way 
toward a "reestablishment of a world order based on morality 
and on law" that would restore peace to the old world. "We have 
created an American system," he told the delegates, "an 
American way of life, which is our chief contribution to world 
civilization. "55
* * *
Only a few months after his appointment as under 
secretary, Welles had quickly emerged as a driving force behind 
the administration's reorientation of its foreign policy. The 
main features of Welles's 1937 peace plan —  promoting 
collective security, free trade and the calling of regular 
international conferences —  had been the cornerstones of the
53 Sumner Welles file, "Conferences and Missions: Conference at Panama," overall history of the department 
of state, 4E3,6/29/D, Box 1, RG 59, War History Branch Studies, National Archives; "On the Margin of War," by 
Sumner Welles, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, September 25,1939, speech files, 
box 194, folder 13, Welles papers, FDRL.
54 Berle Diary, August 26,1939, box 210, Berle Papers, FDRL
55 "On the Margin of War," by Sumner Welles, September 25, 1939, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics, speech files, box 194, folder 13, Welles papers, FDRL
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Good Neighbor Policy. By applying these principles to the 
international crisis, Welles had sought to transfer them to a 
larger stage. But he faced opposition from the British and a 
lack of enthusiasm in his own department. Furthermore, the plan 
had other problems. Welles's aims needed to be tempered by 
political realities, for even if the British acquiesced there 
were no guarantees the American people would have given their 
support. Isolationism remained strong. But while Welles and 
Roosevelt retreated for a time, they would continue to search 
for ways for Washington to play a more active role in the world 
crisis and Welles would continue to speak publicly about 
creating "a new world order" based upon the rhetoric of the 
Good Neighbor Policy and his "American system." What neither 
Roosevelt nor Welles realized —  and failed to realize until 
the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940 
—  was that the opportunity for a diplomatic solution to the 
crisis had long since passed.
* * *
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CHAPTER THREE 
Creating War and Peace AiJns:
The Welles Mission, the Atlantic Conference 
and the Origins of Postwar Planning* 1939-1941
In the autumn of 1939, when the war in Europe was still in 
its first few weeks, Welles already had his mind focused on 
planning the peace that would follow. Soon after the outbreak 
of war in Europe, Welles sought to promote a peaceful 
resolution of the war without violating the provisions of the 
neutrality acts and moved to the forefront of the 
administration in expressing his belief in the war's potential 
to bring about an American-led new order. Like many of those 
who recalled President Wilson's efforts to reorder 
international relations, Welles believed the very lack of such 
early planning during the last war had led to the chaos of the 
Paris Peace Conference. He thus wanted to begin immediately 
planning for the postwar world.
By embarking upon postwar planning in 1939, Welles sought 
to avoid the confusion that had characterized American efforts 
a generation ago. But the president remained cautious of 
getting too far ahead of public opinion and within his own 
administration he received divided counsel- Several officials, 
such as Hull, feared that premature discussion of postwar 
planning would immediately resurrect the Bitter controversies 
that had surrounded the League debate. Welles felt otherwise. A 
few weeks after the outbreak of war, he asked Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, the director of the Council on Foreign Relations, to 
produce a number of studies about postwar planning and make 
them available to the department. Welles worked closely with 
Armstrong and took a personal interest in the selection of the 
council's postwar planning research staff-1 Furthermore, in 
November 1939 state department planner Harley Notter suggested 
Washington immediately embark upon "the planning of a better 
peace than followed the last war" and he sent Welles a proposal 
outlining plans for an investigation of the problems of postwar
1 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York" Marper, 1950), 180; Harley Notter, 
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. 1939-1945 (Washington: U.S. Departm ent of State, 1949), 19.
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peace. Welles strongly agreed with Notter's proposal that 
departmental planning should begin at once. After a number of 
discussions with state department officials, Welles suggested 
to Hull that they launch an official postwar planning 
operation.2
For guidance, Welles looked to the Wilsonian precedent of 
the so-called "Inquiry,” where President Wilson and Colonel 
Edward House assembled a group of experts to study the war aims 
of the great powers and formulate American policies. House and 
Wilson had excluded congressional representation and state 
department personnel from the panel and instead looked to the 
worlds of academia and journalism.3 Notter believed the absence 
of formal planning in the state department had forced President 
Wilson to rely too strongly on the services of House and his 
Inquiry. Notter argued that because the Inquiry had operated 
outside the state department, it had "greatly and unfavorably 
affected the effectiveness and the prestige of the Department 
of State, and to varying degrees the whole Executive, in regard 
to the making of peace." Notter added that due to America's 
potential to tilt the world balance of power, it would be 
impossible for the United States to stand aloof from the 
peacemaking process in the current war. "In fact," Notter 
noted, "it would seem desirable from the standpoint of our 
national interests that we should participate in that peace 
construction."4
Welles agreed with Notter's assessment that a major flaw 
of Colonel House's investigation had been its exclusion of the 
state department and congressional representation, and that the 
Inquiry had not been created early enough to give it sufficient 
time to look into the complex problems of shaping the postwar 
world. Furthermore, he believed the Inquiry and the state
2 "Memorandum on United States Participation in Peacemaking at the End of the War," by Harley Notter, 
November 13,1939, box 54, folder 14, Welles papers, FDRL; "Division for the Study of Problems of Peace and 
Reconstruction," by Harley Notter, December 12, 1939, Appendix 1, in Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy. 453- 
454.
3 "Memorandum on the House Inquiry," July 15, 1941, box 8, Notter files, RG 59, National Archives. Colonel 
House enlisted Isaiah Bowman, head of the American Geographical Society, Archibald Carey Coolidge, a  
professor of history at Harvard, and the journalist, Walter Lippmann.
4 "Memorandum on United States Participation in Peacemaking at the End of the War," by Harley Notter, 
November 13, 1939, box 54, folder 14, Welles papers, FDRL; Stanley Hombeck memorandum to Welles, 
November 22,1939, box 54, folder 14, Welles papers, FDRL.
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department had often worked at cross purposes.6 Thus, a few 
days before the end of 1939, Welles and Hull created an 
"Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations" to 
explore the possibility of peace terms and to study postwar 
recovery. Unlike the Inquiry, this new committee would function 
squarely within the department and would have three 
subcommittees, one focusing on political problems, another on 
limiting arms and a third studying postwar economic problems. 
The subcommittees would handle much of the work and present the 
advisory committee with recommendations. According to state 
department officials, the planning committees would seek to 
"survey the basic principles which should underlie a desirable 
world order to be evolved after the termination of present 
hostilities, with primary reference to the best interests of 
the United States . . .." The state department planners added 
that in "light of the principles indicated above and of past 
experience, [the committee would] determine policies which 
should be pursued by the United States in furtherance of the 
establishment of such a world order, both as a basis of our own 
action and of our attempts to influence other nations . . .." 
Thus, roughly two years before the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, state department planners, guided by the active 
encouragement and participation of Welles, began to study the 
prospect of shaping a postwar order which would be commensurate 
with American interests.6
Meeting for the first time in January 1940, the Welles- 
chaired "Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations" 
had a vague enough title to avoid raising the suspicions of 
Congress or the public. Concern still existed in the state 
department that rumors or leaks about the committee might 
arouse opposition. The committee thus issued a public statement 
explaining its functions. The statement differed significantly 
from the department's secret discussions, as any mention of 
constructing an American-led "world order" after the war was
5 "Division for the Study of Problems of P eace and Reconstruction," December 12, 1939, in Harley Notter, 
Postwar Foreign Policy. 453-54; "Memorandum on the House Inquiry," July 15, 1941, box 8, Notter files, 
National Archives, RG 59, National Archives; Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading?. (New York: Harper, 
1946), 20.
6 "Subcommittee on Economic Problems of the Intradepartmental Committee on Peace and Reconstruction: 
Program of Work," January 3,1940, appendix 2, in Notter, Postwar Foreign Policv.454-455.
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carefully omitted.7
Welles saw his leadership of postwar planning as an 
opportunity to realize his neo-Wilsonian vision of a world 
reordered along lines desired by Washington. He hoped to use 
his membership on the newly formed subcommittee on political 
problems to exert his influence over all aspects of planning. 
In reality, Welles served as the de facto chairman of the 
subcommittee. Its official chairman, New York lawyer George 
Rublee, whom Welles once described to Drew Pearson as "a 
pompous fathead," was usually too ill to attend meetings. 
Welles further consolidated his power when the Subcommittee on 
Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, which had met only once, 
merged with his own subcommittee. Furthermore, he took personal 
responsibility for reporting the activities of the committees 
back to Hull, thus controlling what little information the 
secretary received about the planning process.s
Initially, the committee dusted off the Welles plan of 
1937, as the state department once again began to focus on the 
possibility of organizing the other neutral nations to promote 
peace. The planners considered a conference of forty-seven 
neutrals with invitations later extended to the belligerents. 
Welles's subcommittee on political problems also began 
preliminary discussions on building a new world organization. 
In light of the failures of the League of Nations and the 
relative success of the inter-American system, the committee 
began to consider the prospect of creating a number of smaller, 
regional leagues. But these discussions were merely 
preliminary, and the plan to organize the neutral nations would
7 Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy. 20-21; "Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations: Department of 
State Announcement, January 8,1940," Department of State Bulletin, vol. II, 19.
8 Welles to Pearson, June 8, 1933, box 146, Welles papers, FDRL; Department of State Bulletin, vol. II, 
(January 13,1940), 19; "Under Secretary Welles," Sumner Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, 
Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, 
Record Group 59, National Archives; "Committee on Peace and Reconstruction," box 191, Postwar Foreign 
Policy file, 1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; "Subcommittee: Organization of Peace," January 3, 1940, 
box 191, Postwar Foreign Policy files, 1940-41, Welles papers, FDRL; "Memorandum on World Order," by Hugh 
Wilson, January 22,1940, box 191, Postwar Foreign Policy files, 1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL.
55
soon be overtaken by the events of the war.9
At the beginning of 1940, Roosevelt and Welles sought to
pursue a number of efforts to promote an American-brokered
peace. Roosevelt wanted it made clear that he was prepared to 
act as a mediator to "reduce and reconcile" the world conflict. 
He thus gave further consideration to reviving the Welles plan 
of 1937, where international arms control and economic
stability would be the chief aims of an international 
conference, and where the neutrals might consider acting as a 
mediating body between the belligerents. 1(> But by far the most 
important move of Roosevelt's winter of 1939-1940 peace
offensive was the decision to send Welles on a mission to 
Europe. The president had a number of reasons for choosing 
Welles for such a task. Welles's knowledge of the issues, his 
close relationship with the president, his leadership of 
postwar planning and his willingness to go outside the normal 
bounds of authority made him the logical choice for the 
mission. Perhaps most importantly, Roosevelt and Welles shared 
a desire to establish an American claim to participation in any 
future peace settlement. Quite apart from the president's faith 
in Welles, Roosevelt was also fond of such bold moves, later 
telling Breckinridge Long that the idea for the Welles mission 
"came to him as an impulse."ii
The postwar planning committees had accomplished little in 
their first few weeks because Welles's impending mission to 
Europe and the overall pressures of the war made more specific
9 Pasvolsky to Welles, January 29, 1940, box 155, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; "The Bases of an 
International Economic Program in Connection with a Possible Conference of Neutrals," by Leo Pasvolsky, 
January 29, 1940, box 155, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; "Memorandum by Hugh R. Wilson Arising From 
Conversation in Mr. Welles's Office, April 19 and April 26," May 1,1940, box 191, postwar files, 1940-41, folder
7, Welles papers, FDRL; "Subcommittee: Organization of Peace," January 3, 1940, box 191, postwar files, 
1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; "Memorandum on World Order," by Hugh Wilson, January 22, 1940, 
box 191, postwar files, 1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL.
10 Welles to Roosevelt, January 12, 1940, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, 
February 1,1940, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL.
11 "Mission to Europe." Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, 
Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, 
Record Group 59, National Archives, 44; Breckinridge Long Diary, March 12,1940, box 5, Long Papers, Library 
of Congress. Roosevelt may also have been seeking a bold move to aid him in his efforts to secure an 
unprecedented third presidential term. See, for example, Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again: A 
President Runs For a  Third Term (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 31-34, as well as Bernard F. Donahoe, Private 
Plans and Public Dangers: The Story of FDR's Third Nomination (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1965).
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planning difficult. This was the period of the "phony war" and 
Welles hoped that the current lull in the fighting might offer 
an opportunity to seek a peaceful resolution. But his mission 
was also indelibly linked to postwar concerns. Welles remained 
concerned that the world powers might achieve a settlement 
inconsistent with U.S. interests. He would thus discuss with 
European leaders a series of vague proposals which resembled
his 1937 peace program, complete with its call for disarmament,
its promotion of free trade, and equitable access to the
world's resources. Furthermore, Welles would emphasize the 
postwar restructuring of the world and his reports back to the 
president would underscore the prospects for creating a world 
order more favorable to Washington's aims. 12
Welles and Roosevelt thus sought to exploit the
opportunity presented by the "phony war" to explore the 
possibilities of a resolution. It is possible, as some have 
argued, 13 that even at this late date Welles sought a revision 
of the Versailles settlement that would have appeased several 
German aims, while at the same time seeking to sooth allied 
opinion through arms control and the reconstitution of some 
form of a "rump" Czechoslovakia and a "rump" Poland. Welles 
certainly went to Europe seeking to explore the contours of 
what might be the basis of a potential settlement (particularly 
from the Axis powers, whose aims and positions were less clear 
to Washington) and he would have been elated had he been able 
to achieve a Wilsonian "peace without victory" in Europe. That 
failing, Welles had other, more practical, goals: namely, to 
explore the depth of the Rome-Berlin axis and consider what 
measures might be taken to weaken Mussolini's commitment to 
Hitler. 14 At the very least, the mission might subtly aid the
12 Pasvolsky to Welles, February 14, 1940, box 155, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; "The B ases of the 
Economic Foreign Policy of the United States," February 1940, box 155, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL; Hull to 
Welles, February 15,1940, box 155, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL
13 See, for example, Frederick W. Marks, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1988), 153-160; Arnold A. Offner, "Appeasement Revisited: The United States, 
Great Britain, and Germany, 1933-1940." Journal of American History, vol. 64, no. 2 (September 1977): 384- 
393; William Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1952), 363-370.
14 See Stanley E. Hilton, "The Welles Mission to Europe, February-March 1940: Illusion or Realism?' Journal 
of American History, vol. 58, no. 1 (June 1971), 93-120. That the Italians might still have been wooed over to 
the allied side, even a s  late as  the phony war, see  Jam es J. Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat Reappraising 
Italy's Role in World War II." Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 24, no. 1 (January 1989), 30.
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allied powers by delaying a German offensive in the west. 
Welles and Roosevelt worried that Hitler was preparing a 
massive spring offensive against the western allies. They hoped 
the mission might cause a delay in the Fuhrer's war plans, or 
even avert a German offensive altogether. They thought even a 
brief delay would benefit the allies by allowing them more time 
to supply their armies and build up their d e f e n s e s .is
Furthermore, Welles feared that the stakes now included 
more than a mere reshuffling of European boundaries and 
colonial spoils and that continuation of the war would increase 
the risks to U.S. interests. Worse still, Berlin's domination 
of Europe could lead to German economic penetration of the 
western hemisphere, thus undermining Welles's efforts to 
safeguard the Pax Americana. Roosevelt and Welles may have had 
fears that Prime Minister Chamberlain might seek an Anglo- 
German agreement that would, in effect, exclude the United 
States from trade and business opportunities in Europe, Africa 
and Latin America.16 "It will be a very important trip —  that 
is, it may be," Breckinridge Long noted in his diary. "If 
Sumner can find any willingness on the part of the various 
responsible officials of any of those Governments to cease 
hostilities, it will be important, but if he does not find any 
such situation, it will probably mean that the war will 
continue on ad infinitum. "i?
A Wilsonian precedent existed for sending Welles on the 
mission to Europe. On the eve of the First World War, Wilson 
had sent Colonel House to Europe to assess the general war 
situation. House and Wilson sensed an opportunity for the 
United States to play a leading role in resolving European 
tensions and both men sought to convince the European powers to 
accept American mediation. Opponents of Roosevelt's foreign
15 See Welles's introduction in the English-language edition of Ciano's diaries, Hugh Gibson, ed., Ciano's 
Diaries. 1939-1943 (Garden City: Doubleday,1946); a s  well a s  Hilton, ibid, 115, 120, and Frederick Marks, 
Wind Over Sand. 155.
16 “Relations with the President," Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles file, Overall History of Department 
of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 
6/29/D, box 1, Record Group 59, National Archives; Roosevelt statement to press on Welles Mission, February 
9,1940, Department of State  Bulletin. II, 155; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 
73-74.
17 Breckinridge Long Diary, January 4, 1940, March 12, 1940, box 5, Long Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress
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policy jumped on this Wilsonian parallel, charging that House 
had dragged the neutral United States into the war and that 
Welles might do the s a m e .is "The United States will not be 
minding its own business," lamented California Senator Hiram 
Johnson, "if it sends . . . Welles to Europe as a roving
listening post." is
Preparing for the mission, Welles drafted Roosevelt's 
letters of introduction to Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and 
Daladier, assuring the foreign leaders that the special envoy 
would report only to Roosevelt and Hull while avoiding public 
pronouncements and leaks to the p r e s s . 20 The president told 
Breckinridge Long that the Welles mission "could not do any 
harm" and would help learn more about the views of Mussolini 
and Hitler. Secretary Hull disagreed. He felt that Welles had 
once again usurped him by lobbying the president about the 
mission, and that it would raise undue hopes for a settlement, 
rekindle fears of American intervention and run the risk of 
angering the isolationists. Hull continued to believe that the 
best course for Washington was the pursuit of bilateral trade 
negotiations. 21
Prior to his departure, Welles learned that William 
Bullitt had been responsible for fueling much of the press 
criticism of the mission. Bullitt thought himself mandated by 
the president to report on the general European scene and he 
deeply resented Welles’s interference. Breckinridge Long noted 
that Welles "told me that the stories in the press which were 
so critical of him and indicated that he and the Secretary had 
had some dispute on the subject of his mission had all emanated 
from the vitriolic tongue of Bill Bullitt and that Bullitt had 
taken the trouble to go to the Capitol and to talk to a number 
of Senators and that they arranged a story of this nature to go
18 Roosevelt Statem ent February 9, 1940, PSF 76, FDRL; "Mission to Europe," Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, Harold F. Gosnell, Division of Historical Policy 
Research, Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, Record Group 59, National 
Archives, 44; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during 
World War I (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991), 35-36.
19 Life, February 19,1940; Chicago Tribune. February 10,1940.
20 Welles draft of Roosevelt letter to Chamberlain, February 14,1940, President's Secretary's File 76, FDRL.
21 Breckinridge Long Diary, March 12, 1940, box 5, Long Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; 
Mario Rossi, Roosevelt and the French (Westport: Greenwood, 1993), 35; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. I, 737- 
739; Newsweek. February 19,1940.
59
to Chicago and to appear in the Chicago papers so that it would 
not have the earmarks of a Washington story."22
Welles left for Europe with U.S. Steel’s Myron Taylor, who 
was bound for the Vatican as the president's special envoy to 
the Vatican, raising speculation that Pope Pius XII might be 
urged to help broker a Welles-designed peace plan. "[Welles] is 
off on what looks to me like one of the most difficult and 
unhappy trips a man ever started on," Adolf Berle confided in 
his diary. "The Chicago Tribune is sending along a man to write 
him up as unpleasantly as possible and make political capital 
against the Administration."23
Welles arrived in Italy on February 22, 1940. At that
point in the war Rome was still a neutral capital, and Welles 
hoped he could successfully prevent Italy from entering the war 
on the side of the Germans. He assumed that France would have a 
greater chance of survival if Hitler could be prevented from 
obtaining the political and military support of Mussolini. 
Welles met with Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign 
Minister who also happened to be Mussolini's son-in-law. Welles 
explained the need for a free trade regime and disarmament. He 
interpreted Ciano's open dislike for the Germans as a signal 
that the Italians might be drawn away from its alliance with 
Berlin. Sensing the possibility of a diplomatic opening during 
his subsequent meeting with Mussolini, Welles went so far as to 
subtly hint at the prospect of Washington's eventual 
recognition of Italian imperial gains in Africa. Welles and 
Mussolini agreed to meet again after Welles's visits to Berlin, 
Paris and London. The warm reception Welles received in Rome 
pleased and surprised him and he began to believe that 
Mussolini might hold the keys to a general settlement.2*
Welles next traveled to Berlin. He was granted a 
remarkable opportunity to observe the Nazi hierarchy up close 
when he was immediately escorted to a meeting with Foreign 
Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, where he presented his ideas for a
22 Time. February 19, 1940; Breckinridge Long Diary, February 17, 1940, box 5, Breckinridge Long Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
23 Newsweek. February 19,1940,16; Berle Diary, February 17,1940, box 211, Berle Papers, FDRL
24 Memorandum of Conversation with Mussolini, by Welles, February 26, 1940, Welles Report, 1940, Part I, 
PSF 6, FDRL; Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries: 1939-1943. February 26,1940 (New York, 1946), 212.
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settlement, such as the promotion of free trade and general 
disarmament. Ribbentrop proceeded to lecture Welles for the 
next two hours. MI have rarely seen a man I disliked more," 
Welles noted of Ribbentrop. Welles also had little success in 
his conversations with Hitler, Goering and H e s s . 25 m  Paris, 
Welles met with Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, cabinet 
minister Paul Reynaud and numerous other French officials. 
Welles sensed a reluctance on the part of the French to discuss 
the prospects for peace without consulting L o n d o n .  26 After
arriving in London, Welles had a series of meetings with
Chamberlain, Halifax and a number of other senior British
statesmen including Eden, Churchill and David Lloyd George, as 
well as an audience with King George VI. Chamberlain's anger at 
the Germans surprised Welles, but before the end of the visit
the prime minister spoke of the possibility of appeasing Berlin 
with colonial concessions in A f r i c a . 27 welles also called at the 
Admiralty to see Winston Churchill, once again the First L o r d . 28 
Upon his return to Italy, Welles met with Pope Pius XII, 
and again with Mussolini and Ciano. Welles still thought 
Mussolini might prove amenable. In his report to the president,
25 Before leaving Germany, Welles had a remarkable interview with Hjalmar Schacht president of the 
Reichbank, who told the envoy of a  plot by a  number of leading German generals to overthrow Hitler. Schacht 
also warned Welles that the atrocities being committed in Poland were "far worse than what was Imagined, a s  to 
beggar description." Memorandum of Conversation with Schacht by Welles, March 3, 1940, Welles Report 
1940, Parti, P S F 6, FDRL
28 Memorandum of Conversation with Chautemps and Bonnet, by Welles, March 8, 1940, Welles Report 
1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL; Memorandum of Conversation with Reynaud, by Welles, March 9, 1940, Welles 
Report 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL; Memorandum of Conversation with Sikorski, by Welles, March 9, 1940, 
Welles Report, 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL; Bullitt, who was highly regarded by the French leadership, did not 
want it to appear that he approved of the mission, and instead sought to snub Welles by leaving Paris. He felt 
slighted that the president sent Welles to confer with the French leaders when he already had a perfectly 
capable representative in Paris. Bullitt told the president that the French harbored serious misgivings about 
Welles's visit, adding that Daladier feared Welles would leave the impression that France and Britain should 
seek a  compromise peace. See Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President. Personal and Secret: Correspondence 
Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 402-403.
27 Memorandum of Conversation with Chamberlain, by Welles, March 13,1940, Welles Report, 1940, Part II, 
PSF 6, FDRL. While dining at Number Ten, Welles took note that the only photograph in one room was of 
Mussolini.
28 Welles was one of the few Americans who remained consistently impervious to Churchill's charms. Welles 
reported to the president "When I was shown into his office Mr. Churchill was sitting in front of a  fire, smoking a  
24-inch cigar, drinking a whiskey and soda. It was quite obvious that he had consumed a  good many whiskeys 
before I arrived." After the preliminary courtesies, Churchill proceeded, like Ribbentrop two weeks before, to 
speak without interruption for the next two hours. “I was never given an opportunity to say a word," Welles 
reported. "It would have impressed me more had I not already read his book Step bv Step (of which incidentally, 
he gave me an autographed copy before I left) and of which his address to me constituted a  rehash." See the 
unedited version of Welles's report in Memorandum of Conversation with Churchill, by Welles, March 12,1940, 
Welles Report 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL.
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Welles explained that Italian policy was dominated by 
Mussolini, who sought nothing less than "the re-creation of the 
Roman Empire."29 Welles assumed that Mussolini wanted to play 
the French and British off against the Germans in the hope that 
they would engage in competitive bidding for concessions to 
Italy, but he noted that "there is no doubt in any one's mind 
that if Mussolini gives the word, the Italian Army will enter 
the war on the German side." Welles suggested the United States 
seek to improve relations between Washington and Rome in an 
effort to wean Mussolini away from the Germans. "In my 
considered judgment a close relationship with Italy today is 
feasible, and the recognition of the Ethiopian conquest is not 
immediately necessary." 30
Welles told the president that Europe might not be capable 
of making peace. "What is imperatively required is 
statesmanship of the highest character, marked by vision, 
courage and daring," he wrote. "I saw no signs of statesmanship 
of that kind in any of the countries I visited, nor do I know 
of any of that character in any other European country. . . . 
The Pope, I fear, is discouraged and, in a sense, confused. 
Mussolini is too closely associated with Hitler." Nevertheless, 
Welles then combined two ideas which had focused his attention 
for the past seven years: he returned to the original concept 
for his October 1937 plan of organizing the neutral powers and 
he also placed particular emphasis on the role the new world 
would play coming to the aid of the old world. "There remains 
only the United States, supported by the other neutral states, 
particularly those of the New World," he wrote. "If the moment 
arrived when the Government of the United States felt it 
possible to move, I am confident that both the Vatican and 
Mussolini would support such an initiative." 3i
Welles's mission made newspaper headlines for a month, but 
yielded little of substance in the way of a diplomatic opening. 
All of the principals with whom Welles had met, including 
Chamberlain and Daladier, remained committed to their 
positions. There seemed to be very little the United States
29 "Italy and the Peace in Europe," by Welles, March 19,1940, Welles Report 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL.
30 ibid.
31 Conclusion of Welles Report, March 19,1940, Welles Report, 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL.
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could do to forestall an expanded war.32 The mission also
deepened Welles's rift with Hull. "Welles is reporting in
cipher to the President," Berle noted in his diary, "and the 
Secretary does not have the ciphers he learns what the 
President tells him.1,33 While Welles was in the midst of his
conversations with Ciano and Mussolini, Hull complained to 
Breckinridge Long that "Welles thinks so fast and moves so
rapidly that he gets way out in front and leaves no trace of 
the positions he has taken or the commitments he has made, and 
the Department is sometimes left in the dark as to his meanings 
and actions." Hull further charged that Welles always acted 
independently of him and refused to keep him apprised of his 
thinking. Hull thought Welles spoke with the president too 
frequently and that Welles insisted upon maintaining his power 
in the area of Latin American policy through his confidant, 
Laurence Duggan. Hull also feared that Berle was too close to 
Welles and that there were other officials "in key positions 
whose presence is due to Welles and who act as if they were 
part of his organization as opposed to the regular 
establishment. "34
Criticism of the Welles mission also came from Roosevelt's 
political opposition. Only a few days after the envoy's return, 
Ohio Senator Robert Taft, seeking the nomination for president 
on the Republican ticket in 1940, publicly expressed his 
concern that the Welles mission meant that the administration 
had not "wholeheartedly accepted" the American people's 
determination to remain out of the war. Another presidential 
hopeful, Manhattan District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, asked: 
"What faith can we place in any promise by this Administration 
to keep this nation out of war?" Warning of an ominous Welles- 
Colonel House analogy, North Carolina's "Tobacco Senator," the 
isolationist Democrat Robert Reynolds, told the Senate: "Mr.
Welles has returned. The American people are extremely desirous 
of ascertaining from Mr. Welles personally information as to 
where he went, with whom he talked, when he talked, what he 
said, what was said to him. This is no time for secret
32 New York Times. March 23,1940,1: New York Times. March 29,1940,1 .
33 Berle Diary, March 18,1940, Berle Papers, box 211, FDRL.
34 Breckinridge Long Diary, March 15,1940, box 5, Long Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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diplomacy. If we must have a 'House' in Europe I insist that we 
have a glass house in order that all may see and in order that 
all may know what is in it. . . . Colonel House was sent to
Europe, and that was prior to our entrance into the World War 
... many persons allege and contend that as a matter of fact 
Colonel House's tour of and sojourn in Europe really 
contributed to a large extent to our eventual involvement in 
the war, and much criticism has been aimed in that direction." 
Congressman Roy Woodruff of Michigan warned that the Welles 
mission would be used to "entangle us in Europe's quarrels" and 
added that the "citizens were not reassured by the secrecy 
surrounding" the mission by "Mr. Roosevelt’s Colonel House."35
Before anyone in the administration could act upon 
Welles's recommendations the "phony war" came to an abrupt end 
when on April 9 Hitler launched an attack on Denmark and 
N o r w a y .36 on May 5, British Ambassador Lord Lothian warned 
Welles that the collapse of Chamberlain's government might be 
imminent. Some in Washington speculated that Lloyd George might 
replace Chamberlain but Welles grew concerned that 
Chamberlain's resignation might mean a new government led by 
Churchill, and Roosevelt remarked that he "supposed Churchill 
was the best man England had, even if he was drunk half of the 
tim e."37 as Welles anticipated, Churchill became prime minister 
on May 10, the very day Hitler launched his western offensive. 
But by the end of May Welles's fears were now focused on the 
prospect that Hitler's stunning triumphs would appeal to pro- 
Fascist elements in Latin America. To Welles, the possible 
defeat of France, the Netherlands and perhaps even Britain, 
opened up dark possibilities for the Americas. The Axis might 
threaten the new world through the French colonial empire in 
West Africa, or through European colonial possessions in the 
western hemisphere. Clearly, a reassessment of regional defense
35 Life. April 8, 1940, 32; Congressional Record - Senate. April 1,1940 and April 2, 1940, (3748, 3821); 
Congressional Record - House of Representatives. 1940. (3969).
36 Reporting to Roosevelt from Paris, Bullitt used the occasion to step up his criticism of Welles: T h e re  are, of 
course, a  lot of defeatists in this country, including Bonnet who attempt to make great use of Sumner's praise 
of Mussolini, but their campaign was cut short by Mussolini's approval of the German invasion of Denmark and 
Norway." See Rossi, Roosevelt and the French. 37.
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was needed, as Welles became increasingly worried about German 
propaganda efforts in Latin America. Welles warned that the 
Nazi threat to the Americas was very real and that the 
"majority of the American Republics would run helter-skelter to 
Hitler just as so many of the remaining small neutral nations 
of Europe are doing today." 38
Rather than bringing Welles and Hull together, the crisis 
in Europe divided them like never before. By mid-June, when the 
French situation had become desperate, Welles and Roosevelt 
supported sending aid to France but Hull feared that such a 
move would draw America into the conflict. Welles opposed Hull 
and backed the president's desire to, at the very least, send a 
message to Reynaud pledging future support. "The Secretary was 
not happy about Welles having over-ruled him in the White House 
on the message," Berle noted in his diary. "He likes to mull 
things over, whereas Welles likes to act fast. But I think in 
this particular case there is a difference of principle. Welles 
and the President are emotionally much more engaged than the 
Secretary. "39
In the midst of the crisis on the western front, the state 
department planning committees revived Welles's old proposal to 
organize a peace conference but German successes in battle 
undermined any such efforts. Why would Hitler listen to peace 
overtures when victory came with such e a s e ? 4o on May 28 the 
Belgians surrendered and on June 3 the British completed their 
evacuation from Dunkirk. The prospect of a German victory in 
the west suddenly transformed the nature of postwar planning in 
Washington. Welles and the planners suspended broad discussions 
of peace and war and limited their aims to the security of the 
Americas. The term "postwar planning" suddenly had a new
38 Roosevelt to Welles, May 20, 1940,PSF 76, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, May 24, 1940, PSF 76, FDRL; 
Welles to Roosevelt, May 25,1940, PSF 76, FDRL; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of 
World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 505. Welles underscored this concern in a letter 
to the President at the height of the battle of France, and he included a translation of an Uruguayan newspaper 
editorial titled "Welles the Ruffian" which began with the sentence, "Sumner Welles, the ruffian, was sent by 
Roosevelt the Jew, to Europe to interview the chiefs of state of the nations included directly or indirectly in this 
great conflict" Welles to Roosevelt, May 24, 1940, PSF 76, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt May 25, 1940, PSF 
76, FDRL
39 Welles to Roosevelt, June 18, 1940, PSF 76, FDRL; Berle Diary, June 13, 1940, box 212, Berle papers, 
FDRL
40 Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy. 29-31.
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meaning, as American officials began to consider the 
possibility of German control of the French, Dutch and British 
empires, and, most urgently, the possibility of German control 
of European possessions in the new world. Welles and the other 
planners feared Germany might seek to establish stronger 
economic and political relationships with the American 
republics. Welles warned that the administration's policy of 
neutrality might soon break down and that the United States 
might find itself drawn into the conflict by attempting to 
defend its interests in the western hemisphere. 4i
The immediate prospects for building a new world order 
faded completely when France surrendered in late June. With the 
war on the continent seemingly decided in favor of the Axis, 
Welles devoted less of his time to matters of postwar planning 
and the work of the subcommittees was suspended.42 with France 
defeated and Britain encircled, the events of the summer of 
1940 provoked a complete reassessment of postwar planning. For 
now, there would be no talk of creating a new world order and 
recasting the League of Nations. But in a series of meetings 
throughout the winter of 1940-1941, Welles considered the 
possibility of launching a research division within the 
department to examine postwar matters.43
Throughout 1941 postwar planning continued to gather 
strength. During the first half of the year incremental 
research had begun into the question of building a new postwar 
order and postwar planning took on a new urgency and sense of 
purpose. In February 1941, Welles and senior officials in the 
state department established a "Division of Special Research" 
to study the desired nature of the postwar world. The division 
had a full-time staff consisting of economists, political
41 "Menace to the United States Through the Other American Republics of a  German Victory," January 24, 
1941, by Harley Notter, box 8, Notter files; Hugh Wilson to Welles, May 31, 1940, with Wilson memorandum, 
box 191, postwar file, 1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL.
42 Roosevelt to Welles, July 16,1940, Welles to Roosevelt, July 19, 1940, PSF 76, FDRL; "Undersecretary of 
State Welles," Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, 
Department of State, War History Branch Studies, 4E3, 6/29/D, box 1, RG 59, National Archives; "Division for 
the Study of Problems of Peace and Reconstruction," December 12, 1939, in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign 
Policy. 453-54; "Memorandum of Conversation in Welles's office, by Wilson," April 19 and 26,1940, ibid., 458; 
Department of State Bulletin. II (January 13, 1940), 19.
43 "Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: Preliminaries," no date, 1941, box 54, Notter files.
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scientists and state department officials.44
The June 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union also had 
important consequences for postwar planning. A perceptible 
change of mood occurred within the state department and a 
consensus began to emerge that further discussions on postwar 
problems should begin anew. By the summer of 1941, anticipating 
a revival of the postwar planning committees, the division 
began reexamining the work of Colonel House's Inquiry.«
Furthermore, Welles continued to make public statements on the 
possibility of creating a new world order, putting into 
practice Woodrow Wilson's emphasis on the importance of public 
diplomacy in influencing national opinion. Through the use of 
speeches, press conferences and timely interviews with 
reporters, Welles intensified his efforts to promote American
leadership in recasting the world order.4^
Welles sought to use his public pronouncements to offer a 
more definitive statement of America's war and peace aims. A 
month after Hitler launched his attack against the Soviet
Union, Welles delivered his most detailed vision to date of
what a postwar world might look like. On July 22, 1941, with 
the ailing Hull out of Washington, Welles spoke for the 
administration as "Acting Secretary" at a dedication for a new 
wing of the Norwegian Legation. Welles sought to offer a pledge 
that Norwegian independence, as well as the independence of 
other nations engulfed by the war, would one day be restored.4? 
His address, broadcast nationwide and throughout occupied 
Europe in twenty-six languages, called for the creation of a 
world organization that would restore law and order and ensure
44 "Memorandum, Pasvolsky to Welles," April 11,1941, appendix 7, in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy. 
462; "Menace to the United States Through the Other American Republics of a  German Victory," January 24, 
1941, box 8, Notter files; Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Welles, July 14, 1941, box 67, folder 3, Welles papers, 
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1941, box 8, Notter files.
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peace at the close of hostilities. He also paid homage to 
Wilson, and added that a lasting peace would have to include 
military/ political and economic planning on a global scale. He 
called for an open door approach to the world's resources, 
which he assumed would remove the need for future wars of 
territorial conquest and undermine the imperial impulse, and 
pledged the restoration of independence and sovereignty for the 
subjugated nations of the world. Most importantly, he concluded 
his remarks with a call for the creation of a new league: "I 
cannot believe that peoples of good will will not once more 
strive to realize the great ideal of an association of nations 
through which the freedom, happiness, and the security of all 
peoples may be achieved. That is the objective before us all 
today —  to try and find the means of bringing that to pass."48 
Welles had announced his belief that American war aims
should seek to forever change the global "status quo." He
desired a postwar settlement based not on great-power politics
and the balance of power, but on a universal vision of a new 
world order where disputes between nations would be resolved by 
regional and worldwide councils. He recognized that a great 
power such as the United States would naturally wield vast 
influence in such councils. His emerging vision of the postwar 
world resembled a combination of the old League of Nations and 
the Good Neighbor Policy writ large, a system that would grant 
regional hegemony to the great powers while operating within a 
framework of international laws, buttressed by the joint 
pillars of capitalism and free trade.49
Much of the press hailed Welles for offering the most
thorough explanation of the administration's war aims while 
simultaneously articulating the war's larger meaning. The New 
York Times quoted liberally from Welles's address, and its 
editorial page hailed the speech as "the most specific 
declaration of peace aims that has been made by the spokesman 
of any Government since the war began. . . .  It is certainly 
'not premature' as Mr. Welles asserted, to publish the 
specifications of the order we stand for when the war is
48 “An Association of Nations," July 22,1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL
49  ibid.
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over."50 Henry Luce's Time magazine called the speech the 
"heaviest brickbat any high official of the United States had 
yet thrown at Adolf Hitler," describing it as a "trial balloon" 
for a new League of Nations. Somewhat surprisingly, Time noted 
approvingly that Welles had called for a worldwide New Deal at 
the end of the war, and described Welles as the 
administration's leading spokesman on foreign policy, si Not 
everyone was so enthused. William Randolph Hearst's 
isolationist newspapers charged Welles with advocating the
"Abolition of our navy, free trade and our entry into a new 
league of nations. As a postwar program nothing more completely 
ruinous to the people of this country could be thought out."S2
Welles's statement of war aims, made less than three weeks 
before the Atlantic Conference and more than five months before 
Pearl Harbor, was almost certainly approved by the president. 
Welles and Roosevelt had been discussing war and peace aims in 
early July 1941, and according to Welles, the president had 
remarked "that nothing would be more valuable from the
standpoint of keeping alive some principles of international 
law, some principles of moral and human decency, than for 
[Welles] to make some kind of public statement of the
objectives in international relations in which the Government 
of the United States believed." Welles's speech at the
Norwegian Legation was certainly a step in that direction, but 
it seemed to go beyond what the president was prepared to 
support publicly at the time and may have been part of a larger 
strategy of having Welles issue a series of "trial balloons" to 
gauge the public mood.55
Welles's address anticipated by three weeks the major 
political points to be debated at the upcoming Atlantic 
Conference, where the United States would clarify its war aims 
in the Atlantic Charter and would for the first time seriously
50 The New York Times. July 23, 1941.
51 Time. August 8 ,1941.
52 New York Journal and American. August 2,1941: Chicago Daily Tribune. July 24, 1941.
53 Langer and Gleason believed Welles's speech deliberately foreshadowed the Atlantic Conference. See 
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War. 1940-41 (New York: Harper, 1953), 680-81; 
"Atlantic Conference and Charter," Welles file, Overall History of Department of State, Division of Historical 
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reveal the nature of its desired world order. A few days before 
he departed for the historic first meeting between Roosevelt 
and Churchill, Welles spoke of his postwar vision in an 
interview with James Reston of the New York Times. Welles 
expressed the aims he would emphasize throughout the war: a 
more activist foreign policy on the part of the United States, 
the need for a world organization to promote collective 
security, and the promotion of free markets and the elimination 
of global trade barriers. The prescient Reston sensed that 
Welles's focus was not so much on American entry into the war - 
- for that seemed an ever-growing likelihood —  but on the 
question of the peace that would follow. "This is the heart of 
the philosophy he is propounding in his almost daily 
conversations with the President," Reston concluded. "It is a 
hard-headed, pragmatic, professional diplomat's philosophy, 
aimed not so much at 'winning the war' as at 'winning the 
peace.'"54 Coincidentally, as Welles prepared for his rendezvous 
with Roosevelt and Churchill, Time featured Welles in a cover 
story alleging that Welles, as the chief instigator of U.S. 
diplomacy, actually ran the state department, and that his 
elevation to secretary of state would soon follow.55
* * *
Welles and other senior officials in the state department 
remained concerned about the specter of a reprise of the 
troublesome secret treaties of the First World War. They now 
feared that London might seek agreements that would bind the 
great powers after the war. After the German attack on the 
Soviet Union, disturbing reports had arrived in Washington that 
London was discussing with Soviet officials territorial 
concessions involving eastern Poland and the Baltic Republics. 
The British were reported to be offering inducements to prevent 
the Russians from signing a separate peace. Furthermore, in 
July it was rumored that British officials had discussed 
territorial questions with the governments-in-exile in London.
54 New York Times Magazine. August 2 ,1941.
55 Time. August 8,1941.
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"It is now evident," Adolf Berle told the president, "that 
preliminary commitments for the post-war settlement of Europe 
are being made, chiefly in London. Perhaps you are being kept 
informed of these. I am not clear that the State Department is 
being kept informed of all of them by the parties. . . . You 
will recall that at Versailles President Wilson was seriously 
handicapped by commitments made to which he was not a party and 
of which he was not always informed. I have suggested to Sumner 
that we enter a general caveat, indicating that we could not be 
bound by any commitments to which we had not definitely 
assented. "56
Shortly thereafter, the president had Welles meet with 
British Ambassador Lord Halifax and underscore Washington's 
desire that no secret treaties be reached between Moscow and 
L o n d o n .57 Not totally satisfied with the results of his meeting 
with Halifax, Welles urged the president to formally warn 
Churchill against territorial settlements prior to the 
conclusion of the war. Roosevelt agreed with Welles and they 
both considered issuing some sort of statement about self- 
determination, which was of growing importance to the 
A m e r i c a n s ,58 and to many of the subjugated nations and neutrals 
of Europe as well. Welles believed that Woodrow Wilson should 
have urged the allies to agree to American war aims at an 
earlier juncture in the last war. Why not act now, despite the 
fact that America had not yet entered the war, to take 
advantage of British desperation? If Wilson had approached the 
allies with his war aims when they most needed him, Welles 
reasoned, the United States might have had more success in 
achieving its aims at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.59
In anticipation of his meeting with Churchill, the 
president had dispatched Harry Hopkins to meet with the prime 
minister in London, where Hopkins warned British senior 
officials about Washington's fear of secret treaties, telling
56 Berle Diary, July 8,1941, Berle papers, box 213, FDRL
57 Welles memorandum of conversation with Halifax, July 10,1941, box 163, Welles papers, FDRL
58 The question of self-determination in American foreign policy is discussed in William Roger Louis, 
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Oxford University Press, 1978), 3-4, 79, 81,121-133.
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the British that the United States did not want to enter the 
war and find London had commitments of which Washington knew 
nothing.so Hopkins suggested to Washington that he should next 
sound out Stalin in Moscow prior to the upcoming Churchill- 
Roosevelt meeting. The President agreed: "Welles and I highly 
approve Moscow trip and assume you would go in a few days."6i
The meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill took place 
aboard the U.S.S. Augusta and the H.M.S. Prince of Wales on 
Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland and is remembered 
chiefly for producing the Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration 
of Anglo-American war aims.62 it is remarkable that officials 
from Washington, (still technically a neutral capital), would 
even dare to meet with officials from the United Kingdom, (a 
belligerent power) to enunciate a declaration of common war 
aims. Roosevelt and Churchill also discussed the course of the 
war, aid to Russia and the possibility of jointly taking a 
harder line toward Japan. In fact both the American and British 
delegations came to Newfoundland more concerned with the war 
than about vague ideals for a far-off peace. Although British 
and American officials had been consulting for a number of 
months, they had not discussed common war and peace aims. Thus, 
no sooner had Churchill arrived aboard the Augusta on August 9 
than the Americans suggested laying down a set of broad
60 Robert Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L  Hopkins  (New York: 1947-48), vol. I, 237; Eden 
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principles guiding their foreign policies.63
Welles, whose chief concerns at the conference would be 
postwar aims, sought to take advantage of Britain's precarious 
position by inducing London to commit to pledges of self-
determination and the open door. Welles and his British
counterpart, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent under
secretary at the foreign office, immediately embarked upon the 
first of their lengthy discussions on political matters.6* They 
began by discussing the Far East. Welles told Cadogan that he 
thought war between Japan and the United States "inevitable" 
but that Washington should delay a showdown with Tokyo until 
the timing was more advantageous for the United States. They 
also discussed the war situation in North Africa and the status 
of Spain and Portugal. More important to Welles was the 
question of secret treaties and territorial matters. He feared 
that any British commitments to territorial reconfigurations
after the war would severely limit Washington's ability to 
shape the postwar world. He explained his unease that 
Washington had not yet received a reply to its July warning 
urging the British to make no secret commitments without the 
agreement of the United States. Cadogan offered his assurance 
that the British had reached no agreements on frontiers or 
territorial readjustments, with the minor exception of an oral 
commitment that had been made to Yugoslavia concerning Istria. 
This pleased Welles, but he reminded the British diplomat of 
the damage that had been done by secret treaties in the last
63 There is no need to recount here the oft-told story of the Atlantic Conference. This account will limit itself to 
Welles's role at the conference and how it related to his ideas tor postwar planning. For a more exhaustive 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 144-161.
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war.65
The discussion then turned to the question of foreign 
economic policy.66 Welles and the state department had long 
sought to revise the Ottawa agreements of 1932, which had 
established a system of imperial preference.6? Welles had been 
greatly alarmed by the comments of British economist John 
Maynard Keynes who, during a recent mission to Washington, 
commented that the British desired closed economies at the end 
of the war. To Welles, abolishing imperial preference would 
contribute to the establishment of global political and 
economic stability and he stressed to Cadogan the importance 
U.S. officials placed on the question of trade discrimination. 
Cadogan replied that he personally had been bitterly opposed to 
the Ottawa agreements and added that he agreed with Welles that 
the events of the past decade had demonstrated the futility of 
restrictive trade practices, but he suggested that the matter 
be taken up by Churchill and Roosevelt.68
Cadogan began the second day of their discussions by 
presenting Welles with a series of draft statements. The first 
proposed simultaneous declarations by the United States, 
Britain and the Dutch government-in-exile on the situation in 
the Far East. It stated that any further encroachment by Japan 
in the southwestern Pacific would compel the three governments 
to go to war. Cadogan then gave Welles a draft of a joint 
Anglo-American declaration of principles. In anticipation of 
the conference, Welles had prepared his own statement of war 
aims, but the president, concerned that his under secretary's
65 Memorandum by Welles of conversation with Cadogan, August 9,1941, FRUS. 1941, vol. I, 351-352.
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draft might provoke a dispute over colonialism or free trade, 
initially preferred something from Churchill's pen. The British 
draft featured five points. Borrowing heavily from Roosevelt's 
Four Freedoms, the first four condemned aggression, promoted 
self-determination for all territorial changes after the war 
and pledged to promote fairer economic and trade practices. The 
fifth point pledged that the United States and Britain would 
seek "by effective international organization'1 to build a 
postwar world based on collective security.69
Roosevelt and Welles discussed the British draft in 
private. Welles made substantial revisions, including the 
insertion of a statement calling for more radical 
liberalization of trade practices. On Monday, August 11, 
Roosevelt, Welles and Hopkins received Churchill and Cadogan 
aboard the Augusta. Welles began by suggesting that the 
American statement to the Japanese be based on a broader policy 
covering the entire Pacific region, thus including any Japanese 
moves north, such as an invasion of the Soviet Union. The 
president and Churchill agreed.70 Welles then handed Churchill 
and Cadogan copies of his redraft of the declaration of 
principles. It generally followed the lines laid out earlier, 
with a few notable exceptions. Like Cadogan's draft, Welles's 
first article declared that neither Britain nor the United 
States sought any kind of territorial aggrandizement, while 
article two proclaimed that no territorial changes would be 
made without the consent of the peoples involved. Welles's 
article three sought to extend the call for the restoration of 
self-government to the colonial question.
' r.' : T' - ~  . V  In Washington a few
days before the conference, Welles suggested that the president 
discuss the possibility of independence for India "in a very 
personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill."7i 
During discussions on board the Augusta, Churchill suggested 
amending Welles's third point, suggesting the phrase "sovereign 
rights and" be inserted prior to the words "self-government." 
Churchill's insertion of the phrase "sovereign rights" was
69 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, August 10,1941. FRUS. 1941, vol. I, 355-358.
70 ibid.
71 Welles to Hull, August 6, 1941. FRUS. Ill, 181.
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clearly designed to make Welles's third point inapplicable to 
the British Empire.72
Churchill objected to Welles 1s changes to the fourth point 
on economic policy, which in Cadogan's draft had mildly stated 
that the United States and Britain would strive to bring about 
a fair and equitable distribution of essential resources. 
Welles changed this passage into a more specific challenge to 
the imperial preference system. 73 Churchill pointedly asked 
Welles if this passage would apply to the terms of the Ottawa 
agreements, and Welles replied that it would, telling Churchill 
that he sought the removal of all trade barriers "which had 
created such tragic havoc to the world economy during the past 
generation." Welles told Churchill that he understood the 
problems such a revision might pose for the British, but he 
added that the insertion of certain qualifiers could imply that 
any changes did not mean an immediate obligation. Roosevelt 
added that he believed Welles's argument to be "of very great 
importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian 
peoples that the British and the United States Governments 
desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal 
opportunity of an economic character."74 Churchill said he was 
uncomfortable making such momentous decisions without first 
consulting the dominions, which might take some time.7*
To resolve the impasse, Harry Hopkins suggested that 
Welles and Cadogan come up with a compromise to avoid further 
delays. Welles immediately recognized this as a threat to his 
aims. He bluntly replied that he thought further modification 
of article four would "destroy completely" its meaning. He 
added that the problem was not one of phraseology, but one of 
"vital principle." Welles argued that if the United States and 
Britain did not fight for free and liberal trade practices 
"they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of 
the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation
72 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, August 10, 1941, FRUS. 1941, vol.l, 356-358. S ee  Louis, 
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in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in 
the postwar world." Welles said they must pursue a policy of 
"constructive sanity" in world economics as a "fundamental 
factor in the creation of a new and better world... . 1,76
Churchill and Cadogan agreed with Welles that the question 
was not a mere matter of phraseology but they reiterated the 
need for consultation with the dominions. Churchill then 
suggested that the impasse could be eased by the inclusion of 
the passage "with due regard for our present obligations", 
prior to Welles’s phrase about economic liberalization. 
Roosevelt thought this might resolve the impasse and suggested 
that Churchill and Cadogan work out the wording, and then have 
Welles go over it with them later. If Welles realized that he 
had suffered a defeat on this matter, he did not show it, and 
said nothing. The group then turned to points five and six, 
dealing respectively with economic collaboration and the 
establishment of a lasting peace. Churchill voiced no 
objections to these articles. Welles and Roosevelt had come up 
with an extra point —  to be known as article seven —  calling 
for freedom of the seas, with which the British also 
concurred.77
Welles left the eighth point, regarding U.S. and British 
participation in an international organization, virtually 
intact, and Churchill asked the president if he would be 
amenable to including support for some kind of "effective 
international organization." On this matter, Welles and the 
prime minister were on the same side, as Welles had merely 
taken Churchill's earlier passage on a world organization and 
made it more explicit. But the president, concerned about 
domestic opposition, wanted to eliminate all references to 
international organizations. Roosevelt offered a new passage 
vaguely calling for disarmament of the aggressors, despite the 
urgings of Churchill, Welles and Hopkins for something stronger 
and more definitive. As Welles looked on in dismay, Roosevelt 
emphasized his opposition to the creation of a new league
76 Ibid, 362.
77 ibid, 363; for the British record of discussions with Welles over the Ottawa Agreements se e  CAB 66/18 
WP(41) 202, August 20, 1941, memorandum by Churchill on discussions at Atlantic Conference; and CAB 
66/18 WP(41) 203, August 18, 1941, "Conference Between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and 
President of the United States," Public Record Office.
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because it might run the risk of stirring up domestic political 
opposition. The others eventually persuaded Roosevelt to agree 
to at least mention some form of international organization as 
a distant g o a l .78 Welles said that he had been "surprised and 
somewhat discouraged" by the president's opposition to a new 
league. He told the president that if he thought Britain and 
the United States should police the world in the short term, it 
might also be desirable for the smaller powers to have some 
sort of assembly where they could voice their opinions. "I said 
it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the 
most effective safety valve that could be devised," Welles 
said. Roosevelt attempted to mollify Welles, but the president 
refused to budge on the question of support for an 
international organization. 79
The meeting then broke up and Welles conferred with 
Churchill and Cadogan before returning to the president. With 
Roosevelt's concurrence, the prime minister had weakened 
Welles's economic clause by inserting the qualifying phrase 
"with due regard for our present obligations," thus practically 
exempting the British Empire. Welles still vigorously opposed 
Churchill's insertion, which the under secretary thought would 
render the economic clause virtually meaningless. Churchill 
would go so far as to agree to a statement calling for equal 
access to raw materials, but the qualifying passages remained, 
and Welles had no choice but to settle for the m ,  so
* * *
When the Atlantic Conference came to an end on August 12 
the participants felt that much had been accomplished. Welles 
had sought to weaken the British system of imperial 
preferences, to loosen London's hold on the British Empire, and 
to move Washington closer to a commitment to join a postwar 
international organization. By his own criteria he had little
78 ibid, 363.
79 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, 365-366, ibid.
80 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, August 11, 1941, FRUS. 1941, vol. I, 364-365; "History of 
Negotiations with Respect to Point Four of the Atlantic Charter," September 11,1941, by Notter and Rothwell, 
Atlantic Charter file, box 13, Notter files.
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success.81 The final version of the declaration concluded that 
neither nation would seek territorial gains during the war, nor 
would they make territorial changes without the agreement of 
the peoples concerned. The right of all peoples to choose their 
own governments —  self determination —  was endorsed on the 
basis that self-government be returned to all nations deprived 
of it by the war, although American and British representatives 
seemed to have differing interpretations of precisely where 
that clause would be applied. Welles had hoped for a more
forceful declaration in this area, one that would more
explicitly cover the entire colonial world. Furthermore, 
Britain and America committed themselves to improving the 
world's labor standards, while promoting economic justice and 
advancement, and providing "social security." They also stated 
that they hoped to establish a lasting peace which would 
provide nations with freedom from fear and want.sz if nothing 
else, the British and American delegations succeeded in better 
articulating war and peace aims.88 Furthermore, as David 
Reynolds has explained, the charter served as a foundation for 
successive declarations of allied war aims from the United 
Nations Declaration of January 1942 to the United Nations 
Charter of April 1945.84
Having been frustrated in his efforts to compel the 
British to accept his aims at the conference, Welles would 
instead seek to expand the meaning of the charter on his own
through public pronouncements and his stewardship of postwar
planning. Nonetheless, without Welles's presence at the 
conference, the Atlantic Charter might have been formulated 
quite differently. "It ought to be set down," recalled the 
president's son, Elliott, who attended the conference, "that
81 This may have been a s  the president intended, believing all along lhat American aims would ultimately be 
realized without the kind of pressure Welles sought to apply to the British. S ee Lloyd C. Gardner, "The Atlantic 
Charter: Idea and Reality, 1942-1945," in Douglas Brinkley and David Facey-Crowther, eds., The Atlantic 
Charter (London: Macmillan, 1994), 50-51. Some have interpreted the Atlantic Conference a s  a  complete failure 
for American aims. See Alan Dobson, "Economic Diplomacy at the Atlantic Conference," 143-163.
82 "Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941," FRUS. 1941, I, 
367-368.
83 For an account of the meaning of the Atlantic Charter from London's perspective, see  David Reynolds, "The 
Atlantic 'Flop': British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt Meeting of August 1941," in Brinkley and 
Facey-Crowther, eds. The Atlantic Charter. 130.
84 See Reynolds, "The Atlantic Flop,11146.
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Sumner Welles was the man who worked hardest on the Charter, 
and who contributed the most. It was his baby, from the time it 
was first considered, back in Washington . . . ."85 The
charter's debt to Wilsonianism and the Fourteen Points is also 
immediately apparent. The first point of the charter, pledging 
that the allies would seek no aggrandizement, territorial or 
otherwise, had its antecedents in Wilsonian pronouncements. 
Similarly, the second point, dealing with territorial changes, 
had a Wilsonian precedent; as did the declaration's third point 
about the restoration of independence and sovereignty and self- 
determination; the fourth point calling for equal access to the
world's raw materials; and the eighth point, calling for the
establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general 
security and disarmament. The charter, incorporating elements 
of Wilson's Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, 
served Welles's aim of preventing the British from proposing 
overly specific war aims or making secret territorial 
concessions. But it also signaled a new tone on the part of the 
United States since the Welles mission of the previous year. No 
longer did Washington seem committed to a negotiated peace, 
for, as Welles understood, in order to secure the aims of the 
charter the Axis powers would have to be defeated militarily.86 
The Atlantic Charter was essentially a proclamation rather 
than a formal diplomatic document or treaty, as Welles and
Roosevelt wanted to avoid anything that might look like a 
formal Anglo-American alliance. But in some respects the 
charter marked an even greater appeal to world opinion than
Wilson's Fourteen Points because it hinted at an intensified 
American commitment to shape the postwar settlement. The 
charter hinted that restoration of the European balance of 
power was not sufficient reason to fight. Welles sought to 
provide higher and nobler war aims by resurrecting a Wilsonian 
vision and by proceeding, while the war still raged, to lay the 
foundations for postwar peace and reconstruction.87 The charter
85 Elliott Roosevelt As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,1946), 39. Although Elliott Roosevelt 
assum ed Welles had created a draft of the charter in Washington, this was not the case.
86 "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," by Sumner Welles, November 11, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
87 Louis, Imperialism at Bay. 122; "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," by Sumner Welles, November 11, 1941, 
speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL.
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thus offered a glimpse of American war aims and envisioned the 
establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general 
security. Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
broke most of the lingering doubts of mass opinion and opened 
the way to another crusade in which Americans would attempt to 
make world affairs an extension of their domestic values. "The 
United States did not enter the war in order to reshape the 
world," wrote Warren F. Kimball, "but once in the war, that 
conception of world reform was the assumption that guided 
Roosevelt's actions." 88
With the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 the United States had 
sought to prevent the reimposition or extension of European 
rule in the Americas. With the Atlantic Charter, Welles sought 
to globalize the Monroe Doctrine by giving notice that those 
liberated by the war would achieve self-determination.89 Despite 
the earlier failure of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Atlantic 
Charter made a significant impression throughout the world. It 
heightened the already high expectations about the postwar 
world and thus contributed to the disillusionment that 
followed, particularly over matters in Eastern Europe and the 
colonial world. While Welles and other administration officials 
would later argue that the charter was merely a statement of 
war aims and not a guarantee of specific action, expectations 
raised by the charter were not met at the conclusion of the 
war. As the war progressed and Welles was confronted with the 
hard realities of alliance relations with both Moscow and 
London, he would find that he could not always pursue the 
ideals of the Atlantic Charter. Not only would America's high- 
sounding principles do little for Eastern Europeans who fell 
under the Soviet sphere, but such principles also had no effect 
on the European colonial powers seeking to retrieve their 
possessions at the end of the war. In fact, by the late 1940s
88 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler. 17.
89 Welles Immediately understood and anticipated the impact the Atlantic Charter would have on world opinion. 
Not only did he put up a vigorous fight with the British over the provisions of the charter, but when he returned 
to the United States he quickly sought to use his public addresses, his discussions with foreign diplomatic 
representatives in Washington, and later, his leadership of the postwar planning process, to expand the 
meaning and interpretation of the Atlantic Charter. For the contrary view that the Atlantic Charter "quickly took 
on a  life of its own, unanticipated by those who drafted it," see  David Reynolds, "The Atlantic 'Flop': British 
Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt Meeting of August 1941," in Brinkley and Facey-Crowther, eds. The 
Atlantic Charter. 130.
81
the United States would find itself supporting colonial powers 
in places Welles had once sought to liberate.90
Welles understood that grand pronouncements such as the 
Atlantic Charter were often necessary to express broader goals 
important for public support in wartime. While Welles 
spearheaded the effort to commit America to an internationalist 
course, it should also be noted that his actions and public 
pronouncements helped push expectations so high that they were 
destined to be shattered by the political and military 
realities of 1945. When reality intruded, such grand rhetoric 
became a liability. After all, part of the disillusionment with 
the eventual postwar settlement stemmed from the fact that the 
Atlantic Charter had pledged the United States to guarantee a 
better world for millions of people for whom, in reality, it 
could do very little.9i
* * *
90 "The Atlantic Charter and National Independence," November 13,1942, Atlantic Charter file, box 13, Notter 
files; "Memorandum on Official Statements of Post-War Policy," January 3,1942, Division of Special Research, 
Department of State, box 8, Notter files.
9 1 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (spring 1992), 
83.
CHAPTER FOUR 
Creating a New League:
Sumner Welles and the Postwar Planning Process, 1941-1943
While the efforts of Welles’s postwar planning committees 
would meaningfully influence U.S. policy both during and after 
the war, the first nine months of 1941 had been a period of 
uncertainty and doubt for the advocates of postwar planning. 
Welles had sought to promote the revival of more detailed 
planning but the realities of the war and other political 
restraints made further action difficult. Throughout 1941, 
Welles had discussed with other senior officials the 
possibility of creating new planning committees, and the 
Atlantic Charter in August had provided an opening for a 
broader discussion of postwar planning and international 
organization than had previously been possible. By the autumn 
of 1941 (nearly two months before America officially entered 
the war) a new timetable for action began to take shape, and 
before the end of the year Welles and his allies would obtain 
the mandate they desired with the president lending his support 
for specific and detailed planning for a new international 
order.1
* * *
After his return from the Atlantic Conference Welles 
remained anxious that the administration should at once begin 
long-term planning for the postwar period. Speaking in New York 
in October, he warned against the United States taking a 
passive policy of "wait and see" and repeated his call for an
1 Armstrong to Welles, July 14, 1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Welles to Pasvolsky, July 15, 
1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Harley Notter memorandums, October 20,1941 and December 8, 
1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, National Archives. The most exhaustive account of the history of the postwar 
planning committees remains Harley Notter's Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945 (Washington: 
Department of State Publication, 1950). An excellent account of the historiography of postwar planning can be 
found in William C. Widenor, "American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right 
Questions?" Diplomatic History, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 1982), 245-265.
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immediate examination of postwar reconstruction issues.2 
Welles sought to give a further boost to internationalism and 
postwar planning during his Armistice Day remarks at Woodrow 
Wilson's tomb in the Washington Cathedral, where he sought to 
expand the meaning of the Atlantic Charter by linking it to 
Wilson's Fourteen Points. Many of those gathered at Wilson's 
tomb came in anticipation of hearing a declaration of the 
internationalist cause. The world had been at war for more than 
two years, and the gathering at Wilson's gravesite knew it 
might not be long before Americans found themselves in the 
conflict, as the U.S. now seemed to be gradually departing from 
its announced neutrality and moving into an undeclared war.3 
Welles sought to embolden those who wanted to hear a portent of 
what America' s war and peace aims would be in the coming 
conflict. "The heart-searching question which every American 
citizen must ask himself on this day of commemoration is 
whether the world in which we have to live would have come to 
this desperate pass had the United States been willing in those 
years which followed 1919 to play its full part in striving to 
bring about a new world order based on justice and on a 
steadfast concert for peace."4
Although a month before Pearl Harbor, Welles did not 
hesitate to offer his most detailed explanation of his version 
of internationalism, going much further than President 
Roosevelt was willing to go at the time. At Wilson's tomb 
Welles called for participation in a new postwar international
2 "Commercial Policy After the War," by Sumner Welles, October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 
195, FDRL. Welles increased the frequency of such statements because he continued to worry about the 
nature of public opinion. He feared that isolationist opinion in the United States would lead to yet another 
rejection of America's quest to play a  leading role in world affairs. He and his fellow planners believed that the 
currently declining isolationist strength was almost wholly due to wartime factors. They felt that by the time a 
postwar settlement cam e before the Senate, the spur of wartime spirit would be a distant memory, and war 
weariness, combined with the traditional impulse to resume peacetime lifestyles, would further undermine 
internationalism. See, for example, Harley Notter memorandum, October 20, 1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, 
National Archives; a s  well a s  "Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: Preliminaries," not dated, 1941, 
RG 59, Notter Files, box 54, National Archives.
3 "Our people realize that at any moment, war may be forced upon us," Roosevelt said in his remarks that sam e 
day during Armistice Day ceremonies across the Potomac River at Arlington National Cemetery. The New York 
Times. November 12,1941.
4 "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," by Sumner Welles, November 11,1941, speech files, box 195, FDRL. The 
late President's widow, Edith Bolling Wilson, wrote to Welles the following day. "I asked Mrs. Welles to tell you 
how deeply I appreciated your making the address yesterday. Aside from its personal side it will stand out as 
one of Ihe noblest expressions of these soul-searching days." Edith Bolling Wilson to Sumner Welles, 
November 12,1941, scrapbook, 1941, Welles Papers, box 241, FDRL.
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organization, defining the Atlantic Charter as a continuation 
of the Wilsonian legacy, giving "new hope and new courage to 
millions of people throughout the earth." He called on the 
public to accept American leadership of a postwar organization 
founded on principles such as Wilsonianism, the Four Freedoms 
and the Atlantic Charter. U.S. participation in a new league 
remained central to Welles's vision of an American-led future. 
He assumed such participation would cement America's leadership 
of the world by committing Washington to an internationalist 
future. Only by taking its rightful role of global leadership 
could America begin to shape the world to its own interests. 
Economic planning on a grand scale would be necessary, Welles 
believed, for only through a systematic approach to the 
problems of postwar economic dislocation could the new 
international order ensure "freedom from want." Free markets, 
free trade and free access to the world's resources (the open 
door) would be the cornerstones of Welles's "new economic 
order."5
Welles also souc^t bo expand the meaning of the Atlantic 
Charter through his leadership of postwar planning. Just a 
month earlier Welles had drafted a letter to Roosevelt urging 
the reestablishment of secret committees to begin work on all 
aspects of postwar planning, including the design of, and U.S. 
participation in, an international organization. Welles hoped 
to guide this effort personally and use it to create a 
blueprint for a new order for the postwar world.6 But the 
growing crisis with Japan and the subsequent attack on Pearl 
Harbor diverted the administration's attention from postwar 
issues for several weeks, and it was not until December 22 that 
a new letter proposing the creation of formal planning 
committees, this version signed by Hull, reached the president. 
On December 28, Roosevelt returned Hull's letter with the 
notation "C.H. I heartily approve. FDR." The president, who had 
been so reluctant to discuss postwar matters in the past, had
5 A number of Welles's speeches during this period repeated these themes. See, for example, "An Association 
of Nations," by Sumner Welles, July 22, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; 
"Commercial Policy After the War," by Sumner Welles, October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 195, 
FDRL; "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
6 Welles to Roosevelt, October 18,1941, Welles Papers, box 151, folder 9, FDRL.
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finally signed on.7
The effort to commit America to a postwar organization
received another important boost when on January 1, 1942 the
United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China and twenty-two 
other nations involved in the war against the Axis, signed a 
"Declaration by the United Nations." The declaration 
represented a major step in the direction of internationalism, 
for the signatories accepted the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter and vowed not to seek a separate peace. To Welles, the 
declaration thus expanded the Atlantic Charter into a universal 
constitution applying to all parts of the world.8
A few weeks later, Welles traveled to Rio de Janeiro to 
head the American delegation to a conference of foreign 
ministers of the American republics. His remarks at Rio 
stressed hemispheric solidarity, but he also reasserted his
universal vision of what the war could achieve, telling the 
delegates that the new world order would bring about "the 
world's regeneration"9 The American delegation at Rio sought to 
obtain agreement on a joint declaration of war against the
Axis, but Argentina and Chile objected, and the original 
declaration was replaced by more innocuous language merely 
recommending the severing of diplomatic relations.10 Welles's 
acceptance of this compromise generated a violent outburst from
7 Pasvolsky to Welles, October 8, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the 
Formulation of Post-War Foreign Policies," by Leo Pasvolsky, September 12, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; 
Welles to Roosevelt, October 18,1941, Official File 4351, FDRL; Hull to Roosevelt, December 28,1941, Official 
File 4720, FDRL. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle said that the advisory committee was Welles's 
idea. See, for example, notes from interview with Berle, by Harold Gosnell, February 2,1948, "Overall History of 
Department of State," (Sumner Welles) 4E3, 6/29/D, Box 1, RG 59, War History Branch Studies, National 
Archives.
8 FO 371/26425, Churchill telegram to war cabinet, December 24, 1941, PRO; "Memorandum of Conversation 
by Welles," December 29, 1941, FRUS. 1942, vol. I, 21-22; rough drafts of Declaration, December 1941- 
January 1942, Presidents Secretary's File 168, FDRL; "Declaration by United Nations," January 1, 1942, 
FRUS. 1942, vol. I, 25-26.; "Memorandum on Official Statements on Post-War Policy," January 3,1942, Notter 
file, box 8, National Archives; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 178.
9 "The Road Before the Americas," by Sumner Welles, January 15, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 4, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
10 For a  more detailed account of the Welles-Hull feud over the Rio Conference see  Michael J. Francis, 'The 
United States at Rio, 1942: the Strains of Pan-Americanism," Latin American Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 92-95.
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Hull.11 The differences between the two men over the resolution 
may have represented for the secretary the final straw in his 
ongoing battle with Welles, particularly when Welles appealed 
directly to the president for support against Hull.12 Hull 
angrily rebuked Welles for acting without authority, but when 
the secretary looked to the president for support, Roosevelt 
backed Welles by suggesting that they leave the resolution 
unchanged. Hull, now beside himself, promptly drafted a cable 
replacing Welles as the U.S. representative at Rio but 
eventually relented. Hull, now exhausted by his confrontation 
with Welles, (and "nervously and spiritually torn to pieces," 
according to Berle), took to his bed and remained there for a 
week.13
Despite the increasing deterioration of his relationship 
with Hull, Welles now had a mandate to go forward with postwar 
planning. Most importantly, with the United States now in the 
war, and the president giving his backing, postwar planning 
could proceed without the fits and starts of the previous 
advisory committee efforts of 1940. Once again Welles sought to 
dominate the administration's plans to design and shape the 
postwar world. But the drafting of the United Nations 
Declaration and Welles' s trip to Rio delayed an immediate 
convening of the new postwar planning committee. At the
11 Welles's presence at the Atlantic Conference had already further strained his relationship with Hull. The 
press described Hull as  "affronted and sore" at being left behind, and one newspaper reported that "Mr. Hull did 
not ask Mr. Welles where he was going and does not know." Chicago Times. August 12, 1941. Hull had also 
taken issue with the Atlantic Conference's joint Anglo-American statement on the Far East and Japan, which he 
thought dangerously provocative. He worried that the declaration's strong language opposing further Japanese 
territorial expansion would undermine his ongoing negotiations with Japanese  diplomatic representatives, 
w hereas Welles devoted himself to an effort, dubbed another "Welles plan" by the American press, to further 
squeeze the Axis powers by cornering the market on strategic materials necessary to wage war. Furthermore, 
Hull, who had devoted much of his career to promoting free trade, was keenly disappointed by article four of the 
charter. He believed Churchill's insertion of the phrase "with due respect for their existing obligations" had 
rendered article four virtually useless, and he blamed Welles for not holding his ground on behalf of free trade. 
See Hull. Memoirs, vol. II, 1018, 975,1144; Washington Post. September 19,1941.
12 Welles cable to Roosevelt, January 24, 1942, Welles papers, box 151, folder 11, FDRL; Berle Diary, 
February 1.1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL.
13 According to observers, when Hull heard the radio reports of Welles's endorsement of the compromise 
resolution, he phoned Welles in Rio and a  "violent conversation" ensued. "As I heard the conversation wear
on," Berle wrote of the Welles-Hull telephone dispute, "I felt that several careers were ending that night For
it is obvious that now there is a  breach between foe Secretary and Sumner which will never be healed -  though 
foe Secretary will keep it below hatches to some extent. Life in this Department under those circumstances will 
be about as difficult a s  anything I can think of." Berle Diary, January 24, 1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL. 
According to one scholar of foe Rio Conference, "The greatest significance of foe meeting in retrospect may 
have been foe degree to which it deepened foe split between Hull and Welles." See Michael J. Francis, "The 
United States at Rio, 1942: foe Strains of Pan-Americanism," ibid, 94.
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beginning of the year, after Hull had departed for his lengthy 
annual leave from Washington, Welles took control of the state 
department. Discovering that Hull had failed to appoint the 
members of the new postwar planning committee, Welles promptly 
sent out his own invitations. u
The committee’s ranks would include administration 
officials with an interest in postwar planning such as Leo 
Pasvolsky and Harley Notter of the state department's Division 
of Special Research; Benjamin Cohen and David K. Niles of the 
president's staff; Milo Perkins of Henry Wallace's Board of 
Economic Warfare; and another Wallace ally, Paul Appleby of the 
Department of Agriculture. Five invitations also went out to 
people from outside the administration, including Welles's 
longtime friend and ally, Norman Davis; Anne O'Hare McCormick, 
a columnist and foreign affairs correspondent for the New York 
Times who frequently wrote uncritically of Welles; Hamilton 
Fish Armstrong of the Council on Foreign Relations; Myron 
Taylor, formerly of U.S. Steel, who had served as Roosevelt’s 
envoy to the Vatican; and Isaiah Bowman, a geographer, 
President of Johns Hopkins University, and formerly the leading 
member of Wilson's Inquiry. Welles thought that Bowman, whom he 
had befriended in the 1920s, would provide valuable knowledge 
of the Inquiry's work. State department officials such as Adolf 
Berle, Dean Acheson and Herbert Feis joined shortly thereafter, 
and the committee would also be expanded further to include a 
bipartisan group from the house and senate.15
Welles thought congressional representation particularly 
importantjfor it might help avoid a repetition of the political 
problems Wilson experienced, while at the same time serving as 
an informal liaison between the administration and Capitol Hill 
on matters of postwar planning and war aims. In the early 
summer of 1942 Welles warmly welcomed the addition of Senators 
Tom Connally and Warren Austin. Connally, a Democrat from 
Texas, had been a supporter of Wilson's foreign policies while 
a member of the House of Representatives. In 1941, he rose to 
become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
14 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 182-183.
15 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12,1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 
59, National Archives.
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became one of the Senate's most powerful supporters of a new 
international organization. Austin, a Republican from Vermont 
and a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
opposed the New Deal, but during the war he made a major 
contribution to the development of internationalism within the 
Republican Party. The membership of Welles's planning 
committees would later be expanded further with the addition of 
Democratic Senator Walter George of Georgia, a former chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1941-42); Democratic 
Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah, who spent five years in the Far 
East as a Mormon missionary and had been a consistent supporter 
of Roosevelt's foreign policies; Democratic Representative Sol 
Bloom of New York, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee since 1939; and Republican Representative Charles 
Eaton of New Jersey, the ranking minority member of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee.16
Throughout the postwar planning process Welles kept 
Roosevelt apprised of the work of the planners, while the 
president, primarily concerned with the military aspects of the 
war, granted Welles a large amount of autonomy. "What I expect 
you to do," the president told Welles, "is to have prepared for 
me the necessary number of baskets and the necessary number of 
alternative solutions for each problem in the baskets so that 
when the time comes all I have to do is to reach into a basket 
and fish out a number of solutions that I am sure are sound and 
from which I can make my own choice." Welles thus sought to 
anticipate many of the political problems the president might 
confront during the war.1?
From its very beginning the postwar planning committee 
sought to adhere to the spirit of the Four Freedoms, the 
Atlantic Charter, and the Declaration by the United Nations. 
These pronouncements would serve as guideposts for the peace 
settlement and the new international order that would emerge 
after the war. Welles thought the global expansion of these 
principles would benefit the United States, for if the rest of 
the world shared America's values and capitalist economics the
16 ibid; Welles, Seven Decisions. 182-183.
17 Ibid.
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postwar system would ultimately be more amenable to U.S. 
interests. Thus while Welles and the other planners began their 
work based on the assumption of the total defeat of the Axis 
powers —  and a lasting world peace would be the primary 
objective —  it was imperative that the peace somehow be 
reconciled with the values and interests of the United S t a t e s .is 
At the outset the committee agreed to keep its meetings 
secret, for the war appeared to be going badly for the allies, 
and Welles told the planners that he wished to delay telling 
the public of the committee's existence until a more favorable 
moment when an announcement about the creation of the postwar 
planning operation would appear as a confident gesture on the 
part of the allies. Welles told the planners that President 
Roosevelt would focus on the military aspects of winning the 
war, while the postwar planning committees would work out the 
details of complicated international political problems. Welles 
would thus provide the president with their recommendations on 
a regular basis.19 He reassured the other planners that their 
efforts would be just as important as the military conduct of 
the war, and reminded them that the failure to construct a 
lasting peace would make another war almost inevitable and thus 
nullify the sacrifices of millions of people around the w o r l d . 20 
Due to the unrestricted nature of their mission, Welles 
told the members that it would be necessary to divide the group 
into a number of smaller subcommittees, each assigned to 
investigate more specific aspects of postwar planning. The 
subcommittees would meet weekly and report back to the full 
group on a regular basis. Welles desired a system whereby when 
the president faced war-related political questions, the 
subcommittees would provide him with options. In Hull's 
continuing absence, Welles appointed himself chairman of the 
subcommittee on political problems and assigned it the task of
18 "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," by Notter, January 2, 1942, Welles papers, box 190, FDRL; P 
minutes 2, March 14,1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives.
19 Ibid. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12,1942, Notter files, box 54, 
National Archives. Several scholars have criticized Roosevelt for being largely uninterested in postwar 
matters. See, for example, Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of 
the British Empire. 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 439-440; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy. 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 358-359.
20 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, 
National Archives.
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nothing less than reordering world politics and designing an 
international organization. Welles arranged to have his friend 
Norman Davis chair the subcommittee on security problems, while 
another Welles ally, assistant secretary Berle, would run the 
subcommittee on economic reconstruction. The subcommittee on 
economic policy would be headed by assistant secretary Dean 
Acheson, and the subcommittee on territorial problems would be 
led by Isaiah Bowman.
As chairman of the subcommittee on political problems, 
Welles led the effort to draft a timetable for the peacemaking 
process. He initially favored a "transitional period" from the 
end of hostilities to the actual signing of the final peace 
because he thought the raw war-related emotions of the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919 had led to many rash and ill-advised 
decisions, and that such matters might be better handled after 
the formal end of the war. But he soon concluded that many 
postwar decisions could not be delayed and would have to be 
taken up immediately. The subcommittee thus focused on urgent 
and specific questions related to the future map of the postwar 
world and the launching of a new league.21
During one session at the end of March 1942, Welles 
suggested the creation of a "United Nations authoritative body" 
which might begin meeting during, rather than after, the war. 
He feared that certain matters, such as relief and territorial 
questions, could not safely be addressed until the creation of 
an international forum of some kind. He believed one of 
President Wilson's greatest mistakes had been his failure to 
reafch firm agreements on the precise nature of the postwar 
order prior to the end of the last war. Welles understood that 
Washington would gain greater leverage over the other members 
of the Big Four on postwar matters by taking the lead in 
planning and then making detailed proposals to the other 
powers. He thus wanted Washington to quickly complete the 
details of its desired blueprint for world order so that it 
could sell its vision of the overall design to the other 
powers. 22
21 p  minutes 4, March 28,1942, box 55.
22 ibid.
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At this time, President Roosevelt supported a postwar 
great power consortium, a sort of continuation of the Grand 
Alliance, whereas Welles supported a world body which would 
include not only the great powers, but all the other nations of 
the world as well. Hamilton Fish Armstrong endorsed Welles's 
views, suggesting they would assist the United States in 
aligning the smaller nations into a pro-American bloc against 
the other great powers. A postwar Anglo-American partnership to 
run the world, which some officials in Washington and London 
supported, might not be sufficiently strong to impose its aims 
on the rest of the globe. Furthermore, and perhaps most 
importantly, U.S. and British war aims did not always converge, 
especially in the areas of trade, postwar economics and 
colonialism. But Benjamin Cohen feared that an organization 
consisting of all nations would degenerate into an unwieldy 
mess. He suggested that a smaller council of four or five great 
powers be created for more effective decision making.23
Welles helped fashion a compromise between Armstrong's and 
Cohen's views. Welles suggested that any new international 
forum would need to contain both an assembly of all member 
nations, as well as a smaller executive council. He thought the 
members of the executive council could allow the smaller 
nations to join them on a rotating basis. He also 
enthusiastically supported the idea of endowing a postwar 
international organization with regional councils. His support 
for the regional concept stemmed from his belief in the 
effectiveness of the inter-American system and Pan American 
Union. A regional approach to world order might also satisfy 
America's desire to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine and would 
avoid compromising U.S. preeminence by preventing outside 
interference in what Washington considered its primary sphere 
of interest.24
In a report to the full advisory committee in early April 
1942, Welles outlined how his political subcommittee sought to 
create a "United Nations Authority" which would include all the 
countries fighting the Axis, but with the Four Policemen
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
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consisting of the United States, Britain, Russia and China, 
playing dominant roles as permanent members of the executive 
council. France, Welles had decided, should be excluded from 
the executive council. Welles also repeated his suggestion that 
the organization feature strong regional groupings. If the 
regional bodies were unable to resolve specific problems, or if 
disputes emerged between regions, the matter would be appealed 
to the executive council. Welles thought the regional councils 
could help reconcile differences among the Four Policemen over 
the desired nature of the postwar settlement, allowing them to 
initially adjudicate disputes in their areas of responsibility. 
Such councils would thus preserve each great power's hegemony 
within its zone of responsibility. Regionalism might also 
resolve disputes within the Roosevelt administration over the 
best approach to take in building the new world organization.25
When Hull returned to Washington in the spring of 1942, he 
disbanded the full advisory committee but allowed the 
subcommittees to continue their work. Hull’s move inadvertently 
strengthened Welles's hand, as the under secretary's political 
subcommittee soon assumed the duties of the now-disbanded 
advisory committee. Welles's subcommittee soon became the 
pacesetter for postwar planning, its judgement sought by the 
other subcommittees and regular reports delivered to it about 
the progress of the other groups.25
In an effort to provide for a more detailed examination of 
the particular problems related to designing a new world body, 
Welles proposed the creation of a special subcommittee on 
international organization.2? This subcommittee, to which Welles 
also appointed himself chairman, assumed a position of major 
importance in the postwar planning process and would continue 
in existence as long as the political subcommittee itself, 
holding a total of forty-five meetings between July 1942 and 
June 1943.28 Its tasks included an examination of international 
organizations (with special attention paid to the League of
25 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, April 4,1942, Notter files, box 54; Sumner Welles, 
Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper, 1946), 19, 23-27.
26 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, May 2,1942.
27 p  minutes 17, June 27,1942, box 55.
28 ibid.
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Nations), the drafting of a constitution for the new world 
body, an in-depth examination of international trusteeship, and 
later, discussions on endowing a new world organization with a 
military capability. During its existence the subcommittee on 
international organization would succeed in creating the 
blueprint for a new world body which would evolve into the
United Nations.29
Welles also used his leadership of the postwar planning 
process to spearhead three ultimately unsuccessful drives to 
shape the postwar world. Had these efforts succeeded, the 
United Nations and the postwar order might have evolved in 
notably different ways. First, based on his experience 
designing and implementing the Good Neighbor Policy and the 
"American system," Welles advocated a regional approach to a 
postwar organization that envisioned "open" spheres of 
responsibility, where the great powers would exercise enough 
influence to protect their physical security, but leave smaller 
nations alone to determine their own internal policies. Second, 
Welles desired to provide the United Nations with a strong and 
effective military arm. He believed the league failed because 
it did not possess sufficient military force to halt acts of 
aggression in the 1930s. He concluded that a new organization 
could only be effective if it contained a credible threat of 
force. Lastly, Welles sought to create an extensive system of 
international trusteeship over all colonial possessions where 
the world organization would implement and oversee a timetable 
for the gradual emancipation of all dependent colonial peoples.
Welles’s lack of success in these three areas is
noteworthy and an examination of these issues offers insight
into the breadth of his internationalist vision. His inability
to gain acceptance for a regional basis for the United Nations
may have made it more difficult for Washington to countenance
Moscow's aims in Eastern Europe, while the failure to endow the
United Nations with a credible military force contributed to
29 p  minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942, box 55; Minutes of the Special 
Subcommittee on International Organization, 34, April 9, 1943, box 85 [hereafter referred to as PIO minutes 
and PIO documents]; PIO document 95, “An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," 
October 21, 1942, box 56; S minutes 24, January 22, 1943, box 76; S document 44, "The Character and 
Functions of a  Permanent International Security Organization," August 11, 1942, box 77; P document 121-a, 
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that body’s ineffectiveness in the postwar years. Furthermore, 
the failure of Welles's trusteeship plan meant that the United 
States would ultimately side with the European powers over the 
matter of colonialism in the postwar era.30
Welles's advocacy of regionalism, for example, did not 
mean that he had abandoned his larger aim of creating a largely 
universalist world order. It instead demonstrated his 
conviction that the postwar settlement had to take into account 
local and regional practicalities. Welles still assumed that
Wilson had been correct in pushing his Fourteen Points, but he 
believed the late president had been too rigid in the
application of his principles. Welles thought a more flexible 
and creative approach to the problems of erecting a postwar 
order might succeed where Wilson had failed. While Welles 
respected many aspects of Wilsonianism, he believed much of the 
previous effort at postwar planning had been flawed from the 
outset. Welles sought to avoid a repetition of mistakes such as 
the failure to create the League Covenant during the war, 
Wilson's refusal to consult Congress (particularly the
Republican members) in the planning process and the flawed 
nature of the mandates system. Welles also sought to avoid 
repeating other failures such as the league's inability to back 
collective security with the threat of force, the league's lack 
of safeguards for America' s predominance in the western 
hemisphere and the failure to include Russia in the postwar 
settlement.31
Welles saw his leadership of the international 
organization subcommittee as an opportunity to succeed where 
Wilson had failed by creating a new league and securing 
American participation. Meeting weekly on Saturday mornings in 
Welles's office, the new subcommittee included other strong 
advocates of international organization such as Isaiah Bowman, 
Ben Cohen and Leo Pasvolsky, in addition to James T. Shotwell, 
a Columbia University history professor who had headed the 
League of Nations Association, Green H. Hackworth, the state
30 it should also be noted that at various times during the war President Roosevelt appeared to support Welles 
on these issues, but in the wake of Welles's resignation, Roosevelt gradually moved away from these positions 
on regionalism, the collective use of force, and trusteeship.
31 Welles, Seven Decisions. 125. 182-183; Welles, Time For Decision. 367-368.
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department legal adviser, and later, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. 
Clark Eichelberger, the director of the Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, served as a consultant. Their experience 
on the international organization subcommittee would be applied 
in the months and years after its disbandment, most 
particularly during the August 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 
where all of the members of the subcommittee (with the 
exception of Welles and Shotwell) would play prominent roles.32 
Welles inaugurated the first meeting of his international 
organization subcommittee on July 17, 1942 by circulating a
draft outline on world organization given to him by the exiled 
Dutch diplomat Eelco Van Kieffens, whose views resembled 
Welles's. Van Kief fens had spent most of the war in London 
serving as foreign minister of the Dutch government-in-exile. 
Welles thought Van Kieffens's outline worth examining in some 
detail, and he circulated it in the hope of framing future 
discussions. The draft began with a review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the league and emphasized the importance of U.S. 
participation in a future world body. Van Kieffens endorsed the 
view that the old league should be abandoned, and replaced by 
something completely different. He criticized the concept of a 
purely universal world organization, questioning whether the 
great powers would ever truly give consideration to the wishes 
of smaller nations. Instead, Van Kieffens endorsed regional 
groupings arranged by oceans: Atlantic, Pacific and
Mediterranean councils, and similar bodies for the Indian Ocean 
and the South Atlantic.33
After discussing Van Kleffens's outline Welles suggested 
that the planners meet again in two weeks after each member had 
drafted their own individual blueprints for a world 
organization.34 when the planners reconvened on July 31 they 
presented their respective plans for a world body. James 
Shotwell emphasized the importance of an international court of 
justice, while Isaiah Bowman underscored the need for an
32 pio minutes 1, July 17, 1942, box 85, Notter Files, [all references to PIO minutes are from Notter Files, 
Record Group 59, National Archives, unless otherwise stated]. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The 
Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
1990), 18.
33 pio minutes 1, July 17,1942; PIO document 1, "Statement by Van Kleffens," July 17,1942, box 86.
34 ibid.
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organization that would enjoy widespread support from the 
American people. Ben Cohen stressed the need for strong 
regional councils and Clark Eichelberger emphasized
universality as the basis of a new world body. Welles merely 
sought to blend together what he thought were the best concepts 
from each p r o p o s a l .35
Welles next led the committee on an article-by-article
examination of the covenant of the League of Nations. Like a 
team of pathologists performing an autopsy, they examined 
different aspects of the league and attempted to diagnose the 
reasons for its failures. Using Van Kieffens's arguments in his 
support, Welles soon convinced the other planners to avoid 
resurrecting the old league. 36 They thus began drafting 
blueprints for a new international organization which could
then be submitted to the parent political committee.37 Welles 
wanted to avoid having the draft extensively debated and
revised by the larger political subcommittee, and thus wanted 
the smaller subcommittee on international organization to 
submit a draft that would be as complete and thorough as 
possible. For example, Welles also sought to address the 
question of where the colonial world would fit into the new 
order, and over the next two months he and the planners labored 
to produce a draft plan for trusteeship to be submitted along 
with a draft outline on an international organization.38
By late October the draft outline of an international 
organization began to take shape. The details of the draft 
demonstrated the degree to which Welles and the other committee 
members wanted to reform the world through utopian means, but
35 pio minutes 2, July 31, 1942; PIO document 2, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," 
by Jam es T. Shotwell, box 85; PIO document 3, "Memorandum by Isaiah Bowman on International 
Organization," box 85; PIO document 4, "Some Observations Regarding the Form of World Political 
Organization," by Benjamin Cohen, box 85; PIO document 5, "Preliminary Memorandum on International 
Organization," by Clark Eichelberger, box 85.
36 while the league would be abandoned, Welles and the planners sought to build upon its more useful 
features. In late August, for example, the committee once again returned to the Wilson era for instruction when 
it examined a 1918 draft by Colonel Edward House suggesting ways a  world organization could be 
strengthened. See PIO document 24, "Draft of Colonel House, July 16, 1918: suggestion for a  Covenant of 
League of Nations," box 86.
37 pio minutes 5, August 14, 1942; Wallace to Welles, August 8, 1942, Henry A. Wallace Papers a s  Vice 
President, 1941-1945, FDRL.
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also the extent to which they desired to globalize their 
"American system.1 To Welles, the outline met many of the 
requirements of the Atlantic Charter by pledging to improve 
living standards and provide security, while at the same time 
offering safeguards for regional diversity. The key features of 
the proposed organization included an "Executive Committee" 
made up of the Four Policemen; a "General Council" consisting 
of all members; an "Annex" grouping the member nations by 
regions; and a "General Security and Armaments Commission" 
which would monitor arms making and enforce international laws 
through collective security backed by an international police 
force. 39
The draft outline also called for the creation of a number 
of agencies to support the world organization, such as an 
"International Court of Justice" for the resolution of global 
disputes. Welles appreciated how the United States's vast new 
power and wealth gave it leverage in shaping the postwar 
economic order, and he sought the creation of a multilateral 
world economic structure in which America's capitalist system 
would prosper and expand. Thus, an "Economic Organization" 
would feature an "International Monetary Commission" to 
stabilize exchange rates, and an "International Labor 
Organization" for regulating global employment practices, while 
an "Economic Commission" would oversee the regulation of 
international commodities, price stabilization, global 
investments and economic development. Such institutions would 
help establish a global economic order in which the U.S. 
economy would be predominant. Furthermore, an "International 
Organization for Health and Social Welfare" would oversee an 
"International Health Organization" and a "Commission on Drug 
Trafficking" while an "Organization on International Cultural 
Relations" would promote scholarship, the arts, education, the 
sciences, international radio broadcasts and the dissemination 
of motion pictures. Other proposed agencies included a 
"Refugees Board," an "International Committee on Nutrition," an 
"International Communications Organization" and an agency to
39 PIO minutes 14, October 30, 1942; PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," 
October 28, 1942, box 87; PIO document 123, "Draft Constitution of International Organization," December 3, 
1942, box 87.
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coordinate international air traffic. These far-reaching 
proposals demonstrated the planners1 efforts to erect a new 
international corporatist order to assist in the ultimate 
exportation and homogenization of American institutions, 
economic systems, culture and lifestyles throughout the world.*o 
While the draft plan for an international organization 
continued to take shape, a number of problems emerged. Welles 
insisted that the new world order have a universal nature, even 
if the Four Policemen served as guardians of particular regions 
in the postwar era. Therein lay a dilemma, for it proved 
difficult to reconcile the notion of the Four Policemen with 
the universalist vision which foresaw nations everywhere, great 
and small, cooperating through a new league.*i Welles thus 
thought regional councils could help reconcile differences 
among the Four Policeman —  as well as within the 
administration —  over the desired nature of the postwar 
settlement. Several planners had expressed their concern that 
the great powers might be reluctant to cede to a world body the 
responsibility for their spheres of interest. Furthermore, 
regionalism might temper the kind of unqualified support for 
minority rights and national self-determination which had the 
potential to turn the new world order into a dysfunctional 
disorder. A regional approach to the postwar order might 
resolve some of those fears. With the memory of Wilson's 
struggle over the league in mind, Welles also sought a regional 
solution exempting the Monroe Doctrine from a world 
organization, thus avoiding the problem of outside powers 
interfering in the affairs of the new world. Regionalism might 
also prevent the postwar settlement from being undermined by 
bitter territorial disputes that might erupt at the end of the 
war, particularly in Eastern Europe, where Welles had noted 
that local national aspirations would inevitably clash with 
Moscow's desire for security and friendly neighbors. A regional 
approach might allow each of the great powers a measure of 
autonomy within their security zones. Welles sought regional
40 ibid.
41 p document 121 -a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 
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integration for other areas along the lines of what he believed 
had been achieved in the western hemisphere. He spoke often of 
providing the rest of the world with an example to emulate 
after the war, seeing recent inter-American cooperation as an 
informal regional federation which might serve as "a 
cornerstone in the world structure of the future."42
Welles's advocacy of a regional approach also sought to 
heal a breach within the administration. Several of Roosevelt’s 
advisers and special envoys, such as Cordell Hull, Henry 
Wallace and Wendell Willkie, advocated a quasi-universal world 
order, where all nations would cooperate through a new league. 
Others, such as Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, thought Wilson's 
dream impractical, and advocated spheres of influence and power 
politics. Welles believed an organization designed with both 
regional and worldwide councils might reconcile these different 
views. 43
Welles had regularly briefed Roosevelt on the work of his 
subcommittee on international organization, at times bringing 
draft plans to the White House for the president's perusal. At 
the beginning of January 1943, as Roosevelt prepared for the 
upcoming Casablanca conference, Welles held a two-hour tutorial 
for the president on postwar planning, outlining the essential 
features of the subcommittees' findings. After forty meetings 
dating back to early 1942, a sketchy design had begun to take 
shape. Welles underscored that some form of postwar 
international organization was absolutely necessary to ensure a 
lasting peace. United States participation, he emphasized, 
would be essential to the future success of such a body.
42 'The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, Arlington National Cemetery, May 30,1942, speech 
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Regional and local disputes would be resolved through regional 
councils which would be subordinate to the overall world 
organization and a program for international trusteeship would 
be created for dependent areas. Furthermore, efforts at 
economic and political sanction would be supported by endowing 
the world organization with police p o w e r s .44
Drawing on the preliminary work done by the other 
subcommittees, Welles's political subcommittee had concluded 
that an international organization should be composed of an 
executive board consisting of representatives of the four great 
powers (the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China) 
with the addition of hand-picked representatives from the 
regions of Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, the 
Far East and possibly the Near East. While the executive 
council would have final decision on the terms of an armistice, 
a larger body, or general assembly, would consist of all the 
members of the United Nations.45
Welles saw European-style colonialism as a threat to the 
world order he sought to create, believing these European 
empires a blight on the world's conscience, while creating a 
climate which made the colonial world ripe for future conflict. 
International trusteeship was thus an integral part of Welles’s 
design. While the work of the subcommittees on the question of 
colonialism and international trusteeship will be assessed in 
chapter six, Welles proposed that a system of trusteeship might 
care for the world's "backward peoples" until they were able to 
stand on their own. 46 Welles feared the new international 
organization would not succeed unless more radical measures 
were taken with dependent colonial areas all over the world. 
Early on in the postwar planning process it had been agreed 
that the mandates system had been a dismal failure and that all 
responsibilities for the mandated territories should be
44 Welles, Seven Decisions. 184-185; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political 
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transferred to the new international organization. But several 
committee members felt that trusteeship should be limited to 
the present mandated territories and the Axis dependencies. 
This divergence would continue to grow throughout the first 
half of 1943, with Welles leading the forces backing a more
universal approach to trusteeship and Hull coming to lead those 
who favored a more moderate and less extensive p l a n .47
* * *
The early months of 1943 proved to be a significant 
turning point in the war. On the military front the Red Army 
had forced the Germans to begin withdrawing from the Caucasus 
in the wake of Stalingrad, while in the Pacific the allies had 
recently won a significant strategic victory during the battle 
of Guadalcanal. It would also prove to be an important moment 
for postwar planning. While Welles and his fellow planners had 
spent much of 1942 conducting a general survey of the new order 
they sought to create, in 1943 they hoped to begin presenting 
their more detailed blueprints to the other members of the 
Grand Alliance. Welles understood that his extensive plans for 
a new world order would succeed only if prior agreement existed 
among the Big Three. He had earlier told the planners that he 
remained concerned about British attitudes toward postwar
p l a n n i n g . 48 u.S. officials had a better sense of British views 
on postwar planning in the wake of an August 1942 visit to 
Washington by foreign office official Richard Law, while the
British came away with a better idea of the goals of Welles1 s 
planning committees. Welles reminded Law that one of the
47 PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 8, 1942, box 
86; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 
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gravest errors of the last war was that the allied nations had
not had sufficient time to coordinate peace aims among
themselves. 49
The British foreign office shared U.S. concerns about
reaching agreements over the shape and structure of the postwar 
world and became increasingly curious about Welles1s postwar 
planning committees. so The British, too, had studied Van 
Kleffens's outline for an international organization and 
foreign office planners had taken a keen interest in regional 
arrangements, hoping the United States (and not China) would 
take a lead in a Far East regional body and noting that 
regionalism might be desirable in Eastern Europe to help 
resolve its many ethnic and territorial problems. British
officials also noted that Welles and other U.S. officials had 
publicly called for a new world organization based on the 
wartime United Nations coalition. Several officials in London 
thus felt Britain should more definitively to establish its own 
postwar aims. "His Majesty's Government have not yet defined 
their views on questions or made any response to Mr. Welles's 
expression of opinion," wrote Gladwyn Jebb, head of the foreign 
office's economic and reconstruction department. "It is clearly 
important that the view of the two Governments should be 
harmonized as early as possible."si Anthony Eden subsequently 
told the war cabinet that Welles's public pronouncements 
demonstrated an American desire to begin bilateral discussions 
about the postwar world and he urged that London should act 
soon to take advantage of the American eagerness to work toward 
an international organization.52 in January 1943 Eden explained
49 pio minutes 4, August 14, 1942, box 85; FO 371/31525, Jebb to Eden, "World Organization," October 
1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 5, (London, Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), 2; P document 117, " British Political Ferment Involving Post-War 
Objectives," October 17, 1942, box 56. Ambassador Halifax (who sa t in on a  portion of Welles's discussions 
with Law) w as unsettled by Washington's support for a  universal organization featuring equality of voting to all 
nations, saying he "could not see  the wisdom or the practical possibility of giving Liberia an equal determination 
in world affairs a s  the British Government." See Welles memorandum of conversation with Law and Halifax, 
"Postwar Problems," August 25,1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL.
50 See, for example, FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on 
Post War Policy," February 16,1943, PRO.
51 CAB 66/30 WP (42) 480 "Postwar Atlantic Bases," (Van Kleffens's views), November 3, 1942, PRO; FO 
371/31518, minute by Gladwyn Jebb, September 3,1942, PRO.
52 CAB 66/31 WP (42) 516 "Four Power Plan," by Eden, November 8.1942, PRO; CAB 66/31 WP (42) 532 "Four 
Power Plan," by Cripps, November 19,1942, PRO; CAB 65/28 WM (42) 159, November 27,1942, PRO.
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to the war cabinet that only through the construction of a new 
world body could Britain continue to function as a world power. 
He enthusiastically endorsed regionalism and, hoping to 
reassure Washington that the other powers did not seek to 
interfere in the affairs of the Americas, he suggested that 
matters concerning the western hemisphere might best be handled 
by the already-functioning Pan American Union. "If, therefore, 
we believe that the United Nations Plan offers the best hope 
for the future," Eden's draft concluded, "we should make every 
possible effort to get it generally agreed without d e l a y . "53
In late March 1943, the day before Eden's arrival in 
Washington for a meeting with senior American officials, Welles 
again briefed the president on his postwar designs, 
particularly plans for an international organization.54 Welles's 
draft sought to achieve a compromise among three different 
groups: the advocates of regionalism, those who supported a 
more universal world organization and those who desired supreme 
power be vested in the Four Policemen. When Roosevelt met with 
Eden the following day the president offered this blueprint as 
the kind of world organization he desired. But to Welles, the 
draft was still not complete, for it contained no provision for 
fully integrated international forces and merely called for
53 FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on Post War Policy," 
February 16,1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP (43) 31 T h e  United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16, 1943, PRO. 
Before departing for Washington with Eden, Gladwyn Jebb drafted another paper, which not only served a s  the 
basis for future British discussions on the postwar order, but also demonstrated the extent to which Welles's 
neo-Wilsonian ideas continued to lead the way. Jebb 's memorandum acknowledged that T h e  principles 
embodied in the [Atlantic] Charter will be the basis of any international world order after the war." See FO 
371/35396, "Suggestions for a  Peace Settlement" by Gladwyn Jebb, March 6,1943, PRO.
54 For a more thorough account of Eden's visit, see  Warren F. Kimball, "Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, 
'The First Review': Eden's Mission to Washington," in The Rise and Fall of Ihe Grand Alliance. 1941-1945. Ann 
Lane and Howard Temperley, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 1-21.
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each nation to make troops readily available.55 Welles also 
believed that any decision to use force should require the 
approval of at least three of the four policemen, thus denying 
a veto to any one power. Welles felt they could not permit any 
nation, great or small, to veto action against itself if it 
undertook policies of aggression.55
Welles offered a more detailed version of his postwar 
plans during a meeting with Eden and Halifax on March 24. 
Welles outlined the functions of the executive committee, the 
regional assemblies and the general assembly. He suggested that 
the members of the new world body be compelled to agree to a 
"Bill of Rights" which would expand the principles of the Four 
Freedoms to all member states. Welles also urged Eden to assist 
him in creating a joint Anglo-American working group to discuss 
political problems, (similar to the Combined Chiefs of Staff).5? 
It soon became apparent to the British diplomats that Welles1s 
views on postwar matters dominated American thinking, for the 
president had just explained an almost identical, if somewhat
55 Welles had less to do with formulating U.S. policy on the concept of international police power. He had 
instead delegated most of the initial work to Norman Davis's subcommittee on security problems. But to better 
discuss how the world organization could best be endowed with military force, in early April 1943 Welles's 
subcommittee on international organization began holding joint meetings with Davis's subcommittee. Two 
opposing views quickly emerged: one faction supported a system where nations would contribute forces from 
their own militaries. Proponents of this view argued that the contribution of individual national forces would 
pose less of a  threat to the sovereignty of Ihe member nations. It might also anticipate opposition from those 
who would oppose the concept of American forces fighting under the direct command of an international body. 
There was also some concern that international forces might pursue their own ends and prove impossible to 
oppose in an otherwise disarmed world. Advocates of the alternative view argued that a  perm anent fully- 
integrated United Nations army would have consistent training and thus would possess better esprit de corps. 
Greater military readiness would be achieved and member nations would have more difficulty withholding 
support for United Nations operations if their forces were already committed in advance. But finding the means 
to provide the United Nations Authority with an effective military arm remained one of the most daunting 
challenges facing the planners. Despite the Welles-Davis joint meetings, the planners remained stymied a s  to 
how best to incorporate the concept of police powers into the draft charter. See, for example, PIO minutes 34, 
April 9, 1943; PIO minutes 35, April 16, 1943; PIO minutes 36, April 29,1943; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton O aks. 
21; S document 44, 'The Character and Functions of a  Permanent International Security Organization," August 
11,1942, box 77, Notter files.
56 p io  document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 86; P 
document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 
1942," October 22,1942, box 56; Memorandum of conversation, by Welles, March 27,1943, FRUS. vol. Ill, 35- 
38; 'Cordell Hull," by Donald F. Drummond, in Norman Graebner, ed. An Uncertain Tradition: American 
"Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 206-207; "Eden's conversations 
in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives.
57 Memorandum of Conversation, by Welles, March 16,1943, FRUS. Ill, 19-24; memorandum of conversation, 
by Hull, March 22,1943, FRUS. Ill, 34; CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd, April 13,1943, PRO.
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less detailed, outline.58 Despite Welles's private fear of the 
volatile nature of American public opinion, he told Eden that 
internationalism was beginning to build momentum throughout the 
country and that Republican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota 
would soon propose a resolution calling for the creation of a 
new international organization.5*
Eden's further meetings with Welles and the president 
succeeded in giving the British a better idea of American 
designs for an international organization. While Eden was in 
Washington, Churchill had called for the establishment of a 
world order based on regionalism, specifically recommending the 
creation of a "Council of Europe" and a "Council of Asia." 
Welles and the president expressed to Eden their opinion that 
while regional representation would be desirable, all nations 
should also be members of an all-inclusive b o d y .so After his 
meetings in Washington, Eden told the war cabinet that London 
and Washington shared many of the same general aims and that 
the foreign office should move to achieve greater coordination
58 The British delegation had been in Washington only a  few days when it took note of the tension between 
Welles and Hull, and particularly of Hull's lack of influence. Eden's private secretary, Oliver Harvey, thought 
Hull to be ill-informed and excluded from many decisions. Harvey noted in his diary: "It is an exhausting country 
where the President can, and insists on, discussing foreign policy without his Foreign Secretary being present 
and without even wishing him to know what his ideas are." The British also noted that the Welles-Hull feud 
spilled over into simple matters of protocol, a s  when the two men held separate receptions for Eden and his 
delegation. Harry Hopkins casually told the British that Welles and Hull always gave separate official 
receptions. During one discussion near the end of his visit, Eden expressed surprise that Welles and Hull were 
together in the sam e room. "Their relations were vinegar," Eden noted. See Oliver Harvey, The War Diaries of 
Oliver Harvev. 1941-45, (London: Collins, 1970), John Harvey, ed., 229-240; Anthony Eden, The Eden 
Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 376-77.
59 Harvey, War Diaries. 232. Eden briefed Welles on Churchill's desire to have the United States take part in a 
regional council for Europe. Welles replied that the American people might not accept such expanded 
responsibilities for the United S tates unless they were sold in purely pragmatic and self-interested terms.
60 Memorandum of conversation by Hopkins, March 27,1943, FRUS. Ill, 39.
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of allied plans for a postwar organization.61 The president 
summed up his own views of Eden's visit in a news conference on 
March 30, where he publicly concurred with Welles's view that 
planning should be coordinated with the other members of the 
Grand Alliance as soon as possible. The president explained 
that such meetings served better to clarify allied views on 
planning and he offered a detailed account of what he hoped 
such meetings could achieve, particularly in the area of 
postwar planning and peacemaking. Roosevelt added that early 
and frequent meetings between the Big Three would be necessary 
to ensure the avoidance of the problems which had afflicted the 
peace process in 1919.62
During a visit by Churchill to Washington in May 1943 he 
hosted a British embassy luncheon for Americans interested in 
postwar questions (such as Welles, Wallace, Stimson, Ickes, and 
Senator Connally) where the prime minister reiterated his 
support for regionalism. &  At the end of the luncheon, Welles 
took Halifax aside and repeated his desire to reach concrete 
agreements soon on the essential outlines of postwar planning.
61 FO 371/35368, memorandum of conversation with Welles, by Halifax, April 12, 1943, PRO; Harvey, War 
Diaries. 232; "Eden's conversations in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives; 
CAB 66/35 WP (43) 130 "Foreign Secretary's Visit to Washington," by Eden, March 30, 1943, PRO. Reporting 
on how Eden's visit was being received in official circles in London, H. Freeman Matthews, an American 
diplomatic official in London, told Washington that the British feared another American withdrawal from world 
affairs similar to 1919-1920. But Matthews also noted concern in London that a  strengthened America would 
attempt to impose its views on the rest of the world, particularly on the British Empire. "The alternate, or 
perhaps I should say the corollary, fear of 'American imperialism' is likewise real," Matthews added.See 
Matthews to Hull, March 20,1943, FRUS. Ill, 26-28. "[It] is no exaggeration to say," Matthews continued, "that 
fear of an American withdrawal from its due interest in the building of the new world is the dominant factor in 
British feeling toward the United States today. Neither the British public nor the British Government dares count 
too strongly that the changed world and the lessons of the aftermath of 1919 will effectively prevent another 
American 'back to normalcy' wave with all its power to destroy the spirit of cooperation founded on wartime 
need."
62 Notes from FDR's press conference of March 30, 1943, FRUS. Ill, 41-42. "If som e of you go back," 
Roosevelt told the assem bled reporters, "some of you can, like myself, go back to 1918, the war came to a 
rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually ifs a  fact that there had been very little work done on the 
post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, between Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris 
early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things."
63 FO 371/35366 "Eden memorandum of conversations in Washington," March 29,1943, PRO; CAB 66/37 WP 
(43) 233 "The Structure of Postwar Settlement," by Churchill, June 10,1943, PRO; FO 371/35435; "Churchill's 
views on postwar problems: May 1943," May 28,1943, Notter Files, box 19. Back in London, Eden thought the 
prime minister's luncheon extremely productive. He felt that it had successfully reconfirmed the enthusiasm on 
the part of the United States, "and most notably Mr. Sumner Welles," for reaching wartime agreem ents with the 
other allies about the nature of the new international organization. See "Postwar Settlement," by Eden, July 1, 
1943, PRO. For a more detailed account of Churchill's views on postwar planning and international organization 
see, for example, E.J. Hughes, “Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization," 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 9, no.4 (October 1974), 177-194.
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Welles told the ambassador that he thought it particularly 
important to secure agreement with Moscow on postwar plans 
while relations among the Big Three remained reasonably
friendly. Welles subsequently provided Halifax with further 
details about his plans for an international organization. 
(Welles did not put his ideas in writing because he had not yet 
discussed them with Hull, and he may have also feared that 
Halifax would leak the details of the plan to the press.)
"[Welles] developed his ideas of a supreme world council and
regional councils in great detail," Halifax reported to London, 
"and he hopes to be able to get the President's approval of his 
plans so that he could let us have it all on paper . . . ." 
Welles assured Halifax that the British should not fear a
repeat of Wilson's failure. He told the ambassador that he was 
"more and more impressed with the way in which public feeling 
in the country as regards postwar cooperation was ahead of 
Congress." 64
But Welles's views on postwar planning continued to deepen 
his rift with Hull, most particularly Welles's backing of a 
senate resolution calling for the creation of an international 
organization during the war. Welles believed that despite the 
risks involved, a congressional resolution calling for U.S. 
participation in an international organization would 
crystallize public opinion and inform other governments of 
Washington's commitment to internationalism. In February 1943 
Welles had taken the liberty of telling his political 
subcommittee (which had now been expanded, in addition to 
Senators Connally, Austin and Thomas and Representatives Bloom 
and Eaton, to include Senators Walter George and Wallace White 
and Representative Luther Johnson) that despite the opposition 
of Hull, Congress could best aid the postwar planning process
64 FO 371/35434 Halifax minute to foreign office and prime minister, June 11, 1943, PRO; FO 371/ 35435 
Halifax to FO, June 29, 1943, PRO. Halifax's discussions with Welles prompted the foreign office's Gladwyn 
Jebb to draft a  memorandum for the war cabinet outlining the areas of Anglo-American agreement on matters 
related to the international organization, and Eden followed with a memo recommending the cabinet endorse 
Welles's ideas for regionalism. See FO 371/35435 "Memo by Jebb," June 12,1943, PRO; FO 371/35435 Eden 
to Churchill, June 16,1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP(43)31, "The United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16,1943, 
PRO.
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and reassure the allies by passing such a resolution.65 While 
Hull rested in Florida in the spring of 1943f Welles met with 
the resolution's sponsor, Senator Ball, at the state 
department, encouraging the senator to introduce the resolution 
as soon as possible. Welles also arranged a meeting between 
Ball and the president to discuss the proposal. Hull opposed a 
resolution of this type and he was further distressed when he 
later learned that Welles had already arranged meetings at the 
White House between the president, Harry Hopkins, James F. 
Byrnes, Senator Ball and a number of other members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To Hull, Welles's actions 
seemed reckless. Not only was Hull opposed to the measure, but 
the president, long Welles's chief defender, remained 
noncommittal. Hull was also displeased with Welles's efforts to 
sell the concept of regionalism to the British, as he remained 
opposed to anything other than a strictly universal world 
body.66
* * *
The controversy over the Ball resolution fostered the 
fears of Welles and the other planners that the U.S. public 
might resist America's increased responsibilities in world 
affairs. Welles desired that more strenuous efforts be mounted 
to develop public support for American participation. He 
believed administration officials should seek publicly to 
stress the urgent need for the United States to assume its 
rightful global responsibilities. Throughout his tenure as 
under secretary, Welles devoted much of his time to such public 
relations aspects of his position, believing that many of his 
postwar aims could be better promoted through public diplomacy. 
President Wilson's failure to sell the peace treaty after 
returning from Paris in 1919 taught Welles that the public 
presentation of diplomacy was a crucial component of a
65 P minutes 45, February 20,1943. While Welles emphasized that such a  move would send a  clear m essage 
to Moscow and London that the United States was prepared to play a  role in the postwar settlement, he may 
also have hoped It might forestall further unilateral territorial moves on the part of the Kremlin.
66 Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: 
Atheneum, 1971), 94; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1942), vol. II, 1640; 
Welles, Seven Decisions. 188-189.
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successful foreign policy. He also believed that public 
pronouncements by senior administration officials could be 
useful propaganda weapons in fighting the war. Welles thought 
the American people would be more inclined to support national 
war aims with a strong idealistic tinge. He explained that he 
believed "history clearly showed that peoples would fight 
indefinitely for ideals and for principles and for the
attainment of liberty."67 Writing to Archibald MacLeish in April
1942, Welles explained that "the creation of an offensive
spirit among our people requires that we give them a cause to 
fight for. If our people believe that all we are fighting for 
is the status quo ante, it will be difficult to keep them 
fighting if the enemy offers a return to that status."66
In late May 1942, Welles acted on this conviction when he 
explained the administration's postwar objectives during his 
Memorial Day remarks at Arlington National Cemetery. Welles
sought to use the speech as an opportunity to clothe the 
sketchy framework of the Atlantic Charter with a more 
definitive program for the postwar era, while at the same time 
winning support for the administration's postwar program, but 
he also wanted to expand America's war aims to include the 
liberation of all peoples. "This is in very truth a people's 
war," he said. "It is a war which cannot be regarded as won 
until the fundamental rights of the peoples of the earth are 
secured."6* With postwar planning going at full speed in the 
secrecy of the state department, Welles offered his most 
detailed public explanation of the aims and meaning of the war, 
claiming that the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations 
Declaration would be the basis of a new world organization. The 
reach of the Atlantic Charter would be stretched to cover the 
entire globe. "Our victory must bring in its train the 
liberation of all peoples. Discrimination between peoples 
because of their race, creed, or color must be abolished. The 
age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their 
freedom must be recognized .... The principles of the Atlantic
67 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 20,1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 522.
68 MacLeish to Welles, April 16,1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL.
69 "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, Arlington National Cemetery, May 30,1942, speech 
files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL
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Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole —  in all 
oceans and in all continents.H
Welles had thus expanded his vision of American war aims 
by publicly describing the current conflict as a "people's war" 
which would inaugurate global reform and lead to American 
leadership in the postwar era. By proclaiming the conflict a 
"people's war" he affirmed his view of the war's revolutionary 
potential to recast the world order, but he also hinted that 
when the war was over, the American people, and the peoples of 
the wider world, could expect something in return for their 
sacrifices. The war would lead to a realignment of world power, 
with new forces such as the Soviet Union and China joining with 
the United States to enforce the peace. Welles assumed that at 
the end of the war only the United States would have the 
strength and resources to lead the world toward a reformed 
world order.70
Reactions to Welles's remarks came from many quarters. The 
New York Times placed its account of the speech on its front 
page, emphasizing Welles's call that the United Nations become 
the "nucleus of a world organization of the future." The Times 
hailed his proclamation of a "new frontier of human welfare" 
and called the Arlington speech a remarkable and advanced 
explication of war aims, once again going beyond Roosevelt's 
vision of what the war could achieve. The Times also 
highlighted Welles's call for the United States to lead the way 
toward a new world order where "freedom from want" could be 
achieved, and where the U.S. would accept its rightful place as 
a global power. The Pulitzer Prize winning playwright Robert 
Sherwood, now director of the Office of War Information's 
Overseas Division, applauded the speech as "revolutionary" and 
arranged its rebroadcast on All India Radio.7* Walter Lippmann, 
writing in his nationally syndicated column, added, "Mr. Welles 
was not making Utopian promises for the distant future but was 
announcing a policy which is very seriously meant," while Anne
70 Welles to Archibald MacLeish, August 13,1942, box 81, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; "The Realization of 
a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, May 30,1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
71 New York Times. May 31, 1942; FO 371/31518, "Proposal by Mr. Sumner Welles for the Organization of 
P e a c e ," July 9, 1942, PRO; Sherwood to Welles, May 31, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL; Sherwood to 
Welles, June 25,1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL.
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O'Hare McCormick noted in her column that Welles's speech "is 
the most concrete statement of postwar intentions and policy 
yet made by a spokesman of this Government" adding that "the 
idea of a New Deal for the world" now represented the central 
theme of the administration's postwar planning policy.72
Welles's Arlington remarks had once again revealed his aim 
that the war should bring about a worldwide extension of New 
Deal-style reforms. He assumed the war would give rise to 
America's eclipse of Europe in the areas of economic, military 
and political power, but also in terms of moral example. He 
assumed American leadership better suited to the challenges of 
the postwar world and that the two world wars had once again 
demonstrated the failure of European primacy.73 Welles believed 
such public pronouncements went a long way toward persuading 
the American people to support a new world order as a result of 
the war. "I am only an amateur politician and therefore I may 
be wrong," Welles wrote to MacLeish in August 1942. "But if one 
can judge by the temper of the American people during the Civil 
War, they fight better when they know for what they are 
fighting and when that 'common hope' is responsive to their own 
aspirations and to their own idealism, and when they believe 
that its realization will make for the security of their 
country, their children and their faith."74 Welles thus sought 
to lead an aggressive public relations effort for a new league 
in anticipation of the 1942 mid-term elections, delivering a 
series of partisan blasts at the Republicans, all the while 
decrying partisanship on the part of the opposition.75
72 New York Herald Tribune. June 9,1942; New York Times. June 1,1942.
73 p minutes, March 7, 1942; "Free Access to Raw Materials, " by Sumner Welles, National Foreign Trade 
Convention, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; "Blueprint for Peace," by 
Sumner Welles, November 17,1942, New York Herald Tribune Forum, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL
74 Welles to MacLeish, August 13,1942, Welles papers, box 81, folder 1, FDRL
75 New York Times. May 31, 1942; "Free Access to Raw Materials," by Sumner Welles, October 8, 1942, 
speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL. Nevertheless, the Democrats did poorly in the 1942 elections, and the 
old dictum that the outcomes of American elections do not turn on foreign policy questions was once again set 
on its head. Former isolationists did well in the 1942 primaries, and in the general election the Republicans 
gained 46 sea ts in the House, and 10 in the Senate. Many interpreted the results as a  repudiation of the 
president's handling of the war, and some supporters of internationalism voiced concerns that a  political 
coalition was forming that would undermine and ultimately defeat the administration's internationalist goals, as  
happened to Wilson in 1918. The Democratic defeat at the polls in 1942 profoundly influenced the 
administration's efforts to promote the new world order. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. 
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Welles and the planners often had great trepidation about 
the level of public support for their postwar plans.76 Welles 
thus sought to convince the American people that only through 
active participation in an international organization could 
they avoid another disaster like the current war. Even after 
the 1942 elections he continued to attack the administration's 
opponents, whom, he said, must take responsibility for causing 
the current war and who once again stood poised to take America 
down the path of isolation.77
Departmental infighting regularly flared up over Welles's 
handling of postwar planning, but his public remarks about a 
new world order particularly angered Hull, who sought to exert 
more control over the entire planning process, which he began 
to view as a runaway locomotive. The secretary eventually 
demanded that all statements on postwar matters be submitted to 
him for prior approval. Hull was further angered when Welles 
explained that the president had authorized him to use his 
public pronouncements to issue a series of "trial balloons" on 
postwar matters. To Hull, this seemed again to confirm Welles's 
disloyalty and insubordination.78 But Welles feared the
76 They feared that Ohio Senator Robert Taft and other isolationists in the Senate would work to destroy 
internationalism. Welles thought political trouble might be brewing in the shape of an isolationist backlash in the 
west and mid-west. He also acknowledged that the political situation in these states had the potential to create 
political hazards for the administration's foreign policy, and that an accelerated public relations campaign might 
convince the American people of toe virtues of internationalism. See, for example, PIO minutes 17, November 
20, 1942. At one meeting shortly after toe 1942 elections, Welles read aloud a  letter from a  recently defeated 
Democratic Congressman who warned that toe country was heading down toe sam e path a s  1918-1920 and 
attributed his defeat to deep-seated isolationist feeling, predicting that toe international question would
dominate the elections of 1944. Isaiah Bowman told toe committee that he had just returned from toe mid-west 
and he warned toe members that toe attitude there was one of "Why should toe United States help these people 
in distant countries?"
77 Welles pushed these accusations further during other speeches, pointing out that toe mistakes of 1919 had 
led directly to toe current war, while placing responsibility for avoiding another war in toe hands of toe American 
people. During a  nationally broadcast address from upstate New York in December 1942, he repeated toe 
theme that American participation in a postwar organization was a  matter of self-interest. "Would we not a s  a 
people have been better advised if we had been willing twenty years ago to join with the other free peoples of 
toe earth in promoting an international order which would have maintained toe peace of toe world and which 
could have prevented toe rise of those conditions which have resulted in the total war of today?" See 
"Dedication to toe Future," by Sumner Welles, Mount Vernon, NY, December 6, 1942, speech files, box 195, 
folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; a s  well as "The Victory of Peace,” by Sumner Welles, February 26, 1943, 
speech files, box 196, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.
78 Hull thus felt compelled to deliver a radio address of his own, where he warned it would be necessary to set 
limits on toe Four Freedoms, thus taking a  stance quite contrary to Welles's more sweeping aims. To make 
matters worse, toe ailing Hull was unable to complete his address. Hull remained uncomfortable with Welles's 
aim of pressing toe European colonial powers to grant self-government to their colonies. Hull assum ed self- 
government would come naturally after an adequate period of years. New York Times. July 24, 1942; Welles, 
Where Are We Headed?. 19-24; Hull, Memoirs. 1227-1229,1599.
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administration risked missing an important opportunity to shape 
public opinion. He privately lamented that it would prove more 
difficult to find agreement on common ideals or "a common hope" 
as the war's conclusion neared. "I am more and more anxious," 
Welles wrote to MacLeish, "that the Administration should at 
least let people know what that common hope should be. And 
still the trend is . . .  to deal solely in platitudes and 
generalities on the ground that politically it is unwise to 
hold up to the American people as a common hope anything more 
than the Beatitudes." 79 Despite Hull's admonitions, Welles 
continued to make unauthorized public remarks about postwar 
aims, and his efforts took another step forward in the summer 
of 1943 when Simon & Schuster came out with Prefaces to Peace, 
featuring addresses from Welles, Willkie and Wallace about 
their postwar aims, but not including any contributions from 
Hull. In June, Columbia University Press followed with a 
collection featuring twelve of Welles's best-known wartime 
speeches under the title The World of the Four Freedoms.80
* * *
Hull had grown increasing restive over his inability to 
control postwar planning and in the spring of 1943 he assumed 
the full-time chairmanship of the political subcommittee after 
its forty-seventh meeting. The bulk of its work had already 
been done, however, and the broad outlines of the kind of world 
order America desired had already begun to take shape. A number 
of problems still remained to be ironed out, but the 
subcommittees had thoroughly and systematically examined U.S. 
war and peace aims in some detail. The "Draft Constitution of
79 Welles to MacLeish, August 13, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL. During a  remarkable speech at the 
May 1943 commencement exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham, Welles devoted the 
majority of his remarks to the question of race and equality in the new world order. Welles stated that ■. . .  in the 
kind of world for which we fight, there must cease  to exist any need tor the use of that accursed term 'racial or 
religious minority.' If the peoples of the earth are fighting and dying to preserve and secure the liberation of the 
individual under law, is it conceivable that the peoples of the United Nations can consent to the 
reestablishment of any system where human beings will still be regarded a s  belonging to such 'm inorities?'. . .  
equality of human rights and to equality of opportunity every human being is by divine right entitled. If that 
cornerstone is laid a s  the foundation of the new world of the United Nations, the blot of the concept of minorities 
upon the fabric of our civilization will be erased." See "Commencement Exercises of the North Carolina College 
for Negroes," by Sumner Welles, May 31,1943, speech files, box 195, Welles papers, FDRL.
80 Sumner Welles, The World of the Four Freedoms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), v-vii.
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the United Nations" was by then largely completed and Welles 
briefed the president on the findings of the subcommittees at a 
White House meeting on June 19, where Welles obtained 
Roosevelt's approval of the latest drafts of the "United 
Nations Protocol" and the "Draft Constitution of the 
International Organization."si
The drafts urged that some form of world organization be 
launched before the war's end. The planners felt that the 
league, despite its failures, had established significant 
precedents for international cooperation, had marked a 
revolutionary advance over previous relationships among nations 
and should serve as a prototype for the new organization. The 
drafts explained that the league failed not only because the 
U.S. refused to join, but also because the league did not have 
sufficient power to carry out its will. A future international 
organization should thus have the power to enforce peace, with 
an international military force giving economic sanctions a 
meaning and substance which they had lacked under the league. 
The planners endorsed a system where nations would contribute 
armed forces as needed. The drafts also endorsed the need for a 
strong universal world organization, but argued that many local 
problems would best be handled by regional bodies. The regional 
bodies would be subordinate to the overall world organization, 
with the universal body having ultimate appellate 
jurisdiction.82 The members also foresaw some danger in forming 
regional bodies, particularly in the Far East and the Pacific 
region, where the interests of several great powers might come
P minutes 60, June 19,1943; P document 234, "Universal International Organization," June 19,1942, box 
57; PIO minutes 44, June 19,1943 with memo from Sandifer regarding Welles meeting with President, June 19, 
1943 [attached], box 85; Welles, Seven Decisions. 189.
82 PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 
56; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2,1943, box 
57, Notter files. Welles and the planners underscored the need for United States participation in a  future world 
organization in stark economic terms. They believed the United States needed to participate in an international 
body to safeguard free trade and the open door. They also concluded that U.S. participation might be 
necessary to obtain basic resources in the years following the war. The planners thought support for 
internationalism might be more easily obtained if U.S. postwar aims were presented in more practical and self- 
interested terms, for example, a s  crucial to the safeguarding of American security, trade and standards of 
living.
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in conflict.83
When Hull finally disbanded the planning committees in 
July 1943 he had at last succeeded in ending Welles's 
domination of postwar planning. A few days after Hull's action, 
the "Draft Constitution of the United Nations" was made public, 
but over the next few weeks the decline of Welles' s influence 
became more apparent, depriving the administration of a strong 
advocate for regionalism. Hull had now become a staunch 
opponent of Welles's regional ideas, and the secretary would 
see to it that the redraft of the plan omitted the concept 
altogether. Hull disagreed with Welles's belief that 
regionalism would serve to safeguard the western hemisphere. 
The secretary instead feared that regionalism would mean that 
European and Asiatic powers would find their way onto regional 
councils for the Americas. When Hull thus received Welles's 
"Draft Constitution" he instructed Leo Pasvolsky to make 
revisions in the area of regionalism.m  Pasvolsky's revised 
version differed little from Welles's previous efforts and it 
became the foundation upon which much of the work would be 
conducted at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the summer of 
1944. But one important omission from the redraft was the 
concept of regionalism, which Hull succeeded in eliminating
83 Ibid. British officials had also been revising their own outline for a world organization. Following Eden's visit 
to Washington, successive British drafts demonstrated how strongly Welles's vision of a world organization 
continued to influence postwar planning on both sides of the Atlantic. British drafts during the summer of 1943 
generally followed the outlines of Welles's proposals. After Churchill's return from the United States, he 
circulated to the cabinet an account of his conversations in Washington. Following Churchill's report, Eden 
circulated a  memorandum examining in some detail the various proposals for regionalism, and by July 7, Jebb 
and the Foreign Office had come up with a draft which encapsulated British views on a  postwar organization up 
to that time. The revised British plan closely mirrored the draft Welles had discussed with Eden in March, and 
restated that the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter "will be the basis of any international world order 
after the war. See CAB 66/37 WP(43) 217, "Armistice and Related Problems," by Anthony Eden, May 25,1943, 
PRO; CAB 65/34 WM(43) June 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/38 WP(43) 300, "United Nations Plan for Organizing 
P eace and Welfare," July 7, 1943, PRO. A few weeks later, on July 22, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee 
endorsed Eden's proposal that the war cabinet form a standing committee to investigate and study specific 
questions of a  postwar nature. Attlee also recommended that the war cabinet consider an exchange of ideas 
with the Soviet Union concerning the structure of the postwar world. See FO 371/35386, Attlee to Churchill, 
July 22, 1943, PRO.
84 Furthermore, in the wake of Welles's resignation Hull would reorganize and revive a new system of planning 
committees in the fall of 1943 to begin preparing the groundwork for the next steps in the postwar planning 
process, such a s  the Quebec, Teheran and Dumbarton Oaks conferences.
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from all future drafts.85
At the Moscow Conference88 in October 1943 
internationalism and the effort to construct a new league 
received an important boost when representatives of the Four 
Policemen at last consulted over postwar matters. Most 
importantly, the delegates reached a consensus agreement 
pledging to establish a postwar international organization. 
Hull interpreted the agreement as a triumph of his approach 
over Welles’s. "The emphasis," Hull later wrote, "was now on a 
general international organization. Nothing was said of 
regional security organizations in the declaration, and in the 
discussions at Moscow I argued strongly against them."8?
Nevertheless, the political subcommittee's final report 
would become the basis for the next steps in the postwar 
planning process, including service as a blueprint of American 
policy goals at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, as well as at 
future allied conferences. When delegates from thirty-nine 
nations met at Dumbarton Oaks, for example, it soon became 
apparent that they relied heavily on the preliminary work and 
decisions made by Welles's subcommittees. Nearly all of the 
members of Welles's international organization subcommittee 
participated at Dumbarton Oaks, and the draft framework for a
85 -The Charter of the United Nations," August 14,1943, in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. 
Appendix 23, page 526-534; Julius W. Pratt, Cordeil Hull (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), in Samuel Flagg 
Bemis and Robert Ferrell, eds. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 723; Hull, Memoirs. 
1640-1643. During Welles's leadership of postwar planning, Roosevelt had supported the concept of 
regionalism and remained somewhat wary of Hull's brand of universalism. Roosevelt also supported Welles's 
more advanced interpretation of trusteeship. But the presidents support for regionalism ebbed in mid-1943, 
roughly at the moment of Welles's resignation. By late summer the president was moving closer to the kind of 
universalism favored by Hull. By the time of the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt seem ed to 
have lost interest in regionalism, a  startling change of mind in only a  matter months. Nonetheless, at the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945 Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg successfully pushed for Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, permitting member nations to enter regional security pacts, which later served as  a  justification 
for U.S. participation in military alliances such as NATO and SEATO.
86 president Roosevelt had asked Welles to represent the United States at the Moscow Conference but 
Welles declined.
87 Hull, Memoirs. 1647. After his resignation, Welles used his syndicated column to promote the merits of 
regionalism. See "Welles Urges Regional S eats on World Executive Council," New York Herald Tribune. January 
26, 1944. According to J. Tillapaugh, "No satisfactory planning occurred before the San Francisco Conference 
to relate the [western hemisphere] region to the world in a way acceptable to both the great powers and the 
American republics. In 1943, . . . Welles devised a  plan for a  universal structure based on regional 
cornerstones. ... Hull rejected the draft because it placed too much em phasis on regional independence. Hull 
turned matters over to Leo Pasvolsky, who sought not to reconcile regional and global interests but rather to 
eradicate regionalism from subsequent proposals." See J. Tillapaugh, 'Closed Hemisphere and Open World? 
The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," Diplomatic History, vol. 2, no. 1, (Winter 
1978), 25-42.
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United Nations organization which emerged —  featuring a 
security council, a general assembly and an international court 
of justice —  differed little from the drafts Welles's 
committees had first created in 1942 and 1943. Furthermore, the 
San Francisco conference, which served as the inaugural meeting 
of the United Nations, was based on the draft proposals which 
had come out of the Dumbarton Oaks conference six months 
before. Thus, in many respects, Welles and his fellow planners 
had laid the foundations for the United Nations concept. The 
influence of the postwar planning committees would continue to 
be felt indirectly, reflected in the advice and proposals that 
Welles and the other planners had made to the president and the 
secretary of state. Many subsequent wartime decisions would 
demonstrate acceptance of the findings of the postwar planning 
committees, and their work would contribute to the shaping of 
American assumptions throughout the war, as well as 
significantly influencing the framework of America's strategic 
doctrine during the Cold W a r . 88
★  * *
88 Several scholars have made use of the records of Welles's planning committees to trace the origins of U.S. 
policy in a number of areas. Jam es Edward Miller, for example, notes that the Welles-led planning committees 
"created a body of coherent policy recommendations and detailed supporting studies, which would powerfully 
influence American decisions both during and after the war. The value of this kind of work was dramatically 
pointed out to the Americans at Casablanca, where they were humiliated by the better prepared British. 
Thereafter, Roosevelt ... did not overlook the existence of this body of information and policy 
recommendations in preparing for international conferences." See Jam es Edward Miller. The United States and 
Italy. 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1986), 43. S ee also the use of postwar planning records in Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese- 
AmericanWar. 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 59-61, 92-93; as well a s  in Rudolf V.A. 
Janssens, What Future for Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era. 1942-1945 (Amsterdam: 
Rodolpi, 1995), and Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their policies for 
the postwar disposition of the Japanese  Empire. 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
34, 76-77.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Quest for a New World Orders 
Postwar Planning and the Great Powers, 1942-1943
Under Welles's leadership the planners initially sought to 
investigate how the peace could be reconciled with America1s 
war aims. But they soon exceeded that mandate, moving from 
broad discussions of postwar matters to more specific 
investigations of the postwar status of particular powers. 
They consequently expanded their investigations to every corner 
of the globe. Over the course of the year-and-a-half between 
January 1942 and July 1943 the advisory committees would help 
shape Washington's policies in numerous areas. In addition to 
creating a new international organization and drafting a 
blueprint for international trusteeship for the colonial world, 
they would investigate and make recommendations for 
Washington's relations with the exile governments, plan for the 
postwar reconstruction of Germany, Italy and Japan, seek to 
chart the postwar future of China, and attempt to stabilize 
relations between Moscow and Washington. They would leave 
almost no part of the world, no continent, no nation, 
unexamined, and when Welles resigned in September 1943, the 
foundations of the postwar order America desired would already 
be in place.
* * *
The discussions in Welles's subcommittees took place in an 
open and exploratory manner. This approach created a number of 
problems. Welles wanted the committees to reach agreements 
rapidly, but his open-ended methods ensured that while the 
planners conducted their survey of the world, America's vital 
interests continued to expand to areas not previously 
considered important to U.S. security. During the lifespan of 
the committees, one of the most common and successful arguments 
followed the line that anything threatening to the future peace 
of the world —  anywhere —  also threatened America's vital
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interests. This line of thinking foreshadowed American 
strategic doctrine during the subsequent Cold War period, when 
events in seemingly unimportant areas increasingly took on a 
greater importance because of their supposed link to American 
security and prestige. Welles and his fellow planners would 
succeed in expanding the concept of Washington's vital 
interests to remote areas of the Far East, Africa, the Near 
East and Eastern Europe.i
It soon became clear that as the planners surveyed the
world situation, a dramatic change occurred in their view of 
the world, and their definition of America's vital interests 
expanded accordingly.2 The planners would meddle gratuitously 
in the internal affairs of other nations and would go to great 
lengths to produce outcomes beneficial to U.S. interests. 
Welles endorsed, for example, a suggestion by Myron Taylor that 
the committees begin compiling lists of potential leaders of 
other nations who would be amenable to American interests in
the postwar period. The United States might then actively seek 
to promote these officials within their native governments. 
Anne O'Hare McCormick thus asked Welles to clarify their true 
mission. Is it, she asked, to determine "the kind of world we 
want?"
"Exactly," Welles r e p l i e d . 3
Welles further suggested that the committees should begin 
to anticipate obstacles to an American-led world order and he
and the planners began to grow concerned about the kind of
delegates the other nations might send to an initial conclave 
of the United Nations. Welles wanted the other nations to 
select "good men." He thus thought Washington should have a 
strong say in the selection of other nation's delegates. He
1 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, May 2, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National 
Archives; P minutes 2, March 14,1942, Notter files, box 55. During a number of his wartime addresses Welles 
repeated the theme that the threat of war anywhere in the world threatened U.S. security. He warned that the 
Four Policemen thus had to be prepared to use their powers to prevent future threats from materializing into 
wars. S ee  P minutes, March 7, 1942; "Free Access to Raw Materials, “ by Sumner Welles, National Foreign 
Trade Convention, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL; "Blueprint for Peace," by Sumner 
Welles, November 17,1942, New York Herald Tribune Forum, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL
2 Some have persuasively argued that the world-wide nature of the war helped to promote a  new 
Weltanschauung among the American people, what Alan K. Henrikson called an emergent ideology of "Air-Age 
Globalism." S ee  Henrikson, "The Map a s  an 'Idea': The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World 
War," The American Cartographer, vol. 2, no. 1 ( April 1975), 19-53.
3 Minutes of toe Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12,1942, Notter files, box 54.
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suggested Taylor's roster of amenable foreign leaders might 
come in handy for such an enterprise. This could be finessed, 
Welles said, if the great powers simply said, "We won the war, 
we won back for you your self-esteem and independence, and we 
wish your advice in all decisions. Therefore, we want 
representatives from yourselves, by regions, to sit with us in 
the making of all decisions. For that purpose we have selected 
these men from you to join us in our deliberations."4
Welles sought the creation of a new economic order in the
postwar world, facilitated in part by massive U.S. postwar
economic aid. Welles hinted that after the war the United 
States would transform itself from an arsenal of democracy
supplying the world's military needs into the workshop of 
democracy providing the aid and material necessary for global 
reconstruction.s But Welles sought to exert U.S. influence in 
other ways as well, such as through the manipulation of exile 
movements. Throughout the first few years of the war Welles 
played a pivotal role as the liaison between the administration 
and various exile movements. In this capacity, he sought to
influence the future course <fthese occupied countries and use 
his relations with the exile movements to shape their postwar 
governments. Welles realized that the United States had much to 
gain through its dealings with the exile movements. The allies 
benefited from the collaboration of various national armed 
forces, some of which, such as the exiled Poles, constituted a 
force of some significance. They took advantage of several 
significant resistance movements, such as those in the 
Philippines, France and Yugoslavia, which often included vast 
networks of intelligence agents. They gained access to millions 
of tons of valuable merchant shipping, mostly Dutch, Norwegian, 
Greek and Yugoslav. The allies also benefited from the 
continued existence of the many exile governments functioning 
on allied territory, thus enabling the allied propaganda effort 
to better combat Axis political warfare.
Welles understood that the collapse of France, for 
example, and the controversies over the various French exile
4  P minutes 4, March 28,1942.
5 "Commercial Policy After the War," by Sumner Welles, October 7, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, 
Welles papers, FDRL
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factions had given Washington an extraordinary opportunity to
shape the destiny of France for years to come. But Welles's
relations with the various Free French envoys sent to
Washington represented some of the least cordial exchanges he
had during the war. Welles’s aims for a postwar France stemmed
more from his vision of American interests than from personal
animus. Welles held very precise aims for France's future. He
saw the Franco-German rivalry as the chief cause of European
instability and he thus sought to treat France little better
than Germany. France would play no role in Welles's postwar
designs and he welcomed the possibility that a weakened France
would lead to a further reduction of European influence around
the world. As part of Welles's "new European order" he wanted
to see France disarmed, stripped of its empire and removed from
the ranks of the great powers at the end of the war.6 He
assumed that after the war the French empire would be a
destabilizing force in the world. At one point during the
postwar planning process Welles even sought to apply the
Wilsonian principle of non-recognition to the provisional
French government led by General Charles de Gaulle. Welles
suggested that the United States could exert its leverage over
the future of France by withholding recognition and aid if the
postwar French government did not meet Washington's precise
standards of legitimacy. Washington would determine for itself
if the French people genuinely supported their future
government, and whether the French government would be amenable
to the implementation of certain reforms desired by Washington
such as disarmament and a commitment to trusteeship for French
colonial possessions. This resembled Woodrow Wilson's often
arbitrary distinctions between de facto vs. de jure governments
in Mexico, Russia and elsewhere, where the United States
refused officially to recognize a government until it met
precise standards of "legitimacy." Welles told his colleagues
that only adherence to the Four Freedoms could ensure a stable,
6 Nevertheless, the administration had reassured Vichy leaders in January 1942 that "the word 'France' in the 
mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire." See Hull to Leahy, January 20, 1942, FRUS. II, 
123*124. Welles thus told the French am bassador in April 1942 that Washington recognized the jurisdiction of 
France over its overseas possessions. Robert Murphy also assured French General Henri Giraud that French 
possessions would be recovered after the war. Nevertheless, these comments did not stop Welles from 
plotting against the French empire, particularly Indochina, during his leadership of the postwar planning 
committees.
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peaceful and legitimate postwar order in France. All 
governments, Welles argued, including the French, "must give 
their peoples such rights and apply them." Welles reminded his 
fellow planners that the United States should not wait for 
events to happen in places like France but should instead 
adroitly exploit opportunities and take the lead in shaping the 
postwar world. France might prove to be the ideal place for 
America to demonstrate its resolve in creating a new world 
order.7
During the first few years of the war, Welles remained one 
of the harshest critics of General de Gaulle's Free French.8 He 
saw de Gaulle as the chief obstacle to achieving Washington's 
goals for a postwar France. Welles would consistently ignore 
entreaties by the British to ease American hostility toward de 
Gaulle. He believed France, as one of the largest countries in 
Europe and the second largest empire in the world, would be a 
major factor in any effort to reconstruct Europe at the end of 
the war. But he thought the Third Republic had merely been
temporarily suspended by the war and that "everything that has 
happened since June, 1940 is illegitimate." That included both 
the regime in Vichy9 as well as de Gaulle' s Free French
committee based in London. Welles's stubborn opposition to 
everything the Free French leader represented would have 
important consequences for the allies and Welles's views on the 
General may have contributed to President Roosevelt's deep 
dislike of the Free French. 10
Furthermore, Welles distrusted de Gaulle as a dangerous
and reckless incompetent ever since his failed attempt to take
Dakar in September 1940, an effort which had been undermined by 
numerous intelligence leaks which tipped off the defending
7 P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P document 158a, "Official 
Statements and Views Affecting the Future Status of France and the French Empire," January 29, 1944, box 
57.
8 An excellent account of the attitudes of Welles and Roosevelt toward de Gaulle and the Free French is 
DeGaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal, edited by Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl 
(Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994), particularly the essay  "The United States and the Free French" by Kim 
Munholland. Milton Viorst Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965) is more 
sympathetic to de Gaulle, a s  is Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle. Free France and the Allies 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).
9 This despite U.S. diplomatic relations with Vichy until .
10 P minutes 5, April 4,1942.
123
Vichy forces. Perhaps most galling of all to Welles was de 
Gaulles's affront to Pax Americana when on Christmas Eve 1941 
Free French forces took control of the islands of St. Pierre 
and Miquelon off the Newfoundland coast. Welles's dim view of 
the Free French would be further reinforced by the French 
diplomat Alexis Leger, who had held cl position
in the French foreign ministry from 1933 to 1940. 
Leger had become a zealous opponent of de Gaulle, whom he saw 
as an "apprentice dictator.1111 After arriving in Washington in 
early 1941 Leger told Welles that he was prepared to surrender 
his diplomatic passport. Welles replied: "As far as the State 
Department is concerned, you are still one of the foremost 
diplomats of France." 12 with the assistance of Welles's friend, 
Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, Leger landed a 
position as a consultant to the library on French poetry. Once 
settled, he worked with Welles to convince Roosevelt that de 
Gaulle could never be the legitimate head of a French 
government-in-exile. Leger suggested that de Gaulle lacked 
legitimacy because he had never offered himself to the French 
people in an election.13
While Welles opposed de Gaulle he nonetheless believed 
France would need a strong and effective civil government after 
liberation. He was particularly concerned about the possibility 
of instability in a post liberation France. He was alarmed by 
reports of the rapid growth of communism in wartime France and 
expressed his concern about the possible emergence of radical 
"communes" in many of France's larger cities after liberation. 
To prevent communists from gaining power in local politics and 
exercising "undue influence" at the national level, the 
planners proposed that the United Nations be prepared to impose
11 Leger doubled as  a  Symbolist poet writing under the name St. John Perse. He had been an ally of the 
French statesm an Aristide Briand in the 1920s, and had fled Paris after the French collapse. See Elizabeth R. 
Cameron, "Alexis Saint-Leger Leger," in The Diplomats: 1919-1939. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 378-405.
12 Washington Times-Herald. January 6,1941.
13 Leger to Welles, August 23,1941, box 70, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Leger, August 25,1941, box 70, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Raoul Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict. A Personal Memoir (New York: 
Free Press, 1988), 115; Nicholas Wahl supports Aglion's view of W elles's role in shaping the American attitude 
toward the Free French. Wahl adds that while Leger "didn't get to see  Roosevelt personally, he did see  Sumner 
Welles, and Sumner Welles was the single most important counselor for Roosevelt in foreign policy at the time." 
See DeGaulle and the United States. Paxton and Wahl, eds., ibid, 95-97. Welles ultimately brought Roosevelt 
and Leger together during a dinner atOxon Hill Manor.
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local and national administration in a liberated France. They 
felt that the United States, working under the guise of 
collective action, should seek to shape the postwar political 
future of France. They also proposed that outside powers should 
seek to ensure that the Four Freedoms be enforced in a postwar 
France and that France's transportation facilities be 
internationalized at the end of the war.i*
Welles feared that it would be difficult to restore a 
legitimate government in a liberated France and he sought to 
oppose any effort by de Gaulle to impose himself as the 
governing authority in liberated French territory. Welles 
feared that de Gaulle was determined to manipulate future 
elections in a liberated France and he worried that 
Washington's choices remained too limited. As Washington's 
relations with Vichy continued to deteriorate in the spring of 
1942, Welles anticipated a complete break. He recognized that 
Washington would need to deal with some other entity 
representing French interests, but he remained hostile to de 
Gaulle's movement. Welles thus began to pay greater attention 
to the composition of de Gaulle's Free French committee, and by 
the spring of 1942 he became convinced that it needed to be 
completely reformed, which for the most part meant that it had 
to be purged of the influence of General de G a u l l e .is
In a top-secret, hand-delivered message sent in March 1942 
to Admiral William Leahy, the U.S. Ambassador to Vichy,is Welles 
acknowledged that the United States might soon have to 
recognize the Free French committee as the French government- 
in-exile. That did not necessarily mean that Washington would 
have to recognize a Free French committee headed by de Gaulle. 
Welles and President Roosevelt wanted Leahy to establish 
contact with their chosen candidate to replace de Gaulle: 
Edouard Herriot, the French statesman who had held numerous
14 p  minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942, box 55; "The Possibilities of Revolution 
During and Immediately Following the Present War," by Notter and Rothwell, August 30, 1941, Notter files, box 
8.
15 P minutes 5, April 4,1942.
16 Welles had been behind Roosevelt's choice Of Leahy in December 1940, angering William Bullitt who was 
not consulted in the appointment. In the wake of the already deep differences between Bullitt and Welles over 
the Welles Mission and the sleeping car porter scandal, the Leahy appointment further increased the animosity 
between them.
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cabinet posts in the Third Republic, including premier. Welles 
and Roosevelt believed Herriot's long political career would 
help him garner the support of the French people and the 
empire. But perhaps most importantly, Welles knew Herriot, 
liked him personally, and thought he might prove to be more 
tractable than de Gaulle had thus far been. Welles never seems 
to have paused to consider the unfortunate consequences of a 
previous experiment in Cuba, where he had sought and failed to 
secure the presidency for his longtime friend Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes. Welles thus ordered Leahy to approach Herriot about 
the possibility of catching a flight to a neutral capital like 
Lisbon for eventual transit to Washington, where Welles hoped 
to begin grooming him to take over a newly unified exile 
movement. Welles's scheme soon encountered opposition from 
other French exiles, who vehemently opposed Herriot on the 
grounds that he had recently served as president of the Chamber 
of Deputies in Vichy. Furthermore, Welles soon had to drop his 
plan when Herriot was placed under house arrest and deported to 
Germany. 17
Welles continued his effort to find a substitute for de 
Gaulle. Furthermore, he understood that London presented a 
formidable obstacle to getting rid of de Gaulle. Welles's 
efforts to depose the French general inevitably brought him 
into conflict with the British foreign office, which continued 
to work through the Free French leader and worried that the 
Americans would not be content until they had demoted France 
from the ranks of the great powers. The British had protested 
in December 1941 when Washington officials omitted the Free 
French from the United Nations Declaration. A few months later 
the British minister in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, warned 
the foreign office that Washington remained steadfastly opposed 
to the Free French and that Welles believed de Gaulle to be a 
"fascist."18
In May 1942, Welles sounded out Ambassador Halifax on the 
prospects for toppling de Gaulle. Welles told Halifax that the 
French committee needed to be expanded to include a broader
17 Welles to Leahy, March 27,1942, box 80, Welles papers, FDRL
18 FO 371 /31949 Campbell to Foreign Office, April 13,1942, PRO.
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spectrum of French public opinion. He argued that the Free 
French should not be granted provisional authority in liberated 
French territory and that London and Washington should seek to 
create a new French exile movement, is Welles warned Halifax that 
it would be wrong to recognize de Gaulle and the Free French as 
the legitimate government; neither did Welles think it a good 
idea to recognize the French general as the head of the French 
resistance. Welles later told British parliamentary under 
secretary Richard Law that he thought the time would soon come 
when the British would have to set de Gaulle adrift. Welles 
acknowledged that deposing de Gaulle would be a great shock to 
certain segments of French opinion, but he believed the 
interests of the Anglo-American allies would be better served 
by settling the matter now, rather than delaying and allowing 
de Gaulle to grow more powerful. Welles feared that de Gaulle 
might never be removed from power if he were allowed to return 
to Paris with the allied armies.20
"Welles thought it would be a fatal mistake for the United 
States Government to recognize any refugee group as a 
government," Halifax cabled London. "Nor was he disposed to 
recognize de Gaulle as chief of French resistance. He thought 
that he lacked the personal qualities to fill this role, and 
was very badly advised by those around him. . . . [Welles]
thought that our two Governments would have to act together to 
[create a French exile government], even though we might dress 
it up as a spontaneous act of the Free French authorities. "21 so 
much for open diplomacy.
A few days later, Halifax noted that "Welles agreed that 
General de Gaulle could hardly be expected to like the idea, 
but made it plain that the United States Government were not 
prepared to play with General de Gaulle as chief of all French 
resistance, which in their view placed him in a position of 
practical dictatorship, distasteful to them."22 Welles warned
19 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, “Free French movement" May 8,1942, box 164, 
folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL.
20 FO 371/ 31965, Halifax to Foreign Office, May 8, 1942, PRO; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The 
Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 340-41.
21 FO 371/31965, Halifax to Foreign Office, May 8,1942, PRO.
22 FO 371/31965, Foreign Office to Dominions, May 16,1942, including copy of Halifax to Foreign Office, May 
11, 1942, PRO.
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Halifax that unless de Gaulle was removed the Anglo-American 
allies would find it difficult to expand the Free French 
committee to include qualified Frenchmen such as Alexis L e g e r .23 
Perhaps in an effort to derail Welles's effort to depose 
de Gaulle, Halifax leaked the substance of these discussions to 
The New York Times, provoking a stinging rebuke from Welles, 
who told Halifax he found it "incredible that highly 
confidential views which I had expressed to the Ambassador in 
recent conversations . . . should have appeared in extenso in 
recent news dispatches . . .  ."24 while de Gaulle was already
aware that Welles had been pressuring the British to remove 
him, he was nonetheless infuriated by the Times's r e p o r t .25 
Welles subsequently summoned Free French envoy Raoul Aglion to 
the state department to explain that his opposition to the 
General was nothing personal, but was merely a question of 
"legitimacy." "The National Committee of General de Gaulle," 
Welles told Aglion, "would not be, and could not be, recognized 
as a government in exile. Governments in exile are legitimate 
governments that have fled invasion. Such is not the case of 
France, where the government did not choose to go into exile 
but remained, and now is not free due to the pressure of the 
Nazis." Welles told Aglion that "the majority of Frenchmen, 
even those who are opposed to Vichy and Laval, do not recognize 
de Gaulle's authority ... ."26
Another of de Gaulle's wartime envoys, Adrien Tixier, had 
recently told Welles that de Gaulle might accept U.S. pressure 
to enlarge his committee, but Tixier added that it should not 
include anyone who was "in any way connected with the signing 
of the French armistice" and, most importantly, should not 
include anyone who had been critical of de Gaulle or any of his 
associates during the past few years. Welles lashed out at 
Tixier, saying that he found it "unbelievable in the present 
state of world affairs that French men and French women, who 
were supposedly determined to do their utmost to further the
23 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, "Free French Movement" May 25, 1942, box 
164, Welles papers, FDRL.
24 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, May 28,1942, FRUS. II, 521-523.
25 ibid. Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle. 114-115.
26 ibid.
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victory of the United Nations, should be spending ninety-five 
percent of their time in petty quarrels of the character which 
was only too evident among the Free French...." Welles charged 
Tixier with spreading inaccurate reports about Welles’s 
handling of Washington's French policy. Tixier called Welles's 
accusations "malicious." Welles refused to accept Tixier's 
account. "What he said," Welles noted afterward, "and the 
manner in which he said it made it entirely clear that he had 
initiated the absurd reports which I had referred to."27
The two continued to clash throughout the spring of 1942. 
When Tixier handed Welles a list of demands prepared by de 
Gaulle to help bolster the Free French movement, they included 
French participation in the allied joint staff conversations 
and a lengthy shopping list of war materiel. Tixier told Welles 
that de Gaulle thought the Anglo-American war effort had thus 
far been "calamitous" and that the General was prepared to 
discuss these matters only with the highest authorities but not 
"with little men who cannot see further than the ends of their 
own noses and who have no authority" —  a comment Welles 
thought directed at him.2s
Relations between Washington and the Free French continued 
to deteriorate. Welles scheduled the initial meeting between 
the president and Free French representatives for November 6, 
1942, but the French envoys mysteriously failed to appear and 
after four hours the meeting was canceled. At the eventual 
White House meeting between Welles, the president and Free 
French envoys Andre Philip and Tixier on November 20, the 
French representatives reacted heatedly to Roosevelt's casual 
remark that the United States would unilaterally determine 
which, "if any," Frenchman would administer any liberated 
French territory in the future. "It would be quite impossible," 
Welles noted, "to attempt to report the latter part of the 
conversation held by these two individuals with the President. 
They both of them howled at the top of their lungs and spoke at 
the same time, and paid not the slightest attention to what the
27 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, May 13, 1942, box 85, folder 5, Welles papers, 
FDRL
28 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, June 21, 1942, box 85, folder 5, Welles papers, 
FDRL
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President was saying to them."29
Throughout the fall and winter of 1942 Welles and his 
fellow planners continued to debate whether France should be 
completely disarmed at the end of the war. On the one hand,
they suggested that if Germany were disarmed, there would be no
good reason for the rearmament of France. Welles and the other 
planners thought the enforced disarmament of the two major 
powers of continental Europe would be a step toward greater 
continental union, thus aiding in postwar reconstruction 
efforts. But they also noted that the French themselves would 
violently oppose such efforts and they feared that any 
diminution of French military power might ultimately redound to
the advantage of the Soviet Union.30
Welles grew increasingly concerned that a civil war might 
erupt in France unless the various factions of the French 
resistance patched up their differences. He warned of the 
possibility of massacres and reprisals along the lines of 1871. 
He feared that the new constituent assembly in postwar France 
might be controlled by the "extreme left" and he thus favored 
United Nations military control in France following the war. 
Noting that the Third Republic had been "disastrous" for the 
French people, he suggested that the United Nations should help 
draft a new constitution for France. Welles told the other 
planners that President Roosevelt was still determined to see 
France disarmed at the end of the war, but that France would 
need to be reassured that the new world organization would 
protect her national interests and defend her from a revanchist 
Germany. When Anne O'Hare McCormick reminded the committee that 
France had been defeated by the Axis and thus should not be 
treated as an enemy state, Welles told them not to forget that 
France had made a "separate peace" with Germany in June. 1940 in
29 Memorandum of conversation between Roosevelt. Welles, Tixier and Philippe, November 20,1942, box 85, 
folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
30 P minutes 38, December 19, 1942, box 55; P document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of 
France," December 18, 1942, box 57; P document 158a, "Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future 
Status of France and the French Empire," January 29,1944, box 57.
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violation of its pledges not to do so.31
Alexis Leger had previously warned Welles that de Gaulle 
and his movement sought communist support and that the general 
desired closer relations with Moscow as a means of escaping 
Anglo-American domination. Leger also told Welles that de 
Gaulle sought to scrap the Third Republic and replace it with a 
system featuring greater "order and discipline." As if that 
were not enough, Leger warned that de Gaulle remained "totally 
opposed to any type of international cooperation or world 
organization."32 Welles received similar warnings from other 
exiled French officials and American concerns about de Gaulle's 
alleged "fascist"33 leanings were now compounded by fears of his 
possible ties to communists, fears which led to an FBI 
investigation of the Free French representatives in 
Washington.34
At the end of 1942 Welles and his political subcommittee 
continued to maintain that the United States should "oppose 
recognition of General de Gaulle as the head of the French 
Government on the grounds that important French groups have 
failed to support General de Gaulle and that it is for the 
French people themselves to determine the character and the 
political head of the provisional and future French Government, 
possibly through the establishment during the war of a truly 
representative French national committee."33 Just how the 
"legitimacy" of a "truly representative French national 
committee" was to be determined was anyone's guess. In any 
event, Welles failed to acknowledge that his own efforts to 
undermine de Gaulle may have contributed to the lack of support
31 Welles to Leger, November 26, 1943, with enclosure "Our Obligation to the People of France," by Sumner 
Welles, box 89, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 38, December 19, 1942; P minutes 46, March 6, 
1943.
32 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Leger, August 13, 1942, box 80, folder 10, Welles 
papers, FDRL.
33 Despite de Gaulle's defiance of Hitler, the feeling persisted in Washington that he had fascist inclinations. 
"[The British] have built up this French Adolf for the past three years," wrote H. Freeman Matthews. See Walter 
LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," American Historical Review, vol. 80, no. 5 (December 1975), 
1288.
34 Leger to Welles, August 15, 1942, box 80, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Leger, October 19, 
1942, box 80, Welles papers, FDRL; Munholland, "The United States and the Free French," in De Gaulle and the 
United S tates. 88-89.
35 p  document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of France," December 18,1942, box 57.
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for the general by a broader spectrum, and that it was this 
very lack of support which had provided Washington with the 
excuse to avoid extending recognition to the Free French. In 
the fall of 1942 Washington had excluded de Gaulle from 
participating in the planning and execution of Operation Torch, 
the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, and instead the 
allies cut an expedient deal with the Vichy Admiral Jean 
Darlan. The U.S. had already taken a further step by seeking to 
push General Giraud as head of the French forces fighting 
alongside the allies.
At the beginning of 1943 Leger warned Welles that French 
trade union leaders feared de Gaulle’s reactionary tendencies 
and that the General would never be able to unite the French 
people after the war. "Not a single step forward has been taken 
toward the creation of a common political platform that could 
be a guarantee against reactionary and fascist tendencies in a 
future France," Leger wrote to Welles.36 Welles also received 
advice and proposals from Camille Chautemps, the three-time 
French premier during the 1930s, whom Welles had helped 
resettle in Washington. Welles maintained excellent relations 
with many of the French exiles not associated with de Gaulle, 
meeting with them frequently.37 in early 1943 Chautemps proposed 
to Welles that a committee be created in Washington to assist 
the state department formulate its French policy. Chautemps 
thought the committee might he headed by himself and consist of 
several other anti-de Gaulle exiles, including Leger. But 
Welles feared that the department might have difficulty 
controlling the kind of French advisory committee proposed by 
Chautemps. Certainly the precedents for "controlling" the 
French exiles had not been very encouraging.36
While in the spring of 1943 both U.S. and Free French 
officials made incremental, if clumsy, gestures toward greater
36 Leger memorandum to Welles, January 19,1943, box 89, Welles papers, FDRL.
37 After their arrival In Washington, Chautemps and his wife began to annoy Welles after Madame Juliette 
Chautemps began making requests of Welles to arrange for her to perform with the National Symphony 
Orchestra. "I do not see  my way to becoming a concert agent for his wife," Welles wrote. Welles to Dunn, May 
27, 1942, box 77, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Juliette Chautemps, February 12, 1942, ibid; Juliette 
Chautemps to Welles, February 8,1942, ibid.
38 Chautemps to Welles, February 17,1943, box 87, Welles papers, FDRL; Atherton to Welles, March 1,1943, 
box 87, Welles papers, FDRL.
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understanding, hope of continued progress was temporarily 
shattered when Welles had a further confrontation with Free 
French representatives, bluntly telling Tixier that Free French 
intrigues "reminded me of nothing so much as an old fashioned 
farce which I used to see in my early days in the Palais Royal 
Theatre in Paris." Welles told Tixier that it was "pitiful" to 
see "General de Gaulle maneuvering for what he considered 
immediate political advantage rather than for effective and 
active cooperation in the war effort."39 Clashes such as these 
only further confirmed Welles's view "that we will not 
recognize any committee or group of French authorities as a 
government of France until the French people themselves have 
been liberated and have been afforded the opportunity of 
selecting such a government."40
Shortly thereafter, Drew Pearson (possibly with Welles's 
surreptitious assistance) wrote in his nationally syndicated 
column that President Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as a laughably 
comical figure of little importance. Pearson claimed that 
senior administration officials believed de Gaulle had a 
theatrical and inflated sense of himself and that Roosevelt 
thought de Gaulle "ridiculous" because he could not decide 
whether he was the reincarnation of Joan of Arc or Clemenceau. 
Pearson's column was repeated over Radio Paris and further 
soured U.S. relations with the Free French.*i
The British, meanwhile, continued to think it essential 
that France be given a place among the great powers, if only 
because without a rejuvenated France at the center of Europe, 
the challenge of creating a sound and free postwar order would 
prove more difficult. During Eden's visit to Washington in 
March 1943, Welles told the foreign secretary that he favored 
"keeping the field open" in France so that any new 
administrative authority there could emerge with the backing of 
the French people. But Welles worried that British "prestige" 
required that London stick by de Gaulle. Welles concurred with 
the views recently put forth by the American embassy in London 
that "Whatever may be the consequences for the people of France
39 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, March 23,1943, box 162, Welles papers, FDRL
40 Welles to Atherton, June 16,1943, box 88, folder 6, Welles papers, FDRL
41 Washington P ost April 26, 1943.
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or however fleeting his tenure may then be, it is required by 
British prestige that, when the day of liberation comes, 'the 
one Frenchman who stuck by us in the dark days of 1940' must be 
installed in France. "42
The alternatives to de Gaulle sought by Welles and 
Roosevelt never materialized, but the poisonous relations they 
had helped to foster between de Gaulle and the United States 
would continue to effect Franco-American relations for some 
time. For more than a year after Welles' s departure from the 
state department, President Roosevelt continued his opposition 
to de Gaulle, even in the wake of the liberation of Paris and 
after Hull argued in favor of recognition in September 1944. 
When Welles's friend Jefferson Caffery was dispatched to Paris 
in early October 1944, the president had curiously sent an 
envoy to a government he still refused to recognize. A few 
weeks later Roosevelt relented but de Gaulle understandably 
reacted coldly.
During the first few years of the war Welles had cited his 
concern for self-determination as one of the key reasons for 
opposing de Gaulle, but Welles in effect undermined France's 
independence by his heavy-handed efforts to control its future. 
De Gaulle's self-assurance and his vision of a reborn France 
with pretensions as a great power ran contrary to Welles's 
desire for a pliable and disarmed France demoted from the ranks 
of the great powers and denuded of its empire. Perhaps 
history's verdict would be de Gaulle's revenge as he would 
ultimately prevail at the expense of his American opponents. 
While the once-powerful Welles would disappear into obscurity 
in the postwar years, the once obscure French general, who had 
risked everything in his defiance of Washington, would endure 
to one day remake France along the lines he desired.
* * *
Welles welcomed the prospect that France, Germany and even 
Britain would emerge from the war weaker than ever before, thus 
affording Washington an unprecedented opportunity to reorder
42 FO 371/35994, Foreign Office Minute, April 1943, PRO; Welles to Harry Hopkins, January 2, 1943 with 
enclosed Matthews telegram to Welles, January 1,1943, box 88, Welles papers, FDRL.
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international affairs. Despite the Anglo-American alliance, 
throughout the war Welles sought to promote U.S. interests at 
the expense of Britain and the British Empire, which he saw as 
a potential source of postwar instability. Despite Cold War 
accounts warmly depicting an affectionate wartime Anglo- 
American "Special Relationship," Welles and many of the other 
planners saw Britain as a potential obstacle to U.S. interests 
in the postwar world. Welles often sought to cultivate 
relations with China and the USSR so that those powers might
serve as effective counterweights to British aims and Welles
and many of his colleagues in the planning process often saw 
Britain as a greater threat to their world aims than either 
China or the USSR. Stanley Hornbeck, for example, thought 
Washington should cultivate China and the USSR "to strengthen 
us for and in any critical controversies which might develop 
between us and the British." Hornbeck warned that Britain "will 
be the most conservative and the most aggressively minded, in 
the fields both of international politics and of international
economics. "43
The British were thus correct in their wary initial
assessment of Welles. Appearances notwithstanding, he was no 
A n g l o p h i l e. 44 At the Atlantic Conference Welles had sought to 
exploit British weakness by pushing for far-reaching changes in 
imperial preference, as well as a more expansive British
commitment to self-determination which might be interpreted as 
covering British colonial possessions, and throughout the war 
he publicly declared that Britain's imperial days had drawn to 
an end. Welles often opposed the appointment of U.S. officials
43 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War. 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), 62. For accounts that wartime Anglo-American relations were less than harmonious, see, for 
example, Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire. 
1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United 
States. Britain, and the War Against Japan. 1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
44 After Welles's first face to face encounter with Churchill in March 1940, for example, he merely reported to 
Roosevelt about Churchill's heavy drinking, long-windedness, repetitiveness and the ridiculous length of his 
cigar. S ee  Welles report to Roosevelt on his conversation with Churchill, March 12,1940, Welles Report, 1940, 
Part II, Presidents Secretary's File 6, FDRL. Welles also had no compunction about openly clashing with 
Churchill at the Atlantic Conference. This contrasts with Harry Hopkins, who tended to be enamored of the 
British, and Churchill in particular. Upon meeting Churchill for the first time Hopkins sat in a  chair muttering 
"Jesus Christ! What a  man!" See FO 371/26179, minute by Cadogan, January 29, 1941, PRO. See also, for 
example, George McJimsey, Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy (Cambridge. MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 137-139. For an official British assessm ent of Welles see  FO 371/21541 
"Records of Leading Personalities in the U.S.," January 12,1937, PRO.
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or emissaries whom he thought too pro-British and wanted to use 
Lend-Lease as leverage to pressure the British to open imperial 
markets and to relinquish parts of their empire, particularly 
their possessions in the western hemisphere, where Welles 
especially loathed the British presence. He would do nothing to 
aid British political aims and would not hesitate to blame 
British officials for press criticism of the administration. He 
distrusted the British as indiscreet leakers and he had a 
number of angry confrontations with British diplomats during 
the war.45 Welles warned his colleagues that the official 
statements of British policymakers did not usually represent 
London's true aims. For example, he suspected the British only 
sought to revive France as a great power so that it would serve 
as a stalking horse for British aims on the continent. 46 
Furthermore, despite London's assurances, Welles worried that 
secret British promises to the exile governments would tie 
Washington's hands at the end of the war and he complained 
about the attitudes of the wartime government in London. Welles 
never assumed that the word "Churchill" necessarily meant 
"Britain." He thought the wartime British government to be one 
of the most reactionary and hidebound of recent memory, and 
believed it unrepresentative of the true wishes of the British 
people. 47
Welles nonetheless took a keen interest in London's 
efforts at postwar planning. Welles sought to monitor those
45 Welles to Atherton, March 6, 1943, box 88, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of conversation 
between Welles and Campbell, March 4,1943, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL. Although Welles often accused 
the British em bassy of leaking information damaging to the U.S. administration this was in fact a  favorite 
practice of his own. Welles often used the press to indirectly criticize British policies, but his own newspaper 
columns after his resignation, when he was suddenly freed from his official status and could now more freely 
speak his mind, often placed the blame more directly on the British. See, for example, Drew Pearson, 
"Confessions of an S.O.B.," Saturday Evening Post. November 3,1956; Roosevelt to Caroline Phillips, August 
30, 1944, President's Secretary's Files, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Sumner Welles column, "Welles S ees 
Opportunity for U.S. to Lead in New Far East Policy," New York Herald Tribune. May 31, 1944; Sumner Welles 
column, "Welles Says Allied Conferences Must Deal with Colonial Issues," New York Herald Tribune. April 4, 
1945.
46 as Christopher Thome has argued, "Britain urgently needed a  strong, friendly France after the war, both for 
reasons of European defense and a s  a  counterweight to the growing predominance in world affairs of the United 
States and the Soviet Union." See Christopher Thorne, "Indochina and Anglo-American Relations," Pacific 
Historical Review, vol. 45, no. 1 (February 1975), 85.
47 An example of Welles's views toward the British government can be seen in P minutes 37, December 12, 
1942, box 55. in his syndicated column Welles publicly described the Churchill cabinet a s  reactionary and 
intransigent. See, for example, "Welles S ees Colonial Policies Reshaped by Attlee Victory: Believes Labor's 
Sweep May Challenge Imperial Traditions and Result in Peace Settlements in Keeping With Popular 
Aspirations," New York Herald Tribune. August 8, 1945.
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efforts and arranged to have Halifax exchange documents on 
their progress. But the British had taken only tentative steps 
in that direction, their work building upon the recently 
proclaimed Atlantic Charter. The foreign office remained 
particularly concerned about point four of the charter, 
worrying that the Americans seemed adamant about abolishing 
imperial preference.48 Welles's vision of a postwar American-led 
new world order depended upon the steady diminution of Great 
Britain as a world power. Welles believed the United States 
stood poised to fill the void as war continued to erode much of 
Britain's military and economic strength. Welles would devote 
several postwar planning sessions to a detailed examination of 
the postwar status of Great Britain. The planners focused 
largely on the ways in which the United States could undermine 
the empire but they also examined ways to promote American's 
postwar political and strategic interests vis a vis the 
empire. 49
Welles believed the war had created an unstable and 
fragile environment on the British homefront. He noted that the 
British had been able to carry on the war only with large 
amounts of assistance from elsewhere, particularly the United 
States. Welles concurred with recent U.S. intelligence 
assessments that Britain was an exhausted power, incapable of 
defeating any power other than Italy and that after the war the 
British government would be largely preoccupied with homefront 
crises.so At one point in the spring of 1942 Welles shared with 
the president a report which concluded that Great Britain would 
emerge from the war as little more than "an overcrowded island 
kingdom" with little power to project around the world, si
48 CAB 65/19 WM(41) 89th, September 4,1941, PRO; CAB 65/19 WM(41) 91 st, September 8,1941, PRO. The 
British also noted that the Russians seem ed less than satisfied with the results of the Atlantic Charter. In 
London, Soviet am bassador Ivan Maisky complained to Eden that it seem ed "as if England and the USA 
imagine themselves a s  almighty God called upon to judge the rest of the sinful world, including my country." 
See Lloyd Gardner, Spheres of Influence: the Great Powers Divide Europe from Munich to Yalta (Chicago: Ivan 
Dee, 1993), 102.
49 p minutes 37, December 12,1942; P minutes 48, March 20,1943; "Problems confronting the United States 
in connection with the British Empire," by Division of European Affairs, December 12, 1942, box 193, Welles 
papers, FDRL; P document 218, "Agenda for Meeting of April 3, 1943," April 1,1943, box 193, Welles papers, 
FDRL.
50 Donovan to Welles, February 21,1942 and March 6,1942, box 77, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL.
51 Welles to Roosevelt April 6,1942, box 150, Welles papers, FDRL.
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Welles's interest in the fate of postwar Britain also extended 
to the economic realm. In his thousands of contacts with 
British officials during the Second World War Welles wasted no 
opportunity to press the need for greater trade liberalization 
and he hoped that Britain' s postwar exhaustion might help to 
destroy imperial p r e f e r e n c e . 52
The British government had been preoccupied with the 
prosecution of the war and had not undertaken extensive and 
specific planning for the postwar world on the American scale, 
but in response to rumors about the far-reaching nature of 
planning in Washington, the foreign office began drafting 
outlines of its own in 1942. Concerned with the shape of the 
postwar order, British officials gave some consideration to the 
future of Germany and France and wondered what would be the 
role of the Soviet Union. But the question of how Great Britain 
could maintain itself as one of the great powers topped the 
agenda. In October 1942, Gladwyn Jebb, head of the foreign 
office's Economic and Reconstruction Department, produced a 
long memorandum which became the basis for subsequent British 
discussions about postwar planning. In it, Jebb surveyed 
American views on the postwar world and openly questioned 
whether Great Britain would find it possible to continue as one 
of the great powers after the war. He warned that at the end of 
the war the industrial capacity of Britain and the empire would 
be far less than that of the United States and potentially less 
than that of the U.S.S.R. To a large extent, the United States 
would seek to impose its wishes on postwar planning and the 
Soviet Union would be a mighty continental power, while Britain 
seemed at the end of its tether. British production of 
munitions lagged far behind the United States and British 
manpower capacity had reached its limits. British currency 
reserves were depleted and much of her export trade had been 
lost during the war. After the war Britain might find itself 
with few financial resources and huge sterling imbalances and 
the integrity of the empire itself might be at stake. Britain 
would need powerful allies like the United States in order to 
maintain itself as a great power. Jebb thought the current
52 Welles memorandum of conversation with Law and Halifax, "Postwar Problems," August 25,1942, box 164, 
Welles papers, FDRL
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American trend toward internationalism was a hopeful sign but 
he worried that if the United States returned to isolationism, 
Britain might even find itself seeking the collaboration of a 
postwar Germany to assist in the containment of the Soviet 
Union. 53
Welles's wartime pronouncements aroused Anthony Eden's 
concern that rather than returning to isolation the U.S. would 
instead push for a "New Deal for the World," or, even worse, 
"Tennessee Valley Authority nostrums for the organization of 
international society, which they tend to urge with missionary 
fervor."54 Eden told the war cabinet that Welles's 
pronouncements represented the clearest indication to date of 
Roosevelt's seriousness about shaping the new world order and 
he thought British efforts at postwar planning should be 
accelerated in order to keep pace with the Americans. Speaking 
to Welles in late November, British Ambassador Lord Halifax 
praised the under secretary for his public remarks and endorsed 
Welles's suggestion that the Big Three should at once begin to 
reach wartime agreements. Halifax told Welles that Churchill 
had not yet seriously focused on postwar matters and hinted 
that only Roosevelt could prompt the prime minister to begin 
discussing an eventual postwar settlement. "He felt very 
strongly," Welles wrote after his meeting with Halifax, "that 
the President should take the lead on this issue and should 
keep the initiative in his own hands."55
Welles worried that the British would seek to reestablish 
the balance of power in Europe by dividing the continent 
between a western bloc, allied to Britain, and an eastern bloc, 
dominated by the Soviet Union. He feared that British 
officials, particularly Churchill, desired a partitioned 
Germany that would be divided between British and Soviet 
spheres. Furthermore, he remained concerned that London would 
obstruct plans for a new international trading system after the 
war. He told the subcommittee that the British war cabinet
53 FO 371/31525, "Four Power Plan," by Jebb, September 9, 1942, PRO; WP(42)516, "Four Power Plan," by 
Eden, N ovem ber8,1942, PRO.
54 f o  371/31525 "Four Power Plan," by Anthony Eden, November 8,1942, PRO.
55 CAB 65/28 WM(42) 157th conclusions, November 23, 1942, PRO; memorandum of conversation between 
Welles and Halifax, November 30,1942, FRUS. Ill, 1-2.
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itself remained divided over these matters and that there 
existed considerable differences of opinion between even 
Churchill and Eden. Welles warned the planners that if the past 
offered any hint of a pattern, Churchill's aims would 
ultimately prevail, and that while the planners might object to 
such views, there was very little they could do to change that 
result in the short term. 56
* * *
Woodrow Wilson had mistakenly called World War I "a war to 
end all wars." Thus one of the most crucial questions facing 
Welles and the planners was whether they could reconstruct 
Germany in a way that would finally curb its military 
ambitions. Only a few months after Germany's declaration of war 
on the United States, Welles and the planners began to chart a 
postwar future for Germany based on the assumption of its 
ultimate military defeat and unconditional surrender. 57 But 
during his Memorial Day remarks at Arlington National Cemetery 
Welles had unmistakably called for a "soft peace" for the Axis 
powers, adding that "no element in any nation shall be forced 
to atone vicariously for crimes for which it is not 
responsible, and no people shall be forced to look forward to 
endless years of want and starvation." 58
Welles had very definite views on the postwar future of
Germany. He felt that Germany would have to be completely
reconstructed and reconfigured before it could be allowed
membership in his anticipated "new European order" where 
Germany would play a crucial role in European economic 
integration. Welles sought to return Germany to what he called 
the "pre-Bismarckian period" of German history. He believed 
Bismarck's unification of Germany had created a dangerous and 
disruptive force at the center of Europe and he assumed that
56 p  minutes 37, December 12,1942.
57 Welles often dominated such discussions because of his long association with the German problem. He had 
visited Germany almost annually throughout his life, beginning a s  a  boy during his yearly visits to Europe with 
his family. He also spoke the language and had a  number of German friends. Welles's long association with 
Germany is explained in Welles to Bailey, March 8,1948, box 129, Welles papers, FDRL.
58 "The Realization of a  Great Vision," May 30,1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
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reducing Germany to its status when it was less centralized 
would provide Europe with greater postwar stability. For 
centuries, the German states had been a conglomeration of 
fragmented principalities. But unification made Germany 
stronger than either France or Austria-Hungary. "It had not 
been until Prussia had obtained a complete domination over all 
of their other German states that the danger to the world had 
arisen," Welles once said.59 Furthermore, Welles did not 
completely exonerate the German people for the acts of Hitler 
and the Nazis. He believed the Germans had a tendency toward 
barbarism and cruelty and that strong measures would be needed 
to reform and control Germany in the postwar era so that it 
could once again become part of the international community.so
Two months after the German declaration of war on the 
United States, Hitler declared that if the German people would 
not fight, they might as well disappear. But Welles and his 
fellow planners had no such draconian aims. Instead, they 
embarked upon their discussions of Germany with the assumption 
that a postwar Germany would by necessity be an integral part 
of their plans for Europe. Welles thought that "a careful study 
of the German federation set up as a result of the Congress of 
Vienna would be highly useful and appropriate when the need for 
a new European order arose." He thought that a federation such 
as the one constructed in 1815 would be "no menace to the rest 
of Europe or to the rest of the world." si
Initially Welles's subcommittee discussed the possibility
59 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 18,1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 520.
60 p minutes 7, April 18,1942, box 55.
61 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 18,1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 520.
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of dismembering Germany into several autonomous states. 62 
Welles’s "new European order" required continental unity, and 
he worried that a strong and centralized postwar Germany would 
make it more difficult to unite Europe on a continental scale. 
But several planners feared —  as early as the spring of 1942 - 
- that a divided Germany might be rendered too weak to serve as 
a bulwark against the Soviet Union. They began to conclude that 
the division of Germany might be inadvisable.®3
Welles suggested that the committee sever Austria from 
Germany. Austria could again become an independent state and 
the centerpiece of a future "Danubian Federation" made up of 
the states located between Germany and the Soviet Union. Welles 
thought that separating Austria would enable the committee to 
focus solely on Germany.64 In the middle of April 1942, Welles 
offered the committee his preliminary plans for a postwar 
Germany. He initially proposed a federation of German states, 
loosely connected, but without actual political union. As 
Welles described it, the federation would be held together by a 
German customs union, or Zollverein. He believed a loose 
federation could serve as a compromise between the status quo 
and more severe plans to fragment Germany into numerous tiny, 
autonomous parts. He warned that the German people might oppose 
Washington's aims and that his plan would have to be "imposed"
62 Several scholars have commented on the position Welles had taken at that moment on the Germany 
question. Keith Sainsbury has noted that "it is significant that the party in favour of partition in this committee 
was led by Sumner Welles, widely regarded a s  'Roosevelt’s  man' in the State Department and one who might 
be presumed to know the trend of presidential thinking." See Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The 
War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make (London: Macmillan, 1994), 146. But Welles's views were 
evolving as the committee discussed the German question. While he favored som e kind of partition of Germany 
he sought to find a  middle ground between complete unification and more draconian aims being developed in 
Washington to pastoralize Germany or fragment her into hundreds of tiny states. He soon cam e to support a  
federation of several autonomous German sta tes within a new Zollverein, or German customs union. Welles 
also toyed with the idea of having autonomous German sta tes integrated into a  larger, federated, western 
Europe. See P document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15,1943, box 57; P document 186, 
"Memorandum to Welles from Division of Political Studies," January 22, 1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4, 
1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942; a s  well as Welles's chapter "The German Menace Can Be Ended" 
(including a detailed map of Welles's recommendations for Germany) in The Time For Decision. 336-359.
63 p  minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11,1942; P minutes 7, April 18,1942; P document 
12, "Why the Division of Germany is Desirable," 1942, box 56; Welles to Representative John Bennett, 
February 19,1948, box 129, Welles papers, FDRL.
64 Throughout the course of the subcommittee's discussions on Germany, Welles would change his mind 
several times on the postwar status of Austria. By the June 20, 1942 meeting of the political subcommittee 
Welles would return to his initial impulse and recommend that an independent Austria be restored at the end of 
the war. He would note that this decision received "almost unanimous" approval. S ee  P minutes 16, June 20, 
1942, box 55.
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on Germany at the end of the w a r . 65
Welles believed the subcommittee had to construct a 
solution that would seem "legitimate" in the eyes of the German 
people, one that would avoid "undue fragmentation." For 
example, he emphasized that Prussia should not be singled-out 
and punished as a scapegoat for all of Germany's ills. After 
all, Bavaria, not Prussia, had been the birthplace of Hitler's 
movement in the 1920s. Furthermore, divisions and federations 
should be considered along religious and historical lines, 
while all postwar German states should be joined together in a 
customs union which would allow for their economies to be 
easily integrated into the rest of Europe. Welles assumed that 
an economically prosperous Germany, tied to a continental 
system, might ameliorate many of the revanchist tendencies 
which had led to the current w a r . 66
Welles and the political subcommittee debated the
reconstruction of a postwar Germany in great detail. The
planners had a shared opposition to reparations, which they
thought had been a cause of interwar instability and
resentment. But for a time the committee remained divided 
between those who assumed that specific elements and
institutions in Germany were the causes of German aggression 
and those who believed that the German people, by their very 
character and history, could never again be trusted. Members of 
the former group, including Welles, sought to create a 
federated democratic Germany, somewhat akin to the doomed 
Weimar Republic, but with the added safeguards of territorial 
readjustments, the punishment of war criminals, disarmament and 
the reeducation of the German people. Welles hoped that a 
federated Germany would bring about the kind of
decentralization that would deprive the Junker class and the 
German General Staff of their traditional p o w e r . 67
The planners also divided over the question of the
division of Germany. Welles counted himself among those, such
65 p minutes 7, April 18,1942, box 55.
66 ibid.
67 p  minutes 42, January 23,1943, box 55; P minutes 43, January 30,1943, box 55; P document 187, "Some 
Economic Problems Involved in Application of a  Proposals to Divide Germany into Three Independent States," 
January 30, 1943, box 57; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55; P minutes 30, October 24, 1942, box 55; P 
document 177, "Postwar Policies Related to Germany," January 15,1943, box 57.
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as Myron Taylor, Isaiah Bowman, Ben Cohen and Norman Davis, who 
favored some form of partition, even within a type of 
federation; while Anne O'Hare McCormick, Adolph Berle, Leo 
Pasvolsky and Hamilton Fish Armstrong supported a unified 
Germany. While Welles thought the allies should seek to avoid 
the kind of reparations that were demanded at the end of the 
last war, he desired German industries and transportation 
facilities to be under international control in the postwar
era. 68
Welles also sought to organize an anti-Hitler exile 
movement which could be used for psychological warfare against 
Germany. Much of this effort centered around former Hitler 
aide, Ernst "Putzi" Hanfstangl, whom Welles referred to by the 
code name "Sedgwick."69 Welles succeeded in having Hanfstangl 
interned at Fort Belvoir in northern Virginia and he used the 
newspaper columnist John Franklin Carter, who wrote under the 
pseudonym Jay Franklin, as a liaison between the administration 
and Hanfstangl. 70 But after a few months it became apparent that 
Hanfstangl either knew far less about the Nazi regime than he 
had claimed or for some reason was withholding information. He 
had also embarrassed Welles by publishing a series of 
sensational articles about the German leadership in the women's 
magazine Cosmopolitan. Little ever came of the Hanfstangl 
episode, but it demonstrated the lengths to which Welles would 
go to make political use of exiles.71
In the fall of 1942 Welles's political subcommittee 
recommended to the president that unconditional surrender 
should be demanded of Germany. The Nazi Government in Berlin 
would have to be completely overthrown and the United Nations 
forces would occupy and disarm Germany at the end of the war.
68 p  minutes 9, May 2,1942, box 55; P minutes 16, June 20,1942, box 55.
69 A Harvard graduate with an American mother, Hanfstangl served Hitler for a  time as a  press adviser and 
unofficial court jester. While on a  flight to Spain at the height of that country's Civil War in 1937, Hanfstangl 
learned that he was to be thrown out in mid-air over Republican-held territory. He escaped during a  stopover in 
Switzerland.
70 John Franklin Carter to Ronald Campbell, May 26,1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL; "Memorandum for 
Mr. Welles: Plan to Recruit German and Italian Nationals," by John Franklin Carter, October 22,1942, box 77, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
71 Ronald Campbell to Welles, January 27,1943, Welles papers, box 164, FDRL; Welles to Carter, September 
13,1946, with enclosure, box 116, Welles papers, FDRL.
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Welles's subcommittee also made a number of political and
territorial proposals designed to ensure that Germany would 
never again become a threat to world peace. But they also
endorsed proposals for a "soft peace," stressing that the
German people should be assured of a prosperous and peaceful 
future, and that any settlement should avoid imposing harsh
terms upon them. The members emphasized that such measures 
would help avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the Versailles 
settlement. The committee remained divided on the question of 
what to do about German partition, but it was generally agreed 
that if division became a necessity, Germany should not be 
dismembered into such small parts as to preclude its future 
economic viability.72
Welles also remained concerned about the possibility of 
postwar economic chaos in Germany as a result of the mass 
movement of war refugees that would likely follow her defeat. 
He initially opposed the Russian proposal for a massive 
transfer of populations in Eastern Europe.73 But the committee's 
surveys for 1942 showed that up to two million Germans might 
have to be forcibly removed from East Prussia at the end of the 
war, with another two million migrating from Pomerania and West 
Prussia, and upwards of three million leaving Bohemia. Several 
planners feared such upheaval might lead to a communist 
revolution in Germany.7*
In accord with Welles's desire that divisions and 
federations be considered along religious and historical lines, 
he generally favored a federated republic made up of three 
quasi-autonomous states: the first, consisting of Bavaria,
Wurttemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and the Rhine-Ruhr region 
including the Saar and Palatinate regions, would be 
predominantly Roman Catholic and somewhat liberal in its 
political outlook; the second, a North German confederation
72 p  minutes 30, October 24,1942, box 55; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on 
International Organization," October 22,1942, box 56.
73 p  minutes 29, October 17,1942, box 55.
74 t  document 130, "Transfer of German Populations From Eastern Europe to the Reich," October 22, 1942, 
box 61; T document 131, "German Capacity to Absorb Additional Population into a  Reduced Territory," October 
21, 1942, box 61; P minutes 29, October 17, 1942, box 55; P minutes 3 0 7 October 24, 1942, box 55; P 
document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15,1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 
55; P minutes 6, April 11,1942.
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made up of Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Oldenburg and the 
Hamburg region including Schleswig and Holstein, would be 
largely Protestant; and the third would consist of Mecklenburg, 
Saxony, Silesia and a new Prussia, divested of East Prussia 
after its incorporation into Poland. Welles assumed that such a 
tripartite Germany would not possess a unified military 
organization, nor would it be centralized financially and 
commercially. While much concern had been expressed that a 
postwar Germany had to be disarmed and contained, the committee 
soon began to favor a reconstructed Germany which would have 
sufficient strength to halt Soviet expansion. The planners also 
worried that a partitioned Germany would be more difficult to 
integrate into an American-led global economic system and would 
undermine efforts for Germany to become an engine for Europe's 
economic revival.75
As in the case of France, Germany, too, would be taught to 
choose "good men." To aid in the reconstruction of Germany the 
planners suggested the United Nations seek out Germans 
possessing "moral leadership" as well as experience in local 
and democratic government. Of fundamental importance would be 
the reeducation of the German people and a "Bill of Rights" in 
a future German constitution to ensure personal freedoms.75 The 
planners considered it vital that future German economic 
prosperity not be jeopardized. They still feared that partition 
would reduce the efficiency of the German economy and thus 
hinder European reconstruction. But they also wanted numerous 
industrial and strategic areas in Germany to remain under 
international control, despite the failure of a similar 
experiment in the Saar and the Ruhr after the previous war. 
With regard to German territorial matters, they concluded that 
Germany would largely return to her pre-Munich frontiers. They 
envisaged no changes of her western boundaries, but feared that 
certain adjustments would be necessary in the east,
75 p  document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P document 186, 
"Memorandum to Welles from Division of Political Studies," January 22,1943, box 57; P document 182, "Myron 
Taylor memorandum on Germany," January 23,1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4,1942, box 55; P minutes 6, 
April 11, 1942; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," 
October 22,1942, box 56.
76 p document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2,1943, box 
57; P document 182, "Memorandum Concerning an Approach to the Post-War Rehabilitation of Germany and to 
a Basis for Lasting Peace on the European Continent," Jan  23,1943, box 57.
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particularly along the Polish-German frontier to compensate for 
Polish losses on their frontier with the Soviet Union.77
Some members of the political subcommittee questioned how 
the possibility of Poland's acquisition of German East Prussia, 
for example, could possibly be reconciled with the Atlantic 
Charter's pledges on territorial adjustments and self- 
determination. On such issues Welles sought to evade the 
details of the charter and a consensus began to emerge that 
perhaps the charter's last pledge, promising a system of 
general security at the end of the war, should take precedence 
over the earlier points about territorial changes and self- 
government. The planners thus rationalized that the charter 
should be interpreted as a general statement of principles, and 
should not be interpreted literally in situations that required 
a "balancing of factors. "78
Meanwhile, British officials continued to trail their 
American counterparts in the area of postwar planning. "In 
terms of hours of discussion," wrote William Roger Louis, "the 
amount of talk and paperwork [at the state department] must 
have surpassed the British equivalent a hundredfold." 7» 
Nonetheless, the British had given some consideration to the 
question of a future Germany. Eden thought that to avoid the 
danger of a postwar Russo-German alliance directed against the 
west, it would be best to convince the German people that their 
long-term interests would be better served within Western 
Europe. Eden thus seemed to hold views remarkably similar to 
Welles's when he noted that Germany could be divided into three 
independent, or quasi-independent states: North Germany, to
include a "reformed" Prussia and Saxony; Western Germany,
77 CAB 66/37 WP(43)217 "Annex: Armistice and Related Problems," March 24, 1943, PRO; P document 236, 
"Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2,1943, box 57; P document 182, 
"Memorandum Concerning an Approach to the Post-War Rehabilitation of Germany and to a Basis for Lasting 
Peace on the European Continent," Jan 23,1943, box 57; P document 186, Division of Political Studies memo 
to Welles (Germany), January 22, 1943, box 57; P document 186, "Postwar Policies Relating to Germany," 
January 15,1943, box 57; P minutes 42, January 23,1943, box 55.
78 P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22,1942, 
box 56; P minutes 42, January 23, 1943, box 55; P minutes 43, January 30, 1943, box 55; P document 187, 
"Some Economic Problems Involved in Application of a  Proposals to Divide Germany into Three Independent 
States," January 30,1943, box 57.
79 Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bav (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 70.
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encompassing the Rhine-Ruhr area; and Southern Germany, made up 
of Baden, Wurttemberg and Bavaria.80 Eden assumed that a federal 
approach to the division of Germany would serve the purposes of 
world peace while not restraining Germany's economic 
reconstruction. The great difficulty was that while Germany 
should be tightly controlled for security purposes, a lasting 
peace and postwar reconstruction were dependent on a prosperous 
Germany. The British had thus discussed the question of postwar 
Germany in the only very broadest terms, but enough to sustain 
preliminary discussions with American officials. Nevertheless, 
the British began to plan for the future of Germany in greater 
detail after Welles's resignation in the summer of 1943.8*
So, what were the long term consequences of the planning 
committee's findings on Germany? Welles had started his 
investigation of the German question with a few simple 
assumptions: first, unconditional surrender should be demanded 
of Germany; second, Germany should eventually be allowed back 
into the international system, without the burden of 
reparations payments that would disrupt its economic viability 
and which might destabilize Germany in the postwar period; 
third, Germany should be partitioned into several autonomous 
states, but in a way that would avoid creating a power vacuum 
at the center of Europe through undue fragmentation and would 
allow customs union; and finally, if the peace was to succeed 
at all there would have to be massive transfers of populations, 
mostly in East Prussia and the Germanic areas of 
Czechoslovakia.
When the question of Germany was raised after Welles's 
departure from the state department in the fall of 1943, 
Roosevelt at first criticized some of the postwar planning 
group's findings, particularly those opposing permanent
80 CAB 66/34 WP(43)96, "The Future of Germany," by Anthony Eden, March 8,1943, PRO.
81 Keith Sainsbury has argued that Eden tacked "backwards and forwards on the issue of German partition, 
which left both allies and colleagues in doubt as  to his real views, and does not add to his reputation as  Foreign 
Minister." S ee  Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War. 140. See also CAB 66/34 WP(43)96, 'The Future of 
Germany," by Anthony Eden, March 8,1943, PRO; CAB 66/35 WP(43)144, "The Future of Germany," by Lord 
Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, April 8, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/35 WP(43)322, "Postwar Settlement- 
Policy in R espect of Germany," by Attlee, July 19, 1943, PRO; CAB 65/35 WM(43)107th Conclusions, July 29, 
1943; CAB 66/39 WP(43)350, "Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration," by Churchill, 
August 4 ,1943, PRO; CAB 66/37 WP(43)218, "Austria," by Eden, May 25,1943, PRO.
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dismemberment. Like Welles, Roosevelt argued that because of 
his childhood vacations to Germany he understood the German 
problem far better than the supposed experts. But Roosevelt 
later admitted to Hull in October 1943 that dismemberment might 
not work and this was encouragement enough for the secretary to 
oppose a commitment to dismemberment at the Moscow Conference. 82 
Although at the November 1943 Teheran Conference Roosevelt took 
a hard line on the dismemberment of Germany, his opinions on 
the matter continued to evolve. The reaction to the publication 
of the draconian Morgenthau Plan for German dismemberment in 
the fall of 1944 embarrassed Roosevelt and when he departed for 
the February 1945 Yalta Conference he avoided an outright 
endorsement of dismemberment. 83
Throughout the war Welles had argued that a German 
economic revival would be essential to the postwar economic 
health of Europe. He foresaw that an economically powerful 
Germany would be necessary to serve as the engine of European 
reconstruction and his support for a "soft peace" for Germany 
eventually carried the day, as did his plan for a massive 
program of postwar reconstruction for the defeated Axis powers. 
What emerged finally, though in ways Welles had not foreseen, 
was a powerful West German state closely allied to the west, 
and rearmed by the west only a few years after the war. Nor had 
Welles anticipated how significantly Germany would be shaped by 
postwar tensions among the Grand Alliance partners. While he 
foresaw how a revived Germany might once again serve as a 
bulwark against the Soviet Union, his ideas for a loose 
federation of German states and Germany's permanent disarmament 
fell victim to Cold War considerations.
* * *
Austria presented a less complicated challenge for the 
planners. Welles thought the allied powers should guarantee 
Austria's independence, with Vienna serving as the headquarters
82 Pasvolsky memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt and Hull, October 5, 1943, FRUS. 1943, I, 541- 
543; Minutes of the seventh meeting of the foreign ministers, Moscow, October 25, 1943, FRUS. 1 9 4 3 ,1, 631- 
632; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. II, 1265-1266.
83 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972), 126.
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of an East European Federation. Welles hoped that a federation 
based in Vienna might encourage an Austrian commitment to free 
trade and greater interdependence in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Welles and his fellow planners also sought to revive 
the prewar Czechoslovakia, which they hoped would serve as a 
bulwark of democracy and free trade within a future
federation. 84
As early as the spring of 1942, Welles's political 
subcommittee began preliminary discussions on the possibility 
of creating an East European Federation which would encompass a 
band of states between Germany and Russia, running from the 
Baltic to the Adriatic. 85 welles often repeated the Czech 
statesman Francis Palacky's maxim that if the Austrian Empire 
had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it,86 
and he believed that any regional federation would have to 
serve as a "counterpoise to both Russia and Germany. "87 it was 
hoped that a union among Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Baltic states and 
possibly Finland, Greece and Turkey might successfully check 
and contain both Germany and the Soviet Union and could promote 
economic union and stability in the region. The committee 
subsequently discussed specific aspects such as customs and 
monetary union, as well as the elimination of borders.88 Members 
sought to organize the nations in the region to provide a 
"strong and stable counterweight and buffer to Germany and 
Russia" so that the area would no longer "be a field for the 
intrigues and maneuvers" of Berlin and Moscow. They 
acknowledged that active American participation in an East
84 p  minutes 5, April 4,1942, box 55; P minutes 7, April 18,1942; P minutes 8, April 25,1942; P minutes 9, May 
2, 1942; P document 121-a, Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 
1942, box 56; P minutes 31, October 31, 1942, box 55; P minutes 39, January 2, 1943, box 55. 
Czechoslovakia held a special place in many of their hearts. Several planners believed Woodrow Wilson had 
been the midwife of the Czechoslovak republic, born at Paris in 1919, and which between the wars formed an 
island of democracy in Central Europe. Welles had visited Czechoslovakia numerous times before the war and 
had much respect for Thomas Masaryk.
85 Welles's ideas for an East European Union will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven.
86 Palacky: "Assuredly, if the Austrian state had not already existed, the interests of Europe and indeed of 
humanity would have required that we create it and that a s  soon a s  possible." For Welles's use of Palacky's 
dictum see, for example, P minutes 45, February 20,1943, box 55.
87 p minutes 5, April 4,1942, box 55; P minutes 10, May 9,1942, box 55.
88 ibid.
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European Federation would represent a "departure from old 
conceptions" about America's vital interests.89
Traditionally, the Habsburg Empire had stood as Europe's 
bulwark against Russian expansion. Thus Welles and the
committee briefly considered a revival of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and the return of Archduke Otto Habsburg, the pretender 
to the Imperial throne, who might also be groomed to serve as 
the leader of an Austrian exile movement. The planners assumed 
that the pretender hoped to return to Vienna at the end of the 
war as the head of a "federal Danubian state."90 Before long, 
Welles developed serious misgivings about the mere mention of 
Otto. Fearing that discussions about the Habsburgs might become 
public, he warned Roosevelt against getting entangled with the 
pretender, whom Welles suspected was seeking the president's 
"official benediction."9i The exiled Italian Count Carlo Sforza 
warned Welles that the feeling in Eastern and Central Europe 
was one of "Better Hitler than the Habsburgs." Sforza added: 
"Peace and order cannot be based on rotten failures of the 
past." 92
Welles and the committee ultimately rejected reviving the 
Habsburg Empire but they conducted a detailed survey of the old 
Empire to determine if any of its institutions and political 
structures could serve as a model for a future federation. 
Welles thought the sporadic attempts at Central American Union 
might serve as an example for imitation in Eastern Europe and 
that a future federation for the region could begin with a 
customs union, advance to monetary union and, eventually, 
political union. The key features of Welles's plan for an East 
European Federation included a regional police force, an agency 
to control trade and industry, a regional judicial system and 
an East European parliament with a political executive, perhaps 
based in Vienna. An "Articles of Confederation" would be 
drafted for the region to determine the relationship among
89 p  minutes 11, May 16,1942, box 55; P minutes 13, May 30,1942; P minutes 14, June 6,1942; P document 
16, "Plan for Central European Union," May 27, 1942, box 56; E document 25, "Economic Subcommittee 
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Economic Relations of the East European Federation with the United Nations Organization," box 56.
90 P minutes 10, May 9,1942, box 55; P minutes 8, April 25,1942.
91 Welles to Roosevelt, March 31,1942, box 77, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL.
92 Sforza to Welles, November 21,1942, box 83, Welles papers, folder 10, FDRL.
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states within the federation.93
The planners understood that the question of Eastern 
Europe remained inextricably linked to that of Russia. The 
Second World War had demonstrated the huge human, natural and 
industrial potential of the Soviet Union, and Welles assumed 
that Moscow and Washington might together do a better job of 
running world affairs than the previous great powers.9* The 
subcommittee understood that the Kremlin would seek the 
restoration of its 1941 boundaries at the end of the war and 
that it might have even larger territorial aspirations. Welles 
thought the Russians might not be content until they recouped 
their pre-World War I boundaries. The planners assumed the 
U.S.S.R. would probably take whatever it saw as essential to 
its security and that it would, at the very least, insist that 
"friendly" governments be installed in all of the adjacent 
European countries. What that meant, however, was anyone's 
guess. The planners accepted the fact that the Red Army would 
be in control of many contested areas at the close of the war 
and that unless the United States was prepared to "fight World 
War III" against the Soviet Union in the near future, 
concessions to Moscow's demands would have to be made.95
* * *
Welles and his fellow planners also had specific ideas for 
the future of Italy.95 Much like their approach to Germany, the 
planners desired that Italy be reconstructed along the lines of 
Welles's liberal economic and political system for a new 
European order. As early as the spring of 1942 the planners 
concluded that peace with Italy meant the overthrow of the
93 p  minutes 12, May 23,1942, box 55.
94 Welles's ideas on postwar planning for the Soviet Union will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven.
95 t  document 228, "Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939-1941,“ January 23,1943, box 62; P document 121 - 
a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 
2, March 14, 1942, box 55; P minutes 19, July 18, 1942, box 55; P minutes 35, November 28, 1942; P 
document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2,1943, box 57; T 
document 378, "Soviet Rule in the Baltic States, June 1940-June 1941," September 16,1943, box 65.
96 The most exhaustive study of U.S. postwar planning for Italy has concluded that the planning committees 
"had laid the basis for wartime American political reconstruction policy by mid-January 1943." See Jam es 
Edward Miller, The United States and Italy. 194Q-195Q: The Politics of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1986), 44.
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Mussolini regime. Welles and the planners concluded that the 
United Nations should take advantage of any desire on the part 
of the Italian people to make a separate peace, but that no 
discussions should be undertaken with the Fascist regime in 
Rome. Before Fascism, the planners noted, Italy had been a 
liberal country and a respected member of the family of 
nations. Welles and the planners saw the Italian people as 
reluctant belligerents, unenthusiastic about their German ally. 
The planners feared that Italy would find it difficult to 
overcome postwar shortages of vital resources such as oil, coal 
and iron. But with New Deal-style planning on a large scale and 
increased emphasis on free trade and technical knowledge, 
Welles thought Italy might return to prosperity soon after the 
war. Money previously wasted on armaments and grandiose public 
works projects would be better spent on education, 
reconstruction, and agricultural technology.97
As early as December 1942 Welles envisioned a future when 
Italy would be detached from its alliance with Germany and he 
began to cast about for a successor regime. The Vatican had 
warned Myron Taylor of the danger of a communist revolution in 
post-armistice Italy and underscored the urgent need for the 
Italian monarchy to play a central, stabilizing role. Welles 
tentatively considered the Royal House of Savoy, working under 
allied supervision, for the civilian authority in the immediate 
armistice period. Taylor and Anne O'Hare McCormick believed 
allied authorities should seek to strike a deal with King 
Victor Emmanuel III, but Welles feared such a move might 
undermine efforts to establish democratic institutions in 
Italy. The feeling emerged that Washington should avoid 
anything that might resemble another Darlan fiasco. Welles 
thought that perhaps Count Carlo Sforza, an early anti-fascist 
politician who had fled Italy in 1927 and had long lived in the 
United States, could be groomed into an effective leader of a 
"Free Italy" movement. Privately, Welles had doubts about 
Sforza's abilities and wondered whether he had the stature
97 P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 26, September 26, 1942, box 55; P minutes 39, January 2, 
1943, box 55; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," 
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153
necessary to be transformed into a "Masaryk" for Italy.**
Welles had briefed Roosevelt on Sforza in early 1942 and 
suggested to the president that the Italian exile could serve 
as the rallying point around which a campaign of psychological 
warfare could be waged against Fascist Italy. Welles told the 
president he had visions of organizing some 200,000 Italian 
prisoners of war into a "Free Italy" army.&  This is curious, 
considering the headaches the Free French had given Welles, but 
he thought Sforza more pliable than de Gaulle. Welles arranged 
for Sforza to go to Uruguay and Argentina to rally the large 
Italian populations there against the Mussolini regime, an 
effort which Welles thought would have "very considerable 
propaganda value in opposition to the Axis efforts in those two 
countries." Sforza wanted Welles to secure Lend-Lease aid for 
his movement. He warned that if the United States did not fill 
the void after the departure of Mussolini, it might lead to 
communism in Italy. 100
State department specialists warned Welles that Sforza had 
very little support or prestige in Italy and cautioned that 
recognition of Sforza's movement as a government-in-exile might 
upset relations with anti-fascist forces currently in Italy. 101 
Eventually, Welles began to doubt if the energy expended on the 
Italian exiles was worth the trouble. To Welles, Sforza began 
to present problems much like de Gaulle. Sforza annoyed Welles, 
burdening him with numerous requests. One such request prompted 
Welles to complain to Adolph Berle, "What in the name of the 
Lord am I to reply to [Sforza's] telegrams?"io2
The planners assumed the future of the Italian colonies 
would be closely tied to the future status of the British and
98 P minutes 39, January 2,1943, box 55; P document 163, “Italy," January 1,1943, box 57; T document 202, 
"The Italian Empire: Political Considerations," December 29,1942, box 61; Miller, The United States and Italy. 
44.
99 Welles to Roosevelt, February 24,1942, box 151, Welles papers, FDRL
100 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Ronald Campbell, "Free Italian Movement," August 14,
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1943, box 92, Welles papers, FDRL
101 Jones to Welles, November 14,1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL.
102 Welles to Berle, November 9, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL. Count Sforza returned to Italy in 
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French colonies in Africa, but they concluded that Italy's 
possession of Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland 
was merely a matter of Italian "national pride" and not 
important to Italy's future economic health. The subcommittee 
agreed that Libya should be placed under international 
trusteeship but no consensus emerged over the future of Eritrea 
or Italian Somaliland, other than the conviction that Italy 
should be stripped of them.*03
The planners hoped that Britain and France could be 
induced to lead the way by transferring their colonies in the 
Near East and North Africa, along with Italy's, into a regional 
trusteeship. The planners thought the Italian possession of the 
Dodecanese Islands (the mostly Greek inhabited islands off the 
coast of Turkey which include Rhodes and Leros) should be 
granted to Greece, although the Italians had stripped the 
islands from Turkey in 1915. Welles even brought up the 
possibility of detaching the Mediterranean islands of Sardinia, 
Sicily and Pantelleria from Italy. Welles thought the tiny 
island of Pantelleria, lying astride the hundred mile wide 
strait separating Sicily from Tunisia, might serve as an 
international base after the war.104
Welles sought a postwar solution for Italy which would be 
in accord with Washington's liberal internationalist ideals and 
he feared that London, merely seeking to reestablish its sphere 
of influence in the Mediterranean, would settle for nothing 
more than fascism without Mussolini, just so long as British 
interests in the Mediterranean were safeguarded. Welles also 
feared the British wanted to exercise control over a postwar 
Italy as part of London's larger effort to dominate the entire 
Mediterranean.105
103 p document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2,1943, box 
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* * *
Japan, too, would be allowed rehabilitation within 
Welles's new world order. Based on personal experience, Welles 
had genuine regard for the Japanese people. During the First 
World War he had been entrusted with the task of supervising 
German prisoners of war and internees scattered throughout the 
Japanese home islands. He thus had numerous first-hand 
opportunities to observe Japanese interaction with foreigners, 
which he believed the Japanese handled with "decency and 
consideration" and with none of the xenophobia which the west 
had so often associated with Japanese behavior. Welles's views 
of Japan's postwar potential were largely a product of his 
exposure to Japan during the period of his residency and 
immediately after. Welles sought to revert Japan to a less 
militaristic state, a period he believed predated Tokyo's quest 
for regional hegemony, much as he believed Germany could be 
revived and reintegrated into the world system if only the 
planners aimed to recapture a distant "pre-Bismarckian" past. 
He envisioned an eventual rapprochement between Washington and 
Tokyo based on a developing pattern of strong commercial ties 
and economic integration.106
Welles had very precise ideas on reordering postwar Japan. 
He believed the attack on Pearl Harbor was the climax of a long 
rivalry between Washington and Tokyo. He vividly recalled that 
after Japan entered the war on the side of the allies in August 
1914 she lost no time in seizing Germany's Pacific possessions 
north of the equator. The allies again looked the other way 
when in 1915 Japan coerced a weak and divided China to grant it 
extensive economic privileges in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, 
as well as the right to German concessions on the Shantung 
Peninsula. In a moment of desperation in the darkest period of 
the war in 1917, the British secretly promised to support
106 Welles, Time For Decision 272-276; P minutes 20, August 1, 1942, box 55, Notter files; P minutes 47, 
March 13, 1943, box 55, Notter files; P document 213, “Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: Part I: 
Treatment of Japan," March 10,1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL
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Japan's permanent claims to these former German possessions.107
During the Second World War Tokyo developed extensive 
plans for the "new order" which would supplement ’ empire.
In addition to the many territories Japan sought to swallow 
early in the war (such as Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, 
Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Guinea, 
Guam, Wake, and the Gilbert, Bismark, Solomon and Admiralty 
islands), the Japanese war ministry also had designs for all of 
Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, much of India and perhaps even 
parts of western Canada, Alaska and possibly the state of 
Washington. They had even slated areas such as Central America, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Cuba and Jamaica for possible membership in 
Japan's co-prosperity sphere. 108
But to Welles and the planners, Japan would become a great 
laboratory for an experiment in national reconstruction and 
would be remodeled in a way that would lend support to U.S. 
interests in Asia. Welles and the planners concluded that in 
the wake of Japan's complete defeat it would be stripped of 
most of its empire, including Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, 
Korea, Formosa, the Kwangtung leased territory, all of its 
recent acquisitions since its taking of Indochina and all the 
Pacific islands placed under Japanese mandate in 1919. "Japan 
should not start off the new era with territories obtained 
through its aggressive action," Welles told the planners in 
August 1942. No one disputed that Sakhalin would probably pass
to the USSR. 109
While Japan would lose these territories, its economic 
viability would be upheld by allowing it to become an active 
player in America's free trade regime in the Far East. Japan
107 Welles, Time For Decision. 272-276; P minutes 20, August 1, 1942, box 55, Notter files; P minutes 47, 
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would thus become a key component of Welles’s liberalized world 
order. He and the other planners believed Japan should be 
prohibited from reverting to economic autarchy but rather 
integrated into the larger regional and world economies. The 
planners discussed these proposals with an eye toward creating 
a postwar Japan which would play a preponderant role in the 
economic revitalization of the Far East, as well as a key 
position in the American-led new order in Asia. While Japan 
would be occupied and divested of its extensive military- 
industrial complex, democratic institutions would be 
reintroduced and free trade and open markets would be promoted 
as an alternative to militaristic expansion.no
To cement Tokyo to the new international economic order, 
Japan would be made dependent upon world markets. The planners 
assumed that free trade and free enterprise would enable Japan 
to obtain the raw materials she required without resorting to 
conquest. The Japanese aircraft, manufacturing and shipbuilding 
industries would be "liquidated” and a tolerable standard of 
living would be maintained by promoting an extensive 
manufacturing and export sector. The planners worried that 
Japan would need to find room for some seven million people 
repatriated from her former empire. Thus, in a further effort 
at social engineering, birth control would be mandated as a 
means of easing Japan’s overpopulation.111 President Roosevelt 
even went so far as to discuss the possible "cross-breeding" of 
the Japanese with "gentler” Pacific islanders. While the 
planners had been reluctant to raise such solutions for the 
other Axis powers, they did not hesitate to discuss eugenics 
for the Japanese.112
* * *
110 Akira Iriye has noted, that even at this early date (c.1942) "postwar Japan was being visualized a s  a  
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One of the key issues which precipitated the Japanese- 
American war in the Pacific was the refusal of the United 
States to accept Japanese hegemony in China. The future status 
of China had also come to represent a significant area of 
disagreement among the allies. Whitehall and the Kremlin 
harbored suspicions that the United States sought to promote 
China in an attempt to obtain support for American aims on a 
future security council of an international organization. There 
was much truth in those suspicions. H3 In accordance with the 
president's wishes, Welles sought to promote China as one of 
the Four Policemen and as a great power in the postwar world. A 
strong China might serve to check the power of Britain, the 
USSR and a reconstructed Japan. While such views may have been 
in conflict with Welles's rhetoric about forever ending spheres 
of influence and the balance of power, he justified such a 
course because he saw China as essential to the success of 
postwar system of collective security. Thus, like Roosevelt, 
Welles saw China as absolutely fundamental to Washington's 
postwar plans. n* He believed the Chinese had been betrayed at 
Versailles. The Chinese delegates at the peace conference in 
1919 refused to sign the treaty after learning that the allies 
would do nothing to remove the Japanese from Chinese 
territory. us This time around, Washington would have to avoid 
such mistakes and instead make a strong showing on behalf of 
Chinese sovereignty. Welles and Roosevelt thought that as the 
colonial powers faded into history, China would emerge as the
113 Roosevelt and Welles were less concerned about a  Soviet or revolutionary threat in East Asia than they 
were about the continuance of the British Empire in the region. According to Michael Schaller, the British "in 
particular feared that American policy had determined to pull down the foundations of the empire even before a 
final verdict was rendered .... Churchill believed Roosevelt's game was to make China strong enough to 'police' 
Asia while remaining essentially dependent upon the United States. The prime minister complained to 
subordinates that the Americans expected to use China a s  a  'faggot vote on the side of the United S tates in an 
attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire."1 See Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China. 1938-1945 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 91 -93.
114 Welles offered a detailed description of his wartime views of China in his "Milwaukee Town Hall Speech," 
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115 For a  detailed analysis of U.S. policy toward China during the First World War see, for example, Warren I. 
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"keystone" to a "new order" to be established in the Far East 
and they feared that no other nation had the potential to 
fulfill or defeat their plans for Asia. They assumed that in 
the wake of the dissolution of the colonial empires, China 
would emerge as a great Asiatic power. In an effort to 
strengthen the Generalissimo's hand, they desired to return all 
territory which had been stripped from China since 1895. 
Washington itself would surrender its extraterritorial rights 
in China and not oppose Chinese emigration to the United 
States. China would be groomed into a cooperative regional 
policeman in Asia, one ready to aid in the promotion of U.S. 
interests in the Far East. For example, while Formosa would be 
returned to China, Welles wanted the Chinese to allow its use 
as a strategic base for an international police f o r c e .ne
Welles feared that a continuation of the civil war in 
China had the potential to engulf the great powers much like 
the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. He thus sought to 
create a strong and economically prosperous China. But during 
the war the Chinese central government had only a tenuous hold 
throughout much of the country. To further compound matters, 
Welles and the state department planners had only a superficial 
understanding of the current and future prospects for China. 
The planners acknowledged that the "Chinese Communist Problem 
holds the greatest danger to Chinese unity in the postwar 
period, and upon Chinese unity the stability of the Far East 
area may depend," but they were blind to many of the more 
specific aspects of China's turmoil. They feared that Soviet 
troops would be in control of Manchuria at the end of the war 
and might attempt to destabilize the rest of China. They thus 
believed Washington should assume a larger role in attempting 
to resolve China's civil war and should make a greater effort 
at strengthening China. Pacification of the country should be 
buttressed by an immense program of internal improvements and 
development —  a virtual Tennessee Valley Authority for China - 
- underwritten by American investment. The plan would include 
the promotion of industry, the development of public utilities
116 “Milwaukee Town Hall Speech," by Sumner Welles, October 23, 1950, speech files, box 199, Welles 
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extending electricity to the countryside, the improvement of 
communications, the utilization of China's mineral resources, 
expansions and improvements in public health and education, 
water and soil conservation, drought control and the promotion 
of greater agricultural stability. Interestingly enough, 
democracy was not deemed absolutely necessary for China. Like 
Latin America, China would merely be required to support U.S. 
interests in exchange for Washington's continued largess. 117
But how best to create a China on American terms? 
Appeasing Chinese desires in the region (if only so long as 
China's desire for status remained consistent with Washington's 
political and economic requirements) might be one way to 
promote a postwar China willing to follow the U.S. lead in the 
Far East.us This meant giving strong consideration to ending 
European control of Hong Kong and Macao, while protecting 
Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and Korea from 
Russian designs. Chinese demands for an end to European control 
in India and Indochina should also be supported. When the 
Office of War Information's Asia expert, Owen Lattimore, (who 
had been an advisor to Chiang and who would later become a 
target of Senator McCarthy and the China Lobby) warned that the 
Chinese would oppose any effort at international control in 
Asia, Welles asserted that the Chinese would not always be 
allowed to have the final say in the region because after the 
war the United States would also be a powerful presence in the
117 “What Do We Desire of China? Preliminary Considerations," no date [c.1942], box 11, Notter Files; P 
document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: further problems for consideration: part ll:the 
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290.
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Far East.119
Throughout the war, Churchill and the foreign office 
opposed American attempts to foster a great power China 
amenable to U.S. interests. Considerable rancor occurred
between the allies over the issue.129 Far from believing that
China would emerge from the war as a great power, British
officials thought China lacked internal stability and military 
power and would probably descend into chaos. While this was 
somewhat foresighted, Churchill, in his disdain for China, did 
not sufficiently consider that China's stubborn refusal to 
capitulate to the Japanese effectively tied down substantial 
Japanese forces in China that might otherwise have been 
available for the Burma-lndia theater. Furthermore, London felt 
threatened by American plans to promote China. The British felt 
they could only reluctantly accede to Chinese involvement on an 
executive council of a future world organization and they 
sought to prevent Chinese participation in regional councils 
where China did not have a direct national interest. The
British detested Chinese interference in the affairs of India 
and Hong Kong.121 (Indeed, the state department's planners had 
already concluded by the fall of 1942 that Hong Kong's postwar 
status should be geared toward aiding China's "postwar unity 
and strength" through repatriation with the mainland.122) The 
British also worried about Chinese participation in a regional 
council for the Near East, where China might make trouble for 
the British on matters such as as the future status of the Suez 
Canal. Furthermore, London vehemently opposed the prospect of 
future Chinese involvement in European matters and determined
119 P minutes 47, March 13,1943, box 55, Notter files; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 
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against Chinese participation on a European regional council. 123 
The British had some cause to fear China as a member of the 
Four Policemen. During the war American officials told British 
officials that China might serve as a useful counterweight to 
the U.S.S.R. both in the Far East and in the councils of a new 
international organization. No doubt the British privately 
feared that China would also serve as a counterpoise to British 
interests in those areas. 124
Welles’s efforts to have China share responsibility for a 
stable postwar order may have been misguided and China may have 
been nothing more than a mythical great power during the w a r .125 
But by supporting China, Welles saw vast benefits for U.S. 
foreign policy in other areas. Regardless of what happened to 
Chiang after the war, Welles believed Washington's support for 
China placed the United States on the side of the oppressed in 
the colonial struggle. Furthermore, throughout the war China 
would serve as a useful proxy for a number of Welles's foreign 
policy goals, particularly decolonization. China also had the 
potential to serve as a counterweight to London's and Moscow's 
aims in the Far East. To maintain this balance into the postwar 
period Washington sought to groom China as an ally on the 
security council of a future world organization. Throughout the 
war Welles seemed to believe that Washington should continue to 
support Chiang while urging him to reach a peaceful accord with 
the communists and to introduce democratic reforms and vast 
internal improvements. Welles never fully understood that 
Washington could do little to determine the terms of China's 
path to great power status. Furthermore, the U.S. could in no 
way ensure that China’s rise would occur on terms favorable to
123 FO 371/31632 Foreign Office Minute on China, January 26, 1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British 
Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. IV, 488-522; T document 302, "The Suez Canal and Egyptian 
Interests," April 1, 1943, box 63, Notter files.
124 CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd, April 13, 1943, PRO; P document 117, "British Political Ferment Involving 
Postwar O bjectives," October 17,1942, box 56, Notter files.
125 See, for example, Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Realilv (New 
York: Basic Books, 1990), 46-50. Washington's extensive investments in China went beyond the political and 
military spheres and included the state department's pursuit of an aggressive cultural policy toward China. 
See, for example, Frank Ninkovich, "Cultural Relations and American China Policy, 1942-1945," Pacific 
Historical Review. 1980. vol. 49, no. 3 (August 1980), 471-498; a s  well a s  Wilma Fairbank, America's Cultural 
Experiment in China. 1942-1949 (Washington: Department of State, 1976); and Christopher Jespersen, 
American Images of China. 1931-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
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American interests in the Far East.126
* * *
By the time the planning committees were disbanded in the 
summer of 1943 Welles and his fellow planners had succeeded in 
conducting the first in-depth examination of Washington's 
postwar aims toward the other powers. At the time of Welles1 s 
resignation in August 1943, the planners had already concluded 
that Germany, Italy and Japan should be reconstructed and 
eventually rehabilitated after the war with an eye toward 
postwar stability, disarmament and economic viability.127 They 
had also held detailed discussions on how China should be 
promoted as one of the four policemen, and they hoped that 
China would serve as a future counterweight to Russian, British 
and Japanese interests in the Far East. When considering the 
postwar status of Eastern Europe, the planners feared that 
postwar instability and fragmentation would make the region 
susceptible to Russian hegemony, and they sought ways to 
provide Eastern Europe with greater unity and cohesion. As for 
France, Welles and the planners failed to reach a definitive 
decision about recognizing an exile movement but their 
hostility toward de Gaulle would continue to animate America's 
French policy throughout the war, as would their conviction 
that France should be kept out of the ranks of the great powers 
in the postwar era. In short, not only did these discussions 
serve as a foundation for future decisions on matters related 
to postwar planning and reconstruction, they would also 
influence U.S. decisions at future wartime conferences.
* * *
126 with the American island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, the Chinese theater becam e more peripheral to 
Roosevelt's wartime strategy. In any event, in May 1944 Roosevelt began easing his efforts to develop China 
a s  one of the four policemen. See LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 1288. For an account that 
Roosevelt held exaggerated beliefs about China's prospects, see  Christopher Thorne. Allies of a  Kind. 307- 
309, 724. Furthermore, Michael Schaller in his The U.S. Crusade in China se e s  U.S. officials a s  blind to 
significant changes occurring within wartime China.
127 The July 1945 Potsdam declaration on Japan closely mirrored the conclusions of Welles's planning 
committees. Akira Iriye has declared that "the Potsdam declaration was clearly an American product, summing 
up more than three years of planning and deliberations within the United States government. See Iriye, Power 
and Culture. 263.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The War Within the Wars 
Sumner Welles and American Anti-Colonialism
1941-1943
Among the many responsibilities confronting Sumner Welles 
as a result of U.S. entry in the war was the challenge of 
formulating a response to the emergent nationalism in the 
colonial world. He believed that regardless of the war's 
outcome, much of the colonial world would be profoundly changed
and the question of how to ally the United States with these
nationalist movements would become one of the most important 
challenges after the war. America's entry into the war 
presented Welles with an enormous opportunity to press for 
reform in the colonial empires. He understood that the United 
States would no longer have to settle for merely offering 
advice on colonial matters from the periphery, because with 
American productivity and manpower directly supporting the war, 
Washington's leverage over wartime political issues had grown 
immensely.i
What Welles sought was nothing less than the
internationalization of the Monroe Doctrine. Welles would use a
combination of public pronouncements, private diplomatic 
discussions and his leadership of the postwar planning process, 
to press for change and promote a reordering of the postwar 
colonial world. Just as John Quincy Adams2 had promulgated the 
Monroe Doctrine as a warning to the European powers that the 
United States would oppose any effort to establish or reclaim 
colonies in the new world, Welles sought to stretch the meaning 
of the Atlantic Charter to ensure that the colonial masters 
would not seek a return to the status quo at the end of the 
war. As Welles saw it, decolonization was inevitable. Thus, the 
United States should take advantage of the radical changes that
1 Welles sought to utilize this leverage to pressure the British over colonial matters and the question of trade. 
Walter LaFeber has argued that "an examination of British and American records can lead to the speculation 
that the diplomats of each nation, with their eyes on postwar advantages, devoted more time to maneuvering 
against one another than to fighting the Japanese." See Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 
American Historical Review, vol. 80, no. 5 (December 1975), 1280.
2 Welles, an admirer of Adams, had the former secretary of state's portrait hung in a  place of honor in his state 
department office.
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would come in its wake. He believed the demand for self- 
determination would be a hugely important political factor 
during and after the war and Washington would best promote its 
postwar interests by supporting the aspirations of the colonial 
peoples.3
Welles's Wilsonianism, such as his commitment to self-
determination and free trade, helped shape his anti­
colonialism. 4 But this is not to say that his views on the 
subject were consistently idealistic. Like Wilson, Welles
partly derived his anti-colonialism from a realistic assessment 
that the continuation of the colonial empires would adversely 
effect U.S. national interests. Welles's anticolonialism 
blended with his pursuit of more self-interested aims. Welles
wagered that any diminution of the colonial empires would work 
to the benefit of the United States by increasing its power and 
influence in the world. He also assumed the United States stood 
to gain from any weakening of the colonial economic systems
because it would enable the U.S. to obtain valuable raw 
materials and markets and to extend its free trade regime. 
Welles feared the United States might slip into another 
economic depression after the war. He thus desired a policy of 
the open door in colonial areas to smooth the way for America's 
manufactured goods. Furthermore, with increasing wartime 
demands for oil and other resources for military and industrial 
purposes, the colonial question assumed even greater importance 
for Welles and the planners.
But Welles often sought to take the colonial debate to the 
next level. His opposition to colonialism also had subtle links 
to the larger question of race, not only in the colonial world,
3 According to two Indian scholars, an examination of Welles's role “during and after 1942 Indicates a  
possibility that even in 1941 he might have had a  clearer perception than the President of the larger issues 
brought to the fore by the war." See M.S. Venkataramani and B.K. Shrivastava, Quit India: The American 
Response to the 1942 Struggle (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 18. In 1944 Welles said that he 
understood earlier than most that the "startling development of Japan a s  a world power, and the slower but 
nevertheless steady em ergence of China a s  a  full member of the family of nations, together with the growth of 
popular institutions among many other peoples of Asia, notably India, all combined to erase  very swiftly indeed 
the fetish of white supremacy cultivated by the big colonial powers during the nineteenth century. The thesis of 
white supremacy could only exist so  long as  the white race actually proved to be supreme. The nature of the 
defeats suffered by the Western nations in 1942 dealt the final blow to any concept of white superiority which 
still remained." See Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 297-298.
4 The anticolonial sentiment of the Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter notwithstanding, the United States 
had also entered the race for colonies at the end of the nineteenth century, and had intervened militarily in 
several Latin American countries.
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but also in the United States. While American opposition to 
colonialism has often been premised upon assessments of British 
power and the exclusion of American business and trade 
interests, Welles’s wartime addresses often focused on the 
impact on the colonial peoples themselves. Throughout the war 
Welles proclaimed that the U.S. could not fight imperialism 
abroad while maintaining it at home by oppressing minority 
groups. The very nature of the war, with German and Japanese 
emphasis on racial questions, further underscored for Welles 
the spuriousness of the racial arguments that had been used to 
justify colonial domination.s Welles proclaimed that the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter could not be limited to "the 
White race." "Peoples capable of autonomous government," Welles 
said, "should be possessed of that right whether be yellow or 
brown, black or white."6 In several of his wartime speeches he 
sought to equate the effort to oppose the racialist aims of the 
Axis powers with the fight for racial equality in the United 
States, thereby demonstrating his belief that the persistence 
of racism at home (while America pledged itself to destroy 
racial hatred abroad) ensured that war aims and colonialism 
would remain mired in the question of race on the homefront. 
Shortly before his resignation he sought to make a connection 
between the effort to destroy fascism abroad and continued 
reform and expanded civil liberties at home, publicly linking 
American attempts to liberate those living under colonial rule 
and Axis domination with the struggle for civil rights and
5 in May 1942, Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People met with 
Welles and suggested the president call a  "Pacific Conference" along the lines of the Churchill-Roosevelt 
meeting off the coast of Newfoundland. White proposed Roosevelt meet with Indian leaders such as  Nehru and 
Gandhi and a  Chinese delegation led by Chiang Kai-shek, and proclaim a  "Pacific Charter" dedicated to ending 
colonial rule in Asia. He further suggested that a  delegation led by Wendell Willkie and including "a 
distinguished American Negro whose complexion unmistakably identifies him a s  being a cobred man" should 
proceed to India and proclaim U.S. solidarity with the Indian struggle under the aegis of the Pacific Charter. In 
light of Hull's steadfast opposition to such a summit Welles suggested to the president that he tell White that it 
was not "the appropriate moment for the United States individually to undertake an effort of this character." 
Nonetheless, Welles's discussion with White no doubt reinforced in Welles's mind the connection many were 
making between Washington's policy toward colonial rule and the persistence of racism on the homefront. 
Welles to Roosevelt, May 22, 1942 and the attached Walter White to Roosevelt, May 4, 1942, box 151, folder 
14, Welles papers, FDRL. The role of African Americans in U.S. policy toward colonialism has been the subject 
of renewed interest of late, most notably Penny M. Von Eschen's Race Against Empire: Black Americans and 
Anticolonialism. 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
6 "Address Before the Foreign Policy Association of New York," by Sumner Welles, October 16,1943, speech 
files, box 196, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
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better treatment for America minorities.7
Welles's views on the European colonial empires did not 
extend to Washington's relations with its Latin American 
neighbors, who were usually seen in the context of the Monroe 
Doctrine. While Welles's opposition to imperialism in Africa, 
the Near East and the Far East has been acknowledged, his 
record of "informal imperialism" in the western hemisphere must 
be conceded. Like Wilson before him, Welles saw no
contradiction between his opposition to European-style
colonialism and Washington's perpetuation of a virtual 
"informal empire" in the western hemisphere. Welles saw clear 
distinctions between the behavior of the European powers in 
their empires and the U.S. sphere of influence in Latin
America. Unlike the imperialism of other nations, Welles 
assumed that many of the U.S. interventions sought to promote 
the protection, happiness and well-being of the Latin American 
peoples. Furthermore, he disingenuously justified much of 
Washington's historic interference in the hemisphere by arguing 
that, unlike the more formal colonial empires of other nations, 
the U.S. was merely interested in maintaining its own security. 
Welles thus justified interference in the region aimed at 
bolstering the kind of hemispheric order Washington desired, 
while seeking to keep other powers out. And with regard to the 
question of self-determination, his own experiences in Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic made America's support for such a
principle look at best ambiguous, and his support for 
dictatorships throughout the region made his wartime 
pronouncements about the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter 
look highly selective and hypocritical.8
Nonetheless, Welles attacked the colonial "status quo" in 
several of his wartime addresses. This would not be a war, he
7 "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, Address at the Arlington National Amphitheater, May 
30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL; The New York Tmes. May 31, 1942; 
"Commencement Exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes," by Sumner Welles, May 31, 1943, 
speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
8 Welles once wrote that he believed that U.S. interference in the affairs of other nations in the hemisphere 
amounted to mere "friendly advice" and that "thinking" Latin Americans would welcome Washington's 
interference in their affairs. See, for example, Sumner Welles, "Is America Imperialistic?" Atlantic Monthly. 
September 1924; a s  well a s  "Joint Action in the Americas," by Sumner Welles, February 16,1942, address to 
the opening session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro, speech files, box 195, folder 4, 
Welles papers, FDRL; and Sumner Welles, "A New Era in Pan-American Relations," Foreign Affairs. April 1937.
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suggested, to merely resurrect or enlarge the empires of the 
victors. He assumed that the British, by agreeing to the self- 
determination clause of the Atlantic Charter, had 
unintentionally lent moral strength and legitimacy to the 
question of anti-colonialism. Welles thus used his public 
pronouncements to give the self-determination clause of the 
charter a more universal application covering the colonial 
empires. To many British officials the self-determination 
clause applied only to the conquered nations of Europe and had 
little to do with the British Empire. But to Welles self- 
determination meant nothing if not broadened to encompass the 
European empires.9
Welles was by no means the only American to challenge the 
colonial status quo during the war. The war had emboldened 
opponents of colonialism throughout the United States. Both 
Vice President Henry Wallace and the 1940 Republican nominee 
Wendell Willkie called for immediate independence in the 
colonial world and powerful congressional voices from the west 
such as Senators Tom Connally and Robert LaFollette, Jr. urged 
President Roosevelt to put more pressure on the British over 
the issue of colonialism. Powerful news organs such as Henry 
Luce’s Time-Life empire also jumped on the anti-colonial 
bandwagon. 10
The British resented American anticolonial views, and 
tension between London and Washington over colonialism played a 
greater role in the Second World War than it had in the First. 
Few issues so threatened the Anglo-American wartime alliance as 
did the tensions created by the colonial question. "I am not 
going to accept less favourable terms from the other German 
Willkie than I could get from Hitler," Churchill declared,
9 "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," by Sumner Welles, November 11, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, 
Welles papers, FDRL; "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, Address at the Arlington National 
Amphitheater, May 30. 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL; "The Atlantic Charter and 
National Independence," November 13,1942, box 13, Notter files, National Archives.
10 Robert Dallek, The American Stvle of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 126-127; Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the 
Decolonization of the British Empire. 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 198. In a  1942 
"Open letter to the people of England." Henry Luce's Life magazine added: "One thing we are sure we are not 
fighting for is to hold the British Empire together. We don't like to put the matter so  bluntly, but we don't want 
you to have any illusions. If your strategists are planning a  war to hold the British Empire together they will 
sooner or later find themselves strategizing all alone . . .  In the light of what you are doing in India, how do you 
expect us to talk about 'principles' and look our soldiers in the eye." Life. October 12,1942.
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while Leopold Amery, the British Secretary of State for India, 
added that he would prefer Hitler's "New Order" to Hull's "Free 
Trade." Nor did the British accept Washington's high-minded 
justification for supporting self-determination. According to 
Anthony Eden, Roosevelt hoped the colonies, "once free of their 
masters will become politically and economically dependent upon 
the United States." Other British officials saw the Americans 
as "economic imperialists" or "economic expansionists" who 
sought to supplant British interests throughout the world.11 The 
British had good reason to feel insecure about their imperial 
possessions. Compounding the problem of American opposition, 
Japanese propaganda efforts in the Far East sought to 
capitalize on allied failures by emphasizing the racial aspects 
of colonial rule, calling for an "Asia for Asians" and a 
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."^
Welles sought to develop a broad policy to counter these 
Japanese initiatives. One important component of his colonial 
strategy was the acceleration of independence for the 
Philippines. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 made the 
Philippines a self-governing commonwealth, with full 
independence scheduled for 1946. In the wake of the Japanese 
invasion of the islands the United States formally pledged that 
the Philippines would be independent immediately upon its 
liberation from Japan, and Philippine President Manuel Quezon 
set up a government-in-exile in the Shoreham Hotel in 
Washington. Welles maintained close contact with Quezon and his 
entourage. The under secretary sought to make the Philippines a 
"case study" for criticizing the other colonial empires. He 
assumed that America's treatment of the Philippines would set a 
useful example for the rest of the world and he convinced the 
president to allow the Philippines to sign the Declaration by
11 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 125: Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The 
Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 513.
12 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (New York: 
Longman, 1991, paper), 149-150.
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the United Nations,13
Welles assumed that a similar approach to India would 
provide a boost for the allied cause.14 He understood that 
resentment against the British ran deep in India and he sought 
to ally U.S. war aims with those of the colonial peoples.^ In 
this vein, President Roosevelt13 suggested to Churchill at the 
height of the fighting in Burma in March 1942 that radical 
change in the British Empire "might cause the people [of India] 
to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British 
Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, 
together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against 
chaotic revolution."17 Thus, when London subsequently sent Sir 
Stafford Cripps to India in an attempt to reach a settlement 
with the Congress leaders by proposing dominion status for 
India, Roosevelt simultaneously dispatched to India Colonel 
Louis Johnson, a former assistant secretary of war.13 Roosevelt 
sought to demonstrate America's commitment to reducing 
political tensions on the subcontinent, but also to show 
solidarity with the aspirations of the Indian people.w The
13 p  document 240, "Official Statements and Views Pertaining to the Administration of Dependent Areas After 
the War," July 12,1943, box 57 [all planning documents and planning minutes are from the Notter files, National 
Archives, Record Group 59, unless otherwise noted]; Hamilton and Hornbeck to Welles, April 14, 1942, FRUS. 
I, 902-903; Welles to Roosevelt April 17,1942, FRUS. I, 903-904; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New 
York: Harper, 1944), 298-299.
14 This despite the fact that Welles was initially reluctant to tell British officials what course they should 
pursue with regard to India. Welles's impatience with British policy in India steadily increased after the United 
States entered the war, when many British actions might thus be interpreted as having Washington's tacit 
approval. For an account of Welles's earlier hesitation to press the British, see, for example, Gary R. Hess, 
America Encounters India. 1941-1947 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 25-31, 45,181.
15 Welles and other U.S. officials had already pressured the British to allow India to sign the Declaration of the 
United Nations a s  a  separate entity. Welles to Roosevelt, April 13, 1942. FRUS. I, 1942, 870-872; Welles to 
Roosevelt, April 17,1942, FRUS. 1,1942, 903-904; P document 64, "India," August 27,1942, box 56.
16 For Roosevelt's views on colonialism see, for example, Warren F. Kimball and Fred E. Pollock, "'In Search of 
Monsters to Destroy': Roosevelt and Colonialism," in Kimball's The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime 
Statesm an (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 127-157; a s  well a s  John J. Sbrega, "The 
Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal," Political Science Quarterly, vol.101, no. 1 
(Spring 1986), 65-84.
17 CAB 66/22 WP(42)118 "India," March 11, 1942, PRO; Roosevelt to Churchill, March 10, 1942, FRUS. I, 
1942, 615-616.
18 For the reasoning behind Johnson's mission, see, for example, Kenton J. Clymer, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 57, no. 3 (August 
1988), 261-284. Johnson's mission is also discussed in Venkataramani and Shrivastava, Quit India. 96-136; 
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a  Kind: The United States. Britain, and the War Against Japan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 236-246; and Warren Kimball, The Juggler. 134-136.
19 p  document 64, "India," August 27, 1942, box 56; P document 218, "Agenda for the meeting of April 3, 
1943: India," box 193, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL
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British deeply resented the presence of Colonel Johnson, for it 
appeared Roosevelt had sent an envoy to mediate between the 
British and the Indians. Furthermore, some British officials 
suspected that the true intent of American interference was to 
secure a large share of the Indian postwar market.20
Welles originally wanted to take up the Indian question at 
the Atlantic Conference, but he instead had to accept the vague 
declaration on self-determination. But with much of colonial 
Asia overrun by the Japanese in early 1942, Welles thought 
India an ideal place for the allied powers to act affirmatively 
in the name of self-determination. In April 1942 Welles 
expressed to the president his hope that the allies would 
support self-government throughout the colonial world. "In 
brief, what I had in mind," Welles wrote to Roosevelt, "was to 
recommend the announcement of a broad policy of liberation, 
insofar as the peculiar circumstances covering the Netherlands 
East Indies and Burma might make such an announcement possible, 
. . . unfortunately, the breakdown of the Indian negotiations 
eliminates, at least temporarily, that possibility."21
A few days later Welles sent the president a second 
proposal further advocating "a broader and more far-reaching 
policy" of liberation in the colonial worlds
I hope that the opportunity may be presented when the United States can 
join with the other nations directly interested in the Pacific regions in 
announcing their common determination to restore their liberties to all of 
the peoples whose territory has been invaded by Japan and to recognize the 
right to full independence of the Philippines and Korea and perhaps, if 
conditions seem to make it wise, Indochina. As I said in that letter, the 
reaching of an agreement for the dominion status or independence of India 
would have offered an admirable springboard for a declaration of this 
kind. It may be, however, that some other favorable opportunity will be 
presented before long for a broad announcement of this kind which would 
really imply that the United Nations were joined together in a war for 
liberation, namely, a war to end i m p e r i a l i s m . 22
20 John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War. 1944-1949 (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1993), 5.
21 Welles to Roosevelt April 13,1942, FRUS. 1,1942, 870-872.
22 Welles to Roosevelt, April 17, 1942, FRUS. I, 1942, 903-904.
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Welles publicly articulated his desire to define the 
Atlantic Charter as part of the struggle against imperialism 
during his Memorial Day Address at Arlington National Cemetery, 
where he described the present conflict as a "people's war" and 
called for complete liberation in the colonial world.23 it was 
perhaps the most far-reaching public pronouncement on the 
subject of colonialism issued by a senior American official 
during the Second World War and it was consistent with Welles's 
view that colonialism was anachronistic and reactionary and 
posed a threat to his vision of a new order in the postwar 
world.
The following day, the New York Times ran a front-page 
story on the speech, highlighting Welles's comments on 
colonialism with the pronouncement: "Age of Imperialism
Ended."24 playwright Robert Sherwood, who also served as 
Welles's ally in the Office of War Information, arranged to 
have the speech broadcast in English and numerous Indian 
dialects over All India Radio and transcribed in more than 500 
newspapers throughout the subcontinent.25 But Welles's Memorial 
Day address immediately met with disapproval from Cordell Hull, 
who thought it premature and too far-reaching. Hull later 
claimed that Welles had acted independently and had never 
cleared the speech with him or the president. Hull thought 
Welles had misrepresented his views and was moving dangerously 
close to causing a breach between Washington and London. Hull 
thus reacted on July 23 with a radio address of his own on the 
question of colonialism, where he pointedly refrained from 
proclaiming an end of imperialism and tempered his remarks by 
saying that independence would come only to those who were 
prepared for it. "It has been our purpose in the past —  and 
will remain our purpose in the future —  to use the full 
measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by 
all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it
23 "The Realization of a  Great Vision," by Sumner Welles, Address at the Arlington National Amphitheater, May
30,1942, speech files, box 195, box 5, Welles papers, FDRL.
24 The New York Times. May 31,1942.
25 Sherwood to Welles, June 25,1942, box 83, folder 11, Welles papers, FDRL; Robert Aura Smith, New Delhi, 
to Sherwood, Washington, cable #145-149, no date, box 83, folder 11, Welles papers, FDRL
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and ready for it."26
* * *
Welles warned the president in July 1942 that India was on 
the brink of chaos. To head off the approaching crisis, Welles 
suggested that the United States and China send representatives 
to New Delhi to serve as intermediaries between the Indian 
Congress officials and the British Government. He thought such 
action "might serve in bringing about some satisfactory 
arrangement which would hold during the war period and could in 
any event, in view of the critical nature of the situation now 
existing, do no harm." But Roosevelt feared Churchill's 
reaction to Welles's proposal, particularly because of the 
inclusion of the Chinese, whom Churchill distrusted. 2? The 
British sought to ensure that the United States did not 
interfere in the Indian problem. When the Maharajah Holkar, of 
the once powerful Holkar dynasty of Indore, wrote to Roosevelt 
endorsing Welles's plan for U.S. and Chinese intervention in 
the current impasse, British authorities intercepted the 
letter. When Welles protested the matter in a subsequent 
conversation with Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Minister in 
Washington, the British diplomat described the Maharajah as a 
"psychopathic case" to whom no importance should be 
attributed.26 Nevertheless, the British became increasingly 
sensitive to every nuance of American statements about India, 
at one point protesting to Welles about several comments in the 
press implying that the administration sought to pressure "both 
sides" in the Indian crisis.29
Not easily deterred by British protests, Welles had the 
planners take up the question of India in greater detail. They 
proceeded to discuss the fate not only of India, but of all the
26 Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation (Washington: Department of State, 1950), 109; Cordell 
Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1228, 1230, 1484-1485; Louis, 
Imperialism at Bav. 175-77.
27 w elles to Roosevelt, July 29,1942, FRUS. 1942 ,1, 699-700; Roosevelt to Churchill, July 29,1942. FRUS. 
1942, I, 700.
28 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, June 1,1942. FRUS.I. 666-667.
29 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Campbell, "Situation in India," August 18,1942, box 164, 
folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
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empires, in an uninhibited and informal atmosphere. Welles 
understood that their views would necessarily clash with London 
—  more so now because the United States had expanding 
interests around the world. Welles inaugurated the discussion 
by asking: "what has been the result of the situation we are 
now contemplating? With few exceptions there has been 
exploitation by European powers with very little if any 
advantage to the peoples concerned."30
As Welles had predicted, his survey of the colonial world 
coincided with the biggest civil disturbance in the British 
Empire since the Indian Army Mutiny of 1857. The so-called 
"Quit India" rebellion reached its height in August 1942, 
leading to the internment of many of the top Indian nationalist 
leaders.3i Yet Churchill maintained his strong aversion to 
negotiating with Congress officials. This contributed to a 
delicate division of opinion within the United States, where 
the Indian struggle enjoyed some sympathy. To many, the crisis 
in India looked like another example of the excesses of 
Imperial rule.33 The crisis also captured the attention of the 
American public because U.S. troops now served on the 
subcontinent helping with the resupply of China. Welles 
understood that the presence of American troops in India might 
be interpreted as support for British imperial aims and he 
worried that upheaval in India would disrupt the allied war 
effort and degenerate into an Indian "Easter Rebellion."33
Welles closely monitored the situation in India. He saw
30 p  minutes 21, August 8,1942.
31 s e e  Venkataramani and Shrivastava, Quit India. 249-258.
32 “This war can be lost in India," the American journalist and social reformer Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in a 
letter to the New York Times. "From the very beginning of the war in Asia it has been the greater danger that this 
struggle would degenerate into a war of the colored races against the white." The noted British biologist and 
writer, Julian Huxley, added: "The world's conscience is beginning to grow a little uneasy over the fact of one 
country possessing another country a s  a  colony, just a s  it grew uneasy a  century or so ago over the fact of 
one human being possessing another a s  a  slave." See "Summary of Opinion and Ideas on International 
Postwar Problems," September 9, 1942, Division of Special Research, box 190, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, 
folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL. While Washington was somewhat familiar with the question of Hindu nationalism, 
much less was known about Muslim nationalism in India. See Betty Miller Unterberger, "American Views of 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Pakistan Liberation Movement," Diplomatic History, no. 5, vol. 4 (Fall 1981), 313- 
336.
33 New York Times. August 13, 1942; CAB 65/27(42)109 August 10, 1942, PRO; CAB 65/27(42)113 August 
17, 1942, PRO; P document 113, "British Views with Respect to Colonies and Dependent Areas," October 2, 
1942, box 56; P document 154, "The British Empire: Empire Institutions," December 9, 1942, box 57; Louis, 
Imperialism at Bav. 8; P minutes 21, August 8 ,1942.
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the Indian question as much more than a petty quarrel between 
British and Indian statesmen. To Welles, it was part of a 
larger experiment in the complete liquidation of imperialism. 
Welles framed the debate by telling the other planners that 
political consciousness was sprouting up throughout the entire 
colonial world and that the United States should attempt to 
lead these movements, rather than follow in the wake of chaos.34 
Welles and the planners believed Britain sought to pursue 
its traditional strategy of "divide and conquer" in India by 
pitting the Muslim minority against the Hindu majority. Several 
planners saw this as just another example of a centuries-old 
British strategy, once employed during the American Revolution. 
The planners pointed out that the American colonists had 
succeeded against similar odds after the British departed 
because they reached an agreement among themselves and, most 
importantly, on their own terms. Some argued that it would be 
far better to allow India to work out its own destiny in a 
similar manner, by trial and error, and perhaps even through 
bloodshed. The prospect of war between Muslims and Hindus was 
real enough to the planners, but a colonial war between India 
and Britain seemed a possibility far more threatening to long­
term U.S. interests in Asia.35
In the fall of 1942 Roosevelt decided to dispatch William 
Phillips to India as a special envoy. Phillips would hold 
ambassadorial rank while on his mission, a significant 
designation in a nation that was still a British possession. 
Welles hoped the mission might "make it possible for the Indian 
people to know of our sympathy while at the same time avoiding 
even the semblance of friction with the British. "36 Welles 
continued to believe that the best course the British could 
pursue in India would be a pledge of independence, much like 
the United States had given to the Philippines. But Welles had 
misgivings about Phillips's qualifications for the mission, 
because he thought Phillips "soft" on the question of British
34 P minutes 21, August 8,1942; P minutes 22, August 15,1942; P minutes 51, April 10,1943, box 55.
35 ibid; P minutes 37, December 12, 1942. Welles never believed the Muslim population of the subcontinent 
would be able to build an economically and politically viable state. See Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? 
(New York, Harper, 1946), 325-327.
36 Welles to Mrs. William Phillips, November 3,1942, box 82, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL.
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colonialism and too much of an Anglophile.37 Welles thus sought 
to convince Hull and the president to reconsider the 
appointment. Welles hoped that if they learned of Phillips's 
hidebound views he might be recalled or, at the very least, 
given firm instructions to avoid siding with the British. "As 
you know," Welles wrote to Hull, "Mr. Phillips has not the 
slightest familiarity with the Indian picture. He has no 
knowledge whatever of present conditions in India, and his 
views on the subject, I assume, must be limited to the general 
impressions he has been given in London. In view of the 
tremendous importance of this question . . .  it would seem to 
me that Mr. Phillips ought to be brought back to Washington for 
full discussion of the policies of this Government in order 
that he may be intimately familiar with the President's views 
and those of this Department before he sets out on his 
journey."33 Indeed, Phillips was initially flattered by his 
acceptance by British officials. Once Phillips arrived in 
India, however, he became sympathetic to the cause of Indian 
self-rule and, much to London's displeasure, he sought to 
mediate between Congress leaders and British officials.39
Welles and his fellow planners knew the British would 
steadfastly oppose complete independence. They thus briefly 
discussed placing India under some form of international 
trusteeship to help smooth its transition to independence, but 
they soon realized there was little they could actually do 
beyond gentle prodding. Furthermore, they faced the daunting 
realization that any sudden change in the current status of 
India might mean a tremendous loss of British and, by
37 For an account arguing that Phillips was not as  ignorant of Indian affairs as Welles assumed, see  Kenton J. 
Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-1945," 
Diplomatic History, no. 8, vol. 1 (Winter 1984), 17, 19. Nevertheless, Clymer writes that "someone less likely 
than William Phillips to sympathize with the Indian nationalist leaders, much less with the m asses, could 
scarcely be imagined."
38 Welles to Hull, November 7, 1942, box 82, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL. Welles's fears may have been 
confirmed in a letter he received from Phillips just prior to his departure for India. "I am not a  miracle man," 
Phillips warned Welles, "and I only hope that the Department fully appreciates that they have put up to me a job 
which nobody but a  miracle man could accomplish. In reading my instructions very carefully I am wondering 
whether those in the Department who have prepared them fully realized the terrific internal dissensions, 
religious and political, which have gone on for hundreds of years and which make the situation so  wholly 
different from that in the Philippines, which the instructions refer to a s  an example to be followed in India." See 
Phillips to Welles, December 10,1942, box 82, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL.
39 Kenton Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips," ibid, 21 -35.
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extension, allied, power and prestige in Asia. It might also 
sever China's support link with the United States through the 
supply base in India. London's repeated threats that any change 
in the status of India would upset the allied cause had 
apparently carried some weight with the planners.4o
Welles asked the committee what other options they could 
pursue with regard to India. Norman Davis warned Welles that 
they did not know enough about the subject to act 
independently, adding the whole matter was "loaded with 
dynamite" that could disrupt wartime relations with Britain and 
undermine the war effort. Davis suggested the administration 
merely encourage Britain to make a stronger commitment to 
India's eventual independence. Welles conceded that any 
gestures on behalf of India which undermined the allied cause 
would obviously not promote the interests of the United 
States.4i The planners wanted to see change come to India and 
desired close and friendly relations with a future postwar 
government there, but they feared doing anything beyond gentle 
persuasion to alter the situation on the subcontinent. While 
they reaffirmed their commitment to self-determination, the 
fire-eating rhetoric of the spring of 1942 had clearly e b b e d . 42 
This shift laid bare their growing emphasis on wartime 
priorities at the expense of liberation, but also foreshadowed 
a continuing problem Washington would face with regard to other 
colonial areas in the postwar e r a . 43
* * *
Welles also looked to the rest of Asia to demonstrate the
40 P minutes 37, December 12,1942, box 55.
41 ibid.
42 p  document 218, “Agenda for the meeting of April 3,1943: India," box 193, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL.
43 See, for example, the account by Lloyd C. Gardner, “The Atlantic Charter: Idea and Reality, 1942-1945," in 
Brinkley and Facey-Crowther, eds., The Atlantic Charter (London: Macmillan, 1994), 61-62. A year after 
Welles's departure from the state department he allegedly leaked to Drew Pearson classified materials 
charging that the administration was missing a valuable opportunity to lead the forces of nationalism in Asia. 
Pearson 's column touched off a  storm of protest from British officials sensitive to the public revelation that 
U.S. officials had recommended postwar independence for India and the establishment of an interim coalition 
government in wartime. See Drew Pearson, "Confessions of an S.O.B.," Saturday Evening P ost November 3, 
1956; a s  well a s  Roosevelt to Caroline Phillips, August 30, 1944, PSF, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Welles also 
criticized British handling of the Indian question in his books The Time For Decision and Where Are We 
Heading? See Time For Decision. 301 -302; Where Are We Heading?. 324-328.
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U.S. commitment to the liberation of colonial peoples. He thus 
led the planners on a broad survey of the colonial situation in 
the entire Far East, while keeping in mind ways the United 
States might shape a "new order" in the region after the war. 
Welles sought a peaceful and orderly postwar Far East which 
would be receptive to U.S. interests. He thought the great 
powers had exploited their colonies in Asia and that the 
dependent peoples had received nothing in return. He suggested 
the United States "must do more than say we hope these powers 
do something about their territories." The planners thus worked 
from the consensus that the United States should actively use 
its influence for the "liberation of the peoples of the Far 
East. "44
The war had forced the United States to reexamine its 
interests in many areas of the world, particularly the Far 
East, and Welles believed French possessions in Asia a major 
obstacle to a new order in the region. The French empire had no 
place in Welles's postwar designs. He had already proposed 
France be completely disarmed at the end of the war as part of 
his aim to demote France from the ranks of the great powers. 
Stripping France of its possessions would complement this 
strategy and might make possible an eventual American takeover 
of French naval bases in Indochina and Africa. In Indochina, 
for example, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services aided 
Vietnamese nationalism, including Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh, which 
was seen as the most effective group resisting the Japanese 
within Indochina.45 More importantly (and somewhat surprisingly 
in light of later events) Washington assumed that Ho would 
provide the United States with a useful ally in Indochina to 
carry forward American interests in the postwar period. Ho 
appealed to the Americans by showcasing Indochina as a "fertile 
field for American capital and enterprise" and holding out the 
possibility of a future American naval base at Camranh Bay, a
44 P minutes 21, August 8,1942, box 55.
45 p  minutes 4, March 28, 1942; Welles, Where Are We Heading?. 287; P minutes 38, December 19, 1942; 
Welles to Leger, November 26, 1943, with enclosure "Our Obligation to the People of France," by Sumner 
Welles, box 89, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; P document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of 
France," December 18, 1942, box 57; P document 158a, "Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future 
Status of France and the French Empire," January 29, 1944, box 57; George C. Herring, America's Longest 
War: The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979,1986, second edition, paper), 
7-10.
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location the American planners considered the fourth best naval 
site in the world.46
Welles believed Indochina's strategic importance had been 
strikingly demonstrated by Japan's use of the region as a 
launching point for further conquests. Before the war, 
Washington's interest in Southeast Asia had been growing 
steadily, with the volume of trade increasing throughout the 
1930s and the U.S. importing greater amounts of natural rubber. 
But the Japanese takeover had jolted Washington's attention to 
the region's importance as a producer of foodstuffs and raw 
materials and as a key strategic point near the major shipping 
routes of East Asia. The Japanese occupation of the colony was 
a major factor in sparking the Pacific war. At the time of the 
Japanese takeover Welles publicly denounced the French for 
violating the Wilsonian prohibition against territorial changes 
without the consent of those affected. Welles feared postwar 
instability in Indochina might destabilize the strategic 
equilibrium of the Far East, threatening the sea routes between 
America's trading partners. Southeast Asia continued to be the 
world's largest producer of natural rubber, as well as an 
important source of oil, tin, tungsten and other strategic 
materials. Welles believed control of this region would be 
crucial to the reconstruction of the postwar world.4?
Welles said he believed the United States could not bring 
itself to a peace table without having ended French dominance 
of Indochina. He and his colleagues felt strongly that France 
had lost its claim to Indochina when French authorities allowed 
the Japanese to occupy the region. "There is a great moral 
question involved here and it is a question that will shape and 
color the history of the world after this war is over," Welles 
told the committee. "To get right down to the question, what 
inherent right has France to territory which she seized, 
sometimes by war, as recently as the 1880s, any more than has
46 p  minutes 4, March 28, 1942; P document 33, "French Indochina," August 4, 1942, box 56; Herring, 
America's Longest War. 7-10; E document 77 and T document 283, "Preliminary Draft: the Economic Relations 
of Indo-China," March 23,1943, box 63.
47 p  minutes 21, August 8, 1942; P document 33, "French Indochina," August 4 ,1942, box 56; P document 
158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of France," December 18, 1942, box 57; P document 158a, 
"Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future Status of France and the French Empire," January 29, 
1944, box 57; E document 77 and T document 283, "Preliminary Draft: the Economic Relations of Indo-China," 
March 23,1943, box 63, Notter Files.
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Japan to seize by force certain territories of China which she 
has now occupied? The only difference is in point of time."48
Welles sought to make sharp distinctions between the 
colonial practices of each European nation and he had somewhat 
different views with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. He 
told the committee that he approved of the way the Netherlands 
government-in-exile had lately decided to handle its colonial 
affairs.«  He explained that the Dutch diplomat Eelco Van 
Kieffens had recently told him that a new constitution had been 
prepared to extend Dutch rights and responsibilities to the 
inhabitants of the Netherlands East Indies. How this was to be 
reconciled with self-determination, Welles never explained. 
Most importantly to Welles, the Dutch also pledged that the 
postwar Netherlands East Indies would be open to American trade 
and influence. Throughout the war, the state department would 
thus maintain better relations with the Dutch government-in- 
exile over the issue of colonialism than with any other power, 
partly due to Welles's high opinion of Van Kief fens and the 
Dutch pledge to honor the open door, so Nonetheless, Welles 
feared that unless serious reforms were undertaken, the present 
situation in the Netherlands East Indies, where Dutch and 
Chinese landlords dominated an impoverished indigenous 
population, would lead to postwar instability.51 The committee's 
staff produced studies underscoring the importance of the 
colony's rich resources for the postwar reconstruction of the 
world, focusing particularly on oil, as the East Indies ranked 
fifth among the oil-producing regions of the world. The 
planners also noted that the colony possessed strategically
48 P minutes 21, August 8,1942.
49 P minutes 21, August 8 ,1942. In early 1944 Roosevelt would tell Halifax that the Dutch empire "had done a 
good job but the French were hopeless." See Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," American 
Historical Review, vol. 80, no. 5 (December 1975), 1285.
50 Millions of Indonesians, however, disagreed with the state department's rose-colored views of the Dutch 
colonial masters, and Sukarno's nationalist anti-colonial movement had much public support. A quarter-of-a- 
million Indonesians voluntarily worked for the Japanese  war effort and the ferocity with which much of the 
population opposed the return of the Dutch authorities at the end of the war demonstrated the depth of ttieir 
loathing for continued European rule. During the Indonesian war for independence (1945-1949) which followed 
the war, Van Kleffens vigorously opposed United Nations attempts to mediate between the Dutch and the 
Indonesian nationalists. See, for example, Robert J. McMahon, "Anglo-American Diplomacy and the 
Reoccupation of the Netherlands East Indies," Diplomatic History, vol. 2, no. 1 (Winter 1978), 1-23.
51 Minutes of the Advisory Committee, February 12, 1942, box 54, Notter files; P document 42, "Netherlands 
East Indies," August 14,1942, box 56; P minutes 21, August 8 ,1942; P minutes 22, August 15,1942.
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important bauxite deposits (the source of aluminum). 
Furthermore, the planners called attention to the fact that the 
region, one of the most densely populated areas of the world, 
occupied a strategically crucial location between the Indian 
and Pacific oceans, a position that would be vital to regional 
security in the postwar p e r i o d .52
Welles also desired to accelerate an end to more than four 
centuries of Portuguese rule in Asia. He reserved his deepest 
scorn for the Portuguese colonies of Macao and East Timor which 
he described as the "worst" examples of colonial exploitation. 
He suggested they be forced into a system of international 
trusteeship, or at least have Macao handed over to China. To 
Welles, the horrible conditions in the Portuguese colonies 
should not "be continued in any healthy or reasonably logical 
w o r l d . "53 The members feared London's opposition to such a 
radical approach to Macao and East Timor and it was suggested 
that every effort be made to pressure the British to cooperate 
in dismantling the Portuguese e m p i r e .54
On the Korean Peninsula, Welles suggested every effort 
should be made to establish an independent nation at the end of 
the war. To many of the planners, Korea had a sentimental 
appeal, having been subjected to Japanese colonialism longer 
than anywhere else. Made a Japanese protectorate in 1905, and 
annexed outright in 1910, many planners could recall with some 
regret that in 1919 Korea tried to persuade the conferees at 
Paris to recognize its right to self-determination. But Japan 
had been an ally during the Great War and the peacemakers 
ignored Korean p l e a s .55
In the eyes of Welles and the planners, Korea's
52 p minutes 21, August 8, 1942; P document 42, "Netherlands East Indies," August 14, 1942, box 56; P 
document 43, "Indonesian or Malaysian Federation," August 11, 1942, box 56; P document 37, "British 
Borneo," August 14, 1942, box 56; P document 106, "Netherlands Indies, Now Under Japanese Occupation," 
September 18,1942, box 56.
53 p minutes 21, August 8, 1942; P document 40, "Macao," August 14, 1942, box 56; P document 41, 
"Portuguese Timor," August 14,1942, box 56.
54 p  minutes 21, August 8 ,1942; P document 35, "British Malaya," August 14,1942, box 56; T document 375, 
"The Problem of British Malaya: Possible Solutions," October 13,1943, box 65.
55 Furthermore, the 1905 Taft-Katsura agreem ent had already affirmed Washington's recognition of Japan 's 
domination of Korea in return for Tokyo's pledge to respect U.S. control in the Philippines. See Jongsuk Chay, 
"The Taft-Katsura Memorandum Reconsidered," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 37, no. 3 (August 1968), 321- 
326; a s  well a s  Ralph Eldin Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship 
Years. 1900-1908 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975).
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industrialization in the 1930s, coupled with its rich mineral 
resources and extensive coastline, made it an important 
strategic point in the Far E a s t . 56 Welles had already discussed 
with the president the possibility of creating a Korean 
government-in-exile. He also contemplated the creation of a 
Korean guerrilla army to sabotage the Japanese war ef f o r t .57 
Welles suggested that the questions posed by places like Korea 
needed to be discussed in a more systematic manner, at which 
point he introduced the subject of international trusteeships, 
where regional boards would oversee the administration of 
dependent areas after the war. The details of such a plan,
Welles added, would be worked out in his subcommittee on 
international organization. 58
While debating what to do if the colonial powers sought to 
recover their lost possessions, Welles proclaimed "the
liberation of peoples should be the main principle" guiding
American policy and that those who could not yet govern 
themselves should be placed under international trusteeship. 
"Many of these peoples cannot undertake self-government at this 
time," Welles added. "This is where trusteeship comes in. The 
United Nations should endeavor to develop the ability of these 
peoples to govern themselves as soon as possible."59
Welles introduced the topic of trusteeship at a political 
subcommittee meeting in August 1942. He warned the planners 
that if they allowed the colonial powers to maintain their
possessions, it would not only dash the hopes of the dependent 
peoples of the world, but would also undermine the U.S. aim of 
fostering a new world order. Worse still, it would place the 
United States on the side of the colonial masters, thus 
damaging America’s long-term interests in the third world. On 
the other hand, Welles continued, it would be equally wrong to
56 Jam es I Matray, "An End to Indifference: America's Korea Policy During World War II." Diplomatic History, 
vol. 2, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 181-196; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942; P document 123-b, "International 
Trusteeship," December 8, 1942, box 56; P document 213, Agenda for meeting of March 13,1943, box 57; S 
document 18a, "Conditions for Japanese  Surrender to the United Nations," March 13, 1943; E document 155, 
Japanese Postwar Economic Considerations," July 21,1943, box 82, Notter files.
57 Welles to Roosevelt, April 13, 1942, FRUS. I, 1942, 870-872.
58 p minutes 20, August 1,1942.
59 p minutes 21, August 8,1942.
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insist that at the end of the war all dependent peoples be 
"turned loose to their own devices." This would lead to 
instability, and worse, chaos. Welles said much of the colonial 
world was not yet ready for complete independence and that they 
did "not possess adequate economic resources, political 
capacity, nor education." "After a while," Welles added, "there 
would be anarchy in all of the areas with sad results for world 
peace."60
Welles thus explained that international trusteeships 
offered the best middle ground. He elaborated that the world 
organization would assume responsibility for trusteeship to 
ensure that "these peoples are given certain rights through 
continuing supervision and inspection." That the United States 
would probably be the dominant power in the new world 
organization, and thus have a powerful voice in determining the 
course of trusteeships, was a given. Welles hoped trusteeships 
would save the colonial world "from the otherwise inevitable 
result that the peoples will be exploited by the colonial
powers." He desired a system that would teach the rudiments of 
self-government and advance dependent peoples toward 
independence, while ensuring that the raw materials of the 
colonial world would no longer be subject to the exploitation 
of the imperial powers, making such resources more available 
for strategic purposes after the war.ei The planners made it 
clear that the United States was committed to eventual
independence for the colonial peoples, but perhaps not because 
of the ideals expressed by Welles in his Memorial Day address. 
Welles and his fellow planners hoped that reform of the
colonial world would once and for all destroy autarchic 
economic systems. They proposed that international trusteeships 
should be established not only to assist the dependent peoples 
to attain political maturity and self-government, but also to 
promote the development and use of their economic resources in 
the interest of the rest of the world. Better still,
trusteeship would work hand in glove with the open door by 
eliminating colonial monopolies in dependent areas.
60 p  minutes 22, August 15, 1942. Welles also provides a detailed account of his views on international 
trusteeship in his Time For Decision. 300-305,383-384.
61 ibid.
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Welles wanted to avoid the perils of the old mandates 
system, which he believed had become a mere smokescreen for 
continued imperialism. He believed the mandatory powers had 
exploited the territories entrusted to them and had done 
nothing to prepare the way for eventual independence.62 He hoped 
international trusteeships might offer a safe middle ground 
between continued colonial rule and complete freedom. 
Trusteeships might promote a more evolutionary approach to the 
quest for independence and a more regulated and controlled use 
of colonial resources for international purposes.62
Unlike the mandates, where the mandatory powers had only 
to make annual reports to the league, Welles's plan envisaged a 
program of continuous assessment and review. The trustee 
nations would be regulated by the regional organizations, which 
would have the authority to send administrators and observers 
to monitor the behavior of the trust powers. Rather than acting 
as a mandatory power, the administering nation would act merely 
as the "trustee" of the regional boards. Real authority over 
the territory would thus reside with the regional boards and 
not with the trust powers, while disagreements between the 
trust powers and the regional boards would be appealed to the 
executive council of the international organization.6*
In the Pacific, for example, Welles thought a "Pacific 
Council" or an "Association of South Pacific Nations" should 
oversee progress toward independence in Burma, Malaya, the 
Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. Welles wanted 
Portuguese Timor to be handed over to the Dutch or placed under 
trusteeship, while Macao would be returned to China. He 
envisioned "international control" of Hong Kong and Singapore 
for "international police purposes." Furthermore, he hoped an 
independent but amenable Philippine Republic would have a seat
62 For a  discussion of the many inherent w eaknesses of the mandates schem e see  Andrew Crazier, "The 
Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-1925: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference," 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 14, no. 3 (July 1979), 483-513.
63 p io  minutes 5, August 21,1942, box 85; PIO minutes 13, October 23,1942, box 85.
64 p minutes 22, August 15, 1942; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942; PIO document 95, "An International 
Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; P document 123-b, "International 
Trusteeship," December 8, 1942, box 56; P minutes 51, April 10, 1943. At Teheran, Roosevelt explained to 
Stalin a  trusteeship plan remarkably similar to this. S ee minutes of the Stalin-Roosevelt meeting, November 28, 
1943. FRUS: Cairo and Teheran. 486.
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on the regional body exercising trusteeship authority in the 
Pacific, thus giving the United States a proxy on the regional 
oversight board. Welles even sought to make Manila the 
headquarters of any future regional institutions. 65
The questions raised by the mandated islands in the 
Pacific revealed the selective nature of the American approach, 
where Welles sought to expand the Monroe Doctrine far across 
the Pacific. Welles believed these "relatively uninhabited" 
islands should not be turned over to international control but 
instead retained by the United States for security purposes. 
Norman Davis explained that the mandated islands would be 
needed in the postwar period to serve as American air bases. 
Welles assumed that due to the U.S. desire to retain the 
islands purely for security reasons, a "reasonable distinction" 
could be made between them and the areas where Washington was 
calling for trusteeship and eventual independence. Welles 
suggested that London’s potential opposition to such a move 
could perhaps be quelled by allowing continued British 
strategic control of Singapore, for example, as a quid pro
quo. 66
This raised the larger question of how the British would 
react to these proposals. During one discussion about the 
British Empire, Welles read aloud the text of recent 
proclamations by the British Liberal Party and the British 
Labour Party calling for a solution in the colonial world akin 
to suggestions offered in the political subcommittee. 67 while 
Welles sought a system of trusteeship that would ultimately 
undermine the British empire, he understood that the views of 
London, and particularly those of Churchill, could pose a 
serious threat to his colonial strategy. British officials
65 t  document 336, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Background," June 24, 1943, box 64, Notter files; S 
document 43, "The Strategic Importance of Singapore and Hong Kong." October 26, 1942, box 77, Notter files; 
P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: Part II: South Pacific Regional Supervisory 
Council," March 10,1043, box 192, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Welles papers, FDRL; draft memorandum on 
Malaysian or Indonesian federation, August 14, 1942, box 192, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Welles papers, 
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66 p  minutes 27, October 3,1942.
67 p document 113, "Resolution of the Assembly of the Liberal Party (July 18-19,1941)," October 2 ,1942, box 
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vehemently opposed American attempts at trusteeship. Many in 
London believed Welles's plan a guise for an American quest for 
greater profits and resources. These concerns may have been 
reinforced after the American planners sought formally to 
clarify postwar colonial policy by issuing a "World Charter" 
which would extend the Atlantic Charter to regions other than 
Europe, most particularly the Pacific. Concerns about the scope 
of Welles's plan for international trusteeship, coupled with 
alarm over the possibility of a "World Charter" and recent 
anti-colonial pronouncements from administration officials, led 
the British to attempt to mollify American opinion.68
During Eden's March 1943 visit to Washington, British and 
American officials discussed postwar colonial policy and 
Roosevelt presented Eden with Welles's trusteeship formula. 
Eden and U.S. officials also considered the prospect of issuing 
some kind of joint declaration on colonialism.®9 The foreign 
secretary found the American ideas unsatisfactory, for the 
Americans proposed the fixing of dates for granting full 
independence to all colonies.?o Eden expressed his dislike of 
such ideas. London instead preferred to see full responsibility 
remain in the hands of each parent country. Eden wanted to keep 
other powers out of European colonial matters. He understood 
that if Washington began seeking the dismantling of French 
possessions the British empire might not be far behind. He thus 
suggested that bilateral treaties between the controlling 
powers and their dependencies might be a more satisfactory
68 FO 371/31527 "U.S. Views on Colonial Policy," November 21,1943, PRO; FO 371/31527 "The United States 
and the Open Door in the British Colonial Empire," by A.G.B. Fisher, December 2, 1942, PRO; CAB 65/28 
WM(42) 166th Conclusions, December 9, 1942, PRO; FO 371/35366, Eden memorandum of conversation in 
Washington, March 29,1943, PRO; CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd Conclusions, April 13,1943, PRO.
69 The president also shared with Eden his views on the necessity of a  strong China and the establishment of 
international trusteeships for French Indochina and Korea.
70 FO 371/35366, Eden memorandum of conversation in Washington, March 29, 1943, PRO; CAB 65/34 
WM(43) 53rd Conclusions, April 13,1943, PRO; "Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence," 
March 9,1943, Hull Papers, folder 262, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
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approach.71
Welles acknowledged that the tensions arising over the 
question of trusteeship could threaten the stability of the 
alliance, but he also believed that a return to the colonial 
status quo would equally jeopardize American interests. Welles 
charged London with assuming the United Nations should fight to 
reconstruct and safeguard the British Empire.72 He wanted to 
find a means to force London to relinquish some control over 
its dependent areas. How to achieve this, he acknowledged, was 
another matter. One possibility Welles considered was the 
issuance of a "Pacific Charter" which would reaffirm the 
universality of the Atlantic Charter. Welles believed that at 
the very least a reformed British Empire might conceivably 
become a valuable asset to the United States in the postwar 
era, but only if induced to cooperate politically and 
economically in a new international system. While the planners 
agreed it would be in America's interest to eliminate European 
control in dependent areas, they failed to achieve a consensus 
on any means to achieve that result before the war's end.73
Welles thought the upheaval in the Pacific and the Far 
East, coupled with Britain's loss of power and prestige, would 
force a radical reconsideration of postwar alignments in the 
region. Welles and the planners had already considered the 
implications of these changes and sought ways to exploit this 
state of affairs. As U.S. interests in the Pacific continued to 
expand the planners considered the postwar creation of an 
economic and military perimeter of friendly states in the
71 CAB 65/28 WM(42) 166th Conclusions, December 9, 1942, PRO; FO 371/35366, Eden memorandum of 
conversation in Washington, March 29,1943, PRO; CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd Conclusions, April 13.1943, PRO; 
Eden to War Cabinet, "Foreign Secretary's Visit to Washington," March 30, 1943, PRO. He also thought 
American suggestions about stripping France of Indochina so harsh that they might warp the political situation 
in a  postwar Paris. "A Right Wing Government in France to be confronted with the dismemberment of the French 
Empire hardly seem s a good Idea," Eden wrote. As Walter LaFeber has concluded; "For the sake of British 
interests in both Europe and Asia. London officials felt they had no choice but to fight for a  fully restored 
France." See LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 1280. During this discussion between Eden and 
Roosevelt Welles warned the president that Washington had already gone on record, with statem ents from 
both Hull and Robert Murphy, for the restoration of French possessions. Roosevelt said the commitment 
referred only to North Africa, but Welles warned that no such modification existed. S ee  Eden, The Reckoning. 
378.
72 During the war American officials in the Far East claimed the acronym S.E.A.C. (the Southeast Asia 
Command) should more accurately have meant "Save England's Asiatic Colonies."
73 PIO minutes 5, August 21,1942, box 85.
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region. Welles told the planners in December 1942 that the 
United States should continue to use its growing influence in 
the Pacific to pressure the B r i t i s h . 74 Welles and the planners 
wanted to classify British Malaya, for example, as a strategic 
area subject to international control at the end of the w a r , 75 
while they assumed that the future status of Hong Kong and 
Singapore would be wholly dependent on American war a i m s . 76 The 
special research division, for example, provided Welles and the 
planners with a number of policy options for Hong Kong, none of 
which included continued British r u l e . 77
To the further horror of the British, Welles and his 
political subcommittee gave surprisingly serious consideration 
to Chinese views on European colonialism in the Far East. 
Welles believed it crucial that China be included if the 
reconstruction of the world was to be successful. And in any 
event, having more than 400 million Chinese as allies might 
prove very useful in the postwar years. Keeping in mind 
Roosevelt's desire that China be considered one of the Four 
Policemen, Welles often gave more consideration to Chinese war 
aims than to those of either London or M o s c o w .  78 Welles felt 
that China, having been dominated by foreign powers for most of 
its recent history, would feel threatened if global trends 
appeared to be heading in the direction of a "new imperialism" 
at the end of the war. Furthermore, China had become a symbol
74 p  document 113, “British Views with respect to Colonies and Dependent Areas," October 2,1942, box 56; S 
document 43, "The Strategic Importance of Singapore and Hong Kong," October 26, 1942, box 77; P minutes 
37, December 12,1942; Division of European Affairs memorandum to Welles, "Problems confronting the United 
States in connection with the British Empire," December 12, 1942, box 193, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, 
Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 47, March 13,1943. For an account that officials in Australia and New Zealand 
were more in agreement with the U.S. state department than with London on many questions, see  Louis, 
Imperialism at Bav. 18. S ee also G. St. J. Barclay, "Australia Looks to America: The Wartime Relationship, 
1939-1942," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 66, no. 2 (May 1977), 251-271.
75 p minutes 21, August 8,1942; P minutes 22, August 15,1942; P document 113, "British Views with respect 
to Colonies and Dependent Areas," October 2,1942, box 56; P document 35, "British Malaya," August 8,1942, 
box 56; T document 375, "The Problem of British Malaya: Possible Solutions," October 13, 1943, box 65; P 
document 43, "Indonesian or Malaysian Federation," August 11,1942, box 56.
76 p  minutes 22, August 15,1942; for an account of the impact of the fall of Singapore on British thinking, see  
Louis, Imperialism at Bay. 134-146.
77 p minutes 22, August 15,1942; T document 137, "The Problem of Hong Kong: Possible Solutions," October
23,1942, box 61.
78 Welles to Ambassador to China Clarence Gauss, March 25,1942, FRUS. China, 1943, 730; P minutes 47, 
March 13,1943; se e  also Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality (New 
York: Basic Books, 1990), 46-47; Ta Jen Liu, A History of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations. 1840-1974 
(Taipei: China Academy, 1978), 250-251.
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for the aspirations of millions of people beyond its frontiers. 
Any advance of China's status might change the very nature of 
the world order, leading to an erosion of imperial prestige
throughout the colonial world and thus, indirectly, an increase
in U.S. influence. Welles feared that Sino-American relations 
in the postwar world might be jeopardized if the United States 
did not make a strong gesture of support for Indian
independence, as opposed to merely backing the British 
preference for dominion s t a tus.79 Welles assumed that American 
power, supported by China, would supplant European power as the 
hegemonic force in the Far East. China might also prove a
useful ally in the non-European world, with considerable clout 
and prestige in colonial areas. Chiang would remain a thorn in 
the side of British imperial interests throughout the war and 
Welles hoped to exploit this by bringing China's influence and 
prestige to bear in critical matters such as India, French 
Indochina, Hong Kong and the Dutch East I n d ies.so
Welles and the planners thus sought to promote China as a 
great power on the assumption that the Chinese would support 
Washington's war aims against those of London and Moscow. 
Furthermore, American officials often found themselves in 
agreement with Chinese war aims and Welles assumed that China 
might serve as a counterweight to America's other alliance 
partners.si in March 1943 Welles briefed the planners on Chinese 
postwar aims in the Far East. He explained that China and the 
United States had similar views, as Chiang enthusiastically 
supported America's pledge to free the Philippines. China also 
desired independence for Korea as soon as possible. In 
addition, Welles added, the Chinese vehemently opposed British 
aims in the region, wanting the British completely excluded
79 P minutes 47, March 13,1943.
80 ibid; FO 371/31633, Churchill to Eden, February 13,1942, PRO; Warren Kimball, The Juggler. 139. Against 
British opposition, Chiang visited the Indian subcontinent in February 1942, where he publicly expressed 
sympathy for the nationalist cause
81 p minutes 47, March 13,1943. Roosevelt conceded a s  much to Eden when he predicted that China would 
undoubtedly side with the United States in the advent of a  future clash with the Soviet Union. The president 
deliberately downplayed Chiang's intense dislike of the British and the fact that the Generalissimo would most 
likely also oppose British interests. Memorandum of Conversation by Harry Hopkins, March 27, 1943, FRUS. 
1943, III, 38-39.
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from any trusteeship responsibilities in the Far East.82
As a gesture of good faith to the Chinese, Welles 
recommended to the planners that Hong Kong and Macao should 
somehow be returned to China. Welles told the planners the 
British did not care about the fate of Portuguese Macao, but 
London would have to be offered something substantial in return 
for Hong Kong. Stanley Hornbeck, the chief of the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs, added that the Chinese detested the 
British presence in Hong Kong. He explained that the Chinese 
felt so strongly that they would prefer any method of 
international solution to the status quo. But Welles feared 
that little could be done to change the British role in Hong 
Kong so long as Churchill remained in power. Welles added that 
he had "no illusions regarding the policy of the present 
British Government" in the colonial world. Welles warned the 
committee that Churchill had "announced in no uncertain terms 
that he would not undertake the liquidation of the British 
Empire." 83
Welles thought Chiang would accept U.S. support for a 
continued Dutch presence in the East Indies so long as the 
Dutch government-in-exile carried out its pledges to extend the 
rights of Dutch citizens to its dependent peoples and made the 
area open to outside economic penetration. As for Burma and 
Malaya, Welles assumed that Chiang would demand complete 
independence but, most importantly, Welles said the Chinese 
felt strongly that there could "never be any peace or stability 
in the Far East until the Indian people have their independence 
. . . and the only way is to grant full independence, with
protection for legitimate British interests." Welles warned 
that the Chinese remained totally opposed to dominion status 
for India, instead favoring independence.8*
Norman Davis warned of the possibility that as China's 
power increased the Chinese might become unreasonable and 
aggressive, seeking to overstep their authority in Asia and
82 p minutes 47, March 13, 1943;P document 113, "British Views with Respect to Colonies and Dependent 
Areas," October 2, 1942, box 56; S  document 43, "The Strategic Importance of Singapore and Hong Kong," 
October 26, 1942, box 77; P minutes 51, April 10, 1943; memorandum of conversation by Welles, July 28, 
1942, FRUS. 1942, I, 698-699.
83 p minutes 47, March 13,1943; P minutes 51, April 10,1943.
84 p minutes 47, March 13,1943.
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coming into conflict with U.S. aims in the region. Welles 
disagreed, retorting that he "did not think that the [Chinese] 
demand that the Indian people be independent and self-governing 
was [unreasonable]," while saying he did not believe any of 
China’s aims were inherently imperialistic or implied a desire 
for territorial expansion. In any event, whatever Chiang*s true 
intentions, Welles felt it imperative that the U.S. side with 
the colonial peoples in Asia. If Chiang sought to speak for the 
dependent peoples of the world, so much the better that he 
seemed to share so many of America's postwar aims. "The future 
of China is necessarily a question mark," Welles said. "We do 
not know whether the present government will remain in power or 
what type of government will [emerge], [but] the trend in the 
Far East is the development of an Asia for the Asiatics, the 
abrogation of the colonial regime of European powers in Asia, 
and in particular, the elimination of the British Empire as far 
as the Far East is concerned. The question arises as to what is 
the interest of the United States."85
Welles told the planners that the Chinese demanded 
trusteeship for Indochina. "The truth concerning Indo-China," 
Welles told the committee, "is that in the hundred years the 
French have had it, very little has been done for the benefit 
of the dependent peoples in that area, and according to the 
present Chinese Government, the people there are far better 
fitted to obtain their independence than the people of any 
other protected area in the Far East." But as the months 
passed, heightened concerns about France's stability in the 
immediate postwar years would lead to a reassessment of the 
French colonial empire and its relationship to postwar France. 
Several planners feared independence for Indochina would deal a 
heavy blow to France's role as the postwar nexus of European 
reconstruction. While Welles may have continued to seek to 
prevent France's return to the ranks of the great powers, he 
also believed a revived Europe would only be possible with an 
economically viable France. He thought a compromise might be 
reached where the French could temporarily stay on in Indochina 
as the chief administrator in the trusteeship plan, but only if
85 ibid.
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France pledged to adhere to the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter, promised to grant eventual independence to Indochina 
and made Indochina more available to outside economic 
interests. 86
As the planning committee’s discussions of Asia 
progressed, American interests in the Far East continued to 
expand. Welles and the planners assumed that mastery of the 
Pacific would pass to the United States as a result of the war, 
and they wanted to ensure that no power, including the Chinese, 
would challenge U.S. hegemony in the region. Their attention 
thus focused on Taiwan, which, they understood, had been of 
considerable strategic value to the Japanese, who had used it 
to administer the Pescadores, Hainan and the Spratly islands. 
Democratic Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah, who had spent five 
years in the Far East as a Mormon missionary, warned that if 
the United States gave Taiwan and Hainan to the Chinese, Chiang 
might build a large navy to defend the islands, thereby 
threatening postwar American naval supremacy in the Pacific. 
Senator Thomas suggested that the U.S. maintain naval and air 
bases on Taiwan to discourage the construction of a Chinese 
navy and to protect America1 s strategic interests in the Far 
E a s t . 87 The Senator told the planners that this could be done 
with very little difficulty because China trusted the United 
States and had a "youthful attitude" and a "student psychology" 
toward Washington. Welles assumed that Taiwan would probably 
have to be returned to Chinese "sovereignty" but he did not 
rule out the possibility that the island could be used for some 
kind of "international security purposes." After all, a Taiwan
86 p minutes 47, March 13, 1943; P document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of France," 
December 18,1942, box 57; P document 158a, "Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future Status of 
France and the French Empire," January 29, 1944, box 57; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War. vol.IV (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975), 531. Roosevelt was prepared to go 
further than Welles with regard to Indochina. In July 1943, the President told a  gathering of the Pacific War 
Council that the French should be stripped of their colonial possessions in the Far East because they had 
"done nothing for the population, but had misgoverned and exploited it," and their return to Indochina after the 
war would "make bad feeling throughout the Far East." "Indochina should not be given back to the French 
Empire after the war," he concluded. See Warren Kimball and Fred Pollock, "'In Search of Monsters to Destroy': 
Roosevelt and Colonialism," in Kimball's The Juggler. 140.
87 p minutes 47, March 13,1943; S document 18a, "Conditions for Japanese Surrender," March 13,1943, box 
77. "American concern for Taiwan," according to Leonard Gordon, "was first stimulated by knowledge of China's 
'sudden public interesf in the island shortly after Japan 's expansion of hostilities in the Pacific in December, 
1941." See Leonard Gordon, "American Planning For Taiwan, 1942-1945," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 37, no. 
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in friendly hands would have economic advantages for the United 
States and, more importantly, great strategic value.88
Welles constantly sought to focus the attention of the 
planners on what he defined as the larger issues at stake in 
Asia and the Pacifies "The question is,” he emphasized, 
"whether you can foresee a peaceful world when many millions of 
peoples are forced to accept a rule they do not wish to 
accept." He persisted in his belief that the United States had 
nothing to gain by supporting the "status quo" in the colonial 
world and should instead continue to look for a way to benefit 
from the inevitable upheaval. "Should we not try to make 
something advantageous to ourselves out of what is going to 
happen in the Par East?"89
* * *
As U.S. interests and influence in the Middle East 
continued to grow during the war the region became another area 
where British and American aims clashed over the question of 
imperialism. In principle, Welles acknowledged London's primacy 
in the Near East, but he assumed that the United States, due to 
its lack of colonial pretensions, might better appeal to the 
peoples of the region. Welles assumed the peoples of the Near 
East sought to be free of the French and British and would thus 
embrace postwar American leadership in the region as more 
acceptable. The history of the Middle East in the decades after 
the war would not see the realization of that delusion.90
Leading the planning committee's survey of the colonial 
situation in the Middle East in the summer of 1942, Welles 
introduced a proposal for a "Middle Eastern Federation." Its 
membership would include Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Iran, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, as well as Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine-Transjordan and possibly the British protectorates in 
Arabia. He argued that a federation would help smooth the
88 p  minutes 47, March 13,1943; Gordon, "American Planning For Taiwan," ibid; S document 18a, "Conditions 
for Japanese Surrender," March 13,1943, box 77.
89 p  minutes 47, March 13,1943.
90 After his resignation Welles used his syndicated column to offer a  scathing criticism of British and French 
rule in the Near E ast See, for example, "Welles Criticizes Both French and British Imperialism on Crisis in 
Levant," New York Herald Tribune. June 13,1945.
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transition of peoples in the region to independence, while 
resolving the Near East's many political disputes and promote 
regional economic development. As in the case of his designs 
for the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Welles sought to promote a sense of greater unity and cohesion 
in the former Ottoman lands of the Near East. He believed the 
Ottoman Empire had lent a degree of stability and coordination 
to the region that had been dangerously lacking in recent 
decades.91
Welles's committee also proposed the construction of a 
smaller Levantine Federation which would include Palestine, 
Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. Welles hoped a Levantine 
Federation would encourage TVA-like cooperative measures in 
agriculture, irrigation, power development, customs and 
currency union. It might also help distract or circumvent 
British opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. According to Welles's preliminary aims for the 
region, the British and French mandates would be terminated and 
complete political independence would be granted to the new 
Levantine Federation. The war had brought enormous changes to 
the area, Welles told the political subcommittee in the summer 
of 1942, and complete independence for these mandates was an 
absolute necessity. Welles worried that Axis propaganda would 
attempt to equate the United States with British aims in the 
region. He thus hoped Washington's backing for liberation might 
demonstrate America’s independent standing in the Arab world.92
France's collapse had seriously called into question 
French hopes of maintaining their possessions in the region, 
which they suspected Britain and the United States of secretly 
coveting. For the most part Welles believed French fears over 
their Levant possessions were nothing more than paranoia, but 
he suspected the British had designs on other strategically 
located French possessions such as Tunisia and Jibuti.92 
Although the Free French felt compelled to promise eventual
91 P minutes 24, August 29,1942; P document 47 "Regional Aspects of the Near and Middle East," August 27, 
1942, box 56. Welles understood that the British would support a  federation in the region.
92 p minutes 24, August 29,1942; P document 48, "Syria and the Lebanon," August 27,1942, box 56.
93 p  minutes 48, March 20,1943; P minutes 49, March 27,1943; PIO minutes, November 20,1942; P minutes 
24, August 29,1942; P minutes 37, December 12,1942.
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independence for their Levant mandates in the autumn of 1941, 
Welles feared their pledge would never be fulfilled. In August 
1942, de Gaulle told an American diplomat in Syria that the 
future of Syria and Lebanon could only be decided by a postwar 
French government and in the meantime there would be little 
change in their status. But the American planners persisted in 
their commitment to independence for these possessions. "France 
at no time, under any government, has taken seriously its 
mandate responsibilities," warned the minutes of Welles's 
political subcommittee. "The French have been disposed to 
consider the obligations of the mandate as just a phrase."9* 
Welles told British diplomats in Washington that he would never 
accept de Gaulle's wishes to uphold the colonial status quo in 
Syria and Lebanon because the United States did not even 
recognize de Gaulle as empowered to make any such decisions. 
Welles told the British Minister in Washington, Sir Ronald 
Campbell, that the Anglo-American Allies should provoke a 
"showdown" with de Gaulle over the issue.95
Although the British encouraged change in the French 
mandates, they bristled when discussing their own possessions 
in the region. Some members of Welles's political subcommittee 
assumed the British could be compelled to grant independence to 
all of their Near East possessions east of Suez. Furthermore, 
Welles told the planners that the Suez Canal might become a 
potential "security problem" in the postwar era and they 
discussed the prospect of internationalizing the canal (along 
with Gibraltar and Singapore) and occupying it with a 
multinational force of Arabs and Jews.96
94 p  minutes 48, March 20, 1943. The British did not hesitate to encourage the independence of French 
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The British also feared the United States would attempt to 
usurp British petroleum interests in and around the Persian 
Gulf region. There was some basis for this fear, for American 
engineers had discovered vast reserves in the Persian Gulf 
region in the mid-1930s. With the increasing wartime demands 
for oil in mind, Welles and the planners took a keen interest 
in the future welfare of Iran.97 The planners noted that Iran 
contained "valuable oil resources" and was thus becoming a 
country "of vital importance." The British owned the oil 
concession in Iran, the fourth largest producer in the world, 
and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company maintained a virtual 
stranglehold on the Iranian economy. British and Soviet forces 
entered Iran in 1942 and state department planners expressed 
concern that the Russians might seek to gain an outlet on the 
Persian Gulf through Iran, thus disrupting the flow of o i l . 98
The committee's consultant on Near East affairs, Wallace 
Murray, told Welles and the planners that the Iranians detested 
the British and Russians, but the United States stood to gain 
much in Iran due to the warm feelings Persians had for 
Americans. He added that the war department was "building up a 
large mission there to take charge of the whole situation 
without appearing to do so" and that the United States was 
"running the police force" and had "the country's finances 
under our direction." Murray added that the United States had 
now become "the favored power in Persia." The minutes of one 
meeting noted that "there is very little left in Persia that is 
not being run by Americans except the Crown, and Mr. Murray 
said he did not know whether we wanted to bother with t h a t . "99
When Welles briefed Roosevelt on Washington's growing 
interests in the region he emphasized how Iran had the 
potential to be reshaped in America's image. Numerous American
97 For accounts of U.S. involvement in Iran during the war see, for example, Stephen L. McFarland, "A
Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crisis in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History, vol. 4, no. 4 
(Fall 1980), 333-351; Eduard M. Mark, "Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947: The Origins of a  Cold War Crisis," 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, vol. 59, no. 1 (Autumn 1975), 51-63; Jam es A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The 
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99 P document 55, "Iran," August 27,1942, box 56; P minutes 48, March 20,1943; PIO minutes, November 20, 
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missions would provide food and supplies, restructure the 
Iranian economy and government, coordinate efforts at public
health and reorganize the Iran police forces under the guidance 
of American officials. Welles told Roosevelt this would bring 
about "the ultimate conversion of Iran into an active and
willing partner on our side." 100 Welles and the planners agreed
that the United States should continue to exert "its 
disinterested influence in Iran after the war to strengthen the 
country and to support its independence against a possible 
resurgence of the continuing contest between Russia and Britain 
for special influence."101
* * *
In the spring of 1943, Welles gave a detailed report to 
the political subcommittee explaining the specifics of American 
policy in the Near East and North Africa. As Welles saw it, the 
United States held a unique position in the Near East and 
American influence and prestige there were quite high, largely 
because "the people of the Near East realized that we have no 
vested political or territorial interests in the region."102 One 
of the greatest antagonisms that developed between London and 
Washington, however, occurred over the postwar status of 
Palestine. The years between the wars had been tumultuous ones 
for the former Ottoman possession. Tension in the area was 
heightened by the fact that British strategic planners 
considered Palestine crucial to the defense of the Suez Canal, 
and also because of the urgent pressure for higher levels of 
Jewish immigration and resulting Arab resentment. Palestine had 
an importance disproportionate to its size and population, not 
only as a shield for the Suez Canal lifeline or as an important 
spiritual site for three great religions but also as the 
terminus of petroleum supplies for Britain and the bridge
100 Welles to Roosevelt October 20,1942, box 152, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL
101 p  document 215, "Agenda for the meeting of March 20,1943," March 19,1943, box 193, Postwar Foreign 
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between Asia and Africa.103
Welles dominated the administration’s early discussions on 
Palestine. His enthusiastic support for the Zionist cause in 
Palestine in many ways anticipated America's later commitment 
to the state of Israel and in the years immediately following 
the war he became one of America's most vigorous supporters of 
Palestine as an independent homeland for the Jews.10* On the 
issue of a homeland for the Jews, Welles operated in an 
occasionally hostile environment in the state department, where 
Anti-Semitism persisted.105 Welles's Zionism played a large role 
in influencing the kinds of policies he advocated in the Middle 
East.105 His belief that only Palestine could provide the Jewish 
people with a homeland was reinforced by previously failed 
efforts to obtain a safe haven for Jews in other countries in 
Latin America and Africa. Since 1938 Welles had publicly 
castigated previous German persecutions of the Jews and he 
understood the desperate situation the European Jews faced. He 
served as a liaison between the Jewish leaders and the American 
legations abroad, channeling preliminary information about the
103 p document 52, "Egypt," August 27, 1942, box 56; T document 302, "The Suez Canal and Egyptian 
Interests," April 1, 1943, box 63; P document 50, "Palestine," August 27, 1942, box 56; P minutes 24, August 
29, 1942.
104 Welles was also active on the domestic side of the Palestine question, working with the various lobbying 
groups such a s  the American Palestine Committee, the Zionist Organization of America and the Christian 
Council on Palestine. When Welles resigned, Rabbi Stephen Wise, the leading Zionist in the United States, 
wrote: "Your vision and your wisdom, your courage and effectiveness cannot long be lost to the American 
people, which cherishes your service, a s  my fellow Jew s in all free lands will, when the whole story can be told, 
bless your name." In his 1944 book The Time For Decision Welles presented his views on a  Jewish homeland 
and criticized British policy in its mandate, and three years after the war he wrote We Need Not Fail, which 
passionately expressed his commitment to a  Jewish homeland in Palestine. See Rabbi Stephen Wise to 
Welles, October 3, 1943, box 93, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, Tbe Time For Decision. 262-267; Sumner 
Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948).
105 frwin Gellman, Secret Affairs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995), 38.
106 Welles had deep admiration for Jewish leaders such a s  Rabbi Wise, the president of the American Jewish 
Congress; Chaim Weizmann, toe president of toe World Zionist Organization, who would later become toe first 
president of Israel; and Judge Joseph Proskauer, a  prominent American Zionist and friend of President 
Roosevelt. Welles frequently spoke before Jewish organizations and sought to arrange meetings for Weizmann 
and Wise with President Roosevelt. In fact, Welles's initial skepticism about a Middle Eastern Federation 
stemmed from his fear that it might pose a  threat to toe Jewish population of Palestine, but he concluded that a  
Jewish-controlled, or bi-national Palestine would become a fully-integrated member of a  federation. Wise 
telegram to Welles, October 4, 1942, box 86, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Wise, June 19, 1942, 
Welles Papers, box 86, folder 5, FDRL; Welles to Wise, October 7, 1942, box 86, folder 5, Welles papers, 
FDRL
199
"final solution" to Jewish leaders in the United States.107
In their quest to find some solution to the problem of 
Palestine, American planners drew up a series of detailed 
reports which sought to address questions of Jewish immigration 
and Arab resettlement. Welles and the planners endorsed 
complete independence for Palestine at their meeting of August 
29, 1942. While some members advocated trusteeship for
Palestine, Welles argued vigorously for independence. He 
thought the United States might help underwrite public works 
projects in the region to enable Palestine to better 
accommodate more immigration so that "the Jewish people could 
realize the ambition gathering for many hundreds of years for a 
homeland, and nationality of citizens of Palestine would be on 
par with that of any other country."100
Welles warned that negotiations with the Arab population 
would be a waste of time. He suggested the United Nations use 
their police powers to enforce Jewish immigration to Palestine 
and that the future of Palestine be tied to a complete
reordering of politics in the region. "If we simply throw up
our hands and say we are going to leave this to negotiation," 
Welles said, "it would merely be that we were going to allow an
open sore to continue for an indefinite period . . . [but] if
the United Nations are prepared to encourage an Arab Federation 
and do what is necessary to push them along the road to 
prosperity and security, should not the Arab world be willing 
to agree to a solution which would accord Palestine to the 
Jews? A bargain might be struck with the Arabs, but the threat 
of force could be held over their heads."109
The planners feared that increased Jewish immigration 
would provoke an Arab backlash. They thus suggested that a
107 as early as 1942 Welles and Wise held a number of discussions about setting up a war crimes tribunal to 
investigate atrocities against European Jews, and at one point that sam e year Welles even discussed with 
General Eisenhower the possibility of creating a Jewish army of Palestine to aid the allied forces in the region. 
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York: Holocaust Library, 1970), which explores the bureaucratic politics involved.
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"Bill of Rights" would be necessary for the protection of both 
populations. When members raised the question of protection for 
the Arabs, Welles said that "Jewish nationalism could not be 
pushed aside" and that an independent Palestine, "composed of a 
homogeneous population, would not be in danger from the Arab 
federation . . .  . " A t  one point, the committee discussed 
whether a Jewish/Arab bi-national solution to the Palestine 
question would be more in accord with the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter, as opposed to a solution imposed by force. 
Welles added that "Moslems are not always reasonable" but might 
accept international trusteeship of some of the holy sites in 
Jerusalem so that access would not be restricted to any 
particular group.no
Welles's views on Palestine were destined to clash with 
those of London. The foreign office tended to be pro-Arab and 
anti-Zionist, and many British officials assumed American 
policy toward Palestine was influenced by Zionist propaganda in 
the United States. British officials had warned Welles that a 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine would undermine the war 
effort by playing directly into the hands of Nazi propagandists 
and they feared that continued Arab agitation about Jewish 
immigration would undermine British influence and prestige in 
the region, in The British embassy in Washington often saw 
Welles as a virtual Zionist agent in the administration, an 
idea given some credence during Eden's March 1943 Washington 
visit, when Welles suggested that the British should 
accommodate at least another 500,000 Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine. Eden's objections did not move Welles. The under 
secretary hinted that at the very least Palestine should be 
removed from British control.112
110 p  minutes 25, September 5, 1942; P minutes 49, March 27, 1943; "The Atlantic Charter and National 
Independence," November 13, 1942, Atlantic Charter file, box 13, Notter files; P minutes 24, August 29, 1942; 
P document 215, "Agenda for the meeting of March 20, 1943: Annex: Palestine," March 19, 1943, box 193, 
Postwar Foreign Policy Files, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL
111 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Butler, April 21,1941, box 163, folder 3, Welles papers, 
FDRL
112 FO 371/35034 "Palestine," memorandum by Cripps, May 4,1943, PRO; CAB 66/37 WP)43) 246 "Palestine," 
by Richard Casey, Minister of State, June 17, 1943, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War. vol.IV, 353. Eden's private secretary Oliver Harvey noted that the foreign secretary 
remained "immovable on the subject of Palestine. He loves Arabs and hates Jews. Our only hope is a  firm 
Anglo-American agreement over Palestine -  Sumner Welles and the President favor a  Jewish State a s  Winston 
does." John Harvey, ed., The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey.1941 -1945. (London: Collins, 1978),247.
201
Welles's resignation in the fall of 1943 would free him to
speak his mind publicly about issues such as Palestine and he
would more openly work to aid the Zionist cause. H3 Meanwhile, 
the British remained divided over the issue. Like Welles, 
Churchill had considered British policy toward the Jews a 
breach of faith. Eden, meanwhile, continued his opposition to 
increased levels of Jewish immigration. After Welles's 
resignation Roosevelt created a War Refugee Board made up of
Morgenthau, Stimson and Hull. Still, few Jews got through to
Palestine during the war. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent 
that the Zionist cause was growing into an unstoppable movement 
which would soon overwhelm British and Arab opposition to a 
Jewish state in Palestine.n*
"k * *
Welles and the planners also held a series of meetings on 
North Africa, where they recommended a regional supervisory 
board of Turkey, Egypt, Britain, Spain, Greece and perhaps 
representatives from a reconstructed France and Italy. These 
nations would oversee a Tangier-based regional council 
responsible for Spanish and French Morocco, French Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro. Welles
thought the United States could accrue power and influence in
North Africa by demonstrating its sympathy for the dependent 
peoples of the region against their former colonial masters.us
Welles and his committee also undertook a survey of the 
rest of Africa, where over the course of the previous half-
century only tiny Liberia had escaped the interference or
colonization of the European powers. Prior to the war, Africa 
ranked low on the list of America's foreign policy priorities. 
But that began to change with Washington's growing fears of
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possible Axis penetration of West Africa, as well as when 
Africa became an important theater of war for the allies. 
Africa also loomed large as a site of valuable strategic 
materials, while its proximity to allied shipping lanes gave it 
a strategic value in the eyes of American planners.118
During the war many Africans observed the weakening of 
their old colonial overseers and it became increasingly clear 
that regardless of the war's outcome, the colonial powers would 
emerge greatly diminished. Once again, American planners 
thought the United States might fill the void. After all, 
Welles had long sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the 
coast of West Africa. But the committee's examination of Africa 
laid bare one of the underlying weaknesses common to their 
survey of the colonial world. As the planners continued to 
discuss the postwar future of Africa, they encountered a vast 
array of cultural, political and ethnic diversity, leading to 
their realization that the entire continent of Africa could not 
easily be lumped into one large regional council.117 Thus after 
several weeks of discussions, Welles and his colleagues 
proposed four regional councils for north, south, east and west 
Africa.118 Welles believed the subcommittee should still adhere 
to the idea of bringing the peoples of other continents 
together in larger regional councils, but he reluctantly 
concluded that the geographical, political and ethnic realities 
of Africa did not lend themselves to larger, more unified, 
groupings. While the U.S. would not itself be a member of any 
of the African regional councils, the planners sought to exert 
American influence through Liberia (the diminutive West African 
republic founded in 1822 by emigrant freedmen from the United 
States with the support of colonization societies) where the 
Firestone Rubber Company controlled huge portions of territory
116 p minutes 26, September 26,1942; P minutes 27, October 3,1942.
117 Ibid.
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and much of the economy.119
The committee's discussion of Africa also led to the 
sobering realization that the colonial powers might have to be 
left temporarily in control after the war (but conditional upon 
their pledge to adhere to principles such as the Four Freedoms 
and the Atlantic Charter). Welles thought that while North 
Africa's prospects for success looked reasonably good, the rest 
of Africa might have to be brought along the path to 
independence more slowly, partly due to the lack of development 
in the region but also because, as Welles told the planners, 
"the Negroes are in the lowest rank of human beings."120 When 
Welles brought this matter up during a meeting in October 1942, 
Norman Davis added that due to the backwardness of Africa the 
U.S. would most likely have to work closely with the European 
colonial powers. But Welles said he still favored stripping 
mandates from those powers such as the British and French who 
had considered them their personal property for the last 
twenty-five years.121
* * *
Throughout the war the European colonies in the new world 
gave Welles particular concern. U.S. war plans in the 1920s and 
1930s had emphasized the danger facing strategic positions in 
the western hemisphere and Welles and the other planners 
remained preoccupied with the security of Latin America. Welles 
thus sought ways to preserve and strengthen the Monroe Doctrine 
as one of the chief foundations of American foreign policy.
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Norman Davis described Liberia a s  "a great independent s ta te . . .  happy a s  a  clam." See Louis, Imperialism at 
Bay. 171. For an account of U.S. control of the Liberian economy, see, for example, Judson M. Lyon, "Informal 
Imperialism: The United States in Liberia, 1897-1912." Diplomatic History, vol. 5, no. 3 (Summer 1981), 221- 
243; a s  well a s  Lloyd N. Beecher, Jr., "The Second World War and U.S. Politico-Economic Expansionism: The 
C ase of Liberia, 1938-1945." Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 4 (Fall 1979), 391-412.
120 For Welles's comments see  P minutes 27, October 3, 1942, a  stark example not only of the racial 
arrogance of a  senior state department official but also of Welles's class prejudices. Welles views on race 
could be contradictory. While he thought American blacks deserved better treatment he persisted in his belief 
that many other races were inferior. His views were shared by many in the state departm ent For example, 
blacks who entered the foreign service during these years were often relegated to postings in Liberia. See, for 
example, Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: 
Norton, 1978),90, 125.
121 p  minutes 27, October 3,1942.
204
Welles and his colleagues suggested all of the British, French 
and Dutch possessions be placed in a regional council for the 
Caribbean basin. He hoped that a regional council for the area 
would assist in the transition to dominion status, or even 
independence, and acknowledged that not every colony in the 
region was ready for independence, adding that the "colored 
races in the Guianas were as unfit for self-government as 
anywhere in the Western Hemisphere."122
Welles also sought to pressure the British to abandon the 
hemisphere after the war. Britain should be induced to turn 
over the Falkland Islands to Argentina and the British naval 
base at Port Stanley should be taken for international police 
purposes. The planners believed the Falklands gave Britain a 
huge advantage in naval strategy. Welles described relations 
between Britain and Argentina as "a messy situation" and told 
the planners he thought Argentine claims to the islands "well- 
founded." In this case, self-determination was of less concern 
to Welles than strategic factors. Welles acknowledged that the 
strategically vital question of Port Stanley was intricately 
tied to the psychology of British prestige, but he hoped the 
future of the port and its naval base could somehow be linked 
to a larger strategy seeking the internationalization of 
Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and Singapore for "international 
police purposes."123
Welles told the planners they should seek "the 
obliteration of European power in Central America." He detested 
the British presence in the region. He advocated political 
union for the nations of the region and thought Britain should 
cede British Honduras to Guatemala. Isaiah Bowman told the 
committee he believed that most of British Honduras was owned 
by four or five prominent Britons, whose presence should be 
"liquidated" at the end of the war. The planners claimed that 
Britain no longer had a good reason to remain in the region, 
but they feared London would refuse to leave because it would 
be a further blow to British national prestige. Welles agreed, 
but hoped British Honduras might somehow be freed from British
122 p minutes 34, November 21, 1942; PIO minutes 10, October 9, 1942, box 85; P document 148, "A 
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control after the war. He hoped London might accept some 
undefined face-saving measures in the region and that Lend- 
Lease aid might provide some l e v e r a g e .  124
* * *
By the spring of 1943 the planners began to disagree over 
whether, as Welles argued, trusteeships should cover all 
colonial areas or whether, as Hull argued, they should be 
limited to former mandates and other territories controlled by 
the Axis powers. All of the planners agreed with Welles that 
the mandates system had failed and that all responsibilities 
for the mandated territories should be transferred to the new 
international organization. Where they disagreed was over the 
future status of the rest of the European possessions.
While the planners may have wanted to supplant the 
European colonial dependencies, they realized that not all 
areas were ready for independence and they could think of no 
viable alternative to European rule in the short-term. Hull's 
position that trusteeships be limited to the mandated 
territories and Axis dependencies gradually gained support. "It 
was assumed," one of the political subcommittee's "top secret" 
summaries concluded, "that the United States would favor the 
general principle of international trusteeship ... [but] would 
not seek to destroy any existing empire or to dictate to other 
countries concerning colonial administration." The postwar 
planning committees had thus significantly retreated from their 
original aims for trusteeship, but they still sought to erect 
numerous regional supervisory councils which would oversee the 
gradual emancipation of the colonial w o r l d .  125
By April 1943 the committee's enthusiasm for trusteeships 
had noticeably abated. In the wake of Eden's visit the planners 
confronted the sobering realization that it would be difficult 
to impose their plans for trusteeship on the European empires. 
The planners also feared pursuing policies that might 
ultimately undermine the allied war effort. Furthermore,
124 p io  minutes 10, October 9,1942; P minutes 34, November 21,1942.
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Secretary Hull attended the meetings with greater frequency 
now, and his allies in the planning process, such as Leo 
Pasvolsky, Harley Notter and Republican Congressman Charles 
Eaton of New Jersey, felt less inclined to hold their tongues. 
Hull moved to halt Welles’s expansive schemes for colonial 
independence and trusteeship, which the secretary thought 
"extreme." Hull instead favored a vague joint Anglo-American 
statement on colonialism along with a curious and unexplained 
proposal he called "international cooperation." He reaffirmed 
his aim of narrowing the goals of the planning committees by 
applying trusteeship only to the former league mandates and 
Axis territories. In this, he was seconded by many of the other 
planners. 126
But Welles continued to push for his version of the 
trusteeship plan. When he presented his draft proposal for 
trusteeship to the political subcommittee on April 10 
Representative Eaton facetiously criticized the document as a 
"wonderful and idealistic scheme." Secretary Hull endorsed 
Eaton's criticism by pointing out that the American public 
would balk at the costs of Welles's plan. But Welles defended 
the proposal by reminding the planners that the United States 
would probably limit its own trusteeship responsibilities to 
the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific. He added that the 
trusteeship plan was predicated upon the creation of an 
international organization and the revenues of dependent areas 
would go toward trusteeship expenses and that the principal 
administrative powers in a given territory would most likely 
cover other costs. He underscored his belief that trusteeship 
would ensure future world peace and reminded the committee that 
the British Labour Party and the British Liberal Party had 
called for a program akin to his trusteeship plan. Both British 
proposals, Welles added, went well beyond many of the 
suggestions in his own draft plan. He also warned that many of 
the peoples of the colonial world had already demanded the 
complete overthrow of European rule. If the United States did
126 FO 371/31527 Halifax to F.O. December 12,1942 and December 26,1942, PRO; Donald Wright, "That Hell 
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not back his trusteeship proposals, Welles added, the dependent 
peoples of the world might seek postwar guidance from China, or 
even worse, the Soviet Union. He also darkly hinted that there 
were perilous political forces already at work throughout the 
colonial world which would lead to instability after the war 
unless Washington took daring m e a s u r e s .  127
Welles reminded the members that colonialism had 
contributed to the tensions which had led to the last two wars. 
He explained to them what he believed were the sources of 
instability and war in the colonial worlds "In the first place, 
there is the unsatisfactory manner in which the mandate system 
has worked. In the second place, in various parts of the world 
there are many people who are clamoring for freedom from the 
colonial powers. Unless some system can be worked out to help 
these peoples, we shall be encountering trouble. It would be 
like failing to install a safety valve and then waiting for the 
boiler to blow u p . "  128
In a final effort to defend his trusteeship plan, Welles 
emphasized that it would not be extended to American 
territories such as the Virgin Islands, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. 
Welles even sought to temper his previous views by telling the 
members that in some cases trusteeship might effectively impede 
potentially destabilizing independence m o v e m e n t s . 129
Despite Welles's efforts, it soon became apparent that the 
initial enthusiasm for the trusteeship plan had ebbed. In some 
ways the argument over trusteeship had only further divided the 
department. Hull sought merely to press the colonial powers to 
pledge themselves to eventual independence and to observe 
particular standards of conduct in their colonies. The 
secretary thought this course offered a more realistic approach 
than those ideas which had been discussed in the committee 
meetings during the period of Welles's ascendancy. Hull 
believed that "we could not press [the British] too far with
127 p minutes 51, April 10,1943.
128 ibid.
129 ibid. Welles singled out areas such a s  the Belgian Congo, where, he added, it might take more than a 
hundred years for home rule. When New York Representative Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Foreign 
Relations Committee, said it might take "more than a  thousand years" before the Belgian Congo would be 
prepared for independence, Welles agreed and added that in cases  such a s  Portuguese Timor it might take a 
thousand years.
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regard to the Southwest Pacific in view of the fact that we
were seeking the closest possible cooperation with them in
Europe. We could not alienate them in the Orient and expect to
work with them in Europe." 130
While Welles thought Hull's views reminiscent of the 
failed mandates scheme, he himself had been steadily backing 
away from some of the more radical positions he had initially 
taken. Many of the discussions on the planning committees had 
contributed in part to altering his views, as did the
stubbornness of the British, who continued to demonstrate that 
they would fight any American initiatives in the colonial 
sphere that threatened the war effort. After the war Welles 
lamented that at the time "no step could be taken politically, 
however beneficial it might promise to be later on, if it 
jeopardized or threatened to postpone victory."i3*
Hull's views ultimately prevailed. When the political 
subcommittee released a summary of its conclusions on
trusteeship in July 1943, it recommended its application only 
to the present mandated territories and Axis dependencies. i33 
After Welles's resignation in August 1943, the state department 
encountered further opposition to the trusteeship plan from 
within the United States government, as well as from the
British. The U.S. military chiefs argued that national security
requirements demanded that the United States keep the Pacific
mandates, rather than have them placed in trusteeship. Hull, 
who had always been ambivalent about the more radical aspects 
of the proposal, had long concluded that the whole program was 
tainted by Welles's involvement. 133 The administration made a 
number of efforts to alter trusteeship, but the plan as it 
existed in Welles's original concept continued to lose support. 
By late 1944 the United States demonstrated its retreat when it 
notified the British, French and Dutch that it would not oppose
130 Hull. Memoirs. 1599.
131 Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 133.
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a reimposition of European control in Southeast Asia.134 The 
U.S. thus weighed in against support for independence or even 
trusteeships for much of the colonial Far East.135 The U.S. 
military chiefs had long viewed the European colonial empires 
as sources of international stability, which would in some ways 
be supportive of American strategic interests around the world 
in the postwar era. This view gained strength as the war neared 
its end.133
* * *
The upheavals of the Second World War did not resolve the 
issue of the future status of the colonial empires. In the 
minds of many senior American officials, Cold War 
considerations would begin to take precedence over the national 
aspirations of the colonial peoples.137 As for the Pacific 
mandated islands that the United States picked up at the end of 
the war, they largely turned out to be burdens rather than 
strategic assets. The ring of U.S. strategic bases in Asia and 
the Pacific proved useless when the United States sought to 
extend its hegemony to the Asiatic mainland in places like 
Korea and Vietnam. As for the European empires, they would 
later be dismantled for reasons that had nothing to do with 
American pressure133
Furthermore, Welles's ideas on trusteeship failed to 
anticipate what would happen in the postwar colonial world, 
where the rapid pace of decolonization would overwhelm careful
134 Shortly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Harry Hopkins reassured British officials that 
Washington's plans for reform in the colonial world extended only to the economic field. At Dumbarton Oaks the 
U.S. proposal on colonial matters made no reference to independence and at the second Quebec Conference 
the American Joint Chiefs told the British that Washington would allow Britain to reclaim Singapore and help the 
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planning for the future. Welles also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the problems of underdevelopment that would 
plague much of the post-colonial world. Hull had argued that 
the dependent areas would never raise sufficient capital to 
support themselves and modernize their economies. Welles gave 
little thought to the possibility that the European colonial 
empires occasionally served as stabilizing forces throughout 
the world. Neither did he understand that the void created by 
decolonization might not be filled by the United States. By the 
late 1950s the United States would be confronted with an 
unmanageable crisis in the former colonial world, one in which 
one of Welles's successors as under secretary would complain 
that in the early 1960s American foreign policy found itself 
"focused on problems involving the bits and pieces of 
disintegrating empires." 139
In some cases, the very chaotic revolutions and 
instability Welles sought to avoid came about due to the rapid 
nature of decolonization. During the war, Welles spoke with 
great moral fervor about self-determination, independence and 
liberation in the colonial world. But decolonization often led 
to instability in the years that followed and the paramount 
concern for order became the basis upon which policy toward 
nationalist movements would be constructed. Thus, concerns 
about self-determination and nationalism would take a back seat 
to strategic concerns in the context of the Cold War struggle. 
No longer would there be talk of promoting change and upheaval 
throughout the world. When America became a superpower and 
hegemon it also became the chief defender of the global status 
quo, a prospect Welles might have found odd in the midst of his 
optimism in 1942.
139 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs  (New York: Norton, 1982), 175.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Limits of Universalisms 
American Postwar Planning for Eastern Europe and the USSR
1941-1943
Welles's efforts to shape the administration's postwar 
designs for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe amply 
demonstrated the difficulties of applying Wilsonian principles, 
such as self-determination and free trade, all over the world. 
Welles believed postwar planning should be predicated upon the 
fact that in the years after the war the United States and the 
Soviet Union would be the world's two greatest powers. But 
Welles had been alarmed by Moscow's territorial ambitions in 
Poland, Finland and the Baltic states between 1939 and 1940, 
and after leading the planners in the spring of 1942 on a 
survey of Soviet territorial aims, Welles more fully understood 
that the Russians would be in control of vast territory in 
Eastern Europe at the end of the war. While he concluded that 
Moscow's aims would clash with the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter and the Four Freedoms, he continued to believe that 
entente with Moscow remained paramount to all other 
considerations. After all, good relations with Moscow would be 
absolutely necessary to bring about the kind of world order he 
desired. With Britain so weakened by the war, and China still 
an uncertain player in the realm of world and regional 
leadership, an understanding with Moscow seemed vitally 
important.1
As the planners continued their investigations, Welles 
grew more concerned that his desired new order hinged not so 
much on the creation of an international organization, or even 
upon the threat of upheaval in the colonial world, but rather 
on what the Kremlin would insist upon to achieve its security 
and how these Russian aims could be reconciled with
1 Eduard Mark, among others, has made the case that from the moment it became apparent that the USSR 
would survive the war, officials in Washington anticipated Moscow's hegemony in Eastern Europe. Mark writes: 
"American efforts in Europe, consequently, represented neither a utopian schem e to rid the continent of 
spheres of influence nor a Faustian bid to dominate it, but a  search for stable spheres of a kind consonant with 
the interests of the principal victors of World War 11." See Eduard Mark, "American Policy toward Eastern 
Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1946: An Alternative Interpretation," The Journal of American 
History, vol. 68, no.2 (September 1981), 314.
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Washington's. Welles and his fellow planners anticipated that 
difficulties might arise between Moscow and Washington, but 
their inability to find some way to resolve the impending 
crisis in Eastern Europe illustrated their failure to reconcile 
Washington's and Moscow’s aims. The frustration Welles and the 
planners faced underscored the futility of extending their 
principles everywhere in the world. But at the same time it 
also demonstrated the willingness of U.S. officials to look the 
other way when faced with the evasion of their principles and 
foreshadowed the uncertainty of the American response to Soviet 
power in the years after Welles’s resignation.
* * *
Throughout the 1930s Welles held ambivalent views toward 
the Soviet Union. While he was often dubious of Moscow's 
sincerity, he at times supported closer relations, if only to 
promote U.S. interests. Throughout his career, for example, 
Welles would often seek ways the Soviet Union might aid
American interests in the Far East. As early as two months
before the first inaugural Welles emphasized to Roosevelt the 
possibility of using Russian recognition as a means of putting 
subtle pressure on Japan, which was then engaged in the 
conquest of Manchuria.2 Welles acknowledged that the Soviet
Union had been prescient about the Nazi threat during the mid- 
1930s and he thought Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet foreign
minister (1930-1939) and later ambassador to Washington (1941- 
1943), was one of the more capable statesmen of the war. Like
Welles, Litvinov had sought to organize an international
conference in 1938 to avert the world crisis. Curiously,
despite Welles's later praise, he opposed Litvinov's plan at 
the time. Welles did not believe Washington should put much
2 Welles to Roosevelt, January 12,1933, box 149, folder 1, Welles papers, FDR Library. By the end of 1933, 
Roosevelt formally recognized the Soviet regime, sending William C. Bullitt a s  ambassador. For an account that 
Moscow and Washington came together out of mutual distrust of Japan, see  Robert L. Morris, "A 
R eassessm ent of Russian Recognition," The Historian, vol. 24, no. 4 (August 1962), 480-482. For an account 
arguing that Welles opposed Russian recognition see  Robert E. Bowers, "Hull, Russian Subversion in Cuba, 
and Recognition of foe U.S.S.R.," The Journal of American History, vol. 53, no. 3 (December 1956), 542-554.
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stock in a plan devised in the Kremlin.3
At the same time, Welles had poor relations with the state 
department’s Russian specialists, led by Robert Kelley, the 
head of the Eastern Europe Division (1926-1937) and an admirer 
of Czarist Russia who had supervised the training of George 
Kennan, Loy Henderson and Charles Bohlen. During these years 
the administration contained two antagonistic camps regarding 
Russia. One side, consisting of Kelley, Kennan and Henderson, 
had been schooled in the environs of Riga during the period of 
non-recognition, studying Russian language and culture and 
socializing with Russian exiles, Baltic peoples and other 
opponents of the Soviet system.4 The other faction consisted of 
Welles, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Joseph Davies (1937-1938), 
Henry Wallace and Eleanor Roosevelt. Welles believed that 
despite all of the difficulties, Washington should seek better 
relations with Moscow and attempt to work out the smoothest 
possible relationship. Shortly after Davies's appointment, 
Welles told the new ambassador that "friendly relations and 
cooperation should be restored particularly in view of the 
Chinese-Japanese situation and the possibility of world war 
starting in Europe."3 Ambassador Davies agreed, and was subject 
to constant criticism from the Riga camp, who believed Welles 
and Davies to be naive.6
Loy Henderson, who had served William Bullitt in Moscow, 
often as his acting chief of mission, warned his fellow 
Russianists that Welles was "extremely able and ambitious" and 
"impatient with any person or thing that might restrict his
3 Memorandum of conversation, by Welles, March 23, 1938, FRUS. The Soviet Untan, 1938, 541; Sumner 
Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 318-320. He also notably ignored Moscow during his 
1940 mission to Europe. Welles instead arranged to have Soviet specialist George Kennan meet him in Italy to 
offer advice. But upon arriving in Italy, Welles ignored Kennan and left him stranded in Rome. George Kennan, 
Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 115-116.
4 Thomas R. Maddux, "Watching Stalin Maneuver Between Hitler and the West: American Diplomats and Soviet 
Diplomacy, 1934-1939." Diplomatic History, vol.1, no. 2 (Spring, 1977), 142-143; Daniel F. Harrington, "Kennan, 
Bohlen, and the Riga Axioms." Diplomatic History, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall, 1978), 424.
5 Thomas Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union. 1933-1941 
(Tallahassee: University P resses of Florida, 1980), 90.
6 There may have been some truth in that charge. During Davies's tenure, which coincided with the height of 
the Moscow show trials, he sent Welles numerous "backchannel" communications, recounting his "great 
admiration" for Stalin and praising the Soviet dictator for having done so much "for the benefit of common men." 
Davies to Welles, June 28, 1937, Welles to Davies, July 23, 1937, box 40, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL; 
Davies to Welles, March 1,1938, box 45, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL; "Interview with Stalin and Molotov," by 
Davies, June 9,1938, box 166, USSR files, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.
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activities or block his advancement." Robert Kelley would 
discover this for himself in June 1937, when Welles, 
reorganizing the department, summoned Kelley to his office to 
inform him that his job had been abolished, exiling him to a 
posting in Turkey. "We have been liquidated," Kelley lamented 
to his colleagues.7
The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 had 
shattered most good will Welles had for the Russians. Hitler's 
"carrot" for Stalin in the Pact included an opportunity for the 
Soviet Union to recover the western territories of the old 
Russian Empire lost during the First World War. These included 
Estonia and Latvia, the Rumanian province of Bessarabia, and 
dominance in Finland (but not at this stage Lithuania). Stalin 
also made substantial territorial gains at Poland's expense.» 
Welles summed up the administration's disapproval of Moscow's 
aggression against Poland during a tense meeting with Soviet 
Ambassador Constantine Oumansky (1939-1941), who brought along 
the new counselor at the Soviet embassy, Andrei Gromyko. 
Welles, angry about the Soviet invasion of Poland, sat in 
sullen silence as Oumansky nervously sought to make 
conversation. After the meeting Welles reported that he had 
deliberately "adopted a completely negative attitude throughout 
the conversation, making it necessary for the Ambassador to 
take the initiative in any topics he brought up, even though 
conversation lapsed upon occasion for as much as a minute or 
two." 9
When the "Winter War" between the U.S.S.R. and Finland 
began on November 30, 1939, Welles's mood darkened further, and 
for a time he considered recommending the severing of 
diplomatic relations with the Kremlin. Moscow's subsequent 
actions in August 1940, absorbing the Baltic states of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, also angered Welles and further
7 H.W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Risa of the American Empire 1918-1961 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 78-79,111; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War 
and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 34.
8 Memorandum by Welles, November 17, 1939, FRUS. The Soviet Union, 1939, 794-795; T document 228, 
"Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939-1941," January 23,1943, box 62, Notter Files, Record Group 59, National 
Archives [all planning documents and minutes are from the Notter files, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
unless otherwise noted].
9 Memorandum by Welles, November 17,1939. FRUS. The Soviet Union, 1939, 794-795.
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soured Washington's relations with the Soviets. Welles saw the 
terms of incorporation as totally contrary to international 
law. Only a year before, the Baltic states had been admitted to 
the League of Nations, thus confirming their sovereign status. 
But the Nazi-Soviet Pact justified their disappearance on the 
grounds that they were geographically and historically part of 
Russia. Fraudulent elections held in each country in mid-July 
had returned majorities which immediately called for their 
admission into the Soviet Union.10 In response, the State 
Department froze the assets of the Baltic nations and Welles 
issued a statement to the press calling the elections 
"devious," adding that the tiny Baltic nations had been 
"deliberately annihilated" by a larger and more powerful Soviet 
Union which practiced "predatory activities" backed by "the use 
of force . . .  . "ii
Welles advised the president that while there was little 
they could do about the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states, 
they should refuse to acknowledge its legality by continuing to 
recognize the Baltic diplomatic missions and consulates.^ 
United States policy toward incorporation (as publicly 
articulated by Welles himself) was clears the United States 
would not recognize the disappearance of the Baltic states and 
would remain "opposed to any form of intervention on the part 
of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any 
other sovereign state, however weak."^
To give substance to U.S. disapproval of Soviet actions in 
the Baltic, the administration imposed a "moral embargo" to 
curtail trade with the Soviet Union. Washington placed numerous 
restrictions on imports from the Soviet Union and even more
10 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision. 169; “Statement respecting the Baltic Republics by Acting 
Secretary of State Welles, July 23,1940," Department of State Bulletin. 1940, III, 48. For the admission of the 
Baltic sta tes into the Soviet Union see, for example, David Kirby, "Incorporation: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," 
in Graham Smith, ed., The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 78-80. Stalin seem s to have concluded that mere protectorate status for the 
Baltic sta tes did not meet Moscow's security needs vis a  vis Germany. See, for example, Jonathan Haslam, 
"Soviet War-Aims," in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance: 1941- 
1945 (London: Macmillan, 1995), 29.
11 Press statem ent by Welles, July 23,1940, FRUS. 1940 ,1,401 -402.
12 Welles to Roosevelt, August 19,1940, FRUS. 1,1940,424-425.
13 Statement by Welles, July 23, 1940, FRUS. 1940, I, 401-402. Welles had apparently forgotten his 
proconsulships in the Dominican Republic and Cuba in 1933.
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stringent prohibitions were placed on American exports to the 
U.S.S.R. Roosevelt also considered breaking off diplomatic 
relations. He had earlier complained to Welles about Moscow's 
"downright rudeness" and suggested Welles tell Oumansky that 
"the President honestly wonders whether the Soviet Government 
considers it worthwhile to continue diplomatic relations." By 
the summer of 1940, relations between the two nations were at 
their lowest ebb since formal recognition in 1933.14
Welles remained angry at Moscow's indifference to 
international standards and world opinion. To Welles, Moscow's 
desire for security and territory on its western frontier flew 
in the face of Wilsonian strictures about territorial 
aggrandizement and self-determination. Welles assumed the 
"moral embargo" would influence Soviet behavior and throughout 
the war he believed the United States so economically strong 
and Moscow so desperate for U.S. aid that such sanctions could 
influence the Kremlin's aims. Welles also thought relations 
between Washington and Moscow were not completely irreparable. 
He believed German expansionism far and away a greater threat 
to U.S. interests than Soviet aims and he hoped the U.S.S.R. 
could provide a counterweight to Germany. He suspected that the 
nonaggression pact between Moscow and Berlin was incompatible 
with the long term aims of both nations and he became alert to 
the prospect of dissension between them. Furthermore, he 
thought France's abrupt defeat in June 1940 would alarm Stalin. 
After a meeting with British Ambassador Lord Lothian during 
France's collapse, Welles noted that "while there was no 
indication that the Soviet Union was as yet prepared to break 
away from her agreements with Germany, there was a very clear 
indication that increasing apprehension existed on the part of 
Mr. Molotov and of the Soviet Government with regard to the 
unexpected German victories and the strengthening of Germany's 
position vis-a-vis Russia as a result thereof."15
Welles broached with the president the possibility of 
opening discussions with Ambassador Oumansky as a way to offer
14 Roosevelt to Hull and Welles, December 22, 1939, FRUS. The Soviet Union, 1939, 868-869; Welles 
memorandum of conversation with Oumansky, July 27,1940, FRUS. 1940, III, 327-331.
15 Welles, The Time For Decision. 169-171; Welles memorandum of conversation, June 18,1940. FRUS. 1940, 
vol. Ill, 321-322.
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subtle inducements to improve relations with the Russians and 
to explore the depths of the relationship between Moscow and 
Berlin. Welles expected no immediate shifts in Soviet policy, 
but may only have sought, as Thomas Maddux has argued, to keep 
Stalin "on the fence" by deterring Moscow from any alliance 
with Japan, while at the same time encouraging any possibility 
of friction between the Soviet Union and Germany, is Welles may 
also have hoped that the establishment of high-level personal 
contacts would reassure Moscow of Washington's good faith. 
Furthermore, with France now out of the war and Britain 
isolated and cut off from the continent, Welles concluded that 
whatever Washington's true feelings about the regime in Moscow, 
the Soviet Union offered the only hope of defeating Germany on 
the continent. 17
Welles would hold twenty-seven meetings with Oumansky in 
the year between the fall of France and the outbreak of war 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. Sometimes their 
discussions would drag on for many hours, covering issues as 
specific as Moscow's requests for machine tools, and addressing 
matters as large as the balance of power. The Welles-Oumansky 
contacts would have important consequences for later Soviet- 
American relations during the war, as their meetings would help 
lay the groundwork for the Grand Alliance. Welles also hoped 
such contacts might enable the United States to conduct 
detailed discussions with Soviet officials without the 
interference of London. Welles remained suspicious that the 
British would seek agreements with Moscow which would later 
prove embarrassing to the United States. He reasoned that 
contact with the Russians would make it more difficult for 
London to go behind Washington's back in any attempt to cut a 
deal with Moscow. He also sought to use the talks as a means to 
avoid a complete break in relations between Moscow and 
Washington. Welles urged caution when Roosevelt considered 
closing Soviet consulates in San Francisco and Los Angeles and 
imposing additional restrictions on Soviet diplomatic activity 
in Washington. Welles told the president that such actions
16 Thomas Maddux. Years of Estrangement. 128-129.
17 Welles memorandum, August 19, 1940, FRUS. 1940, vol. I, 424-425; Welles memorandum, December 10, 
1940, FRUS. 1940, vol. I, 534-535.
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"would render futile the efforts which we are making just now 
in a continuing series of negotiations that are going on with 
the Soviet Ambassador to remove some of the obstacles that 
might permit an improvement of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union." Welles also sought to pressure 
the Soviets to adhere to international standards. He thought he 
could achieve that aim by continuing the dialogue with Oumansky 
while maintaining recognition of the Baltic missions and 
consulates and keeping up the pressure of the "moral embargo."^ 
Initially, Welles and Oumansky discussed the Kremlin's 
desire to obtain export licenses for strategic items. Welles 
bluntly told Oumansky it would be difficult to fulfill any of 
his requests. Numerous points of contention existed such as
U.S. outrage over the nonaggression pact with Berlin, the 
subsequent division of spoils in Poland, Russian absorption of 
the Baltic states and the Winter War against Finland. Welles 
told Oumansky that while their two nations might disagree over 
particular issues such as the treatment of the Baltic peoples, 
they should "agree to disagree but that they would endeavor, so 
far as possible, to eliminate other points of disagreement 
between them."is
Welles's discussions with Oumansky soon provoked
opposition from the state department's Russian specialists, who 
feared that an "accomodationist" like Welles would concede too 
much to the Russians. "I do not need to labor the point with 
you that this is the wrong approach to these people," Loy 
Henderson wrote to Lawrence Steinhardt, the U.S. Ambassador in 
Moscow (1939-1941). "[The Russians] are realists, if ever there 
are any realists in this world ... I personally have some grave
doubts that our policy of so-called appeasement will get us any
place." Welles, sensing a desire on the part of Henderson and 
Kelley to sabotage the talks, sought to keep them in the dark 
about the substance of the negotiations. 20
Welles also emphasized to Oumansky the common interests of
18 Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Oumansky, August 1,1940, FRUS. 1940, III, 340-348; 
Welles to Roosevelt, August 19,1940, FRUS. I, 424-425.
19 Welles, The Time For Decision. 169-171; Welles memorandum of conversation with Oumansky, July 27, 
1940, FRUS. 1940, III, 327-331; memorandum of conversation between Welles and Oumansky, August 7, 
1940, EBUS, 1940, III, 358-361.
20 Brands, Inside the Cold War, 96-97.
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the United States and the Soviet Union in the Far East. He told 
Oumansky that Germany's pact with Japan posed a serious threat 
to the security of the USSR. He explicitly played the "Japan 
card" with the Russians, emphasizing that Japanese domination 
of China and the spread of Japanese hegemony in the region were 
contrary to the interests of both Washington and Moscow. 21 The 
Welles-Oumansky talks succeeded in offering Soviet officials 
evidence of the administration's willingness to seek better 
relations, paving the way for the United States to one day 
grant Lend-Lease aid to Moscow. For the Russians, the talks 
proved fruitful when Welles informed Oumansky in January 1941 
that the United States had decided to lift the year-long "moral 
embargo." 22
Around the same time, Welles obtained evidence from a 
confidential informant and other intelligence sources that 
proved "beyond the shadow of a doubt" that a German attack on 
Russia would be launched in the coming spring. He convinced 
Roosevelt and Hull that the information should be passed along 
to Oumansky.23 in March, Welles received a memorandum from a 
Greek diplomat in Washington giving further evidence that 
Germany would soon attack Russia. The following day, he 
provided Oumansky with this new evidence. Oumansky looked 
visibly stricken. "I fully realize the gravity of the message 
you have given me," the ambassador replied. "My government will 
be very grateful for your confidence and I will inform it 
immediately of our conversation."24 in subsequent meetings 
Welles continued to press his point that Washington and Moscow 
had a commonality of interests in seeing Hitler stopped, 
telling Oumansky that the Axis invasion of the Balkans in early 
April 1941 "must inevitably prove to be profoundly disquieting 
to the Soviet Government." 25
The Russians did little with these and other warnings
21 Welles memorandum of conversation with Oumansky, January 15, 1941, box 166, USSR files, folder 2, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Welles memorandum of conversation with Oumansky, March 20, 1941, box 166, USSR 
files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL.
22 Welles to Roosevelt, January 9,1941, FRUS. 1941 ,1, 685-686; Brands, Inside the Cold War. 97; Welles to 
Oumansky, January 21,1941. FRUS. I, 696.
23 Sumner Welles. The Time For Decision. 170.
24 Memorandum by Welles, March 20,1941, FRUS. 1941 ,1, 723; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision. 171.
25 Memorandum by Welles, April 9,1941, FRUS. 1941 ,1, 735-736.
220
about the impending German attack. Stalin may have thought that 
he could continue to finesse the diplomatic situation in Europe 
indefinitely, or perhaps the Russians thought that such 
warnings were merely a western attempt to trick Moscow into a 
war with Germany.26 when the German attack finally occurred on 
June 22, 1941, Welles, serving as acting secretary of state, 
sensed an opportunity to underscore to the American people the 
radically changed nature of the war. He and Roosevelt sought to 
expand America's role as the German threat increased and wanted 
publicly to promise aid to the Soviet Union.27 one day before 
the attack, the department's division of European affairs had 
prepared a memorandum outlining what American policy should be 
in the event of war between Russia and Germany. The division 
continued to take a cautious attitude toward Russia, warning 
that the United States should make no promise of aid. "We 
should steadfastly adhere to the line that the Soviet Union is 
fighting Germany does not mean that it is defending, struggling 
for, or adhering to, the principles in international relations 
which we are supporting."28
Welles did not share the division's cautious views, 
despite the fact that many analysts gave Moscow little more 
than three weeks to three months of resistance. On the morning 
of June 23, he met with Roosevelt in the president's bedroom to 
show him a draft of his proposed statement on the U.S. reaction 
to the German attack. Roosevelt approved Welles's suggestions: 
the United States would release Soviet economic credits and 
promise American aid under its policy of giving assistance to 
any nation fighting Axis aggression. These decisions would 
prove significant to the outcome of the war and, in particular,
26 Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe. From Munich to Yalta 
(Chicago: Ivan Dee.1993), 87. Stalin's suspicions perhaps had some basis in fact. Only a  few hours after the 
German invasion of Russia, Halifax told Welles that he felt optimistic that if Germany quickly defeated Russia 
"Hitler would then present a  plausible peace proposal based upon the fact that he had defeated communism 
and established a new order in Europe and was no longer anxious to continue hostilities against Great Britain, 
or undertake them with the United States." S ee  memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, 
June 22, 1941, box 163, Great Britain files, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL. For the view that the German 
invasion did not catch Stalin completely by surprise, see, for example, Louis Rotundo, "Stalin and the Outbreak 
of War in 1941," Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 24, no. 2 (April 1989), 277-299.
27 Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision. 171-172.
28 "Policy with Regard to the Soviet Union in the C ase of the Outbreak of War Between the Soviet Union and 
Germany," by the Division of European Affairs, June 21,1941. FRUS. 1941 ,1,766-767.
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to wartime US-Soviet relations.29
"If any further proof could conceivably be required of the 
real purposes and projects of the present leaders of Germany 
for world domination," Welles told a packed press conference 
later that day, "it is now furnished by Hitler's treacherous 
attack upon Soviet R u s s i a .  "30
In Washington, skepticism deepened over the prospects for 
the Soviet Union’s survival. Within the state department, the 
Russianists remained doubtful of Moscow’s chances and of 
Russia's suitability as a prospective recipient of U.S. aid. 
Throughout much of the nation Welles's remarks met with 
outright hostility. "The Reds," exclaimed an editorial in 
Hearst's New York Journal American, "are now a greater menace 
than ever to our well-being because of the virtual endorsement 
of Russia as a 'democratic' ally of the USA by the mouthpiece 
of the administration, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles." 
Ohio's Robert Taft told the Senate: "The victory of Communism 
in the world would be far more dangerous to the United States 
than a victory of Fascism," and Senator Burton Wheeler of 
Montana added, "I don't think the American people will stand 
for us to tie up with the Communists. . . . Now we can just let 
Joe Stalin and the other dictators fight it out." John T. Flynn 
of the America First Committee declared, "If Germany wins, 
Russia will go Fascist. If Russia wins, Germany will go 
Communist. There is no chance for us at all. The question now 
is, are we going to fight to make Europe safe for Communism? " 3i 
Welles nevertheless sought to assist the Russian war 
effort in every way he could, ensuring that Moscow's orders for 
war materials were expedited quickly and publicly proclaiming 
America's solidarity with the USSR. When Oumansky presented 
Welles with extensive shopping lists for war material, Welles
29 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared W ar 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 1953), 336- 
343.
30 Welles to Steinhardt, June 23, 1941, FRUS. 1941, I, 767-768; original drafts of Welles's statement on 
German invasion of Russia, June 23,1941, box 166, USSR files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL.
31 New York Journal American. August 4, 1941; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War. 542. Missouri 
Senator Harry S. Truman added: "If we se e  that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is 
winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill a s  many as possib le. . . Vojtech Mastny, Russia's 
Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy. Warfare, and the Politics of Communism. 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979), 39, 22.
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sped the requests to the appropriate departments and a g e n c i e s . 32 
Welles became progressively more concerned about good relations 
with the Kremlin than about relations with Whitehall, primarily 
because the aims of the Soviet Union loomed more important to 
the cause of future world stability. Relations between 
Washington and Moscow remained relatively good during Welles1s 
years at state partly because he and Roosevelt made an effort 
to treat the Russians as equals, but also because some of the 
difficulties that would come to strain the relationship, such 
as the Baltic states and Poland, had not yet come to a boil. 
Central to the strategy of making Moscow an equal partner was 
Welles's inclination to address Russian aims by showing that he 
understood and respected Moscow's interests. Welles also was 
particularly anxious to secure Stalin's approval of his postwar 
plans. To Welles's mind, Moscow had not yet taken actions that 
blatantly contradicted the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and 
he held out hope that he and the planners might come up with a 
means to redirect or moderate Moscow's a i m s . 33
* * *
Differences between Washington and London over how to 
respond to Russian territorial demands often set Welles at odds 
with British officials. Welles feared that any attempt by 
London to meet Russian demands in either Poland or the Baltic 
states would undermine the chances for the peace to be founded 
upon the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter. But the 
British had their own ideas about how the Russians should be 
approached. Two months before Barbarossa, Foreign Secretary 
Eden had raised the possibility of recognizing Stalin's recent
32 “Why Help the Soviet Union?" by Sumner Welles, American Federation Clubwoman. November 1941; 
Acheson to Welles, July 8, 1941, box 166, USSR files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; Oumansky to Welles, 
July 29, 1941. FRUS. 1941, I, 798.
33 "Why Help the Soviet Union?" by Sumner Welles, American Federation Clubwoman. November 1941; Welles 
to Loy Henderson, July 16, 1941, box 166, USSR files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of 
conversation between Welles and Litvinov, February 23, 1942, February 23, 1942, FRUS. Ill, 693-694; P 
document 34, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," August 12, 1942, box 56, Notter 
files; "Free Access to Raw Materials," by Sumner Welles, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Political Subcommittee Minutes, meeting 4 (P minutes 4), March 28, 1942, Notter files, 
National Archives; Welles, The Time For Decision. 306-335.
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territorial acquisitions obtained between 1939-1940,34 and for 
some months after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
Stalin sought British recognition of his new territorial 
spoils.35 Churchill, Attlee and many other British officials 
were strongly resistant to any concessions and for a time 
London refused to recognize the USSR's new boundaries.36
At the end of 1941, Stalin showed his hand to the British. 
He made clear that he strongly desired recognition of Russia's 
pre-Barbarossa frontiers, which included the Baltic states, a 
large portion of Poland, part of Finland and portions of 
Rumania such as Bukovina and Bessarabia.3? Eden and other 
foreign office officials worried that Stalin might try to 
obtain a separate peace with Hitler and they sought concessions 
to Stalin to keep him in the war.33 Eden wanted to smooth 
relations with Moscow as much as possible, but he realized that 
any attempt to appease the Kremlin would be difficult to 
reconcile with the principles enunciated in the Atlantic 
Charter. Eden anticipated that the Americans would oppose any 
settlement contrary to the spirit of the charter.3»
Another major obstacle to London's desire to mollify 
Stalin came from those nations that would have to make the 
actual concessions to the Russians in Eastern Europe. The
34 FO 371/29464 Eden to Cripps, April 17,1941, British Public Record Office (PRO).
35 These initial war aims seem  to have been concluded in vague outline in Stalin's mind during the period prior 
to Barbarossa. See, for example, Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet War Aims," in The Rise and Fall of the Grand 
Alliance. 1941-1945. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 22-39.
36 FO 371/32875 "Policy Toward Russia," by Anthony Eden, January 28, 1942, PRO; Memorandum of 
Conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 18, 1942, FRUS. Ill, 512-514; FO 371/32877, Eden to 
Churchill, March 6, 1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in ihe Second World War, Vol.ll, 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), 236.
37 "First" Stalin cabied Churchill, "there is no definite understanding between our two countries concerning war 
aims and plans tor the post-war organization of peace, secondly, there is no treaty between the U.S.S.R. and 
Great Britain on mutual military aid against Hitler. Until understanding is reached on these two main points, not 
only will there be no clarity in Anglo-Soviet relations, but, if we are to speak frankly, there will be no mutual 
trust." See Gardner, Spheres of Influence. 108; and Albert Resis, "Spheres of Influence in Soviet Wartime 
Diplomacy," Journal of Modern History, vol. 53, no. 3 (September 1981), 431.
38 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy. 239, 244; Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Prospects of a 
Separate P eace in World War II," American Historical Review, vol. 77, no. 5 (December 1972), 1367. "On 
balance,” Mastny writes, "any Russian efforts to come to terms with Germany before Stalingrad may be 
dismissed a s  mere products of anxious imagination." [page 1369]. For the view that Washington was more 
concerned about a  separate peace than London, see, for example, Keith Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at 
War: the War they Fought and the Peace they Hoped to Make (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), 142.
39 FO 371/32875 "Policy Toward Russia," by Anthony Eden, January 28,1942, PRO; Winant to Hull, January 
19, 1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 494-503.
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Poles, for example, presented a significant problem for British 
aims. Welles had become more involved with the Polish 
government-in-exile. He understood that Polish suspicions of 
Moscow's ambitions ran deep and were often stronger than their 
hatred of Germany.*o Welles feared London would not hesitate to 
violate the principles of the Atlantic Charter in pursuit of an 
accord with Moscow. Prior to the German attack on the Soviet 
Union, Welles warned Halifax of the dangers of recognizing 
Soviet gains. Halifax stunned Welles with his cynicism toward 
the Baltic states. The ambassador described the Baltic region 
as populated with people whom he did not think deserved "very 
much respect or consideration," and whose fate might easily be 
exchanged for Stalin's future good will. Halifax reminded 
Welles that the Baltic peoples had only been independent of 
Russia for two decades, thus it would not much matter if they 
once again lost their freedom. Welles angrily responded that 
recognizing Stalin's "loot" was hardly distinguishable from 
accepting what Hitler had already done to a number of small 
nations in Europe. He asked the British diplomat if such views 
extended to Finland, which had also achieved its independence 
from Russia at the end of World War I. Halifax merely replied 
that he "did not have the same respect and regard for the 
Baltic peoples that he did for the Finnish people."«■
Polish officials, fearing an anticipated British effort to 
reach an accord with Moscow, appealed to Welles for help, 
warning that territorial concessions to Stalin would be 
contrary to American ideals. The Polish ambassador in 
Washington, Jan Ciechanowski, told Welles he hoped "if and when 
Russia turned to the United States for assistance, [Washington 
would] insist that Russia agree to restore to the Polish people 
that portion of Polish territory which had been occupied by
40 For example, prior to the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, Polish officials told Welles that they opposed 
the possibility of an Anglo-Russian joint guarantee for fear of Russian domination of Poland. Memorandum of 
conversation between Welles and Polish Ambassador Potocki, "General European Situation," August 22,1939, 
box 165, Poland, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL. Poland and the other nations of Eastern and Central Europe 
had good reason to fear Russia's territorial appetite. The 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the subsequent 
peace had led to the independence of much of Russia's western empire, with the loss of many of the Czarist 
possessions which had been am assed during the previous two centuries. Stalin had shown his desire to regain 
these territories in his 1939 pact with Hitler. See Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War. 5-11; Gardner, 
Spheres of Influence. 58-59.
41 Welles memorandum of conversation with Halifax, June 15, 1941, box 163, Great Britain files, folder 4, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
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Russia as a result of the partition agreement with Germany."42
Through his extensive meetings with Oumansky, Welles had 
already experienced the depth of Russian paranoia over its 
western frontier,«  and Welles continued to worry that any 
Anglo-Soviet accord would violate several tenets of the 
Atlantic Charter. He nonetheless reassured the Poles that their 
territorial integrity and their right to self-determination 
would be upheld under the charter.44 During subsequent meetings 
with Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski, Ambassador Ciechanowski 
and Foreign Minister Edward Raczynski, the Poles warned Welles 
that Eden's efforts to sign a treaty with Stalin would 
completely undermine their independence. Sikorski warned Welles 
that if the British appeased the Kremlin by confirming Russia's 
pre-1941 borders, the traditional Russian hunger for territory 
would soon extend to the Balkans, Iran and even the 
Dardanelles. Welles told the Poles that the Atlantic Charter's 
call for disarmament of the aggressor nations, particularly 
Germany, would provide Moscow with sufficient security to avoid 
Soviet meddling in Poland or outright territorial annexations. 
The pace of events seemed to dictate otherwise, while Welles 
clung to the naive belief that the Atlantic Charter could 
govern the behavior of Moscow. Welles continued to believe that 
the great power politics of the past would disappear in the new 
order, while regionalism would enable the great powers to 
eschew formal spheres of influence.«
While British officials hoped Roosevelt would accept an
42 Welles memorandum of conversation with Ciechanowski, June 26, 1941, FRUS. 1941, I. 237-238. Loy 
Henderson, analyzing a  Moscow meeting between the Polish Prime Minister General Wladyslaw Sikorski and 
Stalin in December 1941, further warned Welles that a  "number of outstanding difficulties between Sikorski and 
Stalin were apparently found to be insoluble. Discussion of some of them was postponed to the indefinite 
future, others were left in an unclarified state and will undoubtedly give rise to considerable friction." Henderson 
to Welles, April 8,1942, box 165, Poland files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL
43 When, in the spring of 1941, Welles broached the possibility of extending Red Cross relief to Soviet- 
occupied Eastern Poland, Oumansky flatly rejected such aid by charging that Moscow could not allow any 
"foreign agents" in Soviet-controlled territory. Welles indignantly replied that Oumansky's recalcitrance would 
hardly "promote a closer interchange" between Washington and Moscow. See Welles memorandum of 
conversation with Oumansky, April 9,1941, box 166, USSR files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL
44 Welles to Roosevelt, February 19, 1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 107-108; memorandum of conversation by 
Welles, March 6,1942. FRUS. Ill, 1942, 114-116.
45 Memorandum of conversation, by Welles, March 6, 1942. FRUS. Ill, 114-115; memorandum of Welles 
conversation with Sikorski, March 25, 1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 123-133; Sumner Welles, "Political Cooperation 
During the War - A Lost Opportunity," (c.1950) in Warren Kimball, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World 
Crisis. 1937-1945 (London; D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), 127-128.
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accord with Moscow, they feared that Welles would pose a 
serious obstacle. Welles worried that the British desire for a 
treaty with Moscow would destroy the principle of self- 
determination and his continued discussions with Halifax did 
nothing to allay his concerns. He thought the British were 
reverting back to the "worst phase of the spirit of Munich." 
"Could it be conceivable," he asked Halifax in February 1942, 
"that any healthy and lasting world order could be created on a 
foundation which implied the utter ignoring of all of the 
principles of independence, liberty, and self-determination 
which were set forth in the Atlantic Charter? If that was the 
kind of world we had to look forward to, I did not believe that 
the people of the United States would wish to be parties 
thereto. "46 some attention must be paid, he argued, to the 
wishes of the people in the areas in question. He was 
specifically concerned that a territorial agreement between 
Moscow and London so early in the war would be reminiscent of 
the secret treaties of the First World War. Why not let such 
issues wait until a peace conference, where everything could be 
put on the table? Welles told Halifax he "saw no hope for a 
stable and peaceful world in the future unless the new world 
order were built upon principles which could be maintained and 
to which adherence would be consistent. What peace could be 
envisaged if at this early stage in the war the British 
Government and ourselves agreed upon selling out millions of 
people who looked to us as their one hope in the future and if 
that new world order were based upon the domination of 
unwilling, resentful, and potent minorities by a state to which 
they would never give willing allegiance?"47
Welles warned Halifax that the president thought the 
British were acting "provincial." Welles said he believed any 
secret agreement with the Russians would violate the "sacred 
principles" of the Atlantic Charter in a "devious fashion" and 
might provoke "the most serious crisis" in the relations 
between the United States and Great Britain. "The American 
people," Welles added, "would regard such an agreement as a
46 Welles memorandum of conversation with Halifax, February 18,1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 520.
47 ibid.
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shameful violation of one of the chief objectives for which 
they believed they were fighting." Welles thought Halifax 
desired another Munich agreement —  this time with Moscow. "The 
Baltic States had in fact been independent and self-governing 
republics," Welles lectured Halifax, "it was unquestionably 
true that the vast majority of the peoples of those three 
nations did not desire domination, direct or indirect, by the 
Soviet Union; and the basic principles enunciated in the 
Atlantic Charter would be violated if either Great Britain or 
the United States secretly agreed now to turn these peoples 
over to Russian domination." Halifax became alarmed when Welles 
hinted that Roosevelt desired direct discussions with Stalin 
over these matters. Halifax instead sought to have Roosevelt 
talk to Ambassador Litvinov. 48
Welles bristled when Halifax charged that he was not being 
"realistic." To mollify Welles, Halifax handed him foreign 
office memoranda explaining that Stalin should be appeased to 
ensure a postwar "balance of power" in Europe. One memorandum 
accused Roosevelt of being "unduly optimistic in supposing that 
some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the 
Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin." Halifax 
argued that Moscow had obtained territory in Finland, the 
Baltic states, Bessarabia and Bukovina through legitimate 
treaties and plebiscites, thus meeting the requirements of the 
Atlantic Charter. Halifax's documentation also warned that the 
alternative to appeasing Stalin would be "the establishment of 
Communistic Governments in the majority of European countries." 
Halifax and Eden sought to convince Welles that the Russians 
might seek a separate peace and would refuse to cooperate in 
the Far East. Furthermore, foreign office officials suggested 
that sacrificing the Baltic states might serve as a useful 
tradeoff for future Russian cooperation on territorial matters 
more vital to the British in the Dardanelles and the Persian
Gulf .49
Halifax's comments, coupled with the foreign office's
48 Memorandum of conversation with Halifax, "British-Soviet negotiations," February 20,1942, box 166, USSR 
files, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL.
49 "Aide-Memoire by the British Foreign Office," February 1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 524-525; "Substance of 
telegram "B" from the Foreign Office to Lord Halifax," February 1942, box 166, USSR files, folder 3, Welles 
papers, FDRL.
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memoranda, did nothing to reassure Welles. He thought the 
British approach smacked of the worst excesses of "old 
diplomacy," where the great powers parceled out territory 
without ever considering the aspirations of the peoples 
affected. Welles saw no contradiction between his criticism of 
the old diplomacy and his discussions in the planning 
committees about reordering the world in accord with U.S. 
interests. When Moscow or London sought to reshape borders and 
nations, it was the same old division of the spoils, but Welles 
assumed that the United States played a different role in world 
affairs, one unencumbered by self-interest and the desire for 
territorial aggrandizement. He believed the United States acted 
from mostly altruistic impulses. Eden's Private Secretary, 
Oliver Harvey, complained that Welles was "full of difficulties 
and objection" on the issue of Eastern Europe. Whenever Halifax 
approached Welles with proposals for concessions to Stalin, the 
under secretary protested that the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter must be strictly upheld. Halifax warned him that the 
ideals of the charter would not stand a chance in Eastern 
Europe after the war unless Moscow felt secure with its postwar 
neighbors. Welles blandly responded that an Anglo-American 
pledge to contain Germany at the end of the war might be 
sufficient to satisfy the Kremlin’s security c o n c e r n s .so
In a meeting in early March 1942 with Welles and Admiral 
William Standley, the new U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union 
(February 1942-September 1943), Roosevelt warned that any 
secret agreements on the Baltic states "would be in violation 
not only of the Atlantic Charter but of the basic principles 
for which we are fighting." Roosevelt told Welles that he 
should "undertake to keep the British in line" and that perhaps 
after the war plebiscites might be held in the disputed 
territories to determine the true desires of the population. 
Roosevelt repeated to Welles that such difficulties might 
magically disappear if only a personal meeting could be 
arranged between himself and Stalin.si
50 FO 371/32876, Halifax to Foreign Office, February 20,1942, PRO; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The 
Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 323-24.
51 Memorandum of conversation between Welles, Standley and Roosevelt, March 5, 1942, box 166, USSR 
files, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL
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Eden explained to Churchill that London should immediately 
embark upon full discussions with Stalin on territorial 
matters s " . . . for such exchanges to take place with any
chance of success," Eden wrote, "it is indispensable that we 
should first clear this frontier question out of the way. 
Otherwise Stalin will neither talk nor listen." Eden hoped that 
an immediate agreement on frontiers might limit Russian 
territorial ambitions later.52 Churchill subsequently cabled 
Roosevelt, suggesting that "the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter ought not be construed so as to deny to Russia the 
frontiers which she occupied when Germany attacked her. . . .  I 
hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to 
sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible." Yet 
officials in London remained concerned that Welles would play 
the spoiler. Thus Eden told Halifax to explain carefully to 
Welles that the war cabinet felt it "very desirable to have 
early discussions with the Russians on the whole conduct of the 
war in order, if possible, to find out what is on their minds. 
We are convinced that this will be impossible until Stalin's 
demands are got out of the way."S3
In early April, Welles expressed to Halifax his 
disappointment that the rough outlines of the agreement between 
London and Moscow "contained nothing in the nature of any 
safeguard for the peoples of the Baltic republics." Welles 
proposed that measures be taken —  such as population 
adjustments —  to protect those who did not wish to be 
incorporated into the Soviet empire. Welles said that such 
safeguards would be "not only far more nearly in accord with 
the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, but would in my judgement, 
make it far easier for American public opinion to attempt to 
tolerate the transaction involved in the proposed treaty."5*
The British decided that the need for an accord with 
Moscow was so great that they should comply with most of 
Stalin’s territorial demands in the Baltic, without regard to 
any of the stipulations Welles desired. He deplored the
52 FO 371/32877, Eden to Churchill, March 6,1942, PRO.
53 FO 371/32877, Churchill to Roosevelt March 7,1942, PRO; FO 371/32877, Eden to Halifax, March 7,1942, 
PRO.
54 Memorandum of conversation with Halifax, by Welles, April 1,1942, FRUS. 1942, ill, 538.
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impending treaty between London and Moscow. "In my own 
judgement," Welles wrote to Berle, "the treaty violated the 
clear terms of the Atlantic Charter and is indefensible from 
every moral standpoint, and equally indefensible from the 
standpoint of the future peace and stability of Europe."He told 
Berle that he felt more strongly about the agreement than any 
other matter which had come before him in recent years. "The 
attitude of the British Government is, in my judgement, not 
only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise 
extraordinarily stupid," he wrote. "I am confident that no 
sooner will this treaty have been signed than Great Britain 
will be confronted with new additional demands for the 
recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to occupy 
Bucovina, Bessarabia, and very likely eastern Poland and 
northern Norway."55
The final version of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty stipulated 
that neither side would sign an armistice with the Axis powers 
without the consent of the other, f
' _ The two powers also agreed not to seek territory as 
the spoils of war and to avoid interfering in the internal 
affairs of other nations.55 Yet for all this, the treaty also 
illustrated the limits of Anglo-American solidarity. Welles 
remained angry. He harbored serious doubts about the future 
territorial integrity of Poland and feared the British were too 
willing to give the Russians a free hand in Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic region, just so long as Moscow would respect 
Britain's more vital interests elsewhere. He worried that the 
British had only appeased Stalin's minimum aims and he declared 
he was in "full accord" with Adolf Berle's characterization of
55 Welles to Berle, April 4 ,1942, box 164, Great Britain files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL. Even Alexander 
Cadogan thought that Eden was too willing "to throw to the winds all principles." See Mastny, Russia's Road to 
the Cold War. 45.
56 Llewellvn Woodward. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. 194-196.
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the Anglo-Soviet Treaty as a "Baltic Munich."57
One week after the signing of the treaty, the British 
Minister in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, sought to reassure 
Welles that it was in accord with the aims of the Atlantic 
Charter.58 Despite British reassurances, Welles remained 
steadfastly opposed to the treaty, which he continued to fear 
had set a dangerous precedent for allied cooperation.
Nevertheless, the United States had some leverage over the 
British and could easily have put up a more vigorous protest, 
or pressured London in some other way. Perhaps Welles thought 
Washington could offer no viable alternative to the treaty. 
Perhaps he secretly feared it was the best outcome possible 
under the circumstances and that it was better to let the 
British take the lead in making concessions to Stalin.5* 
Whatever the case, Welles soon became animated by a desire to 
have the United States make its own way in its relations with 
the Soviet Union. He thought that as a preliminary step the 
postwar planning committees should examine Soviet war aims in 
more detail. Thus due to the fears raised by the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty, in the late spring of 1942 Welles led the postwar 
planning committees on a detailed examination of Soviet foreign 
policy aims.
* * *
Welles’s leadership of the postwar planning committees 
significantly shaped his views about Soviet-American relations. 
The planning process also influenced the numerous members, many 
of whom would shape American opinion and policy in the years to
57 Welles to Berle, April 4,1942, box 164, Great Britain files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; Berle Diary, March
28,1942, box 213, Berle papers, FDRL. President Roosevelt told Welles that an American endorsem ent of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty "would mean that I tear up the Atlantic Charter before the ink is dry on it. I will not do that." 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt subsequently told Molotov that he had no serious objections to the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty. See memorandum of conversation among Molotov, Roosevelt, and Hopkins, May 29, 1942, FRUS. 
1942, III, 569.
58 Memorandum of conversation with Ronald Campbell, by Welles, containing text of foreign office telegram, 
June 1, 1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 583-585.
59 o ther members of the administration may have felt similarly. When Welles told Berle that the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty was presenting Washington with a  fait accompli in Eastern Europe, Berle confided in his diary: "I am 
afraid this is true. I am also afraid that every British politician will get behind us and insist that we, in substance, 
did it" Berle Diary, April 4,1942, box 213, Berle papers, FDRL
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c o m e .so Their discussions of Moscow's aims were based on a 
number of assumptions. First, they believed Moscow must be a 
full partner in building the postwar world and an active 
participant in the new world organization. They also assumed 
that after the war the U.S.S.R. would demand the recognition of 
its pre-1941 boundaries, thus posing a number of political 
problems for those who sought to have the USSR meet the 
requirements of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. The 
planners felt it had been difficult enough to urge London to 
apply the charter within the British Empire, whereas Moscow's 
aims would pose another problem altogether.6i
The planners also had come to believe that despite the 
prospect of postwar economic aid, the U.S. might have little 
leverage to counter Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe. Welles 
and his colleagues thus began their investigations with some 
understanding of the realities of the region. Welles believed 
some means must be found to subordinate particular differences 
with the Soviets, while emphasizing the larger cause of Grand 
Alliance harmony. Yet for all this, Welles understood that as 
Moscow's aims in Eastern Europe became clearer, the task of 
soothing U.S. public opinion would become more d i f f i c u l t . 62
Welles wanted the planners to come up with recommendations 
to resolve these problems. The divergence between Soviet and 
American war aims was uppermost in their minds and, as early as 
December 1941, the department's planning staff sought to find 
areas where the great powers agreed on various subjects treated 
in the Atlantic C h a r t e r .63 with regard to the charter's article
60 It bears repeating that this impressive roster included Senators Tom Connally, Warren Austin, Walter 
George, Wallace White and Elbert Thomas; Representatives Charles Eaton, Sol Blum, Luther Johnson; 
administration figures such as Dean Acheson, Adolf Berle, and eventually Cordell Hull himself; and other 
shapers of public opinion such a s  Anne O'Hare McCormick, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Jam es 
T. Shotwell and Archibald MacLeish.
61 "Memorandum on Official Statem ents of Post-War Policy," by Leo Pasvolsky, January 3, 1942, Postwar 
Foreign Policy Files, box 190, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; P document 23, "Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics," June 10, 1942, box 56, Notter files; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on 
Political Problems," (March 7-October 10,1942), October 22,1942, box 56, Notter files; P minutes 11, May 16, 
1942; "The Atlantic Charter and National Independence," November 13, 1942, Atlantic Charter File, box 13, 
Notter files.
62 p  minutes 2, March 14, 1942; P minutes 11, May 16,1942; P document 137, "Background Information on 
the Soviet Union," November 13, 1942, box 56; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on 
Political Problems," (March 7-October 10,1942), October 22,1942, box 56.
63 "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," by Notter and Rothwell, January 2,1942, box 190, Postwar Foreign 
Policy Files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 2, March 14,1942, Notter Files.
233
pledging the allied powers to an avoidance of territorial 
aggrandizement during the war, the planners noted that the 
Soviets had not yet expressed any dissent over this pledge, but 
they also recognized that it would be difficult to influence 
Soviet actions in places like the Baltic states or the rest of 
Eastern Europe without the presence of U.S. troops in the 
region, a prospect they knew the Russians would never allow. 64
Welles initiated discussions about the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe by emphasizing the root of the problem which 
would plague American policymakers throughout the wars while 
Moscow's statements regarding its future intentions in Eastern 
Europe were highly suspect, Washington must continue to 
emphasize the need for good relations. Welles believed Moscow's 
lack of confidence in Washington to be one reason why the USSR 
sought its own security through territorial acquisition. He 
assumed relations with Moscow might be strengthened if the 
American government reassured the Kremlin that it would 
cooperate in maintaining the peace of the world after the w a r . 65 
Smooth relations with Moscow would be necessary to ensure a 
stable postwar order, but Welles also acknowledged that the 
pursuit of better relations with Moscow would inevitably 
contradict numerous Wilsonian and Atlantic Charter principles 
such as self-determination and free trade. While he remained 
uncomfortable with an Anglo-Soviet Treaty which he thought was 
nothing more than a spheres of influence deal, he began to 
realize that a lack of Anglo-American troops in Eastern Europe 
at the end of the war would mean that Moscow would have a free 
hand there anyway. "If we recognize settlements," Welles told 
the planners in March 1942, "by which certain people are to 
remain under a sovereignty or system they do not desire, would 
we not in effect be approving conditions which would eventually 
undermine the p e a c e ? "66 Welles called this the most serious 
dilemma facing the planning committees. Yet he also recognized 
that even if the United States could reach an agreement with
64 p  minutes 2, March 14,1942; P minutes 44, February 6,1943.
65 p  minutes 2, March 14,1942; Memorandum of conversation between Notter and Rothwell, "The Possibilities 
of Revolution During and Immediately Following the Present War," August 30, 1941, box 8, Notter Files; P 
minutes 5, April 4,1942.
66 p  minutes 2, March 14,1942.
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the Soviet Union, there was no guarantee that Moscow would 
honor its pledges. When Adolf Berle reminded Welles that the 
Soviet Union had already informally agreed to much of the 
Atlantic Charter, Welles retorted that had been the easy part, 
"but the tragedy is that while we can get acceptance, it will 
not mean that the principles will be carried out."67
Welles and the planners, with their abhorrence of secret 
treaties, initially believed Washington should avoid premature 
agreements with the other members of the Grand Alliance. In the 
course of their discussions they soon changed direction. Some 
matters might have to be decided prior to the end of the war, 
before all chance for an equitable settlement was lost forever. 
Within weeks of relaunching the postwar planning process, 
Welles had come around to the position that many agreements 
with the other members of the Grand Alliance must be reached 
during, and not after, the war. He no longer feared that 
agreements between Moscow and the Western Allies would be 
reminiscent of the secret treaties of the First World War. He 
now worried that if agreements securing the interests of 
Moscow's neighbors on its western frontier were not reached 
during the war it "would be of no avail to them to appeal in a 
few years to some international authority for a change, because 
it would probably not be possible to help them or alter the 
action." 68
Welles and his fellow planners gradually moved toward 
accepting a Soviet-controlled sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe. They still sought to apply universal principles to 
other parts of the world, but the realities of power politics 
in Eastern Europe undermined their efforts. Nearing the end of 
a planning meeting in March 1942, Welles told the committee 
their discussions had "raised a fundamental problem of whether 
it was conceivable that the 'Four Freedoms' could be placed in 
effect all over the world —  actually."^ He expressed his 
concern that the United States might eventually have to endorse 
a restoration of the "old unsteady balance of power" in Europe. 
He acknowledged that this would be an admission of failure
67 p  minutes 2, March 14,1942; P minutes 5, April 4,1942.
68 Welles, "Political Cooperation During the War: A Lost Opportunity," 127-129.
69 p  minutes 2, March 14,1942.
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because it would abandon the fate of millions to subjugation by 
Moscow. He feared that if the United States went ahead with
plans to disarm Germany and France, and failed to erect an East
European Union or come up with some other solution for the
region, the void at the center of Europe would inevitably be 
filled by the Soviet Union. He hoped the police powers of a new 
world organization might partially contain Russian ambitions 
and he continued to seek the creation of a postwar Germany that 
could serve as a check on future Russian aggression. 
Nonetheless, the planners acknowledged that there appeared to 
be no easy way to shield Eastern Europe from Soviet
domination. 70
Welles also feared that the Soviet Union might have larger 
territorial demands than merely a restoration of its pre-1941 
frontiers. He and the other planners were particularly 
concerned with the postwar borders of Poland. Stalin's 
enthusiastic partition of Poland in October 1939, and the
subsequent incorporation of eastern Poland into the Soviet 
Union, led many to believe that the Kremlin once again favored 
the permanent disappearance of Poland as an independent state.7i 
Welles and the planners assumed the Russians would most likely 
take a portion of eastern Poland and that there was very little 
the United States could do to change Moscow's mind. They 
accepted the fact that the Red Army would probably control most 
of Eastern Europe at the end of the war and that unless the 
United States was willing to fight the Soviet Union in a "Third 
World War" some concessions to Soviet demands would have to be 
made. They believed many of these questions would best be 
settled during the war while the United States still had some 
means of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union.72
In the spring of 1942 Welles received further warning 
about Soviet aims. Former Ambassador to Moscow Laurence 
Steinhardt warned Welles that the Russians had extensive 
territorial ambitions. Steinhardt, now posted in Turkey, warned
70 p  minutes 19, July 18,1942; P minutes 7, April 18,1942; P minutes 8, April 25,1942; P minutes 9, May 2, 
1942.
71 T document 2, "Polish Population," April 1,1942, box 60, Notter files; T document 13 "A Note of the Eastern 
Provinces of Poland," June 26, 1942, box 60, Notter files; T document 16 and P document 190, "Boundary 
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72 p minutes 11, May 16,1942; P minutes 12, May 23,1942; P minutes 13, May 30,1942.
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Welles that Moscow also had territorial designs to the
southwest, and that Turkish mistrust and hatred of the Soviet 
Union "is unmistakably stronger than their fear of Germany." 
Steinhardt predicted that Moscow would emphasize its military 
contribution to the war to obtain territorial concessions. "In 
my opinion," he wrote to Welles, "they will leave no stone
unturned to obtain possession of the Straits and the mouth of 
the Danube. I believe they are already laying their plans in 
that direction."73
Throughout the summer and fall of 1942, Welles and the
planners discussed specific problems in Eastern Europe. With 
regard to Finland, a consensus emerged that an attempt should 
be made to persuade Moscow to accept the 1940 boundary
established in the wake of the Winter War. Welles suggested 
that the best way to preserve Finland's postwar survival would 
be for the committee to call for an international "neutral 
zone" separating Finland and Russia, but he feared that 
regardless of whatever measures might be taken, the Soviet 
Union would do as it pleased with Finland.74
The planners also recognized that while the Baltic states 
wished to be independent, the Kremlin would probably be 
unwilling to discuss any future for them except as part of the 
Soviet Union. But Welles continued to seek a solution to the 
Baltic problem without so openly violating the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter. He suggested that plebiscite privileges 
might be granted to the peoples of the region, with those who 
did not wish to live under Russian rule free to emigrate.75 Anne 
O'Hare McCormick replied that most of the people of the Baltic 
region, given the choice, would most likely prefer to live 
under the Germans.76
While it appeared the Soviet Union wished to absorb the 
three Baltic states, the committee members, in a desperate 
effort to find a solution, hoped a quasi-independent Baltic
73 Steinhardt to Welles, April 24,1942, box 83, folder 15, Welles papers, FDRL
74 P minutes 35, November 28, 1942; P document 134, "Official Russian Statements, July 1941-November 
1942," November 28,1942, Notter files.
75 Welles did not specify the nations to which they would emigrate. P document 193, "The Baltic States," 
February 4, 1943, box 57; "The Atlantic Charter and National Independence," November 13, 1942, Atlantic 
Charter File, Notter files, box 13; P minutes 2, March 14,1942.
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Federation (under Russian influence) might be acceptable to 
Moscow. They hoped that if the Kremlin allowed cultural and 
religious freedoms within such a federation the peoples of the 
Baltic states would be more amenable to Russian overlordship. 
Yet this assumed a level of Russian tolerance for the cultural 
and political diversity of its neighbors that had no basis in 
recent history.77
The more the planners discussed the intricate problems of 
Eastern Europe, the more they began to move away from their 
earlier rigid adherence to Wilsonian principles. Compromise 
would have to be made with principle. As early as the fall of 
1942, the subcommittee began to conclude that the Soviet 
Union's claims to the Baltic states could not be put off 
indefinitely and would eventually have to be acknowledged. This 
only further underscored the problem of how to reconcile the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter with the political and 
military realities of Eastern Europe. Only six months before, 
Welles had warned Halifax that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty would 
violate the "sacred principles" of the Atlantic Charter. Now, 
Welles and the other planners were confronted with Soviet power 
politics in Eastern Europe. They might not approve of Moscow's 
desire to swallow the Baltic states, but there was very little 
they could do to prevent it. The U.S.S.R. continued to do most 
of the fighting —  roughly 50 Red Army soldiers were being 
killed in combat for each American —  and it began to dawn on 
Welles and the planners that Moscow held most of the leverage 
in the relationship and that considerations like Lend-Lease and 
the promise of postwar reconstruction assistance might have 
little influence on the K r e m l i n . 78
It became ever clearer to the planners that the peoples of 
the Baltic states, as well as others in the region, would never 
revert willingly back to Russia. The planners understood that 
the fate of the peoples of Eastern Europe was every bit as 
threatened by Moscow as by Berlin. They learned that the 
U.S.S.R. had "killed off or dispersed" most of the
77 P minutes 13, May 30,1942.
78 P minutes 35, November 28, 1942; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political 
Problems," (March 7-October 10, 1942), October 22, 1942, box 56, Notter files; P document 151, Tentative 
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intelligentsia and the upper classes in the Baltic states,79 and 
Loy Henderson had already warned Welles that Stalin displayed a 
"vindictive spirit" toward the peoples of Eastern Europe, 
particularly the Ukrainians of eastern Poland. Stalin, 
Henderson reminded Welles, had already threatened that these 
Ukrainians "would be exterminated and the Ukrainian problem 
permanently liquidated." According to documents in Welles's 
possession, as many as 4.5 million Ukrainians lived in eastern
P o l a n d ,  so
Welles and the other planners remained gravely concerned 
about Russian intentions. During a meeting in late November 
1942 Welles thus delivered a "top secret" presentation about 
the aims of Soviet foreign policy. He based this briefing on 
what he had learned from the previous nine months of postwar 
committee meetings, but also from discussions with other 
diplomats in Washington and his understanding of Moscow's 
demands derived from his contacts with the various exile 
governments. Welles warned the committee that the Kremlin' s 
ambitions went well beyond the Baltic states and that Stalin 
had taken a "hectoring, insulting attitude" toward several 
nations. Stalin threatened Sweden, for example, because of her 
interest in a political union with Finland. Welles said Russia 
would probably demand Petsamo from Finland at the end of the 
war and he warned he "never yet found the Soviet Government 
willing to discuss having something less than it once had." He 
feared that Stalin might demand more, such as the incorporation 
of all of Finland into the Soviet Union "through some phony 
plebiscite." Welles proclaimed that an independent Finland was 
"of vital importance to the future world order." In the rest of 
the Baltic region, Welles warned that the Russians would seek 
to give their conquests legitimacy by once again holding "some 
phony kind of plebiscite [that] would be rigged to indicate the 
desire of the people to return to Soviet rule."8i
79 P minutes 35, November 28,1942.
80 Henderson to Welles, April 8, 1942, box 165, Poland files, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; Poland: Map II, 
May 21,1942, box 191, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Eastern Europe: Postwar, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
81 p minutes 35, November 28, 1942. At one point in the discussion, Isaiah Bowman warned that territorial 
problems in the region might have repercussions at home, pointing out that a  substantial number of Finns 
inhabited Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan.
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On the question of Poland, Welles predicted the Russians 
would promise part of East Prussia to the Poles in exchange for 
other territory which would be taken from the Poles in their 
east and incorporated into the Soviet Union. Welles added that 
the Polish and Czech governments-in-exile had discussed the 
possibility of a postwar Polish-Czech union and that President 
Benes thought the Soviet Union was "not adverse to the setting 
up of regional federations in principle." But Welles feared the 
Russians might look upon such an arrangement with suspicion.82
Welles feared the Kremlin might set up its own 
governments-in-exile which would be responsive to Stalin's 
aims. He also warned the planners that Russia's chief 
territorial aspirations appeared to be largely concentrated in 
the norths the Baltic states, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, 
possibly Finland and perhaps parts of northern Norway. As for 
other areas of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Welles told the 
planners that the Soviets might aim for "a political and 
economic preponderance rather than territorial acquisition." 
Welles warned that once the Red Army crossed national borders 
it would be impossible to ensure freedom in those areas.«
At the beginning of 1943 James Shotwell warned Welles that 
"it is true that Russia has officially followed a policy, in 
its dealings with Western Europe, which has grown less 
menacing, but this cannot be counted upon, especially with 
reference to [its western frontiers]."8* Shortly thereafter, 
Isaiah Bowman reinforced these concerns when he delivered his 
own analysis of Russia and the prospects for postwar planning. 
Bowman told Welles and the rest of the planners that secrecy 
and bad faith had marked Soviet actions. He added that the 
planners should not expect "frank dealing and good faith" to 
characterize future relations with the Kremlin. "We are waiting
82 Ibid. Isaiah Bowman later told Welles that Benes thought a  middle way might be found for the future of 
Eastern Europe through the promotion of a  socialistic "guided revolution." The Czech leader would reassure 
Welles that "Czechoslovakia would never become communistic." See Memorandum of conversation between 
Bowman and Benes, May 19, 1943, box 87, folder 2, Welles papers; memorandum of conversation between 
Welles and Benes, May 17,1943, box 161, Czechoslovakia file, Welles papers, FDRL.
88 P minutes 35, November 28,1942,; memorandum to Welles, "Note on Alternative Soviet Policies in Europe," 
by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, box 191, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Eastern Europe: Postwar, folder 4, Welles 
papers, FDRL
84 Shotwell to Welles, January 15, 1943, with enclosure, box 192, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, folder 8, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
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in vain if we suppose that a great wave of appreciation for our 
help will suddenly sweeten the Soviet temper if we but help 
enough," he said, adding, "will Russia stop permanently on the 
Danube because we have proclaimed the wickedness of territorial 
aggression?" Bowman thought steps should be taken to forestall 
serious conflict. "We will not fight Russia for an abstract 
principle. We will not fight to stop her on the Riga line in 
the interest of Poland. We will not fight her to give Finland 
the port of Petsamo . . . Our meanings must be clear when we 
proclaim high principles . . . Will we promptly negotiate the 
agreements that will reverse the present trends of power or 
will we wait until it is too late to control the mechanical 
monster that our enemies have forced us to create?
Thus far, the planners had held two, multi-week, 
examinations of the impending clash between the Soviet Union 
and its neighbors to the west. The first series of meetings in 
the spring of 1942 had awakened the members to the need to 
apply Wilsonian principles to Moscow's foreign policy aims. 
Welles had expressed his outrage to the committee about 
London's willingness to legitimize Soviet territorial gains 
which he thought flew in the face of the "sacred principles" of 
the Atlantic Charter. He and the other planners concluded that 
some agreements with the other members of the Grand Alliance 
needed to be reached before the end of the war, but they held 
out hope that peace could still somehow be reconciled with the 
spirit of the Atlantic Charter.
The second series of meetings, held in the late fall of 
1942, had further confirmed the worst fears of the planners, 
particularly when Welles departed from his usual duties as 
chairman to deliver his detailed presentation about Soviet 
foreign policy aims. Perhaps more importantly, these autumn 
discussions initiated a move away from the rigid Wilsonianism 
of the previous spring. Welles's aim of implementing an 
American-led democratic internationalism thus became more 
problematical. Welles and his colleagues began to fear that the 
Kremlin's territorial appetites might be larger than even the 
planners anticipated. They began to conclude that some Soviet
85 "Memorandum on Russia," by Isaiah Bowman, March 6, 1943, box 87, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; P 
minutes 46, March 6 ,1943, Notter files.
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territorial gains might have to be recognized as a matter of 
practical realism.86 A premium should be placed on good 
relations between Washington and Moscow for the sake of 
creating a new world order. Thus, "lesser" issues such as the 
fate of the Baltic states and eastern Poland should not be 
allowed to interfere. In any event, an early confrontation with 
Moscow over Eastern Europe would do nothing to advance self- 
determination for the region. The members of the postwar 
planning committees, which included a bipartisan group of at 
least eight senior members of the house and senate committees 
dealing with foreign affairs, had concluded that the location 
of the Red Army would most likely determine the postwar status 
of Eastern Europe, thus undermining later claims that Stalin's 
control of the region came about due to naivete, presidential 
illness, or a treasonous conspiracy to "sell out" or "enslave" 
Eastern Europe.8? Nonetheless, Welles's private comments about 
the realities of power in Eastern Europe (and America's 
inability to do much to change those realities) contradicted 
his public Wilsonian rhetoric, which continued to hint at a 
dawning "new order" for the region. And as Welles and the other 
planners made exceptions to their plans for a new order in 
Eastern Europe, it gradually became more difficult to envision 
the extensive social, economic and political changes that they 
desired for the region. This would be particularly true for the 
fate of Poland, which was rapidly becoming the most explosive 
issue facing the planners.
★ * *
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The Polish-Soviet frontier continued to represent a source 
of considerable acrimony between the Russians and the Poles. 
Sikorski and the other Polish officials in London were also 
anxious to learn of the whereabouts of the thousands of Polish 
prisoners of war who had fallen into Soviet hands, about whom 
nothing had been heard since early 1940.88 Welles's many 
meetings with the Polish exiles confirmed his worst fears about 
Soviet intentions. In late 1942 Sikorski warned Welles that he 
thought Stalin would first take back the Baltic states and then 
attempt to incorporate Finland into the Soviet Union, demand 
Bessarabia and seek "hegemony" over other states in the region. 
"It does not follow at all that the 'leadership' in that part 
of Europe should be left to Russia," Sikorski told Welles. 
"Such a solution would be as harmful as acquiescence to German 
ambitions." 89
At the beginning of 1943, Welles conducted a series of 
detailed discussions with the leadership of the Polish 
government-in-exile. He reaffirmed America's desire to see 
Poland reconstituted under Article Three of the Atlantic 
Charter: the restoration of independence and sovereignty.90 Yet 
for all this, it was becoming increasingly clear to Welles that 
the Polish-Soviet problem would simply not go away and that it 
would grow more dangerous as the war continued. In early 1943 
it had become apparent that the Soviet Union would seek 
substantial territory from Poland. Welles thought Poland 
deserved to be truly independent after the war but he 
acknowledged that the future looked bleak in the region and 
that the committee could probably hope for nothing more than 
"the best of a series of bad bargains."9*
Welles sought to subordinate the problems of Eastern 
Europe to the larger aim of U.S.-Soviet postwar cooperation. He
88 Richard C. Lukas, The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland. 1941 -1945 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee, 1978), 8.
89 Sikorski memorandum to Welles: "The Problems of Central and Southeastern Europe," December 7,1942, 
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wanted to be careful to avoid anything that might resemble a 
"cordon sanitaire" directed against the Soviet Union.92 Welles 
continued to tell the Poles he would work for the restoration 
of Poland "as a powerful European state" but he told the Polish 
Ambassador that President Roosevelt wanted Poland "to keep its 
shirt on" and be patient, and reminded him that Washington 
retained the right to be "the only judge" of what could be done 
to resolve the Polish-Soviet impasse.95 Welles feared that a 
serious break loomed between the Polish government-in-exile and 
the Kremlin. Ciechanowski had earlier warned Welles that Moscow 
demanded Polish recognition of Russia's future sovereignty in 
"White Russia and the western Ukraine." Ciechanowski thus 
pressed Welles to publicly proclaim his pledge that the 
Atlantic Charter would safeguard Poland's future.94
Shortly thereafter, in February 1943, Welles reported to 
the planners that relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Polish government-in-exile had reached a breaking point. In 
what Welles described as "a serious and disquieting 
development" he told the committee that the Russians now 
considered any Poles in Ruthenia and the Ukraine to be Soviet 
nationals. He told the planners that when the Russians entered 
these areas in 1939 a large number of Poles had been 
"liquidated" and many others deported.95 The larger crisis 
Welles feared erupted in April 1943 when the Germans discovered 
numerous mass graves in the Katyn forest near Smolensk which 
they claimed to be those of Polish officers murdered by 
Stalin's secret police.95 Hitler proposed an international 
investigation of the site, a call immediately seconded by the
92 Memorandum of conversation with Sikorski, by Welles, January 4,1943, FRUS. Ill, 314-318.
93 Memorandum of conversation by Welles, January 30, 1943. FRUS. 1943, III, 325-326; "Annex: 
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London Poles. The Kremlin, calling the Poles fascist and 
reactionary, broke off diplomatic relations. Stalin moved 
immediately to promote his Russian-backed Union of Polish 
Patriots, a group of communist Poles in Moscow (later based in 
Lublin) who sought to organize a postwar Poland along Stalin’s 
desired lines.97
The massacre of the Polish officers might have come as no 
surprise to the planners in Washington. They had for some time 
been discussing Moscow's aims in the region and had heard a 
number of intelligence reports about various atrocities carried 
out by the Russians.98 Welles told Anthony Biddle, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile, that he would 
seek to reestablish relations between the London Poles and the 
Russians, but he warned that any attempt to change the 
composition of the Polish government-in-exile in London to suit 
Stalin would be ill-advised. "While some changes might prove 
advantageous after the restoration of relations," Welles wrote 
to Biddle, "we do not feel that it would be proper for us to 
bring pressure on Sikorski to change the composition of the 
Polish Government in order to satisfy the Soviet Government. In 
our opinion it would be unfortunate for a precedent to be 
established under which the government of one United Nation 
could successfully force changes in the composition of another 
government of the United Nations."99 At the same time, Welles 
wanted to be careful not to antagonize Stalin over Eastern 
European issues not vital to American interests. In Welles's 
estimation, Poland was not a vital interest and was quickly 
becoming an impediment to America's quest for better relations 
with Moscow, Welles believed that postwar cooperation with 
Russia should be the primary consideration and he resolved to 
avert anything that might derail Washington's evolving
97 CAB 66/36 WP(43) 175, "Russo-Polish Relations" by Churchill, April 26,1943, including Churchill to Stalin, 
April 24,1943, PRO.
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relationship with the Kremlin.100
Poland would remain a thorny and intractable problem and 
Welles may have reasoned that since the United States had not 
participated in the prewar guarantees to Poland, Washington was 
therefore not officially bound by them. To Welles, the Atlantic 
Charter and the United Nations Declaration sought to grant 
sovereign rights to the peoples of the world. Certainly this 
pledge also applied to Poland, but Welles seems to have 
convinced himself that it did not commit the United States to 
any specific course in Eastern Europe.101 "The principles for 
postwar policy laid down by the Atlantic Charter provided an 
altogether desirable pattern," Welles wrote after the war. "Yet 
they constituted a pattern, and nothing more. They gave no 
slightest indication, for example, of the justice or injustice 
of a given settlement covering eastern Poland." Welles believed 
that Moscow might plausibly claim that its aspirations in 
Poland did not violate the Atlantic Charter, but instead were 
fully consistent with the charter's provisions about 
territorial changes being in accord with the desires of the 
peoples concerned. "Agreement upon the broad principles of the 
Atlantic Charter," Welles wrote, "would never in itself prevent 
future bitter controversies over frontiers and zones of 
influence. M1°2
Welles and the planners had once again looked the other 
way when Moscow evaded their professed principles, and they may 
have rationalized that maintaining good relations with Moscow 
was paramount to defending the welfare of Russia's western 
neighbors. While it began to dawn that their claims to
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defending high principles were rapidly slipping away, Welles 
and the planners still hoped that the creation of an "East 
European Federation" might help extricate them from this moral 
dilemma.
* * *
In response to the moral and political problems presented 
by Russian objectives in Eastern Europe, as early as March 1942 
the planners had begun discussing the possibility of creating a 
political federation for the region. 103 The idea fit nicely into 
Welles’s belief that institutions and careful planning could 
help contain the potential for upheaval in Eastern Europe. The 
nations of the region were precariously situated between 
Germany and the Soviet Union and had achieved their 
independence at a time when both powers had been weakened by 
the Great War. With Germany and Russia now recovered, the fate 
of these small states looked precarious. The planners believed 
a union or federation might furnish those nations with the 
strength of numbers. The idea had first been presented to 
Welles by Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski (a fact Welles 
tactfully concealed for fear of arousing Russian suspicions) 
and Welles's first advisory committee had discussed it in the 
spring of 1940.104
Welles hoped that a number of problems might be resolved 
if the United Nations could construct and impose its own
103 The most thorough account of U.S. interest in an East European federation can be found in Geir 
Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe. 1943-1947 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1978), 
347-393.
104 Minutes for the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, May 7, 1940, box 191, Postwar 
Foreign Policy Files, Postwar: 1940-41, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL. Starting in the fall of 1939 the British 
Foreign Office had held vague internal discussions about a  regional federation of some sort for Eastern 
Europe. But dating back to the end of World War I, the Poles had been the leading proponents of a  
supranational federation in Eastern Europe. In November 1940 the exiled Poles reached a preliminary 
agreem ent with Benes and his Czech government-in-exile over a  postwar confederation for the region. Eden 
even went to Moscow in December 1941 with a proposal for a  similar scheme. The British foreign office feared 
that unless some solution was found for the future of Eastern Europe the Russians would dominate the region 
after the war. At the time, Stalin seem ed receptive to plans for a  regional federation and he did not rule out the 
possibility of some sort of supranational organization. In January 1942, Poland and Czechoslovakia repeated 
their desire to unite in som e form of federation and Greece and Yugoslavia followed with similar declarations. 
See, for example, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers. 194Q-1943 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979); as well as Gardner, Spheres of Influence. 111-112; Mastny, R ussia's 
Road to the Cold War. 56: and P document 205, "Interlocking Confederations in East-Central Europe," February
19,1943, box 57, Notter files.
247
version of an East European Federation. Hitler had already set 
a precedent for just such a scheme with the Reich's attempt to 
erect a new economic order in Eastern Europe. Berlin wanted the 
entire Danube basin to serve as a provider of labor and raw 
materials to the German economy. Prior to 1919, the Austro^ 
Hungarian Empire had partially filled the void in the region. 
Despite its many weaknesses and periodic instability, Welles 
thought the Empire had given the region a degree of unity and 
coherence while at the same time providing a much-needed buffer 
between Germany and Russia. Welles hoped the Russians might see 
U.S. relations with its Latin American neighbors as a model for 
future Russian relations in Eastern Europe and that a federal 
solution in Eastern Europe might help avoid potentially 
destructive clashes among the allies over territorial and 
ethnic matters in the region. After all, he pointed out, the 
Russians had the troops to enforce their will in Eastern Europe 
and would most likely do what they pleased regardless of 
British and American protests.
From the earliest discussions of planning for a federation 
Welles had emphasized that one of its chief functions would be 
to serve as "a counterpoise to both Russia and Germany."106 Many 
of the nations of the region also had historic hatreds toward 
one another and the planners feared it would be difficult to 
contain the competing antagonisms under one roof. Welles 
reasoned that their mutual hatred of Russia might serve as a 
common bond. He surmised that while the Russians might dominate 
the nations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Russian 
hegemony in those nations would be balanced within a federation 
by including "anti-Russian" nations such as Poland, Hungary, 
Austria and Romania. He assumed the nations of the region could 
not be expected to establish such an arrangement by themselves 
but would have to "be told how to do it." 107
Welles and the planners hoped a federation would promote 
economic and political stability in the region. The
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subcommittee recommended that an economic union should first be 
pursued and later extended to political integration. Welles 
feared that if the Russians forcibly removed the Baltic region 
and Eastern Europe from postwar plans for a worldwide liberal 
economic system, European reconstruction would be much more 
difficult and efforts at creating a new order would be dealt a 
serious setback. He also hoped the creation of a federation 
would prove advantageous to the economic and security interests 
of the United States, not only through the promotion of free 
trade, but also by checking the territorial, political and 
economic aspirations of Germany, the Soviet Union, and Great 
Britain. A federation might even help facilitate the rebirth of 
the Baltic states as fully-functioning, independent 
republics. i08
The erection of a East European Union as a mega-buffer 
against Soviet expansion seemed to run contrary to some aspects 
of Welles's Wilsonian ideals. After all, Welles claimed an 
international organization should be sufficient to assuage 
Moscow's security concerns. But his attempts to create a 
federation seemed calculated to avoid the appearance of the 
cynical recognition of what all the planners assumed was likely 
to become a political fait accompli in the regions namely, a 
Soviet sphere of influence.
Welles first offered the political subcommittee a detailed 
outline of what he had in mind for an East European Federation 
in the spring of 1942. His belief that the ideas of Wilsonian 
universalism and the Atlantic Charter could be transplanted 
everywhere led him to seek to impose on the region the concepts 
of free markets and free trade, and, where suitable, democracy 
and individual rights. Welles explained that the nations of the 
region might be bound together by "Articles of Confederation" 
which would include guarantees of individual rights. The 
political structure of the federation would feature an 
American-style judicial system, a federal diet, customs union 
and an intra-regional military force.
As Welles explained it, the federation would consist of
108 p  minutes 11, May 16,1942; P minutes 14, June 6 ,1942.
109 p minutes 12, May 23,1942.
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the entire Eastern European region, comprising the twelve 
states situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, including 
Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and with some optimism, the 
Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The planners 
hoped to promote a federation by emphasizing its economic 
advantages, as well as its potential for fostering collective 
security. That failing, the planners thought that union might 
have to be forcibly imposed on Eastern Europe.110 Adolf Berle 
warned that the Russians had previously opposed similar efforts 
at regional union. But Welles thought that the plan might be 
successfully sold to Moscow as a "buffer" to defend Russia 
against Germany, or even as a vast market for Russian 
manufactured goods and trade opportunities in the postwar 
era.111
At Welles's direction, the state department's special 
research staff crafted a number of detailed outlines of a 
possible union. Their drafts demonstrated the degree to which 
they accepted the belief that New Deal-style planning on a 
global scale —  coupled with the careful application of the 
principles of free trade and free markets —  would greatly 
reduce the potential for crisis in the region. They drew up 
plans for the modernization of the region's agriculture, the 
expansion of Eastern European industries, the coordination of 
national export policies and monetary union. The planners also 
drew up schemes for a regional development agency, an 
agricultural administration, and a transportation department to 
oversee and coordinate shipping, railroads and highways.1^  But 
by early 1943, after a revival of Russia's prospects following
110 Ibid; P document 191, "Eastern Europe: Regional Factors," box 57; P document 16, "Plan For Central 
European Union," May 27,1942, box 56; P document 46, "Proposals for the Political Reorganization of Eastern 
Europe," August 19, 1942, box 56; P minutes 23, August 22,1942; memorandum of Welles conversation with 
Sikorski, December 4,1942. FRUS. 1942, III, 199-202.
111 P minutes 14, June 6,1942; P minutes 13, May 30,1942.
112 p document 204, "The Feasibility of an East European Union," February 10, 1943, box 57. During an 
August 1942 meeting between Welles and Richard Law of the British Foreign Office to discuss postwar 
planning, Law enthusiastically endorsed creating a federation, calling it a "Tennessee Valley Authority" for the 
Danube River basin. Welles warned Law that while such a scheme represented a  small step in the right 
direction, a  TVA for the Danube would not nearly go far enough to resolve the region's ills, which, he added, had 
been exacerbated by centuries of local hatreds and great power politics. S ee  memorandum of conversation 
between Welles and Richard Law, "Postwar Problems," August 25,1942, box 164, Great Britain files, folder 4, 
Welles papers, FDRL.
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the Red Army's success at Stalingrad, it became apparent to the 
political subcommittee that the Soviet Union might oppose all 
efforts to construct a federation. Stalingrad proved to be an 
important turning point in the Moscow's political relations 
with other nations. It emboldened the Russians to take a harder 
line in their relations with the Poles and other exile 
governments and stiffened the Kremlin's opposition to any
attempts to create a federation. Welles had recently received a
warning from exiled Czech officials in Washington that an East 
European Federation could not, under any circumstances, succeed 
if it was seen as an anti-Soviet endeavor. The Soviets 
apparently feared that a federation would be directed against 
them. 113
Welles was not deterred. Furthermore, Churchill's and
Eden's continued enthusiasm for a regional solution in Eastern
Europe encouraged Welles to continue with the committee's work.
He believed Moscow's tentative opposition to federations
reemphasized the importance of reaching agreements with the
Kremlin on such matters at the earliest date possible. He hoped
that Moscow might be approached with a formal proposal for a
federation sometime in 1943. Welles's naivete about Soviet
willingness to support an American-designed federation may have
stemmed from his underestimation of the deep and abiding
suspicion the Russians had toward the west. He hoped that even
if the plans for a federation were stillborn, Washington would
have sufficient time to improve its relationship with Moscow,
perhaps by convincing the Russians that the containment of
Germany, coupled with the power of an effective international
organization, would be sufficient to protect Soviet interests
in Eastern Europe. He also worked under the delusion, widely
shared in Washington, that the Kremlin might be heavily
dependent on American assistance for its reconstruction after
the war, and that Moscow, not wanting to jeopardize postwar
aid, would seek to avoid a breach over a federation. Welles
113 p  document 202, "Secret Official Commitments Regarding the East European Countries," February 5, 
1943, box 57; P minutes 44, February 6,1943; P minutes 45, February 20,1943; P document 206, "Soviet and 
British Attitudes," February 18, 1943, box 57; P document 135, "Official Russian Views on Postwar 
Settlements," November 11, 1942, box 56; Welles memorandum of conversation with Czech Minister Hurban, 
"Proposed Federation between Poland and Czechoslovakia," December 2,1942, box 161, Czechoslovakia file, 
Welles papers, FDRL; T document 200a, "Soviet War Aims as Presented by Soviet Sources," September 14, 
1943, box 61, Notter files.
251
thought that Lend-Lease had established a useful precedent for 
using American economic largess to promote its political and 
military aims.n*
Welles and the political subcommittee further investigated 
the question of federations in February 1943. Welles repeated 
his warnings that the Kremlin still appeared opposed to the 
scheme. He had an attentive audience, including five senators 
and three members of the House of Representatives. Welles 
delivered a lengthy presentation on the proposed federation and 
underscored its importance for the security of the postwar 
world. He claimed a federation would fill the void in the
region left by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
He also expressed fear that Moscow would only accept a 
federation in exchange for support for their territorial aims 
in the Baltic and Eastern P o l a n d .us
Responding to Welles's presentation, Representative 
Charles Eaton said he was alarmed by the high degree of mutual 
suspicion between Moscow and Washington. Eaton said Welles had 
outlined one of the most difficult challenges confronting the 
committee. "Russia has a distinct and well-thought-out line of 
policy," Eaton said. "What resources have the rest of the
United Nations to meet that claim? Will we fight Russia, and
will Russia back down? . . . Will we sprinkle rose water on
her, or will we show our teeth?" Norman Davis suggested they 
might grant Russian claims to Bessarabia in exchange for
Moscow's acceptance of a federation. Welles feared that, much 
like the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, Davis's suggestion would
114 p document 191, "East Europe: Regional Factors," February 4, 1943, box 57; P document 202, "Secret 
Official Commitments Regarding the Eastern European Countries," February 5, 1943, box 57; P minutes 44, 
February 6,1943, box 57.
115 p  minutes 45, February 20, 1943. The Poles, too, had enthusiastically backed plans for a  federation, 
which they hoped might succeed in containing both a  postwar Germany and the Soviet Union. "Poland would be 
the anchor in the north and Turkey the anchor in the south," Sikorski told Welles. (Memorandum of 
conversation with Sikorski, by Welles, January 4, 1943, FRUS. 1943, III, 317). Welles told the planners that 
Turkey would also play a  crucial role in the security of the region and he read a recent m essage from Turkish 
officials which explained that they would enthusiastically support a  truly independent federation but would 
vigorously oppose one controlled by Moscow. According to Welles, the Turks were particularly nervous about 
the future of the Black Sea straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, which, along with Constantinople, the 
allies had promised to the Czar in 1915. Welles warned the planners that the Soviets had once again begun to 
show greater interest in the straits. "Every move which Turkey is making has, of course, the position of Soviet 
Russia in mind," Welles explained. He further added that Turkey desired a reaffirmation of the 1936 Straits 
Convention signed at Montreux, desiring a  new treaty that would be backed by the United S tates and Great 
Britain. See P minutes 45, February 20,1943.
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merely serve to appease Stalin's minimum aims.
Isaiah Bowman thought the Russians might be more flexible 
in a few months, after the Germans reestablished their lines on 
the eastern front. Welles disagreed. He thought the German 
lines in the east might never be stabilized and that the Red 
Army would methodically creep westward. The promise of a 
disarmed Eastern Europe, Welles suggested, might gain Moscow's 
acceptance of a federation. Anne O'Hare McCormick observed that 
although the disarmed countries in Eastern Europe would not 
present a threat to the Russians, the prospect of a defenseless 
swath of states from the Baltic to the Balkans would be too 
tempting for Moscow's territorial appetites and might induce 
the smaller nations of the region to band together in an armed 
coalition directed against the USSR. Welles agreed, describing 
the situation as an insoluble vicious circle.116
Welles's plans for a federation received an important 
boost when Churchill seemingly endorsed them during the May 
1943 luncheon he hosted at the British Embassy for senior 
American officials interested in postwar planning. Churchill, 
too, felt something had to take the place of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire in the region. Eden also continued to support 
the idea, but by June he began to privately express his concern 
that the Russians would never accept a fully-integrated and 
capitalistic federation along the lines advocated by Welles.n?
Welles feared the planners needed a fallback plan in the 
event of the failure to erect a federation. He and Roosevelt 
subsequently returned to their favorite Wilsonian cure-all for 
the complex problems of the regions plebiscites.116 At a meeting 
of the political subcommittee in February 1943, it was 
suggested that plebiscites, despite their unsatisfactory 
application after the First World War, might effectively carry 
out the principles of the Atlantic Charter in Eastern Europe. 
For any chance of success they would have to be held under the 
supervision of the United Nations. At the very least, 
plebiscites would provide the United States with a "cover" that
116 P minutes 45, February 20,1943.
117 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV (London: Cassell, 1948-1954), 717; FO 371/35435, 
Eden to Churchill, June 16,1943, PRO.
Welles to E.R. Graves, April 13,1948, box 133, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.
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the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter 
were being upheld.119 Roosevelt discussed with Welles at some 
length his enthusiasm for plebiscites, claiming they might 
settle once and for all the enmities among many Eastern 
European and Balkan peoples, particularly the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. i20
Nonetheless, Welles ultimately failed in his efforts to 
construct a federated solution for Eastern Europe. While he 
understood that the Soviet Union would control the region at 
the end of the war, he underestimated the degree of domination 
they would insist upon. Welles had hoped the Russians might 
erect a kind of Good Neighbor Policy^1 for Eastern Europe, 
where Moscow would achieve regional hegemony without meddling 
too much in the internal affairs of its neighbors. 122 m  any 
event, the Kremlin opposed the federative approach and 
complained that the American enthusiasm for federations and 
multi-national unions in Eastern Europe was reminiscent of the 
policy of the cordon sanitaire which was directed against the 
Soviet Union in the years before the war. Anthony Eden proposed 
a federal scheme at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in 
October 1943, but it met with a chilly response from Cordell 
Hull, who generally opposed all regional solutions.^3 Welles, 
who had been the leading advocate of regionalism, did not 
accept Roosevelt's request to represent the United States at 
the conference. Had he attended, Eden might have found more
119 P minutes 44, February 6, 1943, box 57; P document 206, "Soviet and British Attitudes," February 18, 
1943, box 57; "The Atlantic Charter and National Independence," November 13,1942, Atlantic Charter File, box 
13, Notter files; see  also Sumner Welles, "Political Cooperation During the War: A Lost Opportunity," in Kimball, 
Roosevelt and the World Crisis. 131.
120 Welles himself would later admit that "Roosevelt was occasionally apt to rely too greatly upon a few 
favorite panaceas for problems that were actually too basic and far-reaching in their origins and nature to admit 
of any easy  solutions" and that the President "was even more wedded to the idea that plebiscites are a 
universal remedy than Woodrow Wilson had been." See Sumner Welles. Seven Decisions. 136.
121 Welles, Time for Decision. 332-334. For the contrary view that Washington did not consider the Good 
Neighbor Policy a s  a  model for Moscow's relations with its neighbors, see, for example, Lynn E. Davis, The 
Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 
143.
122 For an account of how Washington sought to make distinctions between Moscow's potential influence on 
the foreign policies of its neighbors and its influence on their internal policies, see, for example, John 
Vloyantes, "The Significance of Pre-Yalta Policies Regarding Liberated Countries in Europe," Western Political 
Quarterly, vol. 11 (June 1958), 215, 226-28.
123 Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy. 1943-1945 (New York: 
Pantheon, 1990), 102-103; Gardner. Spheres of Influence. 196.
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support for his initiative.
* * *
To Welles, the Kremlin's tentative opposition to 
federations further emphasized the need for Big Three 
consultation. He thought it urgent that the Anglo-American 
allies begin conferring with Moscow on postwar plans. The first 
half of 1943 saw a number of preliminary exchanges between 
British and American officials over the future shape of the 
postwar world, but the Anglo-American allies had not yet 
approached the Russians with their proposals for an 
international organization and other specific postwar matters. 
Welles thought the United States should immediately learn 
Russia's attitudes and then seek to induce Moscow to cooperate 
with Washington's aims.124 Roosevelt had held a brief meeting 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in the spring of 1942, but 
discussions about the postwar world were cursory. The British 
took another step in this direction in April 1943, when the war 
cabinet instructed British Ambassador to Moscow Sir Archibald 
Clark Kerr to discuss postwar matters with senior Soviet 
officials. The Russians, like the British, had been largely 
preoccupied with the military prosecution of the war and had 
devoted far less time to postwar matters than U.S. officials. 
But during his talks with Molotov, Kerr referred to Welles's 
recent speeches, explaining that the under secretary's 
pronouncements demonstrated a genuine desire on the part of the 
west to settle, prior to an armistice, the outlines of the 
postwar settlement. 12s
In the spring of 1943, as Roosevelt and Welles traveled to 
Mexico City to meet with Mexican President Avila Camacho, they 
discussed their hopes and fears about the prospects of creating 
a new postwar order. Welles was struck by Roosevelt's concern 
and uncertainty about how Stalin would react to their aims and 
the president lamented that much of their work on the postwar
124 P minutes 38, December 19,1942.
125 P document 34, 'Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," August 12, 1942, box 56; 
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World W ar, vol. II, 550; P document 206, "Soviet and 
British Attitudes," February 18, 1943, box 57.
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world might come to nothing if the Russians remained 
intractable. Roosevelt still thought Washington could remove 
many of the obstacles to full cooperation, perhaps by 
demonstrating a commitment to better relations with Moscow, as 
well as promising U.S. participation in the new international 
organization. 126
In this vein, Welles sought to maintain smooth relations, 
as was indicated by his response in the spring of 1943 to 
Ambassador Standley's public charge that the Russian people had 
been kept ignorant of the many services the United States had 
rendered the Soviet Union, such as Lend-Lease and Red Cross 
relief. Welles held a press conference countering Standley's 
comments, instead claiming that a large degree of mutual trust 
and understanding existed between Washington and Moscow. But 
Welles knew otherwise from his discussions on the postwar 
planning committees. He had also recently been confidentially 
warned by Soviet Ambassador Litvinov that Stalin's postwar aims 
remained dangerously vague and that the Soviet leader had no
understanding of, or regard for, U.S. public opinion. 127
* * *
In the months leading up to his resignation, Welles had 
begun to devote more attention to Soviet-American relations. He 
understood that if Washington desired any kind of postwar 
relationship with the Soviet Union, the problems of Eastern 
Europe would have to be subordinated to the larger goal of 
better relations with Moscow. Like President Roosevelt, Welles 
seems to have reluctantly conceded that the United States could 
do little to prevent Stalin from dominating Eastern Europe and,
as the Red Army continued to move west, the plight of the
peoples of the region was becoming a fait accompli. Thus the 
Red Army, rather than duplicity, treason or ineptitude in 
Washington, had given Stalin control of Eastern Europe, and 
U.S. policymakers began to understand this as early as 1942.
Welles wanted the peace to be arranged along Wilsonian
126 Welles, Seven Decisions. 189; FO 371/35435, Halifax to Foreign Office, June 29,1943, PRO.
127 Keith Eubank. Summit at Teheran (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985), 66-67; Welles 
memorandum of conversation with Litvinov, May 7,1943, box 166, USSR files, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.
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lines, but his realization that Washington remained impotent to 
do anything to halt Soviet aims in Eastern Europe, and his 
willingness to look the other way in the face of Moscow's 
territorial aspirations, made it less and less likely that the 
peace would develop along lines other than spheres of influence 
and power politics. 128 whereas much of Welles' s wartime rhetoric 
emphasized new, more universal, approaches to the practice of 
world politics, his approach to the Soviet Union more closely 
resembled realpolitik, for instance, by pledging aid to the 
Soviet Union as soon as it was attacked by Germany. 
Furthermore, Welles had placed a higher priority on relations 
between Moscow and Washington and was willing to accept an 
Eastern Europe under Soviet domination if it meant holding the 
wartime alliance together after the war. He hoped his regional 
approach to the postwar organization might allow a certain 
degree of great power autonomy within their spheres of 
interest, but he failed to understand that federations would do 
absolutely nothing to extended the ideology of the Atlantic 
Charter to the peoples of Eastern Europe. 129
Welles understood that good relations between Moscow and 
Washington were absolutely essential to the success of his 
concept of a postwar order and he optimistically hoped that the 
two countries could use the new world organization to work out 
any political or economic differences between them. While he 
had maintained cordial relations with Russian diplomatic 
representatives throughout the war, Welles realized that the 
alliance was little more than a coalition held together by 
mutual opposition to Germany and he felt strongly that the 
United States would best be able to secure good relations with 
the Soviet Union through the aegis of the new world 
organization. This view was shared by the president, who at 
times suggested that many of the wartime political problems 
would mysteriously work themselves out after the war through 
the channels of the new world organization.
128 Gardner. Spheres of Influence, xii.
129 A few years after Welles's departure from the administration, his admirers claimed that his presence in 
Washington might have helped to produce an outcome other than the Cold War. The case was made, by the 
columnist Drew Pearson among others, that Welles's resignation in September 1943 may well have been a 
significant moment for Eastern Europe, a s  well a s  for the prospects for postwar entente between Washington 
and Moscow.
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Welles's greatest failure may have been his contribution 
to raising unrealistic expectations about the potential of the 
war to reform the world and bring about a new system of 
relations among nations which would abandon the balance of 
power. Welles left the administration in September 1943 and 
thus never had to confront the realities of postwar Eastern 
Europe. During the war he sought to use his influence with the 
leading members of the House and Senate to alert them to the 
problems that might emerge in Eastern Europe. He did an 
effective job of heightening public expectations about the new 
world order and America's responsibilities therein, but he did 
little to prepare the public for the day of disillusionment 
that he secretly feared might follow the war. He continued to 
believe, well into 1945, that the new world organization might 
create some magic formula to ameliorate tensions with Moscow. 
Furthermore, even if he assumed, as he seemed to have concluded 
during the planning committee's investigations, that Stalin's 
domination of Eastern Europe was the price to be paid for 
Russian postwar cooperation, he never explained this view in 
his extensive writings in the years after 1943.
In the wake of repeated briefings from Welles and other 
members of the planning committees, Roosevelt, too, accepted 
the fate of Eastern Europe in the hands of the Kremlin at the 
end of the war. But he hoped that the Russians would not create 
a situation in Eastern Europe which might antagonize domestic 
opinion in the United States. By the time Roosevelt arrived at 
the Teheran Conference in November-December 1943, he seemed 
prepared to concede the future of Eastern Europe, just so long 
as Stalin would give him some "cover" on the question of self- 
determination by accepting vague plebiscite privileges for the 
area. 130 This was precisely the conclusion Welles and the 
planners had reached in the summer of 1943. Even earlier, one 
of Welles's chief objections to the April 1942 Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty stemmed from his fear that the treaty offered no 
rhetorical protection against the charges that the agreement
130 Welles, Seven Decisions. 189; Charles Bohlen Notes on Roosevelt-Stalin Conversation, December 1, 
1943, FRUS. Moscow and Teheran, 594-595.
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was little more than a "Baltic Munich."131
As Welles and the planners had once predicted, Stalin put 
forward extensive claims to Polish territory at Teheran. 132 
Churchill was receptive to moving Poland1s borders westwards
after the war4 While the Americans  ^ j
had in fact long ago given tacit approval to most
of Stalin's claims. In July 1943, for example, Welles's
political subcommittee had reported to the president that they 
had "accepted the fact that Soviet military forces would
probably be in control of the contested areas at the close of 
the war and that unless the United States were willing to fight 
against the Soviet Union, some concessions to Soviet demands 
would have to be made." Welles and the planners had further 
suggested that "many of these problems might best be settled
during the war period, while this Government had some means of 
bringing pressure on the Soviet Union . . .."133
In the case of the Baltic states, for example, Welles and 
the committee had abandoned their "no compromise" position 
taken during the winter-spring 1942 negotiations over the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty. In May 1942 the committee had initially 
concluded that the Baltic states should have the right to
determine their own futures.134 But by July 1943 there had been
a startling reversal of opinion. Welles's committee now 
"recognized that while these states wished to establish their 
right to independence, they themselves realized that they were 
not viable as states, due to their economic position."135 By the 
summer of 1943, Welles and the planners recommended that the 
"historic ties between Russia and the Baltic States" be taken 
into account and therefore "the Soviet Union's claims to the
131 p document 34, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," August 12,1942, box 56; P 
document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," box 57; memorandum of 
conversation between Welles and Halifax, April 1,1942, FRUS. 1942, III, 538.
132 Nonetheless, Stalin's wartime territorial aims turned out to be relatively modest when compared to what 
Welles and the planners assum ed he might seek.
133 p document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," box 57.
134 p  minutes 13, May 30,1942.
135 ibid; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," box 57. The 
statem ent that the Baltic states "themselves realized that they were not viable as states" w as untrue. Armed 
resistance to Soviet rule continued until 1952. See, for example, Aleksandras Shtromas, “The Baltic States as 
Soviet Republics: Tensions and Contradictions," in The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of 
Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), Graham Smith, ed., 87-92.
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Baltic States should be recognized." Additionally, in 
Bessarabia and Bukovina, Welles and the planners decided to 
concede most of the Kremlin * s demands. 13$ Maintaining good 
relations with Moscow would take precedence over the Atlantic 
Charter.137
As for Poland, the committee initially reaffirmed its 
desire to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter such as 
self-determination, as well as its desire to see Poland's 
prewar boundaries restored, but the planners ultimately 
suggested that "Eastern Poland might constitute an area where 
departure from this principle was justified." Welles and the 
members conceded that Eastern Poland "was of less significance" 
than other areas of Europe. The planners recommended that while 
a perfunctory attempt might be made to induce the USSR to 
return to its prewar boundaries, a compromise based on the 
appeasement of almost all of Moscow's aims would not 
necessarily jeopardize U.S. interests or the prospects for 
creating a new world order elsewhere. 13^
By the time of the February 1945 Yalta Conference the Red 
Army had already made the fate of Poland and much of Eastern 
Europe a de facto reality. The conference's "Declaration on 
Liberated Europe" rhetorically reaffirmed the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter for Eastern Europe, but it lacked any 
enforcement machinery, thus implying that no one expected 
compliance with its terms. This was perfectly consistent with 
Welles's recommendations in the summer of 1943. By July 1945, 
recognition of the London-based Polish government-in-exile was 
cynically withdrawn by the United States and Great Britain, 
further confirming that the great powers accepted the fate of 
Poland and much of the rest of Eastern Europe.139
Welles had long sought to minimize differences between
136 p  document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," box 57.
137 The argument has been made that London should have adhered to Washington's stance against an Anglo- 
Soviet Treaty confirming Stalin's territorial aims. See, for example, Steven Merritt Miner, Between Churchill and 
Stalin: The Soviet Union. Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1988). This assessm ent overlooks the fact that in the wake of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty U.S. officials 
quickly abandoned their rigid stance against wartime territorial settlements.
138 p document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," box 57.
139 "Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland," FRUS. Malta and Yalta, 230-234; Yalta Conference 
Communique, February 12,1945, FRUS. Malta and Yalta, 977-978.
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Moscow and Washington over Poland, the Baltic states and 
Rumania for the sake of alliance harmony. He thought such 
harmony not only important during the war, but particularly 
crucial during the transitional peace period immediately 
following the cessation of hostilities. When the war ended 
there appeared to be less reason for the allies to cooperate, 
and President Truman and his advisers assumed they could wring 
concessions out of Stalin by threatening to cut off postwar 
economic aid. They were off the mark by a wide margin, and it 
is difficult to see, particularly in light of what Welles and 
his fellow planners knew as early as the fall of 1942, how 
events in Eastern Europe could have turned out other than they 
did.
* * *
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Resignation
By the summer of 1943, Welles concluded that the stories 
circulating in Washington about his personal life could no 
longer be contained and in early August he offered his 
resignation to the president,1 Although the real reasons behind 
his resignation were hushed up, many officials knew the truth. 
"There is a lot of talk," Breckinridge Long confided in his 
diary in late August, "about Welles's departure being on 
account of differences in opinion about policy. That is not the 
case. The trouble was purely and simply that Welles was accused 
of a highly immoral bit of conduct, that Bullitt became advised 
of it, and spread the story. There was an investigation. The 
office of District Attorney had some part in it I am informed. 
Hull told me repeatedly about the F.B.I. reports —  the file 
which was sent to the White House and disappeared for the time. 
The story was whispered around Washington."2
For three years Bullitt had worked relentlessly with Hull 
to bring the incident to the attention of the president and 
members of the Senate's wartime watchdog committee headed by 
Missouri Senator Harry Truman. But FBI director J. Edgar Hoover 
had lent his quiet assistance to Roosevelt on the matter and 
actually helped the president conceal the scandal for three 
years. Roosevelt told Hoover that he suspected Welles's 
drinking had precipitated the incidents and he accepted 
Hoover's suggestion that "someone should be assigned to travel 
with Mr. Welles to see either that he did not indulge in the 
use of liquor or that, if he did, that he then did not endeavor
1 The official announcement of his departure cam e in late September, but he had effectively left the 
administration weeks before and word of his resignation leaked to the Washington press corps.
2 Breckinridge Long diary, August 29,1943, box 5, the Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress. "The 
problem of Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles seem s to be settled," noted Margaret Suckley, Roosevelt's intimate friend. 
"Mr. Welles is out for good, a s  the Senate would not confirm him if the P. were to give him an appointment. This 
is because on a certain occasion, years ago, when drunk, he behaved 'in a  manner unbecoming a  gentleman.' 
Bullitt, who wanted his position in the State Dept, dug up the story, told it to 'Cissy' Patterson . . . .  The P. told 
me the whole story, which is unsavory. The only excuse is that Sumner Welles was drunk, and didn't know what 
he was doing, and was completely unconscious of any of it when sober again. It is the kind of thing to ruin his 
career, how ever.. . .  The P. never wants to speak to Bullitt again." Geoffrey C. Ward, ed., Closest Companion 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 244.
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to make propositions for such immoral relations."3
When Bullitt confronted Roosevelt over Welles shortly 
thereafter the president sought to halt the effort to have 
Welles removed by telling Bullitt that he was aware of the 
charges and that he had already remedied the situation by 
providing Welles with a bodyguard to look after him. Bullitt 
was unbowed. How could the president think of "asking Americans 
to die in a crusade for all that was decent in human life," 
Bullitt asked, when he had "among the leaders of a crusade a 
criminal like Welles"? Bullitt told the president that Hull 
believed Welles "worse than a murderer." Roosevelt was so 
disturbed by Bullitt's comments that he canceled his 
appointments for the rest of the day.4
Stymied at the White House, Hull and Bullitt next sought 
to tighten the noose on Welles by using the Washington press 
corps, delivering evidence of the incident to James Reston of 
the New York Times and Cissy Patterson, publisher of the 
Washington Times Herald. But no newspaper dared use the 
explosive charges. "I wrote a column at the time regretting the 
loss of this talented diplomat," Reston recalled, "and Mr. Hull 
called me the following day to his office. He said that perhaps 
I was not well enough informed about 'the facts' and offered to 
remove 'this deficiency.' He then reached into a drawer of his 
desk and handed me a thick FBI report alleging homosexual 
charges against Welles. I asked him if he was prepared to take 
responsibility as the source of this information, but he said 
he was not, he was just doing me a favor. I turned the report 
over to Arthur Krock, but the Times didn't print a word of it. 
I began to understand, however, the depth of competition and 
personal hostility that existed even at the top of the
3 Athan Theoharis, J. Edgar Hoover. Sex, and Crime: An Historical Antidote (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1995), 32.
4 Orville H. Bullitt, ed .. For the President Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 511-518; Adolf A. Berle Diary, September 1, 
1943, box 215, Adolf A. Berle Papers, FDRL. "Welles first spoke to me about the story," Breckinridge Long 
recalled in his diary. "That was in the spring of 1942. He said Bullitt had started it and that it was a  malicious lie. 
I assum ed it was. Bullitt is a  person without honor, in my eyes. I have known him a  long, long time and know him 
well but I have never had any confidence in him. And -  he wanted Welles's position. So I accepted Welles's 
statem ent at face value. Even without Bullitt's instigation of the story I would still have accepted Welles's 
statement." Breckinridge Long diary, August 29, 1943, box 5, the Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division.
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government."5
Hull and Bullitt then leaked their evidence to some of the 
administration's congressional critics, such as Democratic 
Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana and Republican Senator Owen 
Brewster of Maine, further complicating the president's efforts 
to contain the scandal.« "The lurid story had been circulating 
for months," Breckinridge Long wrote. "A number of people 
outside the department had asked me about it. I always passed 
it off in a light vein and stated my belief that the story was 
false. It persisted. Finally it got to some Republican members 
of the Senate. None of them spoke to me about it but the fact 
that they knew it was dangerous. "7 Several officials warned the 
president that with his campaign for a fourth term just around 
the corner, the Republicans would take a keen interest in the 
Welles matter. The president had successfully protected Welles 
from the charges for three years and he may not have believed 
the accusations. After all, he himself had been the target of 
false slanders in the past and he was well aware of Bullitt's 
temperament and tactics. But when confronted by the threat of 
Hull's resignation in the summer of 1943, it became clear to 
the president that Welles had to go. Hull later recalled that 
Welles confronted him at the state department and accused him 
of turning the president against him. Hull denied the charge 
and claimed that Roosevelt, too, thought Welles should resign. 
The president assumed that Hull's presence in the 
administration would be needed in the coming presidential 
campaign, as well as in the battle in the senate over the new 
international organization and future peace treaties. Welles 
understood this, and in a note to the president on August 16 he 
explained his decision to resign. "Since talking with you," 
Welles wrote, "it has seemed very clear to me that the present
5 Orville H. Bullitt, ed.. For the President 511-518; Will Brownell and Richard Billings, So Close to Greatness: 
A Biography of William C. Bullitt (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 297; Jam es Reston, Deadline: A Memoir (New 
York: Random House, 1991), 103. That Krock did not use the material is somewhat surprising, as he had 
devoted much of his career to using the pages of the New York Times to promote friends such a s  Hull and 
Joseph P. Kennedy. Lord Halifax noted that "Krock, who veers between the extremes of vindictive spite and 
sycophantic flattery, has for some months held up Mr. Hull a s  a  paragon of virtue gratuitously frustrated by the 
greatly inferior persons among whom it is his bad fortune to be compelled to function." See FO 371/34160 
minute by Halifax, August 7,1943, PRO.
6 Brownell and Billings, So Close to G reatness. 297; Reston, Deadline. 103.
7 Breckinridge Long diary, August 29,1943, box 5, the Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress.
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hue and cry in the press, and elsewhere, will continue unless 
this step is taken immediately."8
The outcry over Welles's resignation was considerable, not 
only in the press, where he was seen as a valued source to 
newsmen like Pearson, Lippmann and Reston, but also with the 
public. Hundreds of letters poured into the White House 
demanding the president immediately reappoint Welles to another 
senior position.9 "There is no doubt that the strength and wide 
extent of the popular reaction over Welles's dismissal was a 
complete surprise both to the State Department and the White 
House," noted Sir Ronald Campbell at the British Embassy. 1° The 
circumstances and timing of Welles's resignation also turned 
him into something of an icon in the liberal press, which 
claimed him as the latest victim of Hull's "reactionary" 
machinations. "I never dreamed that Hull would some day force 
us to make a hero of Sumner Welles," lamented Nation columnist 
I.F. Stone, who claimed that the president and Hull were 
"startled by the reaction of the country to the Under 
Secretary's forced resignation."11
Across the nation, sympathetic newspapers called for his 
retention. "Keep Welles, Mr. President," blared the headline 
editorial in PM, New York's progressive afternoon daily. "We 
have come to think of him as a kind of Wallace of the State 
Department, a man who has learned to think in world terms not 
only in respect to the war, but in respect to the peace to 
come. Now you understand what we mean, Mr. President, when we 
say that Sumner Welles has become a kind of symbol of yourself 
and the things you believe in. Isn't this the place to make 
your stand, Mr. President? There is no satiating the howling 
wolves."^ A St. Louis Post-Dispatch headline asked "Why Was
8 Morgan, 337; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol. II, 1229-1231; 
Welles to Hull, September 21,1943, PSF 77, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, August 16,1943, PSF 77, FDRL.
9 See "Resignation of Sumner Welles," Official File 20, Department of State, box 16, FDR Papers, FDRL
10 FO 371/34161, Campbell to Foreign Office, September 18,1943, PRO; "FDR and the Conservative Trend," 
The New Republic. August 23, 1943; FO 371/34161, "Situation in the United States," by Campbell, September 
5,1943, PRO.
11 Nation. September 13,1943.
12 Welles to Roosevelt, August 16,1943, PSF 77, FDRL: New York Times. August 25, 1943; "Resignation of 
Sumner Welles and appointment of Edward R. Stettinius to Under Secretary of State," White House Press 
Release, September 25,1943. DAFR. vol. VI, 55; Department of State Bulletin. IV, 208; "Resignation of Sumner 
Welles," OF 20, Department of State, box 16, FDRL Nation. September 13,1943.
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Sumner Welles Fired?" reminding its readers that it was Welles 
"who gave greatest meaning to our fight, who crystallized it
for the downtrodden everywhere with the strong words, 'This is
in very truth a people1 s war.1" 13
Drew Pearson claimed Welles was the victim of a
conservative conspiracy, led by Hull, that desired a harder 
line with Moscow. Pearson claimed Welles was sacrificed because 
he was "liberal in his attitude toward Russia," charging that 
Hull wanted "to bleed Russia white." Hull reacted furiously, 
calling Pearson's accusation a "monstrous and diabolical
falsehood," and an uncharacteristically enraged Roosevelt told 
a startled White House press corps that Pearson was a "chronic 
liar."14 Pearson also warned that other officials of a
progressive bent would soon be stripped of influence, a charge 
seemingly supported by the subsequent abolition of Henry 
Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare, which was seen as yet 
another victory for Hull. According to New York Times
Washington Bureau Chief Arthur Krock, a close ally of the
Secretary, "Hull told the President that if he was not
vigilant, the Wallace-Welles combination would 'ruin him as 
Woodrow Wilson was ruined' by idealistic and reckless promises 
that could not be fulfilled and that the American people would
not redeem."is
Conspiracy theories about Welles resignation gained much 
currency. Brain Truster Rex Tugwell later suggested that a 
subterranean campaign existed to undermine and destroy New 
Dealers. "Washington was awash just now with derogatory gossip, 
malicious rumor, and fantastic allegation," Tugwell wrote. "The 
game was to pick off all those who were really loyal to 
Franklin. The conservatives who were now gathering about Hull 
succeeded with Welles who was too proud and too reserved to 
fight back."i6 Others thought Welles's resignation part of a
13 S t  Louis Post-Dispatoh. August 30,1943; New York Post. August 25,1943
14 Drew Pearson: An Unauthorized Biography. 175-176.
15 Ibid, 206; Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 206; 
Drew Pearson: An Unauthorized Biography. 175-176: "Cordell Hull," by Donald F. Drummond, in Graebner, ed. 
An Uncertain Tradition. 615-617.
16 New York Post. August 25,1943; EM, August 27, 1943; St. Louis Post-Dispatch. August 30, 1943; "Cordell 
Hull," by Donald F. Drummond, in Graebner, ed. An Uncertain Tradition. 6 15-617: Tugwell, The Democratic 
Roosevelt. 622-623.
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"conservative coup" engineered by Hull with the acquiescence of 
the president.17
While the scandal ended Welles’s career, it also destroyed 
Bullitt's. Roosevelt told press secretary Steve Early that 
"Welles may be a poisoned man, but Bullitt is a poisoner."18 
When Hull subsequently proposed Bullitt for a senior position 
in the department, the president wrote on the bottom of the 
requests "Why not Minister to Saudi Arabia?" —  a proposal he
knew Bullitt would refuse. When Bullitt later asked the
president for support in his race for mayor of Philadelphia,
Roosevelt told him: "If I were the Angel Gabriel and you and 
Sumner Welles should come before me seeking admission into the 
Gates of Heaven, do you know what I'd say? I would says 'Bill 
Bullitt, you have defamed the name of a man who toiled for his 
fellow men, and you can go to hell.' And that's what I tell you 
to do now."1*
While the train incident was the spark that led to 
Welles's downfall, a number of other factors also contributed 
to his resignation and might have led to his departure had the 
scandal never occurred. The president had muddied the working 
environment at the state department by promoting competing 
lines of authority between "Welles men" and "Hull men."
Roosevelt preferred working with Welles in matters that clearly 
should have been the domain of Hull. "By frequently bypassing 
Hull and permitting Welles to enunciate foreign policy from its 
very source, the President added to the feud," a September 1943 
Newsweek story con c l u d e d . 20 Welles's resignation had a damaging 
effect on morale in the state department,21 and Sir Ronald
17 "FDR and the Conservative Trend," The New Republic. August 23, 1943; FO 371 34161, "Situation in the 
United States," by Campbell, September 5 ,1943. Writing to his friend Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Ambassador 
to Brazil, Welles placed the blame for his resignation on Hull's angry response to Welles's actions at the 
January 1942 Rio Conference. "To you," Welles wrote to Caffery, "I do not have to give any explanation, 
particularly in view of our association a year and a half ago. I need merely add that the past few months have 
been a very bitter time for me."Welles to Caffery, August 22, 1943, Welles papers, box 91, resignation letters, 
FDRL
18 Eden noted that "Bullitt is poisonous and his record in France in 1940 discreditable." FO 371 34161, 
Campbell to F.O. August 30,1943.
18 Berle Diary, September 1,1943, box 215, Adolf A. Berle Papers, FDRL; Morgan, FDR. 677-685.
20 Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W.Norton, 1969), 
12; Newsweek. September 6,1943.
21 Berle Diary, September 1, 1943, box 215, FDRL; Drew Pearson to Welles, November 29, 1943, Welles 
papers, box 147, FDRL
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Campbell at the British Embassy wrote that there was "profound 
distress" over Welles's resignation among foreign diplomatic 
representatives in Washington. 22
The president, always seeking the path of least 
resistance, offered as a consolation to appoint Welles to head 
the delegation to the upcoming Moscow conference. 23 Welles gave 
careful consideration to the Moscow assignment because he 
believed the alliance stood at a crucial juncture in its effort 
to coordinate postwar policies, and he remained greatly
concerned about the slow deterioration of the Washington-Moscow 
relationship. "If the situation runs much longer it will be 
insoluble," Welles said, and he warned senior officials that 
Hull was "intensely prejudiced against Russia."24 But to the 
surprise of many, Welles rejected Roosevelt's offer, writing to 
the president that he did not believe it possible to work with 
Hull in any capacity.25
Reporting the details of Welles's resignation to the 
foreign office, Campbell wrote that the imbroglio could not 
have occurred at a worse time. Public concern about 
Washington's relations with Moscow had been heightening, and
the resignation fueled speculation that there was a sinister
connection between Welles's departure and deteriorating 
relations with Moscow. Campbell reported that "the turmoil 
within the State Department adds to the disturbed feeling" in 
the country and that the episode would now "serve to exaggerate 
the Russian issue, and provide a cue for the left-wing press, 
in whose eyes Welles is now a Liberal martyr sacrificed to a 
'reactionary clique' in the State Department." Campbell 
observed a "nation-wide feeling of discomfort and suspicion 
about the 'inside story' of Welles's removal . . . [and]
general dismay at his retirement cut far deeper than the
2 2 ; FO 371/34161, Campbell to Foreign Office, September 5,1943.
23 Roosevelt to Stalin, September 4,1943, FRUS. I, 518-519; Welles to Roosevelt, September 21,1943, PSF 
77, FDRL
24 Berle Diary, September 1,1943, Berle Papers, box 215, FDRL.
25 "Resignation of Sumner Welles," Official File 20, Department of State, box 16, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt 
September 21, 1943, PSF 77, FDRL Henry Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A.Wallace. 1942- 
1946. ed. John Morton Blum (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 240; Eden's private secretary, Oliver 
Harvey, noted: "Sumner Welles is on such bad terms with Hull (everywhere we now come across HulPs 
deadening influence) that he won't in all probability be allowed to undertake such a mission. There is no other 
American who has the clear head or the experience to do it so well." Oliver Harvey, August 24.
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indignation of Liberals at the deprecation of W a l l a c e . "26 Welles 
continued to fear that Hull's domination of the department 
would mean that Washington would find it more difficult to 
carve out a relationship with Moscow independent of the British 
and that Hull's approach would cede the leadership of postwar 
planning to London and Moscow. 27
* * *
Even after his resignation, Welles’s continued to be one 
of the more influential voices in the debate over America's 
role in the postwar world. In a constant stream of books, 
articles and lectures, he promoted his views on how the peace 
should best be arranged. He began a weekly column syndicated by 
the New York Herald Tribune. the country's leading moderate 
Republican paper and a hotbed of Willkie advocacy. Appearing in 
seventy papers throughout the United States, Latin America and 
Europe, Welles used the column to promote his views, 
particularly urging a regional approach to international 
organization, international trusteeships, closer cooperation 
with Moscow and improved relations with Latin America. 28 
Furthermore, his resignation did not end his association with 
the president. Roosevelt asked Welles to continue his advocacy 
of the new world order, suggesting Welles write a book 
popularizing the Four Freedoms. Within only a few weeks of his 
resignation, Welles would meet privately with Roosevelt at Hyde 
Park, where they held detailed discussions about the 
administration's postwar designs. At one point, Roosevelt asked 
Welles to use his newspaper column to counter any attacks on 
his foreign policy, particularly from the organs of Henry
28 FO 371/34161 "Situation in the U.S." by Campbell, September 5,1943, PRO.
27 Henry Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A.Wallace. 1942-1946. ed. John Morton Blum 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 237-241; FO 371/34161, minute by Campbell, August 24,1943. 
Hull may have been in sole control of the department, but he did not succeed in putting forward his personal 
choice for Under Secretary: Breckinridge Long. Instead he submitted to the President's wishes and accepted 
the appointment of Edward J. Stettinius, the 43-year-old son of a  partner in the influential J.P. Morgan banking 
concern. Walter Johnson, "Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.," in Norman Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: 
American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961, paper), 210-222..
28 "Columnist Welles," Newsweek. December 13,1943; speech by Welles, "Safeguarding Our Interests," 
Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Foreign Policy Association, Vital Speeches. November 1,1943.
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Luce's publishing empire, which now employed William Bullitt.29 
A few days before Roosevelt departed for Teheran to attend the 
first meeting of the Big Three, Welles spent several hours with 
the president, confidentially surveying preparations for the 
conference and discussing postwar plans. Soon after Roosevelt's 
return from the conference, he wrote to Welles: "It would be 
good to see you as soon as you come North. I want to tell you 
all about Cairo and Teheran. I think that as a roving 
ambassador for the first time I did not pull any boners."30
Welles soon became the highest-paid lecturer in the 
country and the arrival of his best-selling book, The Time for 
Decision, in the summer of 1944, coincided with the peak of the 
debate over the nature of the postwar world. Walter Lippmann's 
book about his views on the postwar order, U.S. War Aims, came 
out at the same time and recent speeches by Wallace and Willkie 
had alerted Americans to the possibilities of the postwar era. 
Welles concluded his book by outlining his plans for an 
international organization and issuing a call to action. 3i He 
also used the book to call for a world body where the Axis 
powers would one day be allowed to attain full and equal 
partnership with other nations. He reiterated his appeal for a 
regional approach to the postwar settlement and stressed the 
importance of international police power and collective 
security. He also advocated international trusteeship and 
eventual independence for colonies in Asia and the Middle 
E a s t . 32 one of the most widely-read and discussed sections of 
his book was his chapter on Soviet-American relations, titled
29 Roosevelt to Welles, October 15,1943, PSF 77, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, not dated, 1943, PPF 2961, 
FDRL; Welles, Where Are We Heading?. 27-30; W.A. Swanberg, Luce and His Empire. (New York: Scribners, 
1972), 218-219.
30 Roosevelt to Welles, October 15,1943, PSF 77, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, not dated, 1943, PPF 2961, 
FDRL; Welles, Where Are We Heading?. 27-30; Roosevelt to Welles, January 4 ,1944, PPF 2961, FDRL.
31 Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims  (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944); Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph 
of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1971, paper), 178-181; Sumner 
Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 414. His publishers sought to boost 
sales of the book by proclaiming that he possessed inside information about the administration's postwar 
plans. “Only a handful of men in the world have had access to the information on which this book is based," the 
book's jacket proclaimed.
32 Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 55,374-378,413-14. In this 
detailed 400-page account of American foreign policy over the course of the last decade, only once did Welles 
mention Cordell Hull by name.
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"The Constructive Power of the U.S.S.R."33 Welles expressed his 
view that in its quest for security, Moscow had a legitimate 
need to create a system in Eastern Europe comparable to 
America's sphere of influence in Latin America. He lamented the 
fact that the security council of the United Nations had not 
yet been erected, for he thought that many of the particular 
issues facing the great powers would be better dealt with 
through international cooperation under the guidance of a new 
organization. "The maintenance of world peace and the progress 
of humanity is going to depend upon the desires and the 
capacity of the peoples of the [the United States and the USSR] 
to work together," Welles wrote. "It will depend upon their 
ability to replace their relationship of the past quarter 
century, which has not only been negative but marked by 
fanatical suspicion and deep-rooted hostility on both sides, 
with one that is positive and constructive."34
Reviewing the book in The New Republic, critic Max Lerner 
added: "Like Cicero retiring to his villa and his books when 
the great ones of Rome had no place for him in their councils, 
or a Machiavelli mulling over in bitter seclusion the meaning 
of his diplomatic experience, Welles has written a rich, 
crowded, reflective book about the commonwealths and the 
princes for our time." The reading public received the book 
with equal enthusiasm. It soon became the surprise publishing 
success of the summer of 1944, displacing Bob Hope's I Never 
Left Home as the number-one best seller on the New York Times 
list and remaining there until 1945. The Book-of-the-Month Club 
made The Time for Decision its August selection, and nearly 
half a million copies sold nationwide. In a year-end poll of 
book critics, it ranked as one of the ten outstanding books of
the y e a r .35
* * *
Throughout 1944 and into 1945 Welles continued his public 
campaign in support of a world organization, and in speeches he
33 "What Russia Wants," by Sumner Welles, Readers Digest. November 1944.
34 Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 306,334-335.
35 The New Republic. July 31,1944; Welles to Roosevelt, June 2,1944, PSF 77, FDRL
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called on the great powers to immediately inaugurate a new 
league. The United Nations Monetary and Financial conference 
held at Bretton Woods in July 1944 affirmed many of the 
principles Welles had fought for and underscored the extent to 
which the United States would dominate postwar economic 
arrangements. Delegates agreed to form an International 
Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The subsequent August-October Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference met to discuss the framework for a new global 
security organization. The conferees issued a set of guidelines 
for the formation of a United Nations Organization, thus 
further building on the foundation that Welles had erected over 
the proceeding y e a r s . 36
When an ailing and exhausted Cordell Hull submitted his 
resignation in the fall of 1944 numerous telegrams reached the 
White House calling for the appointment of W e l l e s .  37 After 
Roosevelt's fourth term victory in November, the president 
announced that Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius would 
replace H u l l . 38 undeterred, Welles continued to campaign for the 
creation of a new international organization along the lines he 
desired. The United Nations Conference in San Francisco in the 
spring of 1945, which gathered to inaugurate the new world 
body, in many ways represented the crowning achievement of 
Welles's professional life. Scores of telegrams once again 
reached the White House calling on the president to appoint 
Welles secretary general of the conference. That honor instead 
went to Alger Hiss. Welles did attend the conference in San 
Francisco, but as a radio commentator, delivering nightly 
interpretive reports. In one commentary, he warned that U.S.- 
Soviet relations were in jeopardy and he charged Truman and 
Stettinius with fumbling relations with Moscow. "In five short 
weeks since the death of President Roosevelt," Welles
36 "The Outlook for a  Democratic World Order," by Sumner Welles, Newton D. Baker Lecture, November 20, 
1944, The Council on World Affairs publication.
37 For letters and telegrams to White House regarding Sumner Welles, see  Official File 470, FDRL
38 Henry Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diarv of Henry A.Wallace. 1942-1946. ed. John Morton Blum 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 397-400; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: 
Macmillan, 1948), 1716-1719. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote plaintively to her husband: "I can hardly see  that the 
set-up will be very much different from what it might have been under Dewey." (Lash, Eleanor and Franklin. 713- 
715).
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announced, "the policy which he had so painstakingly carried on 
has been changed. Our Government now appears to the Russians as 
a spearhead of an apparent bloc of the western nations opposed 
to the Soviet Union. " 39
In the years immediately after the war William Bullitt 
continued to haunt Welles. Bullitt had turned against 
Roosevelt's policies, and had joined Whittaker Chambers at 
Henry Luce's publishing empire, taking up what colleagues 
called the "Red-wrecking" beat. He became one of the most 
popular conservative critics of the Roosevelt and Truman 
foreign policies. Bullitt tirelessly charged in both articles 
and a book that an ailing Roosevelt had been duped by Stalin at 
the Big Three conferences into "selling out" Eastern Europe. 
His charges created a sensation and he argued that the nations 
of Eastern Europe would be free today had it not been for the 
president's feeble-mindedness and the pro-communist duplicity 
of his advisers.40
Welles wrote two of his next books, his 1946 Where Are We 
Heading and his 1950 Seven Decisions That Shaped History, in 
part as attempts to answer Bullitt's lurid charges. "It is ... 
in the field of foreign policy that I fear lasting harm may be 
done by some of the recent efforts to falsify the record made 
by President Roosevelt," Welles wrote in Seven Decisions That 
Shaped History. "The danger is that, by their attempt to 
blacken the character of the man whose memory they would 
assassinate, the Roosevelt-haters may also kill the ideas with 
which his name is associated. "*i Welles also reacted angrily to 
the 1948 publication of Hull's memoirs. "I had naturally 
anticipated Mr. Hull's diatribe against myself in the book he 
published last year," Welles wrote to Roosevelt's former 
speechwriter Sam Rosenman. "In any event this is not of any 
material importance. What to my mind, however, is important, 
what I deeply resent, and what I will never forgive is his 
consistent effort in his book to make it appear that in his
39 See Official File 470, "Sumner Welles," FDRL; President's Personal File 2961, FDRL; "Herald Tribune 
Broadcasts, 1945," box 199, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL; Broadcast speech by Sumner Welles, May 22, 
1945, Appendix to the Congressional Record, 1945, A2507-A2508, May 25,1945.
40 w.A. Swanberg, Luce and His Empire. (New York: Scribners, 1972), 215-219.
41 Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, xi.
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conduct of foreign affairs President Roosevelt always failed 
when Mr. Hull was not in agreement with him and that the 
President's only successes were those instigated by or approved 
by Mr. Hull."42
Welles's name returned to the headlines during the height 
of the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss controversy. Called upon 
to assist the House committee investigating Hiss, his former 
subordinate, Welles identified the famous "Pumpkin Papers" —  
which had been dramatically concealed on Chambers's Maryland 
farm in a hollowed-out pumpkin —  as authentic state department 
documents. And only five days after the indictment of Hiss by a 
grand jury, Welles's former assistant Lawrence Duggan jumped to 
his death from a building in midtown Manhattan. In Washington, 
the House Un-American Activities Committee Chairman Karl Mundt 
and his colleague, Representative Richard M. Nixon, told a 
press conference that Duggan was under investigation as part of 
a vast communist network which had operated in the state 
department during Welles's tenure. When a reporter asked the 
Congressmen about the identity of the others, Mundt promised to 
name them "as they jump out of windows." Welles responded by 
publicly praising Duggan as one of the finest public servants 
in wartime Washington, describing him as "one of the most 
brilliant, most devoted, and most patriotic public servants" 
whom he had ever k n o w n .43 writing to a friend, Welles expressed 
doubts that Duggan had killed himself. "There was not the 
slightest motive for suicide in his case," Welles wrote. "On 
the contrary, there is, I think, unmistakable proof that he had 
no such idea in his mind and knowing him as you and I do he is 
certainly the last man on earth whom one could think to have 
wished to take his own life."44
Only three days after Welles returned from Duggan's 
funeral, he fell unconscious and nearly froze to death beside a 
stream on his Oxon Hill property. With his clothing frozen to 
his body and his face cut, Welles was rushed to a nearby
42 Welles to Rosenman, June 17,1949, Welles papers, box 140, FDRL.
43 A.M. Sperber, Murrow: His Life and Times  (New York: Freundlich Books, 1986), 317-318; David Caute, The 
Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 
567.
44 Welles to Guachalla, January 13,1949, box 138, Welles papers, FDRL.
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hospital. He eventually regained consciousness, but said he 
remembered nothing. Investigators surmised that he had fallen 
into the nearby stream, dragged himself out, and collapsed a 
short distance away. He remained there, unconscious, the entire 
December night and had suffered life-threatening exposure and 
frostbite.45 Conflicting accounts emerged as to what had taken 
place. Investigators soon began to speculate that perhaps 
Welles had passed-out and fallen into the stream. He had been 
drinking heavily since his resignation and had a history of 
alcohol-induced blackouts. Still, this did not seem to explain 
all of the details of the incident.46
Many in the press also began to speculate. "By one of 
those curious coincidences that make you wonder," wrote Jay 
Franklin in his syndicated column, "the death of Larry Duggan 
was followed shortly by the discovery of his friend and 
sponsor, Sumner Welles, lying half-frozen in a Maryland field." 
Franklin speculated that there was a sinister connection 
between Duggan's death and Welles's accident. "It requires a 
heroic degree of self-control not to speculate as to whether —  
just as with Larry Duggan —  there is not more to the tragic 
incident than the outward appearances."47 Drew Pearson referred 
to Welles's accident as "Hull's Revenge," claiming the former 
secretary of state continued to seek Welles's destruction. 
"Hull's vengeance never relaxed," Pearson charged.48 Others 
blamed the House Un-American Activities Committee for Welles's 
mishap. "It is hard to avoid the impression," stated an 
editorial in the Nation, "that the near-tragedy that overtook 
Sumner Welles had its origin in the reckless conduct of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. Mr. Welles, who had 
been in an extremely agitated state for many hours before he 
was found lying unconscious and nearly frozen in a field near 
his house, was known to have been deeply affected by the death 
of Laurence Duggan and the scandalous efforts of Representative 
Mundt to link Duggan with the Chambers spy ring. "49 Others
45 Philadelphia Inquirer. January 30,1949.
46 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist (New York: S t Martin's Press, 1997), 365-366.
47 Jay Franklin column, January 4,1949, Welles papers, box 259, scrapbook January 1949- November 1950.
48 Washington Post. January 1,1949.
49 The Nation. January 8, 1949.
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charged that Welles's collapse had more lurid origins, such as 
a homosexual tryst gone awry.50
Welles's recovery was slow, and for more than a year he 
ceased all activities such as lecturing and writing. He soon 
gave up his syndicated column, and due to his extensive 
physical therapy he was unable to travel or lecture. He 
eventually had several toes amputated due to severe nerve and 
tissue damage. As he became restless and frustrated with his 
slow recovery he drank more heavily than before. By the summer 
of 1949 he was at last able to travel and he and Mathilde
departed in July for further rehabilitation in Switzerland. In
Lausanne, misfortune stuck again when Mathilde developed 
peritonitis and died suddenly. Mathilde's death devastated
Welles and he descended into what he described to friends as a 
complete "physical and mental breakdown."si "Sumner Welles is in 
terrible shape," Drew Pearson confided in his diary, "his wife 
is dead, his big toes gone, some of his fingers off. He has no 
interest in life, won't see his friends, can't sleep at night. 
I'm afraid he wants to d i e . " S 2
Out of the public eye, depressed and drinking heavily,
Welles began to lose his appeal as a commentator. According to 
the head of the booking agency for Welles's lectures, they "had 
to drop Sumner Welles from the list of its lecturers; the 
reason —  Welles's drunkenness and homosexuality. Welles is 
said to have started drinking like a fish. Combined with the 
homosexuality, the other vice often makes Welles entirely unfit 
for lecturing. " 55
His remaining years were mostly filled with despair. While 
many of his contemporaries and former colleagues received 
appointments in the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations, he was never again considered for any official 
position. He spent the remainder of his years dividing his time 
between Bar Harbor and Palm Beach, for the most part living in
50 Gellman, Secret Affairs. 392.
51 Welles to Welch, November 17, 1949, box 140, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Weisbach, October 14, 
1949, box 140, Welles papers, FDRL.
52 Drew Pearson Diaries. 1949-1959, edited by Tyler Abell, 76.
53 Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 685.
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isolation and drinking himself into nightly stupors.54 Without 
his column, and making no public appearances, he gradually 
faded from public memory. He slipped into a long state of 
depressive brooding, where his heavy drinking became so 
uncontrollable that close friends and family feared for his 
life and sanity. He attempted suicide. A few years after 
Mathilde's death he remarried,55 but he lived in seclusion 
throughout most of the 1950s. When he died of pancreatic cancer 
(an apparent result of his years of alcoholism) on September 
24, 1961 in Bernardsville, New Jersey, at the age of 68, his 
many eulogists perfunctorily listed his many posts and 
assignments, but failed to note that he had never attained the 
promise of his early career.56
54 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist. 373.
55 Harriette Post, a  childhood friend who was the daughter of a  founder of the New York Stock Exchange.
56 New York Times. September 25,1961; John F. Kennedy to Harriette Welles, September 25,1961, box 22, 
Welles papers, FDRL; Winston S. Churchill to Harriette Welles, September 26, 1961, box 22, Welles papers, 
FDRL.
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CONCLUSION
The life and career of Sumner Welles paralleled a period 
of increasing American involvement in the world, as U.S. 
foreign policy evolved from mostly regional concerns to the 
preoccupations of an American-guided world order. He was a 
transitional figure in American foreign policy, born at a time 
when the United States, confronted by the challenges of the 
closing frontier and a rapidly industrializing economy, began 
to seek overseas outlets for increased commercial expansion. 
His initiation into the diplomatic corps coincided with 
Wilson's effort to reorder world politics. Welles found 
inspiration in the Wilsonian vision of the United States as the 
political, economic and moral engine of a new international 
order, one that would eschew both imperialism and revolution 
and lead the world forward under the banner of liberal, 
capitalistic internationalism.
During the early 1920s Welles worked to reorder relations 
with Latin America, seeking to consolidate and integrate the 
hemisphere politically and economically behind U.S. leadership. 
He continued these efforts in the 1930s while implementing the 
Good Neighbor Policy. Welles was also behind two of the most 
important events in American diplomacy during the years before 
the wars the Welles plan of 1937 sought to reorient U.S. 
foreign policy by calling for a conference of neutrals which 
would agree to an assortment of Wilsonian principles; and his 
1940 mission to Europe attempted, like Wilson before him, to 
achieve a peace without victory, while laying a claim for 
significant U.S. involvement in any postwar settlement.
Welles played a leading role in determining U.S. war aims. 
He helped draft the Atlantic Charter, seeking to expand the 
charter's meaning to cover the entire globe. The Atlantic 
Charter heightened expectations that the United States had 
pledged to the peoples of the world that it would help to 
achieve a better postwar future. Welles sought to globalize the 
charter by giving notice that those liberated by the war would 
achieve self-determination. But as the political and military
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realities of the war intruded, Welles often assented to 
arrangements that seemed to contradict his professed aims. He 
believed grand pronouncements such as the Atlantic Charter were 
often necessary to express broader goals important for public 
support in wartime. But, while he would later argue that the 
charter was merely a statement of war aims and not a guarantee 
of specific action, expectations raised by the charter were not 
fully met at the conclusion of the war. As the war progressed 
and Welles was confronted with the hard realities of alliance 
relations, he would find that he could not always pursue the 
ideals of the Atlantic Charter, which had in many ways become a 
liability.
Central to Welles's vision of a new order was U.S. 
participation in a world organization. In this area Welles 
achieved his greatest success. He spearheaded the effort to 
create a new league. His inclusion of numerous members of 
Congress in drafting a charter for a new world organization 
helped secure bipartisan support for the draft plan. 
Furthermore, many of the members of Welles's committees would 
play significant roles in postwar planning during the years 
1943-1945, thus ensuring that Welles's influence would continue 
to be felt at future wartime conferences.
Nevertheless, his failures in the area of world 
organization were equally significant. Welles's efforts to 
create a number of smaller, regional world organizations met 
with little success. He failed to anticipate the ways in which 
the climate of heightened nationalism would create a stumbling 
block to his schemes for regional federations, as nations were 
becoming less inclined to cede sovereignty to any international 
body. National consciousness had been heightened in almost all 
regions and the very attempts at repression of national 
aspirations during the war made nationalism more desirable. As 
for his efforts to endow the future world organization with an 
effective means of collective security, he wanted to avoid the 
danger of the United States becoming the world's policeman, and 
thus sought to create a fully integrated international police 
force able to intervene at the request of the new world 
organization. This, too, met with little success.
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Throughout the Second World War Welles sought nothing less 
than a complete restructuring of international relations. In 
numerous speeches he expressed his view of the war's potential 
to bring about a new world order, pursuing his vision through 
his leadership of the postwar planning committees. Welles 
anticipated a huge expansion of American interests and 
commitments around the world. This brought about a significant 
alteration of Washington's Weltanschauung, where events in 
previously strategically insignificant areas were now believed 
to have ostensible consequences for the United States due to 
the impact they might have on other areas that suddenly seemed 
vital. This led to a reflexive impulse to project American 
interests broadly, no matter the consequences, and fueled the 
belief that the smallest shifts or changes in the global 
balance of power would be destabilizing to American security.
Welles also desired a restructuring of the world economy. 
He saw the goals of the inter-American economic system —  such 
as greater economic interdependence and integration —  as 
exportable globally. He anticipated that at the end of the war 
America would be positioned to expand its economic interests 
all over the world. He understood that while much of the rest 
of the world would struggle to rebuild after the war the United 
States would dominate a huge share of the global market. He 
thus anticipated and proposed an American effort to reconstruct 
not only the economies of the weakened allied and neutral 
nations, but also those of the defeated Axis powers. As Welles 
had outlined, such American generosity would not be bestowed 
for mere altruistic reasons, but rather as a matter of hard- 
headed self interest. Welles's desire to create a framework of 
international economic institutions would not only serve 
American economic interests, but also national security. After 
all, the reconstruction of the world would benefit the United 
States by providing Americans with new markets, raw materials 
and potential allies, and would also enable Washington to take 
the lead in creating a new postwar economic order dominated by 
the United States.
Welles also led the American effort to guide the postwar 
course of the other great powers. As early as the spring of
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1942 he argued that the Axis powers should not be so crippled 
that they could not return to the community of nations after 
the war. They would instead be reconstructed in a way that 
would lend support to U.S. interests in the postwar era. While 
democracy and liberal capitalism would be the ultimate goal for 
postwar Germany, Italy, Japan and France, democracy would 
perhaps not be suitable everywhere. In China, for example, as 
in much of Latin America, a mere adherence to U.S. aims would 
suffice. Welles initially sought to insure that the peace be 
reconciled with America's war aims, but he soon went beyond 
that initial goal, embarking upon more specific investigations 
of the postwar status of particular powers. By the time the 
planning committees were disbanded in the summer of 1943 they 
had succeeded in conducting the first thorough examination of 
Washington's postwar aims toward the other powers. But it 
proved difficult to implement a long-range program to achieve 
Welles’s aims, and his assumptions often demonstrated that it 
was unwise to do such planning in Washington, independently of 
the countries concerned. Furthermore, such discussions were not 
always conducted by people who understood the unique features 
of the different societies and cultures in question.
Welles's wartime vision also included the weakening and 
eventual destruction of imperial systems abroad and the 
ultimate granting of independence and self-rule. During the 
war, American interests underwent a vast expansion, where 
numerous colonial areas previously ignored were suddenly seen 
as vital to the nation' s postwar strategic and economic 
concerns. Welles opposed European-style colonialism not only 
because he thought the trend toward independence irreversible, 
but because he also thought America should seek to lead the 
forces of change in the colonial world rather than challenging 
chaotic revolutions and upheaval. He thus sought to ally the 
United States with the emerging nationalisms of the colonial 
world. Seeking a safe middle ground between the colonialism of 
the past and the possibility of future revolution, independence 
would be allowed in some areas, international trusteeships in 
others.
During the war Welles would promote the destruction of the
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colonial status quo without regard to the consequences. After 
all, with the notable exception of the Western Hemisphere 
(where the United States already was the dominant power and 
thus had a vested interest in promoting the status quo) America 
stood to gain much from an alteration of the old global order. 
Welles foresaw that the United States would have expanded 
interests not only in the future markets of Europe, but also in 
raw materials, trade, market potential and strategic importance 
of the Far East, Africa, the Pacific and the Near East.
Welles sought to stretch the meaning of the Atlantic 
Charter to ensure that the colonial masters would not seek a 
return to the status quo at the end of the war. But Cold War 
considerations would eventually begin to take precedence over 
support for the national aspirations of colonial peoples. And, 
in any event, Welles's ideas for trusteeships never anticipated 
what would happen in the postwar colonial world, where the 
rapid pace of decolonization would overwhelm careful planning 
for the future. Welles failed to give adequate consideration to 
the problems of underdevelopment and political instability that 
would plague much of the post-colonial world and he gave little 
thought that the void created by decolonization might not 
necessarily be filled by the United States. During the war, 
Welles spoke with great moral fervor about self-determination, 
independence and liberation in the colonial world. But 
decolonization often led to destabilization in the years that 
followed and the paramount concern for order became the basis 
upon which policy toward nationalist movements would be 
designed. Thus, conditional support for self-determination and 
nationalism would take a back seat to strategic concerns in the 
context of the Cold War struggle. No longer would there be talk 
of promoting change and upheaval throughout the world. As 
America became a superpower and hegemon it increasingly became 
the chief defender of the global status quo.
Early in the war Welles saw cooperation with the Soviet 
Union as essential to his designs for the postwar world and he 
sought to construct a world body that might use regionalism to 
subordinate many of Moscow's territorial aims to the larger 
goal of continued entente. Perhaps Moscow would merely erect
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its own "Good Neighbor Policy" for the region, which might
avoid blatant political and military intervention and instead
concentrate on economic influence. At the very least, 
regionalism might help contain the Soviet Union from fully
extending its influence into the heart of Europe. Welles hoped
his regional approach to the postwar organization might allow a 
certain degree of great power autonomy within their spheres of 
interest, but he failed to accept that federations would do 
absolutely nothing to extend the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter to Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Welles discovered he 
could not completely escape the ideals of the charter when the 
realities of Grand Alliance politics demanded concessions to 
Soviet aims. How to reconcile the principles of the charter 
with Soviet demands became one of the issues which most 
concerned Welles shortly before his resignation. He 
underestimated the Russian desire for security in Eastern 
Europe and he naively thought that schemes such as federations 
or national plebiscites would reduce the political problems of 
the region. If these approaches did not work, he reasoned, 
economic aid might be used to influence Russian aims. But 
Welles had come to realize by mid-1942 that the question of 
Eastern Europe presented the United States with an almost 
impossible dilemmas the political shape of the postwar world 
would be decisively shaped by the position of the Red Army when 
the war ended and not by idealistic pronouncements made in 
Washington.
Welles remained publicly silent about such private 
concerns. He used Wilsonian rhetoric to protect the 
administration against domestic criticism. But he concealed his 
more candid fears about America's inability to influence 
outcomes in Eastern Europe because he placed a premium on 
relations between Moscow and Washington. He was willing to 
acquiesce in Soviet control of the region if it meant holding 
the wartime alliance together after the war. He wanted the 
peace to be different from what had come before, but the simple 
fact that Washington remained impotent to do anything about 
Soviet aims for the region made it less and less likely that 
the peace would develop along lines other than spheres of
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influence and balance of power considerations.
In any event, the outcome in Eastern Europe was far less 
important to Welles than the larger goal of creating and 
safeguarding an American-led new world order. Welles 
anticipated the coming of this "Pax Americana" and helped 
facilitate America's transformation from great power during the 
Second World War to a seeker of global hegemony during the Cold 
War. But his vision of a coming American Century was not always 
tempered by an understanding of the limits of American power 
and in the decades that followed Americans would repeatedly 
learn the difficult lesson that despite their vast new power, 
they must endure great sacrifice in any effort to create the 
kind of world order they desired. America's quest for hegemony 
would prove to be messier and more complicated than Welles had 
ever anticipated.
Welles sought to create a new liberal-internationalist 
world order led by the United States, which thus opened the way 
to a crusading internationalism that, with decidedly mixed 
results, animated American policy through the next forty years 
of the Cold War. Granted, Welles was not alone in this effort. 
He was a contemporary of Wendell Willkie, Walter Lippmann, John 
Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Henry Wallace 
and George F. Kennan and, with the passage of more than a half 
century since his resignation, it is at last time to place him 
among those other architects of the "American Century." For, 
without Welles, the story of America's rise to globalism is not 
complete.
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